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18235286 No.18235286 [Reply] [Original]

Compatibilism confuses me. How can I call free will ‘free’ if no other outcome would have occurred? It just seems like wordplay to me

>> No.18235320
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18235320

>>18235286
IDK about compatibilism, but how I reason free will and determinism is that
>determinism is true
>there is no free will really
>we can pretend that we do have free will since there is no way to accurately predict the future
Maybe compatibilists believe in free will* but not free will from the perspective of, say, god.

>> No.18235332

>>18235320
That’s basically how I view things. If we understood the universe like clockwork we wouldn’t hold anything at fault but we are incapable of that.

>> No.18235339

>>18235320
But God is in everything, so your life is what God wanted, and God is experiencing it, so you, as God, freely chose this life.

>> No.18235350

>>18235332
I like exploring the implications if I had the god perspective of free will, like basically everyone is a victim of their environment.
>>18235339
Sure doesn't feel like that

>> No.18235373

>>18235350
>Sure doesn't feel like that
that’s because you are ignorant, and even this is part of the plan

>> No.18235381 [DELETED] 

>>18235286
Look up Lewis’ response to van Inwagen

>> No.18235391

>>18235373
I bet it was gods plan for you to be a cunt on a anime messaging board too. To bad you chose to be here being unconvincing instead of doing something interesting.

>> No.18235408

>>18235391
I don’t know how I was being rude. It’s clear that everyone is ignorant, as no one has the omniscience of God. But omniscience must include the knowledge and experience of the lack thereof, which is fulfilled in you and me everyone else.

>> No.18235422
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18235422

>>18235408
>tfw your'e so omniscient you forget everything

>> No.18235431

>>18235286
Look up Lewis’ response to van Inwagen. Essentially the argument of determinism is that some full state of the universe S_0 combined with the laws of the universe L fully describe all future (after S_0) states of the universe, each of which could be called S_1. However counterfactuals still hold under determinism (or so most think), which opens the possibility of some “miracle event” happening between S_0 and S_1 that allows a new event to occur at S_1, called S_1’, in which you take an action that is not implied by the connection of S_0 and L. You don’t have to break the laws if something does it before you. If you object to the miracle event just read the paper, I don’t agree with Lewis so this is a biased restatement

>> No.18235440

>>18235422
God is beyond time, he is already fulfilled. But you are just one of his memories of what time and ignorance are

>> No.18235443

>>18235373
Jesus tells Peter that Peter will deny him thrice before the cock cries. Is Peter able to not deny Jesus thrice before that time? If he cannot, he has no free will. If he can, Jesus is a liar. (Am Lewisposter)

>> No.18235589

It is confusing because it is nonsensical. Besides, indeterminism doesn't help believers in free will, be they compatibilists or libertarians. Galen Strawson's Basic Argument shows why. His paper called "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility" is available for free online, but I'll post an excerpt with the relevant part here:
"... the Basic Argument goes as follows.

(1) Interested in free action, we are particularly interested in actions that are performed for a reason (as opposed to 'reflex' actions or mindlessly habitual actions).

(2) When one acts for a reason, what one does is a function of how one is, mentally speaking. (It is also a function of one's height, one's strength, one's place and time, and so on. But the mental factors are crucial when moral responsibility is in question.)

(3) So if one is to be truly responsible for how one acts, one must be truly responsible for how one is, mentally speaking—at least in certain respects.

(4) But to be truly responsible for how one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, one must have brought it about that one is the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects. And it is not merely that one must have caused oneself to be the way one is, mentally speaking. One must have consciously and explicitly chosen to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, and one must have succeeded in bringing it about that one is that way.

(5) But one cannot really be said to choose, in a conscious, reasoned, fashion, to be the way one is mentally speaking, in any respect at all, unless one already exists, mentally speaking, already equipped with some principles of choice, 'P1'—preferences, values, pro-attitudes, ideals—in the light of which one chooses how to be.

(6) But then to be truly responsible, on account of having chosen to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, one must be truly responsible for one's having the principles of choice P1 in the light of which one chose how to be.

(7) But for this to be so one must have chosen P1, in a reasoned, conscious, intentional fashion.

(8) But for this, i.e. (7), to be so one must already have had some principles of choice P2, in the light of which one chose Pl.

(9) And so on. Here we are setting out on a regress that we cannot stop. True self-determination is impossible because it requires the actual completion of an infinite series of choices of principles of choice.'

(10) So true moral responsibility is impossible, because it requires true self-determination, as noted in (3)."
Still haven't come across a good response to this. Can /lit/ provide me with one?

>> No.18235680

>>18235443
Peter does what he is supposed to do, which God freely chose. The flesh of Peter has no free will, no.

>> No.18235718

>>18235589
>So true moral responsibility is impossible
So what?

>> No.18235728

>>18235718
What do you mean?

>> No.18235783

>>18235718
So what? That's it. No such thing as moral responsibility. There is no "so what" to it.

>> No.18235803

>>18235783
And?

