/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.19052339]

what if consciousness is just a physical brain process and the retardo neuroscientists haven’t been able to locate it in the brain yet?

any books on this? (kys janny)

[Anonymous No.19052384]

this is the mainstream position in phil of mind. neuroscience has correlated at least some aspects of consciousness (eg, memory, the "mind's eye") with particular brain processes

[Anonymous No.19052399]

>>19052339
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/05/mind-body-problem-roundup.html

>>19052384
>some aspects of consciousness (eg, memory, the "mind's eye") with particular brain processes
These things i) are not part of consciousness ii) have never been considered difficult to explain

You don't know the hard problem of consciousness

I redirect you to the work of Chalmers

[Anonymous No.19052404]

>>19052339
what if the university is just a building on campus and the retardo deans haven't been able to locate it yet?

[Anonymous No.19052409]

Materialism has inherited from Galileo, Descartes, Locke, and other modern thinkers, a highly mathematical conception of the material world, according to which matter possesses only quantifiable 'primary qualities', such as spatial location, motion, size, etc., and is devoid of anything corresponding to so-called 'secondary qualities', such as colour, smell, sound, taste, heat, cold, etc., at least in the way common sense understands these qualities. In this understanding, if you want to redefine a quality, such as 'being red' for example, in terms of 'the tendency of certain objects to absorb and reflect certain wavelengths of light', then only you can say that 'an apple is red'. But if by 'being red' you mean what common sense means by 'being red', namely 'what red looks like to a normal observer', but would not look like to a colour-blind observer, then there is nothing in the apple itself that corresponds to that, and you cannot really say that 'an apple is red'. And the same is true of other colours, tastes, smells, sounds, etc. Irreducibly qualitative characteristics were taken by early modern philosophers and scientists to exist only as qualia of experience - as parts of the veil of perceptions through which we are aware of the material world, not as parts of the material world itself.

But if you define matter in this way, then you are already implicitly engaged in a form of dualism, whether you realise it or not. For if you say that colours, smells, sounds, tastes, etc., as common sense understands these characteristics, do not exist in matter, this implies that they do not exist in the brain either, since the brain is no less material than the objects outside it. Therefore, if you also say that these characteristics exist in the mind, in our conscious experience of matter, then you are saying that the mind is not material. Thus, a Cartesian-type dualism is in no way a strange kind of resistance to the modern scientific mode of explanation, but on the contrary follows from it. Indeed, early modern thinkers, such as Malebranche and Ralph Cudworth, insisted on it. Oddly, most contemporary philosophers and scientists seem blind to the fact that a Cartesian dualism is lodged at the root of the modern scientific understanding of matter - although Schrödinger is one of the scientists who saw the connection between the two, as is Thomas Nagel among the philosophers.

(1/2)

[Anonymous No.19052425]

And what is true of qualia is also true of intentionality, for another key aspect of the mathematical conception of matter is that it leaves out anything that might remotely embrace the Aristotelian notion of final cause or teleology. In essence, teleology implies that something is directed towards, or points towards, an end. For example, an acorn can be said to be directed towards becoming an oak tree, or an eye can be said to be directed towards enabling an organism to see. To say that matter is devoid of teleology is therefore to say that there is no such 'directionality' understood within it. But intentionality is a kind of directionality. So if there is no teleology inherent in matter, there is no intentionality inherent in matter either. But intentionality exists in the mind, especially in our thoughts - since a thought is always directed towards, or about, some object or subject. Intentionality also exists in our choices, which are directed towards the achievement of certain goals. So to claim that there is intentionality in the mind while supporting a mathematical conception of matter is to implicitly commit yourself to a form of dualism. And to deny intentionality would be to deny meaning. As long as modern materialism has a mathematical conception of matter, it contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction via the dualism it presupposes.

(2/2)

[Anonymous No.19052470]

>>19052399
they're pretty uncontroversially considered constitutive of access consciousness

[Anonymous No.19052538]

>>19052470
The hard problem is about phenomenal consciousness not access consciousness

[Anonymous No.19052552]

>>19052538
op wasn't asking about the hard problem

[Anonymous No.19052575]

>>19052552
Yes he was
>what if consciousness is just a physical brain process and the retardo neuroscientists haven’t been able to locate it in the brain yet?

[Anonymous No.19052627]

>>19052339
consciousness is just sense and thought. now stop making threads you fucking fagboat.

[Anonymous No.19052657]

>>19052627
your iq is lower than apes

[Anonymous No.19052674]

>>19052657
pederastful pedagogical pedophilic pedantry.

[Anonymous No.19052686]

>>19052339
Again, who the fuck cares? We should be thinking be about its consequences rather than its origins and consequences the fucking BRUTAL.

