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18223136 No.18223136 [Reply] [Original]

Why there seem to be a lack of omnicomprehensive philosophical systems in our age? I know no post-WWII philosopher who tried to systematize te whole human knowledge as Aristotle, Aquinas, or Hegel did.

Why this?

>> No.18223150
File: 63 KB, 705x700, Gustavo-bueno.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
18223150

>>18223136
Gustavo Bueno

>> No.18223163

>>18223136
Because everyone realised that philosophy is meaningless and everything can be explained by science. Our knowledge of science is limited so we will probably never understand fully the totality of existence, but we can discover more and more by researchers specialising. The age of grand geniuses and all-encompassing theories is over.

>> No.18223170

A lot of the people you listed were acting in the absence of rigorous scientific data we now have. the need for such systems is moot, and actually counterproductive. /lit/ will advise otherwise because they have issues with intellectual insecurity, but if you want to understand comprehensively the systems that define our universe you’re going to need to look to the hard sciences— even if you don’t appreciate the authors’ generally materialist outlooks, you won’t be able to address them sufficiently without taking in the relevant facts these same authors are promoting

>> No.18223183

>>18223136
>>18223163
Pretty much this. Metaphysics and a “theory of everything” has always been speculation and has always been proven wrong, so there’s simply no point.

>> No.18223193
File: 59 KB, 2160x1078, 1619345458178.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
18223193

>>18223170
>>18223163
>Is-ought

>> No.18223220

>>18223193
>anime fag doesn’t understand is-ought fallacy
not surprised in the slightest

>> No.18223227

>>18223193
The is-ought gap is just a result of the limitations of our current state of scientific knowledge. With a complete understanding of the universe it would not exist.

>> No.18223240

>>18223227
Baby-brained take desu

>> No.18223241

Ken Wilber?

>> No.18223277
File: 21 KB, 320x233, Gustavo Bueno.preview.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
18223277

>>18223136
Bueno's philosophical materialism was probably the last one. He died on 2016.

>> No.18223284

>>18223163
/lit/ will never accept this because everyone here desperately wants to be a "grand genius" who revolutionises philosophy and has a school of thought or ideology named after them. In reality, you will not contribute to advancing our understanding of anything unless you work in academia, and that is soul-crushingly boring. It is better to abandon your pseudointellectual pretensions

>> No.18223291
File: 213 KB, 828x991, 1620524489760.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
18223291

>>18223220
If it's true, I'm not too bothered by that. Even a famed neuroscientist couldn't grasp the is-ought gap.

>> No.18223306

>>18223136
Anyone intelligent enough to do it has realized that it's a waste of time

>> No.18223518

>>18223227
>The is-ought gap is just
cope

>> No.18223608

>>18223136
>systematize te whole human knowledge
My basic understanding is that after the holocaust, the western philosophical project of categorizing, systematizing, and grabbing at reason began to seem suspect, since, after all, the west proved itself capable of committing large-scale atrocities while toting "Enlightenment" ideals.

Much of the subsequent philosophy explored how this could've happened and did so using insights into subjectivity and non-duality that are typically attributed to thinkers like German idealists, Spinoza, Nietzsche, existentialists, Eastern philosophy, and art

Some post war thinkers developed their criticism while also producing new* ways of thinking about human knowledge, such as Karl Popper, Marshall McLuhan, and French post-structuralists like Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guatarri. They often emphasized in their work that something like an "omnicomprehensive" system could easily be seized upon and redeployed as a fascistic ruling apparatus. This lead to a re-imagining of Western epistemology, wherein humans are expected to be self-aware enough to consider, at the most fundamental levels, problems such as ontological instability, bias, context in relation to content, difference in relation to essence, becoming in relation to being, etc.

>> No.18223639

>>18223163
>muh science

>> No.18223647
File: 33 KB, 600x514, gustavobueno2.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
18223647

>>18223150
>>18223277
This.
In Bueno's view, only when arts, religions, techniques (including politics), sciences and technologies –"first grade knowledges"– have been sufficiently developed can philosophy then appear as "second grade knowledge", transcendental in relation to "first grade knowledge" (in the sense that it permeates various kinds of knowledges).
Thus philosophy is far from being an absolute knowledge (metaphysics), a science (logic, epistemology) or the "mother of sciences" that would not have a specific role once sciences have become sufficiently mature.
Bueno offers an operational description of philosophy (as opposed to etymological or psychological definitions, such as "love of wisdom"): philosophy is the discipline that works with ideas.
Ideas, however, do not descend from heaven nor emerge spontaneously from the human soul; they are worldly and objective products of human reality. How, then, are they produced? Provided that the above-mentioned first grade knowledges produce concepts, ideas spring from contradictions and incommensurabilities among different concepts, or among different regions of concepts.

Therefore, since ideas depend on concepts, it is to be expected that the more developed the "first grade" concepts are (technologies, politics, sciences), the more developed ideas will be. As quotidian reality becomes more and more complex, instruments for a philosophical and systematic approach to ideas must be revised and completed. Any truly philosophical system has to be able to address and interpret both that increasingly complex reality and the various systems offered in the past. Philosophical reasoning, as Plato taught, is dialectic and never dogmatic, in that it cannot just "describe" reality as if it had a direct relation with it, but needs to refer controversially to interpretations of the concepts with which human beings re-organize the world.

With these methodological characteristics, philosophical materialism postulates itself as one of the most powerful systems currently at work. Even today, when scholars claim to have abandoned "grand narratives" and systematic views, ideas still need to be related to other ideas in order to be understood and, as such, each of us inevitably has an ontology and a theory of knowledge, no matter how basic and implicit. For example, people trying to make sense of their own religious feelings need to have ideas (no matter how simple) about humans, divine entities, and the relationships between the two. The same is true for someone in a pub or at work trying to justify a democratically elected law - they would probably need to mention free will, representation, nation, etc. All of these ideas are intertwined, thus forming systems, however weak or strong. A criterion for determining the power of a system of ideas is its capacity to relate to the phenomena it is trying to organize.