>> No.18235806

>>18235783
then why does it matter if we are “responsible” or not? Punishment etc. is still necessary to guide human behavior. Though you might conclude that an eternal hell is unjust (it is)

>> No.18235839

>>18235806
This isn't about whether or not we "should" (nonsensical word, see the is/ought problem for further information) punish people or not, but I'll bite. The obvious answer is that most people will keep believing in free will and moral responsibility no matter what someone like Galen Strawson writes in a philosophy paper, or what people like us write on here, so saying something like "Punishment etc. is still necessary" is silly, because of the obvious fact that punishment as a concept is not endangered by the Basic Argument. I don't understand why people get so hung up on things like punishment when the question of free will comes up.

>> No.18235850

>>18235803
So what?

>> No.18235872
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18235872

>>18235850
>>18235718
>>18235728
>>18235783
>>18235803
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TxWN8AhNER0

>> No.18235885

Check out Leibniz's compatibilism

>> No.18235950

>>18235286
Determinism is the highest law of all existence.
Any sort of creation conjured by the minds of men, no matter how high and powerful, is in the end still bound to it.
It stands so far above us that there is no real reason to worry about it. You can feel free when doing the things you like to do, that should be enough.
The only reason these forms of semi-determinism exist is because some people simply cannot bear with the idea that they aren't the ones who get to decide on their destinies.

>> No.18236071

>>18235950
>The only reason these forms of semi-determinism exist is because some people simply cannot bear with the idea that they aren't the ones who get to decide on their destinies.
Prepare for an army of free will believers in denial to attack you

>> No.18236187

>>18236071
>semi-determinism is all cope
lmao true

>> No.18236208

>>18235286
Really just a kinda different definition of free will. You are a deterministic entity and all your actions are nonetheless taken and owned by you. I don't even know what free will would look like since one would imagine anything meaningful must be causally determined.

>> No.18236215

I've never met a determinist that wasn't crippled by depression.
Also, the reason why """""debate""""" still rages is because of the liberal illness of shared humanity. Some people clearly have the capacity of choice. Others, the golems, the npcs, cannot.

>> No.18236241

>>18235950
> everyone who disagrees with me is engaging in motivated reasoning
you’re not wrong though

>> No.18236242
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18236242

>>18236215
I am hard determinist and not depressed.
How?
>all things are predetermined
>I exist in the present and have no means of seeing the future
>fuck it might as well pretend I have some free will, I think I'll do something fun today
>wow I really fucked up in the past, well that can be easily explained by the environmental pressures that molded me up to that point
Yes I really live like this and I am not looking to change any time soon. Learn to love yourself and enjoy the rollercoaster of life.

>> No.18236267

>>18236241
although it should probably be said that not wanting to have to take responsibility for your actions is probably a likewise powerful motivator

>> No.18236302

>>18236215
Being depressed =/= being wrong. I see plenty of mentally retarded people at work, and they seem pretty happy compared to the intelligent people I know. Where does that leave us?

>> No.18236592

>>18235286
you had a free choice, you just would never pick anything other than what you did, but still the choice exists

>> No.18236967

>>18236592
Then what makes my choice determined by liberty and not necessity?
Even when we think a choice is really tough to make we make a snap decision when compelled. The act of choosing is only a natural process to arriving towards what you truly want, it’s not *real*.
Does that make sense?

>> No.18237323

>>18236592
>but the choice exists
Some disbelievers in free will would grant you that, but I don't even think the choice itself exists. Every hypothetical decision - that is, every decision we consider but don't end up making - is a pure fantasy. The conditions that would inevitably lead to your choice were there long before you felt like you made it. It's not like there are several potential realities out there and we can choose between them by making certain decisions. A choice is more like a consequence than an action.

>> No.18237849

this whole debate is worthless abstract semantics. is this what philosophy cares about?

>> No.18237854

>>18235950
>The only reason these forms of semi-determinism exist is because some people simply cannot bear with the idea that they aren't the ones who get to decide on their destinies.
Sounds like cope for laziness and lack of self-actualization to me.

>> No.18238179

Even if we did have free will our free choices would still be motivated by our prior actions, experiences, and beliefs. If they weren't, and free will means truly random choices, then why the fuck would anyone want that? I don't know what you would you even perceive, since you'd be functionally insane with no reason for doing anything. In this case could you even want to do (or not do) anything?
Either way, we still act/perceive as though we have free will because we can't do otherwise.
So while they can be fun to argue about, determinism, indeterminism, free will, no free will, compatibilism, etc are kinda pointless debates imo all with their own flavors of cope.
That being said, I'm pretty retarded so who knows

>> No.18238226

>>18238179
>If they weren't, and free will means truly random choices, then why the fuck would anyone want that? I don't know what you would you even perceive, since you'd be functionally insane with no reason for doing anything. In this case could you even want to do (or not do) anything?
That's assuming indeterminism too. But I guess this doesn't rule out compatibilism either, in that could say we have a sort of random free choice but in some sense choose to base it on the same conditions that are firmly causal under hard determinism.

