/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.19320876]

Is "the book has a green cover" (when it actually has a red one) false in the same way "the Modus Ponens rule is red"?

Could the latter be neither true nor false, allowing for a third value in logic? Or are they just false in different ways (perhaps it amounts to the presence of another property within the same category [color] in the former case v. the absence of any property from a comparable category [I assume rules of logic don't have properties like color] in the latter case)?

Would love any relevant thoughts.

[Anonymous No.19321766]

Multiple-valued logic can solve the problem, as you said, and sometimes that really helps in logic and semantics.

However in metaphysics is much better to just assume that some propositions don't have a truth-value at all.

[Anonymous No.19322424]

Truth as defined by correspondence, e.g. "Thesis is standing," is true if he is indeed standing, false if he is sitting, is useful from a pragmatic perspective, but it not a complete system of epistemology.

Knowledge comes on multiple levels. A mechanic can correctly explain how an engine works, but a chemist can explain it on another level. "The truth is the whole."