David Lewis was based

[Anonymous No.18340441]

I'm sure any practicing philosopher is familiar with David Lewis, but amongst educated and philosophically-inclined non-philosophers, he gets nowhere near the attention of someone like Chomsky, or even Putnam or Kripke or Fodor. If he was Jewish, then amongst Analytic philosophers, he would probably be regarded as second only to Wittgenstein and Godel.

[Anonymous No.18340468]

Nobody except the initiated knows about Putnam or Kripke or Fodor or Wittgenstein or Godel either. Also Gödel wasn't Jewish.

[Anonymous No.18340477]

He's definitely top 20 in analytic phil

[Anonymous No.18340480]

>>18340441
This is a literature board, and we’d all prefer if you took this shit to /his/ so that we can discuss fiction and poetry.

[Anonymous No.18340677]

>>18340441
Quickly, post some of his works and discuss why they are important, before jannies see your post.

[Anonymous No.18340688]

>say "literal who" every thread
>(you)'s start rolling in
>forget who he is by the time another thread is made about him anyway

[Anonymous No.18340730]

>As I walk through the many of the possible worlds
>I take account of what is, and realise it's manifold
>As I’ve been thinking and argu’ing so long, that
>even my counterparts think my mind is gone!
>But I ain't never crossed a square that didn't deserve it
>Me be using prim’tive modality you know that's unheard of
>You better watch how you're talkin', and where you're walkin'
>Or you and your operators ‘be lined in chalk
>I really hate the Kripk’ but I gotta lope
>As they cope I see worldmates in the ersatz yoke, fools
>I’m the kinda G that sees all possibillia
>De Dicto in the night, De Se in the streetlight!

>Been spendin’ most their lives
>Livin’ in the philosopher’s paradise
>Been spendin’ most their lives
>Livin’ in the philosopher’s paradise
>Keep spendin’ most our lives
>Livin’ in the philosopher’s paradise
>Keep spendin’ most our lives
>Livin’ in the philosopher’s paradise

>Look at the situation they got me facin'
>I can’t have a modal part, I am bound to this world
>but I gotta get trans-world iden’tiy
>Too much talkin’ got’em chasin’ haecceities
>I'm an educated fool with modal on my mind
>Got my grue in my hand and a bleen in my eye
>I’m a loc’d out gangsta set theorem’ banger
>And this Humphrey ‘jection done arouse my anger, fool.
>It ain’t nothing but a coun’rpart relation
>there, win or lose, through rep’sentation
>the stares are incredulous but then so were they before
>If it will ever stop I’m not sure

>Tell me why are we, so blind to see
>Modal realism, through parsimony

>Been spendin’ most their lives
>Livin’ in the philosopher’s paradise
>Been spendin’ most their lives
>Livin’ in the philosopher’s paradise
>Keep spendin’ most our lives
>Livin’ in the philosopher’s paradise
>Keep spendin’ most our lives
>Livin’ in the philosopher’s paradise

>Square and the diamond, diamond and the square
>Function after function, stare after stare
>Everybody’s talkin’, but half ain’t even startin’
>To understand counterfact’ls, when missing the relata
>They say it’s all ersatz, but nobody here can teach me
>Even with Lagadonian, can they defeat me?
>I guess they can't, I guess they won't
>I guess they front, that's why I know their view is out of luck, fool

>Been spendin’ most their lives
>Livin’ in the philosopher’s paradise
>Been spendin’ most their lives
>Livin’ in the philosopher’s paradise
>Keep spendin’ most our lives
>Livin’ in the philosopher’s paradise
>Keep spendin’ most our lives
>Livin’ in the philosopher’s paradise

>Tell me why are we, so blind to see
>Modal realism, through parsimony
>Tell me why are we, so blind to see
>Modal realism, through parsimony

[Anonymous No.18341889]

>>18340477
This. Shame he doesn’t get the recognition he deserves.

[Anonymous No.18342137]

>>18340468
>nobody knows about some of the most famous contemporary philosophers and mathematicians

[Anonymous No.18342988]

>>18342137
Yes.

[Anonymous No.18343059]

>>18340441
Anon, I don't know what circle you hang out in, but everyone who is vaguely familiar with analytical philosophy knows of him. His style of writing, along with Kripke's, is dominant in the Anglo-American philosophical establishment. Every book on analytic metaphysics, ethics, epistemology, you name it, cites him.

[Anonymous No.18343100]

>>18340480
Newfag detected. Philosophy has always been discussed on this board, more so then on /his/.

[Anonymous No.18343106]

Possible worlds aren’t real bro

[Anonymous No.18344025]

>>18340441
This is the most impoverished conception of philosophy I've ever encountered and yet it's what most analytics unironically believe

[Anonymous No.18344118]

>>18343100
Yeah, I know that. I still have a problem with it. Kys.

[Anonymous No.18344277]

>>18344118
Philosophy has been posted here since the beginning. Everyone who isn't baby-tier new has gotten used to it. Mods and jannies approve of it. If you don't like it, no one cares. Stop crying and make a filter list.

>Kys
Iamgine trying to fit in so hard

[Anonymous No.18344309]

>>18344025
First of all, this is not at all the consensus opinion. Second of all, it is taken completely out of context and misrepresents what he was trying to say. Third of all, obscurantists like you feeling the need to ruin every analytics thread because you feel insecure with your own inability to produce anything which is verifiably useful or worthwhile are the worst scum of 4chan.

[Anonymous No.18344324]

>>18344277
Mods and jannies are fucking stupid, and people like you should be castrated.

[Anonymous No.18344337]

>>18344025
What reason could you possibly have for disagreeing with this?

[Anonymous No.18344359]

>>18340441
Among all of them Kripke and Lewis are probably the least approachable. Both of them meddle in such depths of arcana that only seasoned, grade-A, genuine article, card-carrying autists want to engage with their work.

[Anonymous No.18344395]

>>18344337
It makes it seem like philosophy is just a game of opinions. It's how you get positions like logical nihilism. I know at least two analytic-phil youtubers (yes, I know, but the recent survey did not include the question "Do you think philosophy is just a playfield??"), Joe Schmid and Kane Baker, both of whom seem to treat philosophy as if it is just a repertoire of strange stances supported by arguments which look like long shopping lists.

