Nietzsche BTFO

[Anonymous No.19293389]

Von Hartmann on Nietzsche

Studies in Ethics

Nietzsche’s “new morality”


Nietzsche often complains that the Germans do not understand his books, and pardons them, because his books are too profound for the understanding of the living. Perhaps it is nevertheless not impossible for a unbiased third party, to understand Nietzsche better than it was for himself from his subjective standpoint. It is certainly not the purpose of Nietzsche’s peculiar way of writing to make it easy to penetrate into his thoughts. For it fundamentally violates all methodology and classification and is equally unsuitable for an architectural design or a coherent logical development. All his works are compilations of aphoristic splinters of thought, which are sometimes epigrammatically sharpened, and sometimes spun into digressions. One can start and end this lecture at any arbitrary page; as he seems to have done with the works of all previous philosophers (with the exception of Schopenhauer), and the purpose of his works is to have a nibble, and to impede a coherent reading. Without any plan he turns for the hundredth to thousandth time around – but we may not call this a flight of ideas, because there are so few underlying thoughts, that possess his complete imagination – in a circle, where he comes back, after all his detours, which is not the case with a flight of ideas. Because he acknowledges no truth, his discourse is not yes or no, but instead yes and no; there is hardly a sentence in his work, that does not assert the opposite of another.

To distill positive thoughts from this cloak of words would be a nearly hopeless labor, if these thoughts would be rich and many-sided. But the labor is alleviated because they are so poor and limited, that they can be led back to a few meagre thoughts, that are constantly varied in diverse new forms. The poverty of the content of his thought would immediately come to light in a systematic presentation and can conceal itself only behind a wit-pap, like a cat that turns around the hot pap and makes thereby dainty or grotesque jumps.

[Anonymous No.19293396]

>>19293389
One can distinguish in Nietzsche three periods. In the first period he places feelings at the top, in the second understanding, and in the third period the will. The first period has only significance as preliminary stage for his development course; the second may be attractive to the negative elements of a radical opposition, but has little objective value, because his critique flows everywhere from personal feelings and is consequently judgmental, whimsical, obstinate, unjustified, exaggerated, unsystematic and without principles. A philosophical meaning can at most be sought in his third period, of which we should consider “Thus spoke Zarathustra” and “Beyond Good and Evil” the main works. The former contains rhetorical, poetic and prophetic outpourings, mixed with paradoxical, bizarre and partially cynical additions; he wants to teach the reader about the overman [Übermensch], but succeeds in not much more, than giving account of Nietzsche’s desire for these overmen. At least this makes him attempt to provide this nebulous ideal clearer outlines. Consequently, a critique of what has been accomplished by Nietzsche must connect itself to these last works, and may only occasionally consult the early works for clarification.

The starting point of Nietzsche is and remains Schopenhauer, and is therefore without doubt to be designated as a Schopenhauerian in the wide sense of the word, the more so because, after having distanced himself from Schopenhauer in the second period, he came back to Schopenhauer again in the third period. Schopenhauer’s “will to live” specializes itself into a “will to power”. Life is more than self-preservation, it is striving after the increase of one’s own being through nutrition, growth and procreation, is essentially appropriation, overpowering, incorporation, imposition of one’s own forms for the spike of the individual’s feelings (“Beyond Good and Evil”, § 259). Modern biology and Spinoza reach him the hand, to affirm the essential conformity between will to live or existence and will to power. Yet the will to live remains the encompassing, more general concept, of which the will to power forms a subset. Nietzsche emphasizes this side of the life-will with regard to his ideal of the tyrant; but we will come to see, that the power-hungry tyrant remains but one side of the “overman”, that therefore here also the will to power does not cover will to live, but capsizes, just as with Schopenhauer, in a “will to know”.

[Anonymous No.19293398]

>>19293396
Just like Schopenhauer, Nietzsche does not escape from the indecision between subjective idealism and metaphysical will-realism. “It is we alone who have devised cause, sequence, reciprocity, relativity, constraint, number, law, freedom, motive, and purpose”; which all do not exist in the “in themselves” of the things (§ 21) though these concepts are systematically related amongst each other like the collective members of the fauna of a continent (§ 20). It is a deceptive principle in the being of the things (§ 34) and truth is not more valuable than semblance with its lighter and darker shades, tones or valeurs (§ 34). The world, which concerns us, can be a fiction without an author or carrier (§ 34), thinking can be without a thinking I or ego (§ 17). This sounds one moment like the absolute illusionism in the sense of esoteric Buddhism, another moment like Feuerbachian sensualism, who declares sense-images and the content of consciousness to be the only reality, and then like skeptical agnosticism in the sense of the most modern epistemology, which calls itself, which is ironic given its pure negativity, positivism. All these standpoints are unclearly jumbled together. But on the other hand he sticks to the lordly task and grandeur of philosophy regarding the founding of a metaphysics and criticizes the positivists, who spread the disbelief in this task amongst the public (whereby he oddly enough believes to target me as well, § 204). “The hypothesis must be hazarded, whether will does not operate on will wherever "effects" are recognized, will affects will”, so that all causality, also that of the mechanical forces, is will-causality (§ 36). But then the mechanical and material actions may not be deception, no illusion, not mere representation, but must as an art of lower urge have equal reality as our human desires and passions (§ 36). A reconciliation of these contradicting assertions has not been attempted by Nietzsche.

