A propos Fritz' dilettantism...

[Anonymous No.19712619]

It is well known in the academic literature that, with the exception of the ancient Greeks and Schopenhauer (C.P Janz, an emminent Nietzsche biographer notes, however, that there were substantial gaps in Nietzsche's comprehension of even the Ancients) Nietzsche had little first-hand knowledge of the philosophers he liked to criticise. We know that his knowledge of Kant, e.g., was derived almost entirely from Kuno Fischer's survey of the history of philosophy, with the exception of the Critique of Judgement, which he appears to have read in 1867-1868. This superficiality has long been known to taint the acuteness of his critiques and even the originality of his ideas. In this respect, Walter Kauffmann and Tchijewsky, e.e., notes how 'Nietzsschean' Hegel was in his younger years.
What remains, however, truly perplexing in the midst of all of this is the glaring lack of engagement on Nietzsche's part with respect to the works of his contemporaries and immediate successors (save Feuerbach), e.g., Engels and Marx, Bauer (with whom he was otherwise acquainted , Stirner, Lotze etc. Is it, here, a mere coincidence that in the absence of easy-access cursory surveys, Nietzsche finds himself unable to engage or in any respect, pretend to engage with serious thought?
In this thread, we meditate on and explore the ramifications of this possibility.

[Anonymous No.19712628]

>>19712619
immediate predecessors*

[Anonymous No.19712642]

Problematise the Procopian catena, insert the branch fronts. Fronts. No more lettuce memories, no more guilty approbabtion. More dulce, less decorum. Feet together.

[Anonymous No.19712658]

He doesn't "criticise" any philosopher in particular safe for occasional immediate references to their concepts to better illustrate his point, because what he truly criticises is the very methodology they abide by and barely noticeable slips of mind they perform at the fundament of their thought. And his critique is perfectly applicable.

[Anonymous No.19712669]

>>19712658
This is entirely incorrect on the facts. You cannot have a meaningful critique of a methodology whose internal workings are lost to you because you gleaned the from a survey.

[Anonymous No.19712828]

>>19712669
Go actually read Nietzsche instead of criticising him for the same thing you're doing right now in regards to him. But to briefly sum it up, his critique consists in picking out predetermined value judgements which every system that claims to be 'objective' and 'purely logical' bases itself on and then illustrating how this judgements aren't self-evident. For example, Plato gets his notion of eidos out of the statement that the material realm is imperfect and then 'rationally' articulates his philosophical system. As such Plato submits negative value to matter and a positive one to form; but based on what? There's no objective reasoning behind this, and that dismantles his further pretense of objectivity. And the same axiological reasoning can be applied to any other system.

[Anonymous No.19712882]

>>19712828
Completely incorrect. If only Plato were that short-sighted and unnuanced. Go read the Parmenides.

[Anonymous No.19712926]

>>19712882
I have. So what? Axiological opposition between the one and the numerous is still present.

[Anonymous No.19712958]

>>19712926
You have not and you know this to be true. You even just exposed the fact that you have not with your post. You desperately want Nietzsche to live up to the fantasy he constructed of himself and while it is unambiguous that the heart of his project is to do just what you described, his axiological attacks presuppose meta-metaphysical (not in the sense of an oppositional beyond) commitments which he fails to sufficiently defend from other anti-metaphysical positions (e.g. Hegel)

[Anonymous No.19712965]

>>19712958
cont;
which undercut the force of his axiological commitments

[Anonymous No.19712988]

Philosophers aren't beholden to engage with every thought at their given time.

[Anonymous No.19712995]

>>19712619
Do you hold all "philosophers" to this standard?

[Anonymous No.19712997]

>>19712958
>You even just exposed the fact that you have not with your post.
How? The very need of existence of the one is brought about by a predefined insufficiency of the numerous - that's a pretty clear axiological judgment if you ask me.
>which he fails to sufficiently defend from other anti-metaphysical positions (e.g. Hegel)
Deleuze made quite a good critique of Hegel from a Nietzschean standpoint fyi

[Anonymous No.19713027]

>>19712988
given that these figures either present a more thorough/sympathetic expression (Marx, Stirner etc.) or complete pre-emptive repudiation or alternative to axiological/genealogical critique (Lotze/Bauer) and that these are the most dominant intellectual figures of the German philosophical scene around Nietzsche's time, it still shows itself to be a glaring omission, especially when we consider that it certainly wasn't due to ignorance

[Anonymous No.19713040]

>>19713027
If Nietzsche had engaged in scholastic bickering over minutiae with some of your literally-who tier philosophers he would—if he were remembered at all—be remembered as one of them!