[Anonymous No.18344407]

>>18344324
>AM I FITTING IN YET, RACIST BROS???

[Anonymous No.18344419]

>>18344395
>>18344025
Carnap caused this

[Anonymous No.18344469]

>>18340441
>second only to Wittgenstein and Godel.

Second... after two other guys. The third person down in a rank... is second. Interesting alchemy, no doubt fundamentally logical and analytical, something lost on us non-genuises however.

[Anonymous No.18344504]

>>18344469
Have you considered the possibility that he may think there is a tie between Wittgenstein and Gödel?

[Anonymous No.18344510]

>>18340441
David Lewis can be lumped on with the likes of Leibniz and Kripke. Brilliant and possibly genius, but wrong opinions on everything.

[Anonymous No.18344527]

>>18344510
If they're wrong on literally everything, they're probably not a genius

[Anonymous No.18344539]

>>18344395
I've watched Schmid's videos, and that's not the impression I've gotten.

[Anonymous No.18344656]

>>18344337
It treats philosophy as an atemporal collection of "big questions" and reasonable answers to those questions, rather than a practice that only makes sense within a historical tradition and which responds to historically situated problems. Analytic philosophy shows that you can take philosophical practice out of this historical tradition, but it also shows that when you do philosophy is reduced to a collection of unresolvable disagreements and contrasting opinions with nothing really at stake.

[Anonymous No.18344865]

>>18344309
Love seeing analytic philosophers coping and seething as soon as you point out that their entire worldview is shaped by ungrounded, worthless common sense intuitions.
>>18344337
>what problem could there be in grounding your philosophy on common sense intuitions?

[Anonymous No.18344873]

>>18344419
Carnap started it, Quine perfected it, Lewis cemented it

[Anonymous No.18344879]

>>18344865
>>what problem could there be in grounding your philosophy on common sense intuitions?
This but unironically

[Anonymous No.18344911]

>>18344879
You see no problem in grounding your philosophy on claims you haven't really thought about?

[Anonymous No.18344965]

>>18340730
underrated post

[Anonymous No.18344974]

>>18344539
Dude, this should be obvious from the existential inertia stuff.

[Anonymous No.18344993]

>>18344656
t. Rorty

[Anonymous No.18345011]

>>18344911
Common sense beliefs aren't the same as uncritical beliefs.

[Anonymous No.18345093]

>>18345011
Common sense intuitions are by definition uncritical, since a belief in them cannot be justified nor rationally nor empirically.

[Anonymous No.18345158]

>>18345093
Um, what are you talking about? There are plenty of philosophers who think that common sense beliefs, such as the belief that our perception of the world is generally accurate, can be justified, but you don't seem to be using the term in that technical epistemological sense. So, do you mean they can't be proven? But just because a belief is unproveable does not mean it is uncritical if it is held as part of an epistemology which does not require that beliefs necessarily be provable in order to be rationally justifiable. You don't seem to get the difference between naive beliefs and philosophical beliefs, something you should have encountered if you've read much philosophy. Common sense beliefs can be either depending on how they're put forward.

[Anonymous No.18345209]

>>18345158
If common sense believes can be justified, what's the point of appealing to them as premises? Why not appeal to the premises used to justify those common sense beliefs? The issue isn't whether common sense beliefs are true or justifiable, it's whether it's legitimate to use them as philosophical axioms.

[Anonymous No.18345212]

>>18344504
Since the merits of philosophers can now be measured down to the millisecond, I think it avoids confusion to award them medals. In the case of a tie between two competitors in this event for gold, no silver shall be awarded and Lewis will be awarded by the committee the bronze.

[Anonymous No.18345217]

>>18345158
Dude, I beg you to read the word I'm actually using. I am talking about common sense INTUITIONS. A common sense belief in general can be justified. The common sense belief for which 1+1=2 is justified, I'm not contesting that.
For the last time, I am specificalky talking about INTUITIONS. Also reread the passage I was responding to >>18344025, in which "intuitions" is used in the same way
>But just because a belief is unproveable does not mean it is uncritical if it is held as part of an epistemology which does not require that beliefs necessarily be provable in order to be rationally justifiable
Since we are specifically talking about philosophy, I'm sure you could see why such an epistemology would be of no theoretical value whatsoever
>You don't seem to get the difference between naive beliefs and philosophical beliefs
I'm starting to think you don't know what this thread is about. So I'll point out once more that we are specifically talking about philosophy and therefore philosophical beliefs, that the passage I've mentioned dealt with philosophical beliefs, and that my response characterized intuitions as non-philosophical beliefs. I'm not here arguing that you should not take for granted that tomorrow the sun will rise, I am talking about philosophy here.

[Anonymous No.18345221]

>>18345209
Most philosophers who believe common sense beliefs can be justified aren't going to try to prove something like sense perception with a syllogism anyway. That kinda misses the point.

[Anonymous No.18345247]

>>18345217
>Since we are specifically talking about philosophy, I'm sure you could see why such an epistemology would be of no theoretical value whatsoever
Reformed epistemology has advocates among competent philosophers and is taken seriously. You clearly don't know much about analytic philosophy.

[Anonymous No.18345340]

>>18345247
My man, we are not in a Phil department, which means that I do not have to pretend that the fact that some people take "seriously" intuition-based epistemologies is relevant in the slightest. The fact that these positions find a spot in thr current philosophical constellation is more of an indictment of certain parts of academia. My take is that if you ground your philosophy on beliefs of this sort, then you're not doing philosophy at all: rather, you will be doing either some sort of inventorial work (which ends up being nothing more than doxastic logistics, as it is the case for Lewis - and he admits that too), or you will end up doing straight-up religious apologetics (as it is the case for reformed epistemologists). Either way the philosophical value of such projects is equal to zero, and it never goes beyond a pseudo-rationalization of ungrounded, unphilosophical intuitions. If this were to be the only solid ground for philosophy, then philosophy would not be a valid field of study

[Anonymous No.18345375]

>>18345340
I'll add: these considerations do not require great philosophical sophistication, and could be aptly defended even by uninitiated thinkers. The one of Lewis (and Reformed Epistemologists, since you've mentioned them) is a trivial mistake. I'll go as far as saying that refuting their entire philosophical projects does not even require any familiarity with any literature on the matter

[Anonymous No.18345425]

>>18345340
I think I would be more inclined to respect what academic philosophers take seriously than what someone on 4chan would like to take seriously. I see now that your real problem is just with academia and not merely with analytic philosophy; you could have just said that.