Like Schopenhauer, he knows reasonability only in the sense of an abstract, discursive reflection, and considers the intuitive, for example in the moral judgement, to be something irrational, because it is not abstract and discursive (§ 191). Just like Schopenhauer he appears to have had some bad experiences with women, condemns them to eternal slavery and silent bearing of the legitimate masculine tyranny, and recognizes in opposing sexes only eternally hostile tension (§ 238) but not the mutually harmonic extension to the complete ideal of humanity in marriage and family.

[Anonymous No.19294008]

>Von Hartmann
Who cares?

[Anonymous No.19294043]

>>19293389
He doesn't get it. That's OK.

[Anonymous No.19294094]

mf was mad as fuck

[Anonymous No.19294100]

>>19293389
He got filtered by Nietzsche, actually sad

[Anonymous No.19294786]

>>19294043
>>19294100
Cope

[Anonymous No.19295981]

>the no one in this thread has tried to refute what Von Hartmann said
Embarassing

[Anonymous No.19296024]

>>19293389
Based. Nietzsche is incredibly contradictory but gets away with it because he acts like it's by design, as though there's a deeper meaning there. Basically the 1800s version of "guuys I was only pretending to be retarded"

[Anonymous No.19296263]

>>19293389
>To distill positive thoughts from this cloak of words would be a nearly hopeless labor, if these thoughts would be rich and many-sided. But the labor is alleviated because they are so poor and limited, that they can be led back to a few meagre thoughts, that are constantly varied in diverse new forms. The poverty of the content of his thought would immediately come to light in a systematic presentation and can conceal itself only behind a wit-pap, like a cat that turns around the hot pap and makes thereby dainty or grotesque jumps.
Completely disagree, Hartmann is being silly here.

[Anonymous No.19296282]

Nietzsche is like buttsex. Fun until the hangover.

[Anonymous No.19297106]

>>19296263
>Hartmann is being silly here.
How so?

[Anonymous No.19297707]

>>19295981
Bahnsen already refuted him and Bahnsen agrees with Nietzsche

[Anonymous No.19297894]

>>19297707
>Bahnsen already refuted him
How?

[Anonymous No.19297948]

>>19293398
>Just like Schopenhauer he appears to have had some bad experiences with women
>have sex incel
holy based

[Anonymous No.19298075]

>>19297894
He showed how Hartmann was more of a Hegelian than a Schopenhauerian and how his singular will was indemonstrable. Nietzsche only added to this point by pointing out that Hartmann was basically setting up mankind to become uncultured last men — with Hartmann's philosophy of the unconscious, there is a desire and preparation for social revolution that would lead to the commodification of art and the absolution of competition.

[Anonymous No.19298088]

>>19298075
>He showed how Hartmann was more of a Hegelian
Stopped reading here, look who accusing accusing other people of being Hegelians

[Anonymous No.19298108]

>>19298088
>Stopped reading here
Stopped reading here. If you want an actual discussion, try not being a dick with meme responses like this.

[Anonymous No.19298176]

>>19298108
I am sorry. But Nietzsche applying his bullshit categories on others doesn't mean anything.

[Anonymous No.19298229]

>>19298176
>Nietzsche
I was talking about Bahnsen. You realize that there was a debate between Bahnsen and Hartmann? The key difference between Hartmann and Bahnsen/Nietzsche is that, while all three were Schopenhauerian from the onset, Hartmann accepted Hegel's notion of a rational undercurrent beneath will, while Bahnsen/Nietzsche didn't and remained closer to Schopenhauer, accepting an irrational undercurrent instead since a rational unconscious couldn't be demonstrated.

[Anonymous No.19298262]

>>19298229
>Hartmann accepted Hegel's notion of a rational undercurrent beneath will
What a retard. Doesn't this makes him proto Nick Land?