[Anonymous No.19053005]

>>19052339
People are way too into localisation.
The other troublesome aspect is the fact that consciousness has two meanings. It can both mean "awake" and the more metaphysical state of awareness that distinguishes us from lesser animals.

I saw a recent animal study localising the former, and of course the press published it as the latter. Briefly we thought the claustrum was the seat of consciousness, as lesions there had achieved interruptions in awareness with preservation of other functions. This was not reproducible.

Ditch that noise. Do IIT.

[Anonymous No.19053124]

>>19052339
it is the opposite, consciousness is the animating force of the universe, and a physical brain process is blocking this realization by creating a illusion of self.

[Anonymous No.19053420]

>>19053124
Based...

[バイポラーたん !Gh99z/1SzU No.19053597]

>>19052409
Based schizo. Your argument does not follow
I think you are mistaken in supposing a teleology in matter and by extension, consciousness. The human brain is unable to escape the instinct for pattern-recognition. When humans have thoughts, they are often invasive. This betrays the material origins of sentience: while all animals carry some form of "consciousness" or awareness of the environment, humans have metacognitive processes overlaid on basic consciousness. Thoughts are emergent properties of the triune brain. Common sense perception tends to confirm mathematical observation. Of course, there is also the ultimate criticism of Cartesian dualism: if the mind does not exist physically, how does it interact with the body?

As far as thoughts, consciousness, and life itself, I do not see evidence for meaning. But the goal of Neuroscience is to translate qualia into quantifiable observations. I anticipate that the hard problem of consciousness will be solved in time, but people will deny it

[Anonymous No.19053898]

>>19052627
> consciousness is just sense and thought
wrong, consciousness is the awareness through which knowing of sense and thought take place

[Anonymous No.19054486]

>>19052339
>what if consciousness is just a physical brain process and the retardo neuroscientists haven’t been able to locate it in the brain yet?
Even hardcore materialists who have any philosophical savviness do not think that consciousness can be "located" in the brain. There is no "consciousness center" in the brain like there is a face recognition center, because that doesn't make sense. Look up "cartesian theater" to learn why. Also, /lit/'s consciousness threads are retard-infested garbage. Don't waste your time with Feser, thomism and buddhism.

[Anonymous No.19054751]

>>19053124
>illusion of self
consciousness *is* one’s self

[Anonymous No.19055451]

>>19054486
Bullshit, most neuroscientists don't believe in the existence of soul or eternal self. Even if consciousness is Metaphysical this is still produced by the brain. Doctors can cut certain parts of your brain and it could effect your memory and as a consequence your sense of self. There are many disorders in which people lose their sense of self, some people stop identifying with their bodies, some people with chopped off body part keep believing that they still have that body part. Consciousness is a bullshite tool which gives us junk information. It lie to us about things as simple as white color.

[Anonymous No.19055692]

>>19055451
>Bullshit, instead of figuring out what you mean with this unfamiliar term, let me make a point that isn't even opposed to yours

[Anonymous No.19055766]

>>19053898
the metaawareness is bundled into the sense and thought

[Anonymous No.19055918]

Please explain how ANY combination of physical laws and properties (which determine solely interactions between physical objects and say nothing about intrinsic properties) could EVER give rise to a subjective experience.
Don't avoid the question, don't redefine consciousness, just explain.

[バイポラーたん !Gh99z/1SzU No.19055925]

>>19055918
They don't and that's why dualists get btfo

[Anonymous No.19055926]

read Husserl my man

[Anonymous No.19055956]

>>19055918
wouldn't the differences in personal experience give rise to anecdotally-fueled change in what seems probable? a lot of subjective experience is guesswork on unknown physical properties using previous experiences with similar laws/properties.

[Anonymous No.19055970]

>>19055956
I don't know what you're talking and, but when I's saying subjective experience, I'm talking about consciousness-- the first-person awareness and experience that we all have. It helps to use that wording because people confuse the term consciousness with complex thought or self-awareness (which are easy problems, once we solve consciousness)

[Anonymous No.19056483]

>>19055766
That seems wrong, are you able to define “metaawareness” and define “bundled into the sense and thought” and give an example of it occurring?

[Anonymous No.19056561]

>>19056483
anecdotally, yes.
metawareness is just being self-aware about your self-awareness. acknowledging your own existence is just self-reflection after all. no reason why it would somehow escape the definition of "sense and thought".

[Anonymous No.19056644]

>>19056561
>metawareness is just being self-aware about your self-awareness.
Awareness is always the same, there are
no types in or of it. “Metawareness” from what you are describing seems to be awareness observing/illuminating the mental thought of oneself, this is not awareness directly observing awareness itself though but is just awareness observing a thought in the mind. So awareness is not really being “bundled into” those thoughts, which implies a modification of awareness itself; rather, awareness is observing the mind think about awareness.