[Anonymous No.18345642]

>>18345425
>I think I would be more inclined to respect what academic philosophers take seriously than what someone on 4chan would like to take seriously
Is there anything worth less than a dogmatic approach to philosophy? A philosopher tells you "this philosophical theory X must be wrong because it goes against a thought of mine that I really like, even though I cannot justify it in any shape or form", and you nod and say "well, some of the philosophers mentioned in my textbooks like this view, so I cannot really be sure whether it is as retarded as it sounds". Have some self-respect and think for yourself.
>I see now that your real problem is just with academia and not merely with analytic philosophy; you could have just said that.
I haven't said anything of the sort. Academia can certainly free itself of these mental abortion, which turn philosophy into an inventorial and apologetic practice.

[Anonymous No.18345652]

>>18340677
On the Plurality of Worlds is his major work, and a very good book to read even just to get some idea of other debates in contemporary analytic metaphysics beyond his own views on possible worlds.
>>18340441
I think Lewis matters more than Fodor across the board.
>If he was Jewish, then amongst Analytic philosophers, he would probably be regarded as second only to Wittgenstein and Godel.
Amongst analytics Wittgenstein already doesn't matter as much as you think, and Godel was never that important for anybody, he did one major thing of big importance (incompleteness proofs) and he comes up sometimes when discussing platonism in mathematics and that's it. People like Quine matter more than Wittgenstein or Godel for analytics right now. Judaism has little to do with anything. I think the most important analytics as of today are Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, Putnam, Kripke, and Lewis. Only two of those people are Jewish. Seems like belonging to Ivy League American families or old British nobility that attends Oxbridge or having to do with Jena, Berlin, or Vienna matters more.
>David Lewis was based
He's pretty great, what's interesting about Lewis' fans is that most of them disagree with his concrete modal realism, he had a much bigger impact with his doctrine of naturalness and with Humean supervenience.

[Anonymous No.18345697]

>>18345642
>A philosopher tells you "this philosophical theory X must be wrong because it goes against a thought of mine that I really like, even though I cannot justify it in any shape or form", and you nod and say "well, some of the philosophers mentioned in my textbooks like this view, so I cannot really be sure whether it is as retarded as it sounds".
Well, fortunately, no one argues like that and you're attacking strawman, so I don't have to defend that as a respectable philosophical option.

[Anonymous No.18345708]

>>18345697
Reread >>18344025
Also read some Quine, or some Varzi, or like 99.99% of contemporary moral philosophy.

[Anonymous No.18346113]

>>18340441
>Analytic philosophers

straight into the rubbish bin

[Anonymous No.18346405]

>>18345642
>Is there anything worth less than a dogmatic approach to philosophy? A philosopher tells you "this philosophical theory X must be wrong because it goes against a thought of mine that I really like, even though I cannot justify it in any shape or form", and you nod and say "well, some of the philosophers mentioned in my textbooks like this view, so I cannot really be sure whether it is as retarded as it sounds". Have some self-respect and think for yourself.
This sounds exactly like what you're complaining about here:
>My take is that if you ground your philosophy on beliefs of this sort, then you're not doing philosophy at all: rather, you will be doing either some sort of inventorial work (which ends up being nothing more than doxastic logistics, as it is the case for Lewis - and he admits that too), or you will end up doing straight-up religious apologetics (as it is the case for reformed epistemologists). Either way the philosophical value of such projects is equal to zero, and it never goes beyond a pseudo-rationalization of ungrounded, unphilosophical intuitions. If this were to be the only solid ground for philosophy, then philosophy would not be a valid field of study
What the hell anon, which is it? Both approaches are called "Quineanism" by the way. What you defend is weighing intuitions for and against each other based on credibility, judged perhaps by comparing with others. What you attack however, is exactly the same thing, the weighing of intuitions. There is no difference.

[Anonymous No.18346456]

>>18346405
>What the hell anon, which is it?
I don't understand what the issue is, in your opinion.
>Both approaches are called "Quineanism" by the way. What you defend is weighing intuitions for and against each other based on credibility, judged perhaps by comparing with others. What you attack however, is exactly the same thing, the weighing of intuitions. There is no difference.
I'm literally arguing against the relevance of intuitions in philosophical thought, so I don't really understand your objection. The two views I've described (the doxastic logistic one and the apologetic one) are views I radically disagree with, I'm not defending them. At the end of that post I even say that if these were two be the philosophical approaches we should pick, then philosophy would not be a valid nor worthy field of study.

[Anonymous No.18346484]

>>18346456
There is nothing but intuitions anon. I don't know if you realize we subsist by beliefs and judgments. They are, we hope, grounded in the right epistemic apparatus to give us justification or warrant. And we might even say we "know" that. But there's always a judgment or belief element necessary to bridge that gap and reach knowledge on JTB or JTB+ views. I don't think there's any real difference between that, an a so-called intuition, except that other intuitions we take seriously suggest that some subset of our intuitions is actually credible and secure and the rest we can't say that for. But we could be wrong both ways. In which case everyone must admit, I might know things and you might not know things when we think otherwise. You can't get outside of intuitions because you can't get outside of judgments and beliefs to compare the content with the world represented thereby.

[Anonymous No.18346611]

>>18346484
>There is nothing but intuitions anon.
I won't tell you that I disagree, since refuting this claim would require an entire philosophical system. I'll just say that if this is the case, then we are truly stuck with those two views, and what Lewis says here>>18344025 will be correct: philosophy won't be concerned with knowledge nor truth, and it will instead only deal with pseudo-rationalizations of our subjective preferences. As such, it could not be anything short of bad science (when it comes to metaphysics and ontology) and bad proselytizing (when it comes to political philosophy, ethics and metaethics).
I don't use this word lightly, but from what I can see such a view could distinguish itself from nihilism and skepticism only in appearance.
>I don't think there's any real difference between that, an a so-called intuition, except that other intuitions we take seriously suggest that some subset of our intuitions is actually credible and secure and the rest we can't say that for.
I'm sure you can see the circularity of this argument.

[Anonymous No.18346704]

>>18344025
This sounds like what MacIntyre calls emotivism extrapolated to all of philosophy. It's pretty hard to disprove, and if you had thought about it at all, you'd likely have come to the same conclusions.