>> No.18223656

>>18223136
mitchel heisman did. suicide note is the greatest work of philosophy since the 60s

>> No.18223660

>>18223647
In any event, philosophical materialism maintains its coherence as a system. Its essential core was expressed in Bueno's book Ensayos materialistas: philosophical materialism means ontological determinism and pluralism. As the founder of academic philosophy, and from the viewpoint of his theory of knowledge, Plato defended in his Sophist the principle of symploke, the same principle that Bueno uses to support both determinism and pluralism: "nothing is isolated from everything else, but not everything is connected to everything else; otherwise, nothing could be known."

The first part of the principle of symploke justifies determinism and can be sustained nowadays by acknowledging how the different sciences need to refer to causal relations in their respective operational fields. Even random theories or theories of chaos do not destroy causal relations, but put them into a complex frame. In any event, the theory of causality employed by materialism differs from the classical theory of cause (employed by both Aristotle and Hume) in that it is triadic, since the material substratum is considered as a necessary part of any causal relation. The dyadic (or formalistic) theory of cause can be represented by the function y = f(x), while the triadic theory of cause defines the effect as the deviation of a given material scheme of identity, H. Thus, the effect Y results from the composition of H with the causal determinant, X. That is: Y = f (H, X).

>> No.18223673

>>18223284
Project harder, faggot.

>> No.18223675

>>18223660
In this scheme, the idea of a cause that causes itself, a causa sui, an idea often used to describe God (and, nowadays, some so-called "emergent" properties) is a philosophical absurdity (since the effect would need to be prior to the cause). Rather, determination always means co-determination among parts of reality. Therefore, from the point of view of philosophical materialism, the idea of form, as opposed to matter, must be re-interpreted as relations between material parts of a whole (philosophical materialism has developed a strong theory of wholes and parts). Finally, regarding non-corporeal materialities (see below), the idea of determination is a functional one (since causal relations only take place among bodies), useful to deny the possibility of self-determination and emergence. It is important to note that defending determinism is coherent with defending human freedom (as in Spinoza, Marx, and others), although it does imply a refutation of free will. In the same way, ontological determinism does not imply gnoseological determinism as sciences do not exhaust reality.

The second part of the principle of symploke justifies pluralism, which goes beyond just heterogeneity or multiplicity since it defends the disconnection among different areas, regions, or categories of reality. For instance, the different sciences appear as non-reducible to one another and often in conflict (given this backdrop, philosophy appears almost spontaneously to treat those areas affected by conflicts among sciences: history vs anthropology, neurology vs psychology, etc.), although they might share elements of their respective fields (it is possible, however, to know the list of American presidents without knowing how to decompose an atom).

>> No.18223676

>>18223277
>>18223150
Is he well known outside of Spain?

>> No.18223684

>>18223675
Pluralism, as opposed to monism (both substance monism: "everything comes from one single thing" and order monism: "everything follows one single plan"), turns the very idea of God into a contradiction, and prevents its modern substitution by the idea of Nature, which has been carried out in systems such as organicism, dialectical materialism, etc. Philosophical materialism, according to this and other arguments, claims to be able to prove the inexistence of God by the inexistence of its very idea: according to the ontological argument to prove God's inexistence ("if the idea of God is possible, God has to exist, since the idea of God implies God's existence") proving that the idea of God is impossible would be tantamount to saying that God cannot exist. But the idea of God is impossible, in that it is contradictory (for instance, the contradictions between an infinite being and a finite world, or the absurdity of an infinite consciousness). Thus, philosophical materialism sustains essential atheism, and not just existential atheism.
>>18223676
He has been getting some traction on Hispanic America, but not very well known outside the Hispanosphere

>> No.18223693

>>18223684
From this point of view, materialism is not understood as corporeal mechanism since the existence of non-corporeal materialities –such as undulatory energy, the distance between two bodies (which, in itself, is not a body), or kinship in a human society– has to be acknowledged. In special ontology, the idea of matter is divided into three genera, or kinds, that cannot survive alone but which nevertheless do not emanate from one another: physical matter, psychological matter and ideal matter. Spiritualism is impossible since a "separated consciousness" cannot exist or evolve without a body: perception, will, projects, and rationality are impossible to imagine without space, time and a biological body with a brain. Thus the different genera are necessarily connected, though not reducible to one another. In order to avoid metaphysical substantiation of these related genera of matter (as occurs in traditional scholastics –World, Soul, God– or as seen in Popper's ontology), Bueno labeled them M1, M2, and M3, three different genera of Matter that together conform the world.

The world, such as we perceive it and operate with parts of it, needs human and animal subjects to preserve its morphology (the anthropic principle becomes a zootropic principle, against idealism) and it is through them that it is conformed. The idea of a transcendental ego (irreducible to an absolute spirit or to the sum of the different individual psychological selves) is thus necessary to the unity of the different genera that conform the universe. Since human subjects apply logical functors to their activities, such as logical addition, we can express their way of conforming the world through logical functors: E (ego) = Mi (World) = (M1 ∪ M2 ∪ M3).

However, from the materialist point of view something would have to exist even if humans and animals were to disappear. This goes against the idealist or nihilist consequences that Fichte and other philosophers deduced from the discovery that an ego is necessary for the world to exist. Thus, as a negative idea defined by radical pluralism, Bueno reinterprets Wolff's general ontology as General Ontological Matter, or "M". "M" works against attempts to reduce reality to the world (M1, M2, M3; even for Wolff, general ontology was devoted to common aspects of special ontology). The dangers of that common reduction can be seen not only in Fichte's idealism (and the nihilist consequences that some authors deduced from it), but also in the fact that it would be a return to monism: only by postulating M can M1, M2, and M3 be conceived as necessarily linked but not reducible to one another. The different systems of philosophy that have existed since ancient Greece can be organized historically according to the importance given in them to these different aspects of ontology (M, E, Mi).