[Anonymous No.19713081]

>>19712997
Good that you mentioned Deleuze. It is also not novel to consider the issues of 1) his reconstruction of Nietzsche, which many would dispute e.g., Kauffmann, Greene, Zimmerman and 2) his theoretical opposition to Hegel that is not reflected in his practice. For Deleuze and his version of Nietzsche, negation is always a denial of qualitatively specified forces. It is never conceived as that which specifies and differentiates such 'forces' in the first place. The affirmation of the specific 'differences' between forces does not therefore involve seeing those forces as necessarily the negation of one another, as mediated by one another. Affirmation and negation for Deleuze and his Nietzsche are quite distinct. If we are predominantly negative beings, we begin with the external negation of existing forces and derive an abstract notion of selfhood by a conceptual dialectical process. If on the other hand we are predominantly affirmative beings (as Deleuze and his NIetzsche want to maintain is the case of the master), then we begin with the affirmation of ourelves and of what differentiates us from other forces, and conclude with a negative evaluation of certain of those other forces. The central axiomatic commitment of Deleuze here is in either case that he holds forces to be irreducible, 'original', 'immediate' and so really just talks past Hegel on this point. Hegel would simply say that Deleuze is standing on an insufficiently determined foundation
But Deleuze and on his reading, Nietzsche as well, just show themselves to fall into the dialectical movement Hegel tries so hard to make explicit in that they still commit themselves to understanding affirmation as fundamentally opposed to negation. Indeed, he himself says and this might just as well be a passage from Hegel that 'negation and affirmation are opposed as two qualities of the will to power, each is an opposite but also a whole which excludes its opposite'. Deleuze's critique is not as potent as you think it is and his Nietzschean standpoint not as cogent or as Nietzschean.

If you had read the Parmenides, you would know that characters rip everything to shreds, including the positions they themselves put forward.

>>19712995
Yes, and most do as well when they aren't being self-deceptive.

[Anonymous No.19713090]

>>19713040
You evidently don't study philosophy if you think those are 'literal-whos' and he is, in fact, when fully appreciated, remembered as one of them

[Anonymous No.19713102]

>>19713081
cont;
>insufficiently determined foundation
insofar as that he just takes the activity of forces for granted

[Anonymous No.19713104]

>>19712619
Nietzsche's words in the opening of the genealogy:
"What have I to do with refutations?".
And from Zarathustra:
"I love only what a person has written with his blood"
It's not Nietzsche's way to fight for elbow room in a bus crowded with other people similar to him only in terms of physical location and time of writing, or who approach problems in a way foreign to himself. The writers he engages with are the ones that are closest to home for him. It's not the job of a mountain climber to retrace the steps of every other person who's crossed over any one of his footprints. No need to superficially engage with people who might as well belong to a different intellectual species like Marx and Stirner. (This doesn't apply to Kant; There's something of a Kant within Nietzsche which for him is like a younger, more naive self, not a mature opponent.)

I can personally give you more or less a Nietzschean interpretation on Stirner and Marx, but it's one that in the latter case stops at the doorstep after smelling something foul inside. For Stirner, a Schopenhauerian perspective can provide good clarification, but it's not a path Nietzsche himself would have needed to take, even if it doesn't contradict his philosophy.

[Anonymous No.19713106]

>>19713104
And in the case of Stirner, it's a good omen for his philosophy that someone with a completely different intellectual background found the same hidden mountain whose peak became Nietzsche's home.

[Anonymous No.19713117]

>>19713104
>"What have I to do with refutations?".
Evidently, not much
>the ones that are closest to home for him.
The people I mentioned are closest to him and not just in space and time. He very often just seems to plagiarise them.
>This doesn't apply to Kant; There's something of a Kant within Nietzsche which for him is like a younger, more naive self, not a mature opponent.)
Nietzsche's view of Kant are laughable and reflect just how little he knows or understands about Kant. Kant is known as the All-Destroyer for a reason.

>I can personally give you more or less a Nietzschean interpretation on Stirner and Marx, but it's one that in the latter case stops at the doorstep after smelling something foul inside. For Stirner, a Schopenhauerian perspective can provide good clarification, but it's not a path Nietzsche himself would have needed to take, even if it doesn't contradict his philosophy.
The point does not concern interpretation, but a baffling inability to engage in discourse with his nearest intellectual brothers (even though he reads them (or about them) and from his letters, doesn't have a clue what they're doing even though they share similar projects

[Anonymous No.19713125]

>>19713106
Nietzsche and Stirner share similarities, but they do not find the same Mountain Peak. Stirner is going to undermine Nietzsche's commitments to 'high' and 'low' and even presents his ideal as explicitly the 'Der un-Mensch'

[Anonymous No.19713150]

>>19713081
>If you had read the Parmenides, you would know that characters rip everything to shreds, including the positions they themselves put forward.
They do so in a dialectical act between the one and the numerous, whereas Nietzsche's position is that the notion of EXISTENCE of the one, as I said, originates from the baseless assumption that it is superior to the numerous. If it had been otherwise neither Parmenides nor Socrates would concern themselves with it and with its properties. So obviously the hint of the neoplatonic "everything is one" that appears both in the beginning and in the end of the dialogue becomes just a cyclic affirmation of the initial position. Same way Deleuze first and foremost criticises Hegel for his ressentiment against non-absolute which stands at the foundation if his dialectical approach and not this approach per se, so it really has nothing to do with forces.