[Anonymous No.18347197]

>>18346704
It sounds like you've given up on philosophy. Sad

[Anonymous No.18347203]

>>18342137
We live in a society of ignoramuses.

[Anonymous No.18347506]

>>18345221
They should

[Anonymous No.18347609]

>>18343059
I have yet to encounter him in class and have taken 6 classes with analytic professors so far.

[Anonymous No.18347614]

>>18344656
based

[Anonymous No.18347929]

>>18346611
>if this is the case
>philosophy won't be concerned with knowledge nor truth, and it will instead only deal with pseudo-rationalizations of our subjective preferences
If what I said is the case, knowledge is still possible. The problem is that philosophers already accept that knowledge is in a certain way not translucent: you might have it, and you might not, and there's no obvious way to tell. We just take ourselves to have it sometimes and not other times. But when we do, we do so because of some strong belief or judgment. We just presume it's further backed up by the right justificatory or warrant-granting apparatus.
>As such, it could not be anything short of bad science (when it comes to metaphysics and ontology) and bad proselytizing (when it comes to political philosophy, ethics and metaethics).
If what I said is right, there is no "good science" and "good proselytizing" to distinguish philosophy from. All science is as intuitions-based as anything else.
>I'm sure you can see the circularity of this argument.
I don't know what you mean by it honestly. You'll have to tell me what you mean.
>I won't tell you that I disagree, since refuting this claim would require an entire philosophical system.
Thing is I don't think anyone disagrees. I made space for knowledge, recognizing the internalist and externalist but fallibilist accounts of knowledge. In spite of that, they're fallibilist, and all that falliblism means is, we could be wrong any time we think we have knowledge. People who deny the KK principle tend to also allow that we can know and fail to know we know, and thus fail to believe we know as well. So you can have both things: you might think you know something, when you don't; and you might think you don't know something, when you do. Knowledge is still possible. Surely you're not promoting infalliblism? Nobody in analytic philosophy, MUCH less continental philosophy, promotes infallibilist epistemology. Oh, and certainly nobody in the sciences does that either. So saying we're always stuck within intuitions is just a recognition of the fact all our judgments and beliefs existing within the falliblism framework. We have no obvious way of telling that we aren't wrong, in a way that prevents us from error. We could say we can "tell" we know, only to turn out wrong, which is all I'm saying.

[Anonymous No.18348737]

Bump

[Anonymous No.18348834]

>>18347929
>If what I said is the case, knowledge is still possible.
Only if you deny the KK principle, and I don't. If you can't know that you know p, then you don't know p, or at the very least, you don't know p in any way that is philosophically significant. This fallibilist view of yours seems to be leaving our intellect at the mercy of pure epistemic luck. While this is acceptable in everyday life and in scientific research, it completely defeats the purpose of philosophical thinking.
>If what I said is right, there is no "good science" and "good proselytizing" to distinguish philosophy from. All science is as intuitions-based as anything else
Science is not philosophy, for it does not have to concern itself with actual truth. Even in a completely anti-realist framework scientific theories can be justified and evaluated on their predictive successes and their instrumental usefulness. Even in light of that view, we can still talk about "good" and "bad" science. I didn't want to imply that what we're talking about concerns scientific research in the slightest (either way scientists will be able to advance their research)
>Surely you're not promoting infalliblism?
I am, as long as we are talking about metaphysics, general ontology, ethics, etc. Anything short of infallible knowledge should be rejected by any philosophical system worth its name. If said infallible knowledge is to be deemed impossible, then this must be first be proven (in such a way that involves no contradiction - and it would be quite hard, if not impossible, to do so, for very obvious reasons). After that, we should simply make it explicit that we are not doing philosophy anymore, since we are not anymore concerned with a genuine search of truth (since we would have barred that way out), and either accept the name "philosophy" as a mere formality, or to change its name so to reflect its newfound purely doxastic (and frankly, rethorical) status. This assuming some good-faith from us, since we, in fact, would have no obligation to tell the truth about the real status of philosophy.
This is basically my take on this matter.
>I don't know what you mean by it honestly. You'll have to tell me what you mean
In that passage you seem to establish the credibility of intuitions, as a legitimate philosophical tool, by referring to beliefs entailed by other stronger intuitions we already hold.

[Anonymous No.18348910]

>>18348834
KK principle or not, how come we can be wrong when we think we have knowledge? I don't see a way around fallibilism, especially with the sciences where we've been wrong all the time and were it not for our ability to recognize this, we wouldn't progress in the sciences as we have.
>Science is not philosophy, for it does not have to concern itself with actual truth
Okay, I don't understand why you would be an instrumentalist about the sciences but an infallibilist about philosophy.
>Anything short of infallible knowledge should be rejected by any philosophical system worth its name.
Well there's only two options here. Option A: There is no infallible knowledge. Option B: There is, but it's extremely limited, limited at most to very simple logical and mathematical inferences, and acquaintance with pre-analyzed present-moment sense data, and maybe with some abstract entities if you want to add those. Nobody in the history of philosophy was an infalliblist about anything past that, except for the rationalists of old. They employed very bad methods to try to deduce certainty from a priori reasoning. This is stuff like Anselm and Descartes "proving" the existence of God. Those examples aside, infallibilism at best can only claim a tiny base, and not enough to get us through in the world. So what's your problem with a discipline of inquiry that seeks after falliblist knowledge? We need it. There's a real distinction to make between falliblist knowledge, and what is completely false and unknown. This is an enterprise that has always existed and will continue to exist. Why resist calling it philosophy?