>> No.18223702
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18223702

>>18223693
Throughout history, many other philosophers have seen the necessity of introducing something beyond the world: Anaximander's apeiron, the Neoplatonic One, Kant's thing-in-itself, Schopenhauer's Will, etc. By reinterpreting this tradition, philosophical materialism opposes formalism, which would give priority to one genera of matter over the other two: physical reductionism (as in some versions of historical materialism), psychological reductionism (or spiritualism or idealism), and essentialism (as in some interpretations of Platonism).
Some of the most important aspects of philosophical materialism can be briefly –and in a very simplified manner– presented following the three axes that, in Bueno's theory, organize anthropological space. The concept of anthropological space is useful to refer to an area of reality that contains heterogeneous material which, from a materialist perspective, must contain more than just human beings (unlike Fichte's or Gehlen's one-dimensional anthropological space). As the idea of God started to decline, and the concepts that had been developed to think about God started to be applied to humans and human societies, anthropological space was reduced to the dichotomy between nature and culture, a dichotomy so common to 19th and 20th century philosophy and anthropology. However, in Bueno's philosophy, the reduction of anthropological space to only two axes cannot be deduced from atheism. A third axis is operationally necessary to connect the other two axes and to establish a critique of any sort of idealism. This critique therefore assumes the possibility of intelligent and willing beings different from human beings. These ideas can be represented by the diagrams in pic related.

>> No.18223707

>>18223241
the new-age coomer’s Guenon

>> No.18223709
File: 116 KB, 1048x640, 4-Bueno-Bueno-Cima-Holzenthal-1048x640.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
18223709

>>18223702
To avoid interpretations that prioritize one of the axes over the others, figure I shows the axis integrating relations between men (H) surrounding the rest and figure II represents the axis (H) surrounded by the other two. Once again in order to avoid substantiation, Bueno named each of the axes according to their role in the diagram (instead of using the traditional ideas of world, soul and God): the circular axis contains human subjects and those instruments through which those subjects act upon one another (H); the radial axis gathers any non-personal entity conceptualized by human techniques (N); the angular axis (A) integrates subjects equipped with will and knowledge, which are alive in our real world but which nevertheless are not humans. This triadic conception opposes itself to the dualism that appears in some interpretations of Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Hegel, Marx or Husserl.

1. Considered from the radial axis, philosophical materialism presents itself as cosmological materialism since it criticizes the view that describes the world as a contingent effect of a creating God who is the owner of the world's destiny. Cosmological materialism also includes a materialist understanding of the categorial sciences, that is, gnoseological materialism (a theory on how scientific categories become closed, or produce a circle of immanence around scientific truths understood as synthetic identities between parts of a given scientific field).

2. From the circular axis perspective, philosophical materialism resembles historical materialism in the critique of historical idealism and its project of explaining human history as a product of an "autonomous consciousness" in which the future of humanity is planned. Despite this resemblance, philosophical materialism rejects any teleology of human history and re-interprets the history of humanity as the history of universal empires. In this sense, it turns Marx upside down (as Marx claimed to be doing with Hegel’s philosophical system).

3. From the point of view of the angular axis, philosophical materialism acquires the form of a religious materialism critically opposed to spiritualism (that conceives of gods, spirits and souls as incorporeal entities). Philosophical materialism argues that those entities are neither spiritual nor products of a hallucinated imagination or social alienation; on the contrary, they are interpreted as real, corporeal entities able to act as numen and which have coexisted with human beings for millennia. Historically, and following ethological sciences, animals equipped with will and knowledge seem to be a good incarnation of real numina. When considered as numina, animals are part of the angular axis, possessing will and knowledge without being human beings and having been represented in prehistoric caves, thus making possible the following materialist principle: "Man made God in the image and likeness of animals."

>> No.18223721

>>18223163
>everything can be explained by science

Yikes.

>> No.18223737

>>18223647
sounds like deleuze

>> No.18223754

>>18223136
Because philosophy became too critical and self-aware. Each comprehensive attempt bound to have compromises. Analytic philosophy made it clear that the big questions were no longer of great importance. Continental philosophy was already too convoluted but it also experienced a series of specializations in the fields of sociology, linguistics, politics and so on. All in all, I would say that in XX century the scope of philosophy became too complex for any human mind to comprehend in one system.

>> No.18223780

>>18223163
I'm very skeptical of this response. I think there are definitive reasons to believe that science cannot account (not even in principle - it's not contingent on us being ignorant of certain facts) for certain facts that are certainly true, namely that there is phenomenical consciousness (the hard problem), and that there are intentional states. Reductive physicalism cannot account for the former, eliminative physicalism cannot account for the latter (and the worst part is that they refer to intentional states in their premises - see for example Frankish' and Dennett's accounts of illusionism, which are grounded on intentional states signifying something of the form of "it is as if I was having an experience x").
>>18223170
I'm not sure what kind of data would contradict what Hegel said. What do you have in mind?
Also, if it is about his philosophy of Nature, or about the one of Aristotle, then that's a non-problem since they both designed a philosophy of nature that was meant to be emendated as new scientific discoveries came out. Hegel revised his philosophy of nature for every new edition of his Encyclopedia, for example (and with great success: historians of science often praise Hegel for his accuracy and for being so updated on new scientific findings) and Aristotle explicitly claims in many passages (the most famous one is in De Partibus Animalium) that the truth of what he says about nature is contingent on scientific observation.