[Anonymous No.19713173]

>>19713117
lol, Marx and Stirner are not "near intellectual brothers". You need a blind-spot the size of a whale for the nature of Nietzsche's system to think that's true. Are you one of those who think Hegel's system is all-encompassing, and Nietzsche's is just a subset?
Also I don't know what you're talking about with him not having read Kant. He read his magnum opus.

[Anonymous No.19713182]

>>19713173
not Nietzsche's "near intellectual brothers"*

[Anonymous No.19713192]

>>19713150
You absolutely do not understand either Deleuze or Hegel. His Hegelkritik rests entirely on his understanding of negation/affirmation and that rests entirely on his understanding of force and the differential calculus.

>They do so in a dialectical act between the one and the numerous, whereas Nietzsche's position is that the notion of EXISTENCE of the one, as I said, originates from the baseless assumption that it is superior to the numerous
Your just randomly saying things at this point. While assumptions are made, they aren't baseless and most definitely don't involve axiological judgements about 'one' or 'the many', but about the paradox entailing that if things are many, they are similar (like) and dissimilar(unlike). The counterproposition that nothing *is* both like and unlike and the inferred conclusion that entities that are both alike and unlike are not many. There are implicit axioms to this opening argument that is presented by Zeno and not Parmenides btw. There is even the question of linguistic abuse as to its logical form, but it does not make axiological judgements whatsoever

[Anonymous No.19713199]

>>19712619
Nietzsche engaged with it to the extent that it was necessary, ie to understand the psychology of those writers. He never claimed to be interested in "refuting" them or writing detailed analyses on their philosophies.

[Anonymous No.19713202]

>>19713173
I don't expect you to understand.
He did not. He was aware of it, he read summaries and abstracts, but he never read KrV, but he did, as I mentioned in OP, read the Critique of Judgement. You have no grounds for any of the claims you have made

[Anonymous No.19713209]

>>19713192
you're*

[Anonymous No.19713217]

>>19713202
He references multiple parts of it in BGE.

[Anonymous No.19713223]

>>19713199
The entire thesis of this thread is that he did not engage with texts to the extent that is necessary because he often completely misses the point in his attempt to psychologise other thinkers and is himself undermined when such psychologism is applied to his own works. Axiological undermining and refutation are after the same thing. It's not because Nietzsche questions the validity of asserting that one should not be able to contradict themselves that you just need to uncritically swallow whatever he pisses down your throat

[Anonymous No.19713230]

>>19712828
>but based on what?
...The fact that matter is never anything of itself but always changing? Ie, imperfect. That's not a matter of opinion, it's just reality. You seem to have not even fully understood Nietzsche either, because he does not care about affirming the value of things per se, he only cares about why the value is attributed and affirmed where it is (which more or less comes down to either personal weakness or strength). In BG&E he proclaims that systems like Plato's are actually essential to life, that even though they are "errors" according to him, they are errors which are "good" and therefore worth supporting.

[Anonymous No.19713235]

>>19713217
referencing works does not in ANY way suggest that you have actually read a work. Even now, it is very common to cite a primary source from a secondary source. This is the ENTIRE point

[Anonymous No.19713236]

>>19713223
Yes, and that thesis was wrong, as per my post. I still haven't seen one example of him "missing the point." Only people claiming he didn't understand irrelevant subtleties of a given system which don't alter the psychological underpinnings one bit.

[Anonymous No.19713240]

>>19713236
then you have failed to read. It was already established at the beginning of this thread that his strategies presuppose meta-metaphysical commitments which we have no reason to uncritically accept

[Anonymous No.19713244]

>>19713240
>t was already established at the beginning of this thread that his strategies presuppose meta-metaphysical commitment
No it wasn't. That's just you making things up.

[Anonymous No.19713245]

>>19713235
If he quotes the book directly and makes it obvious he knows both where in the book these selections are found and how the book is structured, how can you to prove he didn't read it?