[Anonymous No.18349018]

>>18348910
>KK principle or not, how come we can be wrong when we think we have knowledge? I don't see a way around fallibilism, especially with the sciences where we've been wrong all the time and were it not for our ability to recognize this, we wouldn't progress in the sciences as we have.
As I said, this should at the very least be demonstrated first. Such a pursuit cannot be liquidated with an abstract reference to scientific "refutations" (which, imho, is misplaced in many cases: with science alone one cannot even refute Plato or Aristotle).
>Okay, I don't understand why you would be an instrumentalist about the sciences but an infallibilist about philosophy
As I said earlier, if I were to do so I would simply deem it bad science, and I would simply discard it as insignificant and unproductive (it would be better to engage in real science, at that point).
>Option B: There is, but it's extremely limited, limited at most to very simple logical and mathematical inferences, and acquaintance with pre-analyzed present-moment sense data, and maybe with some abstract entities if you want to add those. Nobody in the history of philosophy was an infalliblist about anything past that, except for the rationalists of old.
Once you take out the rationalists, from Parmenides to Hegel, you've taken out a good chunk of the Western canon. That's not exactly a "nobody". Also without a proof of the matter, it should not be accepted that infallible knowledge only extends to a minute set of mostly inconsequential propositions. If such a proof exists, then its formulation and divulgation would be of capital importance: it should be the first thing we should concern ourselves with.
>Those examples aside, infallibilism at best can only claim a tiny base, and not enough to get us through in the world
It depends on what you mean by "getting us through the world". I'm not claiming that we should be able to deduce Krug's pen (such a possibility might even be ruled out by an infallible philosophical system), but this should not lead us to ground our metaphysics, our general ontology and our morality on mere intuitions.
>Why resist calling it philosophy?
Why should we? If we take for granted that all there is is intuitions, and that there is no epistemic criterion outside intuitionist ones, then we are outside of the pursuit for truth. We are left with subjective preferences (which can be true only accidentally), and philosophy would just be a way of giving a rational appearance to said preferences. As Lewis said, it would be just a fancy way of presenting your own opinion, while having absolutely no way of confirming the worth of said opinion. Moreover, every philosophical claim, since it would be based on mere opinion, would be purely subjective, and its appeal would entirely depend on the subjective considerations of the individual. The value of a philosophical argument would not be found in its relation to truth, rather it would be found in its rhetorical power.

[Anonymous No.18349162]

>>18349018
>As I said, this should at the very least be demonstrated first.
What do you want a demonstration of, the fact that science was wrong about a bunch of things for its entire existence? Every scientist accepts that. It's supposed to be a good thing that we recognize our capacity for error because it leads us in the direction of progress. Can you demonstrate the falsehood of my claim?
>Once you take out the rationalists, from Parmenides to Hegel, you've taken out a good chunk of the Western canon.
My intention isn't to take them out: it's to point out that aside from them, nobody thinks this way. And they were wrong. That doesn't mean I don't love them (I do) or find them useful or insightful or interesting (I do). All of philosophy is likely wrong. Much as all of science is likely wrong. Progress wouldn't be possible if we were already right. We haven't reached the end of history yet.
>Also without a proof of the matter, it should not be accepted that infallible knowledge only extends to a minute set of mostly inconsequential propositions.
Prove the opposite then. I don't think you can actually win this one either: any "proof" taken in steps over time relies on you trusting your memory when it could have been implanted a second ago by an evil demon. That's just meant to show even your demands for proof depend on fallible, not infallible, assertions of "knowledge."
>intuitionist
Be careful with that word, because it tends to mean something very different.
>We are left with subjective preferences (which can be true only accidentally)
No we're not. We're left with our subjectivity yes, but not with our preferences. The point is that we have them "as our preferences" because they're right, or so we think. So we should stick by them. You can't escape this. Everything you do, you do because you believe it's right. This is inescapable. That doesn't mean your beliefs come down to preference. Preference implies you see it yourself as a mere matter of taste. Nobody sees it like that. We all think we're objectively right. Disagreement doesn't mean we can't be objectively right.
>As Lewis said, it would be just a fancy way of presenting your own opinion, while having absolutely no way of confirming the worth of said opinion.
Lewis was a classic Quinean who believed you could weigh costs and values in theory choice and then commit to the best theory when you measured everything. He wasn't just in the business of mere subjectivity as you think.
>The value of a philosophical argument would not be found in its relation to truth, rather it would be found in its rhetorical power.
It's just very disingenuous of you to think that just because I recognize someone else doesn't share my intuitions and they mine, then if either of us stick by our intuitions, we're doing away with the belief (held independently by both of us) that the reason we have our intuitions is that they are truth-conducive.

[Anonymous No.18349272]

>>18349162
>What do you want a demonstration [...] the falsehood of my claim?
I thought that you were talking about science proving that we were wrong all the time on philosophical matters. I certainly don't contest that claim when it comes to scientific knowledge (after all I have already said that I think that scientific research can be fully independent of truth). Again, here I am only concerned about philosophy, I think science is left unscathed by these considerations.
>My intention isn't to take them out: it's to point out that aside from them, nobody thinks this way.
Again, that's a pretty big "aside". I'll add, consensus is completely irrelevant on these matters.
>And they were wrong. That doesn't mean I don't love them (I do) or find them useful or insightful or interesting (I do). All of philosophy is likely wrong. Much as all of science is likely wrong. Progress wouldn't be possible if we were already right. We haven't reached the end of history yet.
I'd claim that if they're wrong, and if they cannot be used to get to truly infallible philosophical knowledge, then we should not take them seriously, we should not consider them insightful, and instead we should talk about "wit" and read them for aesthetic purposes only.
>Prove the opposite then.
Even if I failed to prove it, this would not constitute a proof against such a possibility. That's why the burden is on those who share your view: they're the one that should prove that this pursuit is untenable, if they really want to rule it out. And if there's even the slightest chance that it could be tenable, then we should direct all our force in that direction, and regard anything short of it (e.g. intuition-based philosophies) as a distraction.
>No we're not. We're left with our subjectivity yes, but not with our preferences. The point is that we have them "as our preferences" because they're right, or so we think.
"Preference" was probably the wrong word, I should have said "subjective dispositions", or something of that sort.
>Lewis was a classic Quinean who believed you could weigh costs and values in theory choice and then commit to the best theory when you measured everything. He wasn't just in the business of mere subjectivity as you think.
Maybe not consciously. The passage that was quoted earlier was, all in all, a rare moment of lucidity for him. It still remains that nor Quine nor Lewis have the tools to justify their theoretical predilection, if not through appeals to intuitions (which are ultimately ungrounded opinions).
>It's just very disingenuous [...] intuitions is that they are truth-conducive.
They're not stuck with it: in this scenario a good argument is an argument with rethorical power, which is capable of swaying opinions (but this does not happen due to their truth-value). The belief of regarding truth-conduciveness would in turn also be grounded on intuitions, and so on. Ultimately, it would be an illusion.

