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18296037 No.18296037[DELETED]  [Reply] [Original]

>> No.18296044

>>18296037
das right we wuz philosophers

>> No.18296053
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18296053

I need some assistance in understanding Kant's proof of the antithesis of his third antimony. I'm not sure what he means by "Every beginning of action, however, presupposes a state of the not yet acting cause, and a dynamically first beginning of action presupposes a state that has no causal connection at all with the cause of the previous one," It seems like he's saying that actions beginning outside the causal chain can't exist because because they aren't caused, which appears to be begging the question. Or if I interpret this differently, he means a free causal chain can't logically interact with the predetermined chain. Why can't an originally uncaused "free" action combine with a normally caused action to produce another caused action?

>> No.18296055
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18296055

>>18296037
DAS RITE

>> No.18296075

>>18296037
AYO WUZ DIS SHIT FUCKING NAZI CRACKA DAVID HUME DUNNO Y THING BE CUZ ITS AFTER ANOTHA THING DIS SHITS FUCKED UP MAN HUME WUZ A FUCKING RACIS CRACKA MAN HUME BTFO

>> No.18296089

>>18296053
fuck man, I just wanted to make a joke for clicks and get people to read my question, not make a stale nigger memes thread

>> No.18296094
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18296094

das ding an sich

>> No.18296979

>>18296053
Here’s my attempt, take it with a grain of salt though:

A “free cause” would have no grounding for existing the way it does because one could not explain it via an appeal to previous states that caused it. This would violate PSR and undermine the intelligibility of nature. If that were the case, it seems nature would not be possible. But nature is indeed possible, with all objects of experience grounded in previous states, so the “free” or “spontaneous” cause does not exist, nor can it interact with the world of wholly determined nature.

I’m not sure I really answered your question though, and this is just me taking a stab at that Kant.