So, can you tell me which scientific discovery refuted Hegel's philosophy?
>>18223608
>the west proved itself capable of committing large-scale atrocities while toting "Enlightenment" ideals.
Is this a fair assessment, or was this just an irrational reaction to the horrendous atrocities of the 20th century? Can we really say that, for example, Nazi Germany followed in the slightest ANY of the directives that could be gathered from the writings of Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel? Having read them, I cannot genuinely see how could anyone think that they're compatible with Nazi ideology and with their crimes.

>> No.18223786

>>18223754
>Analytic philosophy made it clear that the big questions were no longer of great importance.
How?

>> No.18223794

>>18223786
By simply ignoring them ; )

>> No.18223852

>>18223780
>I cannot genuinely see how could anyone think that they're compatible with Nazi ideology and with their crimes.
>Heidegger was a nazi

>> No.18223891

>>18223852
I haven't mentioned Heidegger and neither did OP, since he wasn't a philosopher interested in formulating an omnicomprehensive philosophical system

>> No.18223967

Let's settle this once and for all. Pic related. Sorry for the meme pic but it's kind of relevant.

(A) On one hand, we had STEMfags who focused greatly on philosophy, and praised the role it had in opening their minds and guiding them towards achieving great things. E.g. Einstein, Godel, Hilbert, Turing, Leibniz, Newton, etc.
(B) On the other hand, there were many great STEMfags that did not care about philosophy or even dismissed it completely. E.g. Feynman, Hawking, Witten, Tao, Neumann, Susskind, etc.

Why did these two groups achieve roughly and arguably the same level of greatness? If philosophy is the spawning grounds of any science or conscious thought, then how is it possible to discover and invent great things without being good at it?
Today, fewer and fewer universities teach philosophy when studying for a STEM degree. Few teach foundational mathematics or foundational computer science.

>> No.18223980
File: 64 KB, 750x937, 1620741213397.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
18223980

>>18223967
Sorry, forgot to add a lust-provoking pic to my post in order to attract more attention.

>> No.18224011

>>18223967
Imo, scientists tend to "mystify" a field a bit with philosophical or religious insights as it is coming into being, but once it becomes essentially "already known", this sort of thinking disappears, because the answers to practical questions tend to be independent of the metaphysics you use to ground the theory. Quantum foundations is an example of this, it's mildly interesting, but ultimately no one has provided an experiment to prove that Copenhagen, MWI, or whatever is right and the others are wrong in some subtle way.

Newton and Leibniz discovering most of modern mechanics is one example, or "quantum mysticism" that's essentially a non-entity nowadays. Philosophy, or the sacred, fill in the unknown mental space until a reliable theory can be formalized and written down. Newton or Leibniz would've had a religious field day with String Theory, I suspect.

>> No.18224023

>>18224011
>>18223967
I forgot to add that physics in the 21st Century is a lot harder than in the 17th or even the 20th. One hardly has time to "study philosophy" in any real depth and half the time professional philosophers don't even agree on what key figures say anyway.

>> No.18224062

>>18223291
I still don't get how people are filtered by such a simple matter

>> No.18224082

>>18224023
thanks for the serious reply. Yeah, that's exactly what I feel. I wanted to become better at what I do, so I naturally tried to read more philosophy. But I realized that almost no one currently alive in STEM has any time for doing this. Everyone just assumes the philosophical aspect of the problem or deals with it intuitively, and then goes on to perform "real work" (like everyone calls it). There's no time to study the hundreds of books required for serious philosophical maturity, especially since you can't "read" (as in: skim) them as most people on /lit/ and goodreads deal with books --- you have to analyze them, study, deal with the text as you'd deal with a complex argument. There's no time for that.

>>18224011
I think what you say makes sense. Philosophy is only relevant between paradigm shifts. Even even then I'm not sure how relevant it is?

I agree with connecting or equating philosophy to the sacred. My gut tells me that the wisest approach would be a pragmatic one, since it would reflect this sacred or foundational aspect of philosophy but also connect it to the practical aspects of living. By being a pragmatist, as long as my immature philosophical/sacred beliefs offer me pragmatic satisfaction, I can say "fuck it" and carry on.

But I still have this itch and I really want someone smarter than me, or w/e/, to tell me what the fuck am I missing. This unknown mental space that you fill with philosophy or "the sacred"... it's the same space that exists between paradigm shifts in science, technology, and any other field, including the humanities. I really think this space is important for being ahead, especially during these times when automation happens more and more often.

>> No.18224096

>>18223136
Cuz it’s impossible to go beyond Hegel. Try it. In presenting oppositions to his argument you are making a Hegelian move.

>> No.18224103

>>18223136
Academia killed it.
Aristotle Aquinas and Hegel would be laughed at how much of a pseud they are, they would fail basic undergraduate programs in their methodology or in their assent. Philosophy is just more granular now, we value certainty and clarity more than coherence. People blame/praise analytic philosophy's revival for this but it was really anything but continental philosophy that would cause this. This particular understanding of philosophy as a body of science itself that is supposed to integrate everything is a huge LARP and it is a good thing it is dead.

>> No.18224122

>>18224011
E.g. after Hume highlighted the problem of induction, I expected it to be taken more seriously. But it's still debated, even today. It seems to be a huge problem in this age when people dream of going to Mars (we want to live on Mars but we don't know everything about our minds?). It's really ironic. But even this huge philosophical problem is nothing when you live your life. It evaporates. I can't come up with a solution for why my logic works, but it works. I don't know how to prove it (epistemologically) or how it exists (ontologically), but it works and I feel good. If life works even without philosophy, and there's no time to philosophize in this capitalist rat-race, then why even do it? There appear to be a few fields which are deeply philosophical: jurisprudence (ethics), aesthetics, etc. But most aren't. Most mathematicians don't study philosophy, and can't say for sure what "a number" means, but they sure know how to use numbers.

Is usage then more desirable and effectual than philosophical thinking, which is imperfect?