[Anonymous No.18349290]

>That's why the burden is on those who share your view
Oh I disagree. I think the burden of proof lies squarely on your shoulders here. Attempts to "prove" infallible knowledge satisfy no one. Though as you said consensus doesn't matter to you so I guess this won't matter to you either. My point though, is that it doesn't satisfy me and others you could say this to. In which case, they and I would feel it's your burden to prove that such infallible knowledge is really possible. Til you do, we look where we look, and see the evidence lacking. So we take the other side. You might disagree with us, but I think you know where we're coming from here. It wouldn't be fair to act like we ourselves, upon introspecting, will realize the burden of proof lies on us not you. Because you can't show us what we want either, and we take our view only because you can't show what you propose.

I guess I'm curious to know what's something you think we have infallible knowledge about that isn't acquaintance with sense data or abstract objects, or small little logical or mathematical inferences. To make it harder I'll say, let's keep out all pure logic/mathematics out of it. What do you propose? We need enough infallible knowledge to put our sciences, ethics, and metaphysics in a secure place, but going beyond what I listed. Otherwise the point I'm making is that we can still secure knowledge in those affairs, just not infallible knowledge, and that's fine.

[Anonymous No.18349291]

>>18349272
>That's why the burden is on those who share your view
Oh I disagree. I think the burden of proof lies squarely on your shoulders here. Attempts to "prove" infallible knowledge satisfy no one. Though as you said consensus doesn't matter to you so I guess this won't matter to you either. My point though, is that it doesn't satisfy me and others you could say this to. In which case, they and I would feel it's your burden to prove that such infallible knowledge is really possible. Til you do, we look where we look, and see the evidence lacking. So we take the other side. You might disagree with us, but I think you know where we're coming from here. It wouldn't be fair to act like we ourselves, upon introspecting, will realize the burden of proof lies on us not you. Because you can't show us what we want either, and we take our view only because you can't show what you propose.

I guess I'm curious to know what's something you think we have infallible knowledge about that isn't acquaintance with sense data or abstract objects, or small little logical or mathematical inferences. To make it harder I'll say, let's keep out all pure logic/mathematics out of it. What do you propose? We need enough infallible knowledge to put our sciences, ethics, and metaphysics in a secure place, but going beyond what I listed. Otherwise the point I'm making is that we can still secure knowledge in those affairs, just not infallible knowledge, and that's fine.

[Anonymous No.18349378]

>>18349291
>Because you can't show us what we want either, and we take our view only because you can't show what you propose.
Wouldn't you concede that my inability to do so does not prove that such a system is impossible? And if such a system could be possible, shouldn't we aim for it, if we are really concerned with the pursuit of truth? And if such a system were to be possible wouldn't we preclude ourselves from ever reaching it, by adopting an intuition-based methodology? Or at the very least, wouldn't such approach leave us at the mercy of epistemic luck?
>What do you propose?
At the moment I propose nothing. I am still reading the works of others, and I am still thinking by myself. The only thing I propose is an objection to all those views that oppose such a goal without having given an actual proof of its impossibility. As long as we are not sure whether such a system is possible, we should strive to either reach it, or produce a definitive proof of its impossibility. I regard this as the first essential task of philosophy (and of any individual philosopher).

[Anonymous No.18349408]

Actually, philosophers don't use intuition at all, or very little.

[Anonymous No.18349426]

>>18349378
>Wouldn't you concede that my inability to do so does not prove that such a system is impossible?
Well honestly the problems with rationalism run much deeper than just being somehow inaccessible. The reason I dismissed rationalism earlier is that the methods are logically fallacious. You can demonstrate what's wrong with Anselm's and Descartes' proofs of God, Kant and Russell do some of that. As for Hegel and other German Idealists, they are abusing dialectic, contrary to Kant's admonition, and getting new special mileage from equivocations involving the words "not" and "is." When you clear things up, these proofs don't work anymore. The best reason to believe rationalism can't prove anything it sets out to, is that it would require content it has no access to. You can't begin with less content than you have originally, and infallibly prove the existence of any new content. If your starting point is impoverished, you just cannot prove new existents, or new states of affairs. But the rationalist strategy was to do precisely that. It's illegitimate but the illusion works because of equivocations, as well as disguised inductive jumps which do not and cannot actually ensure infallible certainty. Anyway, all the problems with rationalism aside, the burden is still yours. This is like saying we should aim for proving the existence of the Giant Spaghetti Monster, and that the burden is on me to prove it doesn't exist. This isn't how this stuff works.
>At the moment I propose nothing. I am still reading the works of others, and I am still thinking by myself.
I do commend the effort, keep it up anon.

[Anonymous No.18350821]

>>18347609
Your professor might not have enough time to cover all of the relevant material. I mean, Wittgenstein is also usually not taught in classes about the philosophy of languages, but literally everybody knows of him.

[Anonymous No.18350834]

>>18344118
THIS. The discussion of philosophy should at least be maintained in conversation with some particular text or series of texts. You want to talk about Platonism? Start a thread about the Republic, and deal with issues specifically raised in that work. Why does nobody read the sticky? Jannies need to actually start issuing warnings and pruning threads.

[Anonymous No.18351737]

>>18341889
He's literally one of the most cited academics of the 20th century

[Anonymous No.18351769]

>>18347609
I took one class and he was mentioned multiple times.

[Anonymous No.18352278]

>>18347609
Were any of them metaphysics classes? He's king in metaphysics, but he doesn't appear so much if you go into other fields. He did make contributions to philosophy of language (essential indexical literature), philosophy of mind, and so forth, but he's more of a metaphysics person.

