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19122584 No.19122584 [Reply] [Original]

Read Ethics

>> No.19122602
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19122602

>>19122584
>not posting the real portrait

>> No.19122619

>>19122584
>Read Ethics
Why anon?

>> No.19122646

>>19122584
I tried. Couldn't get past the 4th definition.

>> No.19122654

how is the tractatus theologico politicus?

>> No.19122698

>>19122654
delectable. his political writings arent very important or interesting to read, however.

>> No.19122707

>>19122584
i did, it was a slog to get through and pretty useless
>>19122698
he has been quite influential on radical republicanism

>> No.19122803

>>19122584
Based Spinoza made his fellow Jews seethe and cope so hard no single /pol/tard can even compete.

>> No.19122844

>>19122584
>Ethics
>not about ethics
Wtf was his problem?

>> No.19123942

>>19122584
Still confused about the ontology of attributes vs. modes. Secondary text have yet to satisfy me... worse neither of them have a consensus.

>> No.19123974

>>19122844
>t. didn't read the last three parts or 'books'

>> No.19124440

>>19123942
I typically see attributes as formal instantiations while modes as material or accidental instantiations. Ontologically speaking they both actually exist. This is the typical way to go about it though, maybe it can be made more clearly distinct by examining the Cartesian use of it.

>> No.19125612
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19125612

>>19122584
Already have desu. The second part was confusing, but it was worth the read

>> No.19125761

>>19122844
Ethics is, to Spinoza, living well, and realizing free will doesn't exist and God is nature puts man at peace so that he may live well.

>> No.19125777

>>19122584
Already did, but I was like 16 or 17 and junior year of high school. I've got it around here somewhere, I'll read it at some point this year or next. Thanks op.

>> No.19125977

>>19122584
I just read Deleuze's book on him

>> No.19126094

>>19125977
Which one?

>> No.19126133

>>19126094
both

>> No.19126522

>>19122584
I love how retarded hippies keep thinking of this nigga as a pantheist. If after a reading of the Ethics you don't realize he was basically a materialist (not the monist kind tho) and an atheist, then you didn't understand it, simple as.

>> No.19126534

>>19126522
True that hippie retards think he's a pantheist, but you're a retard atheist for thinking he's an atheist. He's a panentheist.

>> No.19126544

>>19126534
Laughable.

>> No.19126568

>>19122584

Have, silly arbitrary nonsense. Didn't misread it.

>> No.19126575

>>19126522

He was clearly not an atheist based upon the Ethics, rather he conceived of god as having nature and properties which are incompatible with the descriptions given in christianity and judaism. t. atheist

>> No.19126580

>>19126522
>you don't realize he was basically a materialist
Filtered hard. By this logic Guenon is a materialist too due to the assertion of infinite potency (incorporeal "matter") as the highest reality.

>> No.19126582

>>19126522
he was a nihilist

>> No.19126589

>>19126522
Retard alert

>> No.19126766

>>19126534
>>19126575
>>19126589
God or Nature in Spinoza is an indefinite idea. Infinity and plurality being its only characteristics. Only two of the infinity of attributes which make up God are known to man, Extension and Thought, but there is no supra-rational or mystical way to gain knowledge of the rest. As an idea, it is not equivalent, but yet comparable, to Kantian noumena, as in composing the limits of rational inquiry from a critical, rationalist mindset.
>>19126580
>Guenon
tradlarpers get out, this is real philosophy

>> No.19126837

>>19123942
Attributes are the essence of substance. As such they exist in themselves, whereas modes exist only in another.

>> No.19126861

>>19126766
>but there is no supra-rational or mystical way to gain knowledge of the rest.
You have the third category of ideas which, when cultivated, restructure your mind in a metaphysical way, leading you to a natural and armonious life, similar to going along the flow of Tao in Chinese philosophy. Just because he didn't believe in a literal sky personal authority god, it doesn't mean he was an atheist.

>> No.19126867

>>19126766
>tradlarpers get out, this is real philosophy
It seems you can't comprehend "real philosophy" then.
> Infinity and plurality being its only characteristics.
Which means he can't be a materialist then, because matter by its definition (in the sense you're using it) is neither of these.
>but there is no supra-rational or mystical way to gain knowledge of the rest
What proof do you have of this?

>> No.19126902

>>19126837
Spinozist substance doesn't have an essence... I'm assuming you meant attributes are predicated of substance, and modes are predicated (accidents) of the attributes.

>> No.19126906

>>19126867
Not him, but the traditionalists were a bunch of pathetic larpers who misread every text they got hold of and then compensated with their personal embarassing "interpretations" of them.

>> No.19126925

>>19126766
Spinoza's nominalism is not much different than Stirner's - in fact, Bruno Baur wrote a critique of Max accusing him of being a Spinozist, making him easily a target of Hegel's critique of Spinoza.