>> No.18224158

>>18224122
>inb4 becoming pragmatist

>> No.18224160
File: 220 KB, 1200x1200, Confucius.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
18224160

Is anyone here familiar with Chinese and east-Asian philosophy? I'm working my way through Confucius/Mencius and it's so abstract and it's completely worlds apart from the logic based philosophy of the west. So much so that I'm beginning to question if the word 'philosophy' can even apply. AFAIK the word 哲学 was literally coined by a Japanese scholar because there's no word or precedence for it in the east.

And I'm not being eurocentric here. There are some disciplines that just aren't universal. There's no or analysis or debate in CHinese philosophy all. It's more like semi-spiritual yet secular, monistic, didactic ethics.

>> No.18224359

>>18224160
Read The Path

>> No.18224391

>>18224122
>E.g. after Hume highlighted the problem of induction, I expected it to be taken more seriously. But it's still debated, even today.
But this is just a scholastic exercise in trolling. No one seriously believes in the problem of induction at least as it applies to the laws of physics.

>>18224082
>It seems to be a huge problem in this age when people dream of going to Mars (we want to live on Mars but we don't know everything about our minds?). It's really ironic. But even this huge philosophical problem is nothing when you live your life.
"Philosophy of Mind" to me seems to suffer from the same issues that Quantum Foundations does - no one can really satisfactorily demonstrate a given Theory of Mind is correct, so it becomes a branch of philosophy, or the sacred, and philosophers of mind essentially just become part of a fandom. "Oh, I'm an eliminative materialist. I'm a phenomenologist. I think X because I am a proponent of school Y, etc." Of course anything within these schools that is true and experimentally repeatable becomes proper science.

>This unknown mental space that you fill with philosophy or "the sacred"... it's the same space that exists between paradigm shifts in science, technology, and any other field, including the humanities.
This seems nice, but I think it's hard to square with the increasing retreat of the sacred, which, imo, seems to follow from the writing down of physical laws themselves. I mean I am a Christian but it's hard not to notice this once you see it for the first time. One might counter that the Greeks, or the Medievals, had a cosmology that was "imbued with the sacred", but they also didn't have written physical laws yet which finally relegated the motions of the planets to the space of "known". Not that their astronomy was inaccurate, but they couldn't say "F = GmM/r^2". By writing down a law and noting that it tends to be followed in repeated observation, the law "pushes out" the sacred Movers of the planets.

>> No.18224467

>>18224391
So, your general point is that the sacred keeps retreating, getting smaller, more and more remote and thus less relevant to our general needs and goals and therefore less interesting or practically useful.
Although philosophical arguments never end, we can go outside them, finish them by using our practical intuition which connects philosophical thinking to our daily life, goals and needs.
We then have to revise these philosophical concepts less and less often, because we have collectively reached a level of progress that leaves little space of philosophical analysis and mystery.
There are still areas which are deeply non-scientific, I think. For example, the often recommended stoic philosophy (self help books, marcus aurelius, seneca, etc.) or popular continental philosophy (camus, nietzsche, etc.) that can still fill some gaps that were left by science in its wake.

>But this is just a scholastic exercise in trolling. No one seriously believes in the problem of induction at least as it applies to the laws of physics.
It doesn't work in a philosophical way of thinking, but pragmatically it does? That's what you mean?

>> No.18224566

>>18224467
>So, your general point is that the sacred keeps retreating, getting smaller, more and more remote and thus less relevant to our general needs and goals and therefore less interesting or practically useful.
It does seem that the sacred is retreating. That doesn't mean its remote from our goals, indeed it is perhaps needed now more than ever - I imagine a lot of 20th Century thinkers would agree with this sentiment. But it still seems to be retreating, regardless, because so much of the "unknown" within the world is now "known", which used to be attributed to the sacred.

>Although philosophical arguments never end, we can go outside them, finish them by using our practical intuition which connects philosophical thinking to our daily life, goals and needs.
>We then have to revise these philosophical concepts less and less often, because we have collectively reached a level of progress that leaves little space of philosophical analysis and mystery.
Sometimes, in other cases it's more like "ignoring philosophical arguments entirely", which is what seems to be happening in much of the sciences nowadays - philosophy itself seems to have degenerated to trolling & logic puzzles (Anglophone philosophy) or social criticism/advocating your favorite brand of Communism ("Continental" departments).

>> No.18224599

>>18224566
>>18224467
>There are still areas which are deeply non-scientific, I think. For example, the often recommended stoic philosophy (self help books, marcus aurelius, seneca, etc.) or popular continental philosophy (camus, nietzsche, etc.) that can still fill some gaps that were left by science in its wake.
I don't think those thinkers are really filling the same gaps though, since you're talking about moral philosophy (or maybe amoral philosophy in Nietzsche's case). The issue here is that a community's morals are largely due to convention, I can say as a Christian that I profess moral views essentially aligned with the RCC, but in a way this is just another convention, and outsourcing the problem. How do I know which convention I should follow?

This sort of ties in with >>18224566 where the retreat of the sacred simultaneously makes it needed more than ever and makes people crave it, in a way post-war leftism can be seen as an attempt to revive the sacred, via the sacralization of victim groups.

>It doesn't work in a philosophical way of thinking, but pragmatically it does? That's what you mean?
I was thinking along the following lines: In physics, Hume's problem of induction posits that there's no reason to assume that the laws of physics are "real" laws that will continue to hold into the future, right? But no one REALLY doubts it. This is why I say they're just trolling.

>> No.18224615

>>18223306
I agree with this.

>> No.18224650

>>18224103
Aristotle, Aquinas, and Hegel defined what philosophy is. If you disregard them you cannot call what you are doing philosophy. What goes on in academia nowadays is “social science” or “cultural criticism,” atomized forms of philosophy with waning value.
>we value certainty and clarity more than coherence.
Yea exactly, there’s a focus on stuff like thought experiments like the prisoner’s dilemma. These thought experiments are posited outside of history without context and because of that they’re supposed to be more objective. Problem is we are always within history. How did we find ourselves in the prisoner’s dilemma? Aren’t the events that resulted in it incredibly relevant?