>> No.18238237

I guess we have free will insofar as we don't know how the future will be
There are choices but they're very limited

>> No.18238531

>>18235332
I don't think it changes anything. If you view someone who wrongs you as the product of predetermined forces it doesn't really change what you should do with them in return, it just changes whether you view them with hatred or with a kind of despair, like you would a natural disaster, and even this is usually relegated to a later stage of processing, in the heat of the moment you aren't going to think that way. Likewise it doesn't get you out of anything personally, you will still feel shame, guilt, remorse, for what you do, unless you were a psychopath to begin with. You might engage in some self-pity: why did I have to be this way? But this is in fact an age-old behavior anyway, people lamenting their inability to control themselves. You are still faced with the same choices(lel), you can integrate the knowledge of what you've done wrong and determine to do better, or you can wallow in self-hatred, or repress the feelings entirely, or whatever other option. Knowing that it was(and is) all predetermined doesn't change that you are likely to want to act a certain way given a certain situation, and though it is a weird sensation to be consciously thinking about the subject of predetermination even as you make choices, knowing that even that is more predetermination, it doesn't really alter the outcome, you still have your preferences, your temperament, your desires and goals, your beliefs. In most cases people simply forget about the concept altogether because they are wrapped up in the particulars of the issues. If we are robots, then we are robots that only occasionally think about the fact that we are robots, so knowing one way or the other doesn't have a great impact. The notion that awareness of this concept would cause nihilism or apathy is really a product of a massive misunderstanding of human psychology, as if we were some neat and simple equation that you put an input into and the logical result comes out(not to mention that it's not even really logical, 'if we aren't in control then nothing matters' is not some necessary or objective chain of reasoning).

Of course people do tend to be a bit too certain about this subject. It is possible that we do have free will, but we simply cannot understand it or articulate it. Maybe our faculty of reason just can't deal with it, similarly perhaps to the problem of consciousness, or God. This is a bit of a cop-out answer but I don't think it can be entirely disregarded. The compatibilist type answers though are just obvious sophism. Handwaving about determinism and knowledge of states and so on doesn't alter the fact that literally nobody can even define the notion of free will coherently(other than in a way in which it is not really 'free' in any meaningful sense at all), and the very concept of causation just shits all over any possibility of free will. So the reasonable options to me are that it simply doesn't exist, or it does exist but we can't conceive of its nature.

>> No.18238535

>>18235286
Determinism is false
Free will is false
Now fuck off with your pre-modern mind games

>> No.18238537

>>18238535
>They're both false

NOOO MY REALIT Y IS CRUMBLING WHAT IS TRUE NOOOOOOOOOOO

>> No.18238555

>>18238537
either you're just obediently doing what they expect you to do or you're negating the halting oracle out of spite, there are no other options

>> No.18238556

>>18235286
I suppose the compatibilist would say that the possibility of doing otherwise is not a necessary condition for free will. A clear counterexample can be seen from considering that sometimes choices necessarily follow from other choices. For example: 1. I have chosen to take either the left or right path of a fork. 2. I have chosen not to take the right path, perhaps because it looks muddy. 3. Therefore, I will choose to take the left path. Given choices 1 and 2, I could not have done otherwise than to make choice 3, but this fact alone does not appear to make it an unfree choice.

>> No.18238668

>>18238555
Damn bro

>> No.18238693

>>18238535
>>18238537
Information complexity is the only physical quantity that is not bound by matter/energy conservation laws and can thus grow to be unbounded.

The information complexity singularity is what we colloquially call "free will".

Whether or not humans posses "free will" is an open question, but the mere existence of "free will" is an absolute fact. (Like the existence of triangles, or the real numbers, etc.)

>> No.18238708

Because many compatibilists have a different definition of free will from you. Let's say you are an undecided voter and in the days before the 2020 presidential election you are unknowingly kidnapped by a mad scientist while you sleep. During the night, this mad scientist implants a chip in your brain that can be controlled remotely by him. What it does is quite simple: if you go to the voting booth and reach out to vote for President Trump, the scientist will turn on the chip, which will then override your brain and make you vote for Biden instead. However, on that day you reach out to vote for Biden; the scientist never turns on the chip. Clearly it is impossible to vote for Trump in this scenario, barring some error in the chip's function or the scientist's awareness. Yet you weren't forced to vote for Biden either. What to make of this? If by "free will" you more accurately mean "an abundance of possibility," then free will is incompatible with determinism. But if by "free will" you instead mean "a lack of external coercion," then it is compatible with determinism.

>> No.18238826

>>18235286
what does it mean for another outcome to 'would have occurred'? its pure linguistic fiction.

>> No.18238858

>>18235332
you can hold people at fault in the same way that you hold machines at fault. If it's broken, for example it lies to you or steals your shit, it needs to be fixed, abandoned, or disposed of.

>> No.18238870

>>18237854
Do you see the truth and shy away from it out of fear or are you actually blind. Only those without faith in themselves have a reason to fear fate.

>> No.18238885

>>18238826
the implication of the phrase "would have occured" is itself an argument for determinism. "Would have occurred if the circumstances were different". It's only the people who don't think about what would actually be required for their alternate history to exist that honestly believe in free will.