>> No.19126985

>>19126906
Nope.

>> No.19127011

>>19126766
>Infinity and plurality being its only characteristics.
>Spinoza: Prop. 13, part 1: Substance (God) absolutely infinite is indivisible [ie, the opposite of plural]
>prop. 12, part 1: No attribute of substance can be truly conceived from which it follows that substance can be divided

>> No.19127040

You would have made a good rebbe in a certain quarter of Amsterdam.

>> No.19127052

>>19126861
Adequate knowledge of God or Nature is needed to achieve freedom in one's actions, (positive freedom, as negative freedom is an absurd concept in Spinoza). Basically, the third kind of knowledge is that of deterministic necessity of Nature. Comparing that to Taoism is superfluous, it is not a mystical idea at all.
>>19126867
Materialism is the negation of spiritualism. It doesn't mean upholding physicalism. Thought is material too, as are abstract objects.
>>19126925
I'm not sure about that, but I can see the comparison. In that sense I think we have to take into account his political ideas, the State, in Spinoza, is a composite individual, a "mens". Stirner would disagree about that.
>>19127011
I mean plurality in the sense of the multiplicity of its infinite attributes. Sorry if I caused a misundertanding.

>> No.19127068

>>19127052
>Materialism is the negation of spiritualism
No, it's not. Giordano Bruno was considered a materialist (as in a type of matter is the highest reality) yet he was a full blown spiritualistic occultist.
>Thought is material too, as are abstract objects.
This is called a reductionist monism, the incorporating of everything under one term so as to make the term effectively meaningless. Spinoza does not assert anything of this type, that thoughts are "material." He does assert a monism, but calling it "material" as opposed to "spiritual" is entirely arbitrary and not supported by any of his writings. Thoughts are an affection or attribute of substance, just as matter is an affection or attribute of substance. You cannot define one distinct attribute (matter and thought) through the other (prop. 10), only through substance, so calling Spinoza an "atheist materialist" is completely retarded.

>> No.19127104

>>19127068
Are you the tradlarper? It is not "reductionism". You call Spinoza a monist because you don't distinguish between General and Special Ontology. Matter or substance, in the sense of General Ontology is not the "mundus adspectabilis" of Special Ontology, the world given in human scale, composed of the attributes (or types of matter) of Extension and Thought (plus "ordo et conexio"). In Spinoza, Substance is not a dogmatic idea, as little can be said or known of it except through its attributes. Rather, it is fairly obvious it's a concept derived from a first knowledge of the "attributes", as a criticism of the limits of rational knowledge without leaving rationalism behind, as Spinoza never did. He showed little interest in esotericism, and his tractatus is pretty much an example of rational exegesis of the Bible.

>> No.19127139

>>19127052
>Basically, the third kind of knowledge is that of deterministic necessity of Nature.
God or Nature, mind your language. The deterministic necessity of events in Spinoza is not the cold cause-and-effect of vulgar materialism, but an expression of trust and acceptance of a higher principle of the whole experienced universe, in which man can integrate himself through right knowledge and harmonise his willing accordingly to this very divine flow of emanation. The practical and ethical conclusions of crass materialism and Spinoza's system are so vastly different, it's surprising how some people still struggle with it hundreds of years later, and especially now when we have access to Taoist philosophy, that is a different, more mythological, expression of the same principle.

>> No.19127143

>>19127104
>In Spinoza, Substance is not a dogmatic idea, as little can be said or known of it except through its attributes.
Exactly, so calling him an atheist materialist is, again, retarded. Stop wasting everyone's time. It's stated explicitly in the introduction to part 2:
>[I am not trying to explain all the things of substance], but to consider only those things which may conduct us as to knowledge of the human mind and happiness.
>He showed little interest in esotericism
Again, that does not make him a materialist. The esoteric ideas are implicit in his philosophical tracts, but they are not ruminated upon because, as in the quote I just gave, they were not considered relevant.
>the world given in human scale, composed of the attributes (or types of matter) of Extension and Thought (plus "ordo et conexio").
Again, where are you getting this from? Propositions 2 and 3 of Part Two clearly establish body (extension) and thought as two distinct attributes which are united in God, as He is indivisible. Then there is prop. 1: God is a Thinking Being. The fact that these are relevant to general ontology and not "special ontology" (which Spinoza never even delineates) is irrelevant
>You call Spinoza a monist because you don't distinguish between General and Special Ontology
Spinoza is a monist. Only one substance is possible. It's stated and proven in very clear terms. Most of his propositions would not make sense without it. The distinction between "special" and "general" ontology is not relevant for this point.
>Substance is not a dogmatic idea
It is quite literally one of his axioms, ie, a "dogma."