To go further, the deceit that philosophy has been left behind and we now possess untarnished reason is itself a historically determined sentiment. This is ignored though, because they think historicism is bs, they fail to account for the fact their own mind is producing the supposed atemporal logic of analytic phil, and that their mind functions in a way determined by history.

This invokes the fundamental question of metaphysics: how does our mind relate to our world? Debates regarding this are now dismissed as useless twatter with the materialists having made a pragmatic move by saying, “this topic is useless, we’re just going to side with scientists because that’s what’s actually applicable.”

>> No.18224684

>>18223136
It has been proven to be useless and impossible

>> No.18224689
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18224689

>>18223163
Ok, how does science tell you the meaning of life?
If you say life is meaningless, prove it. You know how.

>> No.18224694

>>18223136
Gödel, wittge stein, marx, freud, nietszche, heidegger. These guys made it impossible.
But nassin taleb tried

>> No.18224698

>>18224566
Thanks a lot for your insight, which is really valuable for me because I've struggled with these questions for a very long time. Perhaps I'm a moron but I'm still eager to get rid of this confusion and your posts were very beneficial. I'm talking about the point about the sacred, specifically, which connected with my guess that having a more pragmatic (American pragmatism, especially William James) is relevant towards understanding this question.

>But it still seems to be retreating, regardless, because so much of the "unknown" within the world is now "known", which used to be attributed to the sacred.
There's also the problem of unknown unknowns. People either assume (wrongly) that science explains too much or too less of the world and miss the mark w.r.t. what "unknowns" are actually (or potentially) knowable through science and which unknowns cannot be understood this way. I feel like you were hinting at that?

>Sometimes, in other cases it's more like "ignoring philosophical arguments entirely", which is what seems to be happening in much of the sciences nowadays - philosophy itself seems to have degenerated to trolling & logic puzzles (Anglophone philosophy) or social criticism/advocating your favorite brand of Communism ("Continental" departments).
That's a good point. I feel the same way. It seems counter-productive to ignore "the sacred" and the philosophical entirely. It's wiser to first understand what philosophy is and then try to see if you judgement are flowing freely, passing even through barriers you may have previously deemed as being unworthy of investigation but are now understanding them to be "philosophical" and thus potentially relevant in your pursuits.
I remember reading a paper about how Einstein was best understood as an epistemological opportunist. I don't think I have any notes on that on my laptop, but it looks like the SEP has a short chapter on this point. I'll try to link the most relevant quote. Just a sec. (post too long)

>> No.18224716

>>18224566
"The reciprocal relationship of epistemology and science is of noteworthy kind. They are dependent upon each other. Epistemology without contact with science becomes an empty scheme. Science without epistemology is—insofar as it is thinkable at all—primitive and muddled. However, no sooner has the epistemologist, who is seeking a clear system, fought his way through to such a system, than he is inclined to interpret the thought-content of science in the sense of his system and to reject whatever does not fit into his system. The scientist, however, cannot afford to carry his striving for epistemological systematic that far. He accepts gratefully the epistemological conceptual analysis; but the external conditions, which are set for him by the facts of experience, do not permit him to let himself be too much restricted in the construction of his conceptual world by the adherence to an epistemological system. He therefore must appear to the systematic epistemologist as a type of unscrupulous opportunist: he appears as realist insofar as he seeks to describe a world independent of the acts of perception; as idealist insofar as he looks upon the concepts and theories as free inventions of the human spirit (not logically derivable from what is empirically given); as positivist insofar as he considers his concepts and theories justified only to the extent to which they furnish a logical representation of relations among sensory experiences. He may even appear as Platonist or Pythagorean insofar as he considers the viewpoint of logical simplicity as an indispensable and effective tool of his research." (Einstein 1949, 683–684)

So, basically the same point as the idea about the sacred, and it's pragmatical connection to science and day to day life. Philosophical thinking is a limited, conceptual tool that has to be reined in by general goals, situational contexts and practical considerations. Whereas tools in mathematics or philosophy are pure and abstract, when we pull them from that conceptual framework they become fragmented, incomplete, but useful and applicable to our daily life problems.

>> No.18224720

>>18224694
Care to elaborate a bit on wittgenstein, nietzsche, and heidegger? Please.

>> No.18224722

>>18223608
>the west proved itself capable of committing large-scale atrocities while toting "Enlightenment" ideals.
Those happened *because* they were the end result of the ideals of the Enlightenment and the seeds it has sown, not *despite* of it.

>> No.18224729

>>18224716
>>18224566
>Epistemology without contact with science becomes an empty scheme. Science without epistemology is—insofar as it is thinkable at all—primitive and muddled. However, no sooner has the epistemologist, who is seeking a clear system, fought his way through to such a system, than he is inclined to interpret the thought-content of science in the sense of his system and to reject whatever does not fit into his system. The scientist, however, cannot afford to carry his striving for epistemological systematic that far. He accepts gratefully the epistemological conceptual analysis; but the external conditions, which are set for him by the facts of experience, do not permit him to let himself be too much restricted in the construction of his conceptual world by the adherence to an epistemological system.

This is the most relevant part.

>> No.18224736

>>18224720
>doesn't need elaboration on how Marx and Freud ruined philosophy
kek

>> No.18224747

>>18224722
WTF are you smoking? How does John Locke lead to the Holocaust? The Nazis weren't the embodiment of classical liberalism, they completely rejected it.