[Anonymous No.19713267]

>>19713245
There are scholars who dedicate their entire lives (make of that what you will) to knowing every possible non-psychic fact of a person that can be found. What books they owned, when they purchased them, when they borrowed them (from friends/libraries), their correspondences, and in Nietzsche's case, all the biographers agree that he did not read Kant's critiques because he admits this in correspondence and relied on Otto Liebmann, a Neo-Kantian to explain things to him and the aforementioned work of Kuno Fischer. He was a full-time professor of philology
>>19713244
You are arguing in bad faith.
see
>>19712669
>>19712958
>>19713081

[Anonymous No.19713271]

>>19713267
he did not read Kant's Critiques, not even the Prologomena, but as I have said twice already, did read the Critique of Judgement

[Anonymous No.19713298]

>>19713267
I found this relatively recent document from 2007 which makes claims to the contrary.
https://nietzschecircle.com/Pdf/NIETZSCHE_S_LIBRARY.pdf
It asserts he read several of his books, including KrV.

[Anonymous No.19713312]

>>19713298
It also includes a quotation where he mentions having read additional scholarly work about Kant as well, which doesn't make sense if he "hadn't read him".

[Anonymous No.19713314]

>>19713192
>While assumptions are made, they aren't baseless and most definitely don't involve axiological judgements about 'one' or 'the many'
They do, because any form of dual opposition is possible only via attribution of different values to the positions in question. And such is the initial premise of the dialogue. If there was no attribution of value, there would be no initial opposition.
>>19713230
>The fact that matter is never anything of itself but always changing? Ie, imperfect
And again, there's no objective grounds to this other than the tautological definitions with axiological judgements which arise from the language's very nature as a set of concepts which do not correspond to reality, as Nietzsche writes in "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense".

[Anonymous No.19713324]

>>19713314
>And again, there's no objective grounds to this
Can you prove to me matter does not necessarily change? Go right ahead. It is simply a brute fact, deny it as much as you want.

[Anonymous No.19713332]

>>19713314
>They do, because any form of dual opposition is possible only via attribution of different values to the positions in question. And such is the initial premise of the dialogue. If there was no attribution of value, there would be no initial opposition.
What does this mean? Are you implying that recognising plurality is an axiological judgement? You are conflating numerical magnitude, i.e., quantity, with normativity
>>19713298
Thanks for this document. Perhaps the first good faith response in this thread. Certainly seems to contradict my sources. Will keep this in mind and try to dedicate a proper response in the morning (if I have any)

[Anonymous No.19713337]

>>19713332
Gute Nacht

[Anonymous No.19713348]

>>19713337
Ebenso

[Anonymous No.19713349]

>>19713332
>What does this mean
He's basically just denying that you can know anything because he doesn't like axioms.

[Anonymous No.19713396]

>>19713324
>Can you prove to me matter does not necessarily change?
I don't have to, because what you say is "something that changes is imperfect" and by definition "imperfect is something that changes". And what are the grounds on which this definition should suit imperfect rather than perfect? Not any objective ones, only the fear of death which is a final result of changing in human life.
>>19713332
>Are you implying that recognising plurality is an axiological judgement?
Plurality itself isn't, because it doesn't presuppose an opposition. E.g. there's no opposition between a fish and a piece of metal because they aren't being lined up by a common axiological paradigm, but there is one between a piece of metal and a chunk of wood. And this opposition doesn't have a fixated "winner" since both can be used from a different perspective and their value would change accordingly. Same way there should not be a "winner" between the one and the numerous from a perspectivist standpoint, but since the basis is that the numerous is secondary in its relation to the one the fixation of value takes place, whereas there is nothing that would 'rationally' suggest this (logocentric) relation.

[Anonymous No.19713416]

>>19713349
>He's basically just denying that you can know anything because he doesn't like axioms.
Correct. Knowledge only exists within the borders of a perspective. From an 'objective' standpoint you're only dealing with interpretations.

[Anonymous No.19713423]

Denying linguistic axioms is like Nietzsche/Buddhism 101

[Anonymous No.19713429]

>>19713416
>>19713423
and is this from an objective standpoint or interpretive?

[Anonymous No.19713453]

>>19713429
From a perspectivist one. And before you imply, objective knowledge does exist within a certain perspective, just not per se.

[Anonymous No.19713454]

>>19713429
Both, since the 'objective' PoV is not preceded by logical axioms

[Anonymous No.19714429]

>>19713081
Deleuze was as Nietzschean as can be, consider this from the Gay Science:

Vademecum—Vadetecum

Lured by my style and tendency,
you follow and come after me?
Follow your self faithfully—
take time— and thus you follow me.

[Anonymous No.19714694]

>>19712619
>that in the absence of easy-access cursory surveys, Nietzsche finds himself unable to engage or in any respect, pretend to engage with serious thought?
Which one of you cunts traveled back in time and became Nietzsche? Fess up, munt.