>> No.19127164

>>19127143
>Propositions 2 and 3 of Part Two
Meant 1 and 2

>> No.19127254

>>19127139
>whole experienced universe
It is clear in Part V, Proposition XXIV, that the knowledge of God or Nature is only acquired or increased through knowledge of singular things. There is no unified "experience of the whole universe".
>The practical and ethical conclusions of crass materialism and Spinoza's system are so vastly different
I agree
>and especially now when we have access to Taoist philosophy
You're trying to equate a rationalist philosophy to Eastern esoteric doctrines.
>>19127143
>Again, that does not make him a materialist. The esoteric ideas are implicit in his philosophical tracts,
They are not. As I said to the guy above, in Part V, Proposition XXIV, it is quite clear you can't put some intuitionist, guenonian nonsense in Spinoza's mouth.
>The fact that these are relevant to general ontology and not "special ontology" (which Spinoza never even delineates) is irrelevant
Except it is relevant. Because the Substance of General Ontology is indefinite, absolute infinity, which man can't experience or know. The attributes and modes of those attributes are Special Ontology. If you read the Short Treatise, you would know Spinoza states clearly in the second dialogue that modes can't form an attribute, and by extension they can't form God either. Yet they are the only way we can gain knowledge of God. Which is paradoxical, unless you understand God or Nature as a completely critical idea. I will add that, even when thought is one of his attributes, there is the Scholium to Prop. XVII of Part One, in which he says that God has neither will nor understanding, not even of "Himself".
>It is quite literally one of his axioms, ie, a "dogma."
Which is, in his philosophy, a completely problematic, indefinite concept. Again, a critical idea, which confuses you because you take the "ordo geometrico" at face value, when it is a particular disposition of his ideas, with its own set of incoherences and problems. Thing is, the value of Spinoza's ideas, thankfully, are more than the particular order and disposition in which they are presented.

>> No.19127257

>>19127254
Is more than the particular order*

>> No.19127319

>>19127254
>it is quite clear you can't put some intuitionist, guenonian nonsense in Spinoza's mouth.
No shit, but that's not my claim. My claim is that YOU can't put some intuitionist, materialist nonsense in Spinoza's mouth. It's irrelevant if you want to consider him an esotericist or not. But if you are justified in calling him a materialist, then I am justified in making a leap in the opposite direction.
>Because the Substance of General Ontology is indefinite, absolute infinity, which man can't experience or know.
These are things you are making up, and not contained within Spinoza's philosophy. Man can know attributes of God, that is the whole point of his writings. So your arbitrary delineation here is again not relevant.
>you would know Spinoza states clearly in the second dialogue that modes can't form an attribute
I never claimed they could. My statement, citing props 1 and 2 of part 2, was that Matter and Thought are attributes and NOT modes of God, and through prop. 10 of Part 1 which I also cited, attributes can only be known through themselves and not another, ergo Thought cannot be known through Matter, ergo Spinoza is not a materialist, which refutes your original claim.
>I will add that, even when thought is one of his attributes, there is the Scholium to Prop. XVII of Part One, in which he says that God has neither will nor understanding, not even of "Himself".
You've entirely misinterpreted that fragment. In fact, he says that will and intellect do not pertain to God's essence, because God's essence is singularly existence, as is the essence of Substance. These, will and intellect, are ATTRIBUTES of God. And his point here really is that they are not "free", in the sense that they are not free to act in one way but choose to act in another, they act in all ways that are possible due to the fact that they are eternal and omnipotent. He goes on to say in the same scholia that the will and intellect of God exist but are not similar to what we know them to be as man:
>Therefore, the intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute his essence, is in truth the cause of things, both of their essence and of their existence - a truth which seems to have been understood by those who have maintained that God's will, intellect, and power are one and the same thing. ... Therefore the Intellect of God, as the cause of both our intellect's essence and existence, differs from our intellect both in essence and existence.
>Which is, in his philosophy, a completely problematic, indefinite concept.
If you want to reduce his entire philosophy to an indefinite nothing, then so be it, but that doesn't give you the justification to call him a materialist.

>> No.19127397

>>19127319
>Thought cannot be known through Matter
I never disagreed friend. As I said in some posts above, Spinoza is not some crass materialist, nor did I ever affirm that one of the attributes can be reduced or known by the other. Spinoza is not an idealist, in the sense that there's no hierarchy of attributes in his system, much less one that puts "res cogitans" above "res extensa", and viceversa. Not all philosophy conceives of "matter" in a reductive, physicalist way, and I repeat, it's not what I mean by materialism. And in my view, his philosophy is not an "indefinite nothing", but, as I said it, it is both rational and critical of the limits of reason.

>> No.19127445

>>19127397
Are you even the same person I originally responded to then?

>> No.19128611

>>19122646
You should've just kept reading and revisit it later.

>> No.19128660

>>19126766
>this is REAL philosophy hehe ;)
Kys reddit

>> No.19128992

>>19128611
is this the best piece of advice ever or what