That's a hard question to answer. Your cosmology depends on what you take a priori first principles of "being" to be. Some people have a reason for claiming their first principles, others are aesthetically drawn toward theirs, others are confused about theirs or so dazzled by the "system" they learned that they rarely think about its first principles. Some people are explicit about their metaphysical commitments and justifications for stating being behaves the way it does, others adhere to them tacitly, others are evasive. Bergson is not evasive but he's somewhere in between explicit and tacit. His middle philosophy of creative evolution is founded on his phenomenology or pure intuition of the creative soul at the centre of our own being. Later in his life he supplemented this with a mystical intuition of love as a first principle or aspect of reality.
He's similar to Schopenhauer in that he believes descriptive, logical language is itself a subset of created reality and thus can't be used to explain reality. Describing ultimate being as a determinate entity with certain features that "unfold" in a given way doesn't make sense, because this sort of picture-thinking and logical consequence-thinking is itself an emergent subset of reality.
Schopenhauer addresses this by saying that the principle of sufficient reason (essentially, our habit and capacity for describing things as the effects of some cause, whether in a physical, metaphysical, logical, or volitional sense) is a product of reason, which is itself a product of the (world-)Will. Intellect uses the principle of sufficient reason for pragmatic purposes, to understand the world. Even animals (possessing more limited intellects) have causal thinking. Everything contingent can be interrogated as to its "why is this here? why did this happen?" But when we face the Will itself all we can say is that it Is. In fact, we can't even represent it, since it's not an "it," but the ground of all things that underlies all things, what the German mystics called the ab-grund, meaning both "abyss" in the sense of fathomless, and "ab-grund," "receding-ground," since it is always underlying any attempt to get "under" it. At the end of The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer freely addresses the fact that this is not satisfying, and that it can always still be asked "Why is the Will there, then?" which is the same as asking "Why is there something instead of nothing?" He doesn't have an answer.