>> No.18224779

>>18224599
>I don't think those thinkers are really filling the same gaps though, since you're talking about moral philosophy (or maybe amoral philosophy in Nietzsche's case). The issue here is that a community's morals are largely due to convention, I can say as a Christian that I profess moral views essentially aligned with the RCC, but in a way this is just another convention, and outsourcing the problem. How do I know which convention I should follow?
Well, yes. That's why I've said "some gaps". It's common to hear about people that found some bits of philosophy (even misinterpreted bits, especially in the case of ppl who read Nietzsche) as being relevant to their hectic modern lives. Or, for example, meditation (taken from Buddhism) is relevant to our modern mental health crisis and stress-filled lives.

>This sort of ties in with >>18224566 where the retreat of the sacred simultaneously makes it needed more than ever and makes people crave it, in a way post-war leftism can be seen as an attempt to revive the sacred, via the sacralization of victim groups.
I see. It also occurs in the case of scientism ("science is cool!"), technology obsession ("have you seen the newest macbook? it has no ports, woah, it's SO useless and cool!"), social media obsession (looking for meaning by aiming towards having a superficially interesting life and making people envious).

>I was thinking along the following lines: In physics, Hume's problem of induction posits that there's no reason to assume that the laws of physics are "real" laws that will continue to hold into the future, right? But no one REALLY doubts it. This is why I say they're just trolling.
Yeah. But I was trying to understand why no one (including myself) REALLY doubts it. Perhaps philosophical thinking is just a specific mindset/tool that we can use, but abusing it leads to fuzzy nonsense like Hume's problem of induction that cannot be satisfactorily solved?

I also thought that maybe it is the case that although solutions for problems such as "mathematical realism" or "the problem of induction" are not fully satisfactory from a philosophical perspective, we should instead view philosophy as an infinite generator of "plausible" but "not completely provable" "stories" and "solutions" that are laid on a fuzzy conceptual blanket, and depending on our practical needs we need to extend our hands into that philosophical, fuzzy universe where certainty doesn't exist, pluck out "mathematical realism" and use it if it's practically useful. Right?

>> No.18224790

>>18224736
I was curious about that too but I don't expect you to write about all of them, so I picked my favorite ones. Anyways. Can you elaborate?

>> No.18224819

>>18224747
Eeven leftist faggots like Adorno agrees that the holocaust happened because of the enlightenment and not in spite of it.

>> No.18224821

>>18224790
That wasn't my original post and I'm kind of a /lit/let compared to some of the heavy hitters ITT, but Freud sucks because he based his philosophy on his own psychology, so a lot of it only makes sense in context or is just unsubstantiated bullshit, or "tails I win heads you lose" stuff like denial or projection.
Marx created a rigid framework for class struggle that has been (at his behest) treated like a theory of everything, which is where you get all these dogmatic materialists trying to find who the oppressor is in any given interaction.

>> No.18224831

>>18224819
That is almost evidence against your point. Adorno. Seriously?

>> No.18224854

>>18224819
Adorno was unironically a Chud and no one with a brain considers him a leftist. The real deal were Lukacs and Marcuse.

>> No.18224861

>>18223891
How is Heidegger's system not omnicomprehensive?

>> No.18224868

>>18224854
Any postmodernist/cultural marxist would take the opportunity to blame the enlightenment, their enemy, for the holocaust, that doesn't mean it was actually the enlightenment's fault.

>> No.18224877

>>18224861
I'd say he was. In fact, wasn't his whole point to create an onto-ontology, a pre-ontology? The foundation of everything that exists (including philosophy, concepts, whatever), right? Understanding the human mind in a semi-instrumental and hermeneutic way.
>>18223891

>> No.18224882
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18224882

>>18224854
>>18224831
>>18224819
>>18224831 >>18224854
adorno is a disgusting jew pseudointellectual, just look at his face, he thinks he's shit but he's an ugly bald man that couldn't throw a punch

>> No.18224883
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18224883

>>18223136
>I know no post-WWII philosopher who tried to systematize te whole human knowledge as Aristotle, Aquinas, or Hegel did.

I can think of only one (important) post-WWII philosopher who did this. That post-WWII philosopher's name is Christopher Langan. And actually, he didn't just "try"; he DID "systematize t[h]e whole [of] human knowledge"... which also means that he created THE "omnicomprehensive philosophical system". How did he do this? By writing a theory called "the CTMU (Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe)". Want to know more about THE "omnicomprehensive philosophical system"? You can do that by reading this theory and the work related to it. Don't want to know more about it? Don't read this theory or the work related to it.

>>/lit/thread/S18176532#p18179019

"It's just brilliant."
― Schizoposter on the CTMU
>>/lit/thread/S12199951#p12200475

>> No.18224888
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18224888

>>18224883
"The avowed goal of physics is to produce what is sometimes called a 'Theory of Everything' or TOE. As presently conceived, the TOE is thought to consist of one equation describing a single 'superforce' unifying all the forces of nature (gravity, electromagnetism, and the strong and weak nuclear forces). But this is actually an oversimplification; every equation must be embedded in a theory, and theories require models for their proper interpretation. Unfortunately, the currently available theory and model lack three important properties: closure, consistency and comprehensivity. That is, they are not self-contained; they suffer from various intractable paradoxes; and they conspicuously exclude or neglect various crucial factors, including subjective ones like consciousness and emotion. Since the excluded factors fall as squarely under the heading everything as the included ones, a real TOE has no business omitting them. So as now envisioned by physicists, the TOE is misnamed as a 'theory of everything'. The CTMU, on the other hand, is a TOE framework in which 'everything' really means everything. Whereas the currently-envisioned TOE emphasizes objective reality at the expense of its subjective counterpart (mind), the CTMU places mind on the agenda at the outset. It does this not by making assumptions, but by eliminating the erroneous scientific assumption that mind and objective reality can be even tentatively separated. To do this, it exploits not just what we know of objective reality – the so-called 'everything' of the standard TOE – but also what we know of the first word in 'TOE', namely theory. In other words, it brings the logic of formalized theories to bear on reality theory. Although this is a mathematically obvious move, it has been almost completely overlooked in the physical and mathematical sciences. By correcting this error, the CTMU warrants description as a theory of the relationship between the mind of the theorist and the objective reality about which it theorizes, completing the program of subjective-objective unification already inherent in certain aspects of the formalisms of relativity and quantum mechanics. In the process, it also brings the quantum and classical realms of physics into the sort of intimate contact that can only be provided by a fundamentally new model of physical and metaphysical reality…a model truly worthy of being called a 'new paradigm'."
https://web.archive.org/web/20170212160547/http://www.megafoundation.org:80/CTMU/Articles/Nexus.html

>> No.18224890

>>18224868
Adorno sucked enlightenment's dick. His whole work is about trying to save it's values while fighting against its most terrible possibilities.