[Anonymous No.18352995]

>>18349426
>But the rationalist strategy was to do precisely that.
I can't think of one name who set out to do so (apart from, maybe, Schelling, but only in a very abstract way). Plato didn't do it (his philosophy is nature, as he says, can at best be likely), Aristotle does not do it (as he says in De Partibus Animaliun, the truth of any claim concerning nature is fully dependent on observation), St. Anselm and St. Thomas do not do it, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz do not do it (for such an operation would require an infinite intellect), Kant and Fichte do not do it (for obvious reasons), and neither does Hegel (who accepted the contingency of philosophy of nature on observation and scientific research - he even go as far as saying that when Krug demands for the deduction of his pen, he is abandoning philosophy).
>Anyway, all the problems with rationalism aside, the burden is still yours. This is like saying we should aim for proving the existence of the Giant Spaghetti Monster, and that the burden is on me to prove it doesn't exist.
I think this is a disanalogy. Does the concept of philosophy entail that I should pursue the knowledge of the Spaghetti Monster? I don't think so. On the other hand I think it is perfectly reasonable to expect a PHILOSOPHER to pursue truth. In fact, a philosopher is defined by it: if he is instead searching for something else, he should be denoted by that pursuit (so, if his goal is doxastic pseudo-rationalization, we can call him a rhetoretician, or a doxophile, or something of that sort). If instead his actual goal is the pursuit of truth, I think it is reasonable to expect from him that he will not adopt intuition-based methodologies (which can only be accidentally truth-conducive, and as such cannot ever be justified, nor can their attainment of truth ever be recognized) before having proved definitely, once and for all, that no other option is available. If the philosopher still takes such a path, I claim that we can be sure that he wasn't really interested in truth (maybe he just thought he was, maybe he was lying the whole time, either way the pronouncement stays the same). Hegel would even say that such a person would be scared of truth.

[Anonymous No.18353306]

>>18352995
>Plato
Plato is definitely messing around with equivocations and inductive jumps, not to mention folk ideas of perfections, when he does a lot of his arguing involving the top-most forms, particularly in places like the Parmenides (involving the One) and the Sophist (involving Being and other top-most forms) where he demonstrates how dialectic lets you prove two mutually exclusive strands. Kant points out how dialectic has this power to prove both sides of a view "right," and the second half of Plato's Parmenides is a brilliant example thereof.
>Aristotle
Aristotle definitely does the same thing as Plato with regards to folk perfections. Easiest seen in On the Heavens when he tries to prove things about the celestial spheres and the prime mover(s).
>Anselm
The ontological proof for the existence of God which I've mentioned already is a typical example of "proving" things inappropriately, and Kant and Russell have good responses to it.
>Aquinas
I'll just say Kant's arguments against dialectic apply with many of Aquinas' "proofs" of the existence of God.
>Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz
The first two get a lot of mileage out of definitions getting us content (chiefly, the existence of God, but also the nature of mind and matter), it's the Anselmian strategy and tends to depend on a priori conceptions of folk perfections. Leibniz depends hugely on the principle of sufficient reason which I don't think should be done, when he says things about space being relational, or this being the best possible world.
>Kant
By and large what Kant does is not rationalism and he is critical of dialectic for the same reasons I am. He does transcendental critique, which has its own shortcomings, but at least he recognizes the problems with rationalism.
>Fichte, Schelling, Hegel
Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel like I said before get a lot from equivocation with "is" and "not." Their dialectic is generative due to that. There's a bunch of examples but a good first example is how Fichte points out that the I must posit a not-I to distinguish itself as something (omnis determinatio est negatio as Hegel quoting Spinoza might say), but in so doing, this renders the not-I it posits ideal, thus also part of itself, so the not-I is somehow also part of the I and not totally different from it, but is still distinguished from it. So all these people save Kant do engage in rationalist metaphysics, and its illegitimate to do so for reasons Kant himself gives. You can tell rationalist metaphysics is rationalist metaphysics very simply: if it starts from impoverished content but, through artifice involving definitions, folk perfections, existence being part of essence, little disguised inductive jumps, equivocations, and other such tricks, you somehow "prove" the existence of further existents or states of affairs. All the people you mention absolutely do this using precisely those methods. And the pre-Kantians were critiqued for it by Kant.

[Anonymous No.18353406]

>>18353306
I haven't claimed that they are correct (proving that any of them is correct would require another extremely long conversation), I have claimed that they were not in the business of proving states of affairs and new existents when it came to philosophy of nature.
>Aristotle definitely does the same thing as Plato with regards to folk perfections. Easiest seen in On the Heavens when he tries to prove things about the celestial spheres and the prime mover(s)
In the passage I have mentioned Aristotle claims explicitly that whatever he says about nature is to be contingent on observation, and that new observation should lead to an emendation of one's own philosophy of nature. He explicitly states that without observation any philosophy of nature is mere dialectics (in the negative. Aristotelian sense, not in the Platonic or Hegelian sense)
>By and large what Kant does is not rationalism and he is critical of dialectic for the same reasons I am. He does transcendental critique, which has its own shortcomings, but at least he recognizes the problems with rationalism.
Kant is clearly a rationalist, just not a dogmatic one (at least in his own eyes).
Also the idea that Kant disproved the possibility of metaphysics can only be grounded on excessively charitable readings of his texts (a reading which takes, wrongly, at face value what Kant has to say about the impossibility of applying the categories to things in themselves). It was already proven by Schulze that Kantian categories are already thoughts entailing being, and that, apart from the one of Reality, they can all be applied to things in themselves, e.g. when we say "things in themselves exist, are not phenomena, and they are a necessary cause of representation" (which is an absolutely necessary claim according to Kant's transcendental logic) we are already applying the categories of Causality, Negation and Existence to them, and we are deeming noumena as real in light of a pure thought; similarily, when we call ourselves "causa noumenon", we are already applying the categories of Quantity, Reality, Substance, Causality and Existence to a thing in itself.

[Anonymous No.18353521]

>>18353406
Schulze, like everyone at the time, was criticizing Kant for illegitimately applying his own categories to things in themselves. That wasn't supposed to be seen as somehow proving that we can: it was supposed to show an inconsistency in Kant. He resisted being seen that way. Whether he was right or wrong about that, he definitely didn't think we could apply categories to things in themselves, and neither Schulze nor the others were trying to say we really could, because the whole categories talk was Kantian and they were just criticizing Kant as a whole by pointing out supposed inconsistencies.
>I have claimed that they were not in the business of proving states of affairs and new existents
Well I'm saying they were in the business, and I gave examples. I don't know where this talk of philosophy of nature is coming in. I've said existents and states of affairs: that's ontology and metaphysics in general. And they were definitely in that business, that's what their rationalism is about.

[Anonymous No.18353554]

>>18353521
>Schulze, like everyone at the time, was criticizing Kant for illegitimately applying his own categories to things in themselves. That wasn't supposed to be seen as somehow proving that we can: it was supposed to show an inconsistency in Kant
It is an inconsistency in his presentation, not his system. He was wrong in saying that categories could not be applied to noumena, he wasn't wrong in applying them. Without those two claims I have mentioned, there is no Kantian philosophy whatsoever.
>Well I'm saying they were in the business, and I gave examples. I don't know where this talk of philosophy of nature is coming in. I've said existents and states of affairs: that's ontology and metaphysics in general. And they were definitely in that business, that's what their rationalism is about.
If proving an existent means, for example, deduce the existence of a single human being, they were not in that business, as I have pointed out. The example you've mentioned were either incorrect, as in the case of Aristotle, or were dealing with specifically metaphysical objects, such as God, Ideas, etc.

[Anonymous No.18354732]

>>18352278
Our metaphysics class mostly dealt with Quine

[Anonymous No.18354960]

>>18354732
I remember we read a bit of Lewis' philosophy of time in my undergraduate metaphysics class. In grad school Lewis showed up in all my metaphysics classes.

[Anonymous No.18354967]

>>18353554
>The example you've mentioned were either incorrect, as in the case of Aristotle, or were dealing with specifically metaphysical objects, such as God, Ideas, etc.
There is no real difference between entities. What exists, exists. Thinking otherwise is a remnant of rationalism itself: the old rationalists thought entities provable a priori but not by observation were "metaphysical entities" like God and ideas. Proving "metaphysical entities" exist a priori is still based on false, flawed reasoning. Something Kant points out and critiques.

[Anonymous No.18354992]

>>18344527
Perhaps, but their analytical skill is rather vertiginous and is recognized as such.

[Anonymous No.18355054]

>>18344527
Everyone is wrong on basically everything, if you believe otherwise you don't believe in the possibility of progress.

[Anonymous No.18355112]

>>18354967
>Something Kant points out and critiques.
You cannot use Kant to make this argument, since he basically does the same thing with noumena (and if you take those out you also lose his critique of dogmatic metaphysics)

[Anonymous No.18355178]

>>18355112
Kant's right whether or not he himself made the mistake you accuse him of.
>and if you take those out you also lose his critique of dogmatic metaphysics
Fully disagree about that. As I said, his critique is simply that we cannot prove the existence of things from an impoverished base. That point holds outside the Kantian framework just as well. Hume mad similar points in this regard well before Kant did.

[Anonymous No.18355255]

>>18355178
>Kant's right whether or not he himself made the mistake you accuse him of
If he is, then we are already past the view you considered, since we have already accepted a line of reasoning that guarantees the existence of metaphysical objects (noumena).
>Fully disagree about that.
Considering that without the existence of noumena the transcendental deduction does not work (for at that point you're left with no source for sensible intuitions, since the intellect is a purely synthetic faculty - and if it isn't you've accepted intellectual intuitions in your system, falling therefore in the Fichtean trap), I don't see how you could possibly disagree. Without the TD you have established no transcendental logic nor you have established its validity, and the whole Dialectic of Pure Reason is predicated on said validity.
Basically, if Kant is right as you say, then actual metaphysics is possible.
>Hume mad similar points in this regard well before Kant did.
And Kant proved in the first critique that his bundle theory (the I think must accompany all my representations) and his critique of personal identity entail his Transcendental Deduction, and said Deduction entails an actual metaphysics concerning metaphysical objects (noumena).

Also concerning Hegel, what's the misuse of "is" and "not" you've mentioned earlier? And could you make an example of this mistake (e.g. with the dialectic of being-nothing-becoming, or with the dialectic of sense certainty)?

[Anonymous No.18355693]

>>18355054
Why do you believe in constant, eternal progress, when it comes to philosophy?

[Anonymous No.18355749]

>>18349408

[Anonymous No.18355752]

>>18355749
>>18349408

[Anonymous No.18355772]

What is based?
Baby don't hurt me... don't hurt me... no more...

[Anonymous No.18355931]

>>18355752
>>18355749
damn, Priest takes no prisoners

[Anonymous No.18356097]

>>18355255
The idea that we can't infallibly prove the existence of something from impoverished content doesn't need Kantianism to work. Like I said, you can look at Hume if you're curious. When he makes the point we can't really prove the future will be like the past, or that there really exist external world objects beyond sensations, it's the same idea. Kant's critique of bundle theory of the self doesn't rob that from Hume. All Kant is saying is that we have transcendental apperception as a condition necessary for the rest of consciousness.
>>18355693
It's just a regulative ideal, without it there's no point in even trying anymore.

[Anonymous No.18356124]

>>18356097
>All Kant is saying is that we have transcendental apperception as a condition necessary for the rest of consciousness.
Yes, but it is not a sufficient condition, since it is a purely synthetic faculty, and as such it cannot "make" by itself any content to relate into an experience: but there is an experience, and therefore there must be another concurrent cause of my intuitions (and this cause will be, by definition, a noumenon). With this Kant has already proved (if you accept Hume's bundle theory and his criticism of personal identity), starting from so called "impoverished content", that something outside of us must exist (and that categories can be applied to this something).
For these reasons I claim that neither Hume nor Kant can be used to make your argument. I suspect that only eliminative materialists could go past this objection.

[Anonymous No.18356366]

>>18356124
Nobody really agrees with Kant's "proof" of noumena there. I don't. Schulze didn't, Jacobi didn't, Fichte didn't. I realize you see to solve the problem by saying we can just apply categories to noumena, but there's several ways around that route. Obviously there's the Fichtean idealist route, which would in fact say the transcendental apperception is jointly necessary and sufficient, but there's also a return-to-Hume option explored by Jacobi and Schulze. We just have "faith" (as the German translation of Hume calls it) or rather as Hume calls it in English "natural belief" in the existence of these external world objects (analogous to Kantian things in themselves), no proof of them. Here's one way we can look at the whole situation: we could just take experiences to be objects themselves and ourselves to be acquainted with them, in the style of acquaintance theory and sense data theory. Then in that case, the objects we prove exist are precisely ones we have direct acquaintance with. Nothing beyond them enters into it. Our base then doesn't get us beyond itself to prove the existence of further entities, not infallibly anyway. Kant never really gives arguments against such a view, he always presupposes a sort of mediated perception view instead of sense data acquaintance, it's actually one of my big issues with Kant that he doesn't really take it seriously.