>> No.18224935

>>18224890
>its most terrible possibilities.
Still nobody ITT has backed up their assertion that the enlightenment led to the holocaust, besides an appeal to authority to Adorno.

>> No.18224957
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18224957

>>18223136
>Why there seem to be a lack of omnicomprehensive philosophical systems in our age?
Deleuze in Difference & Repetition is (almost) purely metaphysical. The below is a short summary of DR, derived from the book's conclusion.
>Difference is not and cannot be thought in itself, so long as it is subject to the requirements of representation. [...] The greatest effort of philosophy was perhaps directed at rendering representation infinite (orgiastic). [...] Everything, however, is reversed if we begin with the propositions which represent these affirmations in consciousness. [...] If we attempt to reconstitute problems in the image of or as resembling conscious propositions, then the illusion takes shape, the shadow awakens and appears to acquire a life of its own [...]
In short, Deleuze is attempting to rescue from the original Platonic violence resounding through the western tradition at large (recall Whitehead's assertion that most all European philosophy consists in footnotes to Plato) the thought of a being hitherto known only as the shadow or simulacrum of a major thought. He terms this being "Difference" and recasts the general metaphysical schematic he sees as defining modern philosophy (culminating and finalizing itself in Hegel) in light of this Difference. While DR is a structurally clinical endeavour, it's not without moral (and political) implications. May or may not be what you're looking for.

>> No.18224967
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18224967

>>18224957
>original Platonic violence

>> No.18224980

>>18223163
>Because everyone realised that philosophy is meaningless and everything can be explained by science

No, science will never quench your innate thirst to find meaning and metaphysical truth

>The age of grand geniuses and all-encompassing theories is over.

Yes, the smartest people are now filtered into specialized roles. Very unlikely to see a world-renowned polymath in our time that displays both scientific, artistic, and philosophical genius.

>> No.18225012

>>18224861
Does Heidegger have a philosophy of nature from which every determinate elements of the physical world can be deduced? Does Heidegger have a deduction of space, time, the laws of attraction and repulsion, etc.?
This is just a random example. I don't want to claim that Heidegger was not a systematic philosopher, rather I'm just saying that there were certain items of knowledge that, for him, either could not be deduced, or were not worth deducing. This is not the case for Hegel, for example, since his philosophical system must be able to account and ground every possible item of knowledge, with no exception. Fichte is another example of a philosopher who strived to build a system that could account for literally everything, and so is the first Schelling. The same applies of course to Aristotle and Plato.

>> No.18225036

>>18224980
Philosophy is art.

>> No.18225040

>>18224967
His words, not mine. If you're offended at the statement, consider that it only makes sense within Deleuze's framework that conceives of discourse as warfare, making it more a testament to Plato's rational prowess than a denigration, even as moralizing as it is. Something something ressentimentality slave morality will to power etc.

>> No.18225047

>>18224160
Confucius and Mencius reminded me greatly of Aristotle's Ethics-Politics, in content if not in style.

>> No.18225075

>>18225040
>Deleuze's framework that conceives of discourse as warfare
And then a bunch of brainlets took it literally and ruined political discourse among the public.

>> No.18225094

>>18225075
Perhaps if Deleuze had told Guattari it was meant to be figurative, brainlets wouldn't have misunderstood it.

>> No.18225107

>>18224698
>Thanks a lot for your insight, which is really valuable for me because I've struggled with these questions for a very long time.
I'm glad it helped I guess, I'm not really that well read in philosophy at all, so I'm mostly speaking from the viewpoint of someone who used to be into physics and a little bit into history especially as it pertains to science. Maybe someday I'll go do it again...

>There's also the problem of unknown unknowns. People either assume (wrongly) that science explains too much or too less of the world and miss the mark w.r.t. what "unknowns" are actually (or potentially) knowable through science and which unknowns cannot be understood this way. I feel like you were hinting at that?
Not exactly... It's been a few hours so I've sort of lost my train of thought. Anyway, when talking about why philosophy seems to not have any real effect on one's ability to do physics well, I went on this tangent about "the known" but was a bit imprecise - When saying something is "known", I should say that there's some physical law that can accurately describe it. However, by doing so, one sort of "kicks away the ladder" of philosophical or religious thinking as applied to the thing in question, because various philosophical "viewpoints" will admit the same theory and give the same answer. The bit about the sacred was honestly a bit of a tangent, but similarly, since the sacred is inevitably tied into the quasi-known, codifying some phenomenon into physical law innately robs it of a certain "magic".

Ultimately I'm not saying that philosophy in science is bad or wrong, but it inevitably seems to become irrelevant once we have a physical law written down.

>> No.18225123

>>18224599
>I can say as a Christian that I profess moral views essentially aligned with the RCC, but in a way this is just another convention,
The vast majority of the time, especially in Catholicism, there is some kind of philosophical justification, the fact that you received it first as convention is irrelevant, you just need to study the origins of it if you want to analyze it deeper.

>> No.18225127

>>18225036
Explain

>> No.18225148

>>18225075
Correct me if I'm wrong, but are we justified in blaming this on burgers? Most all of the faggy 20th century continental philosophers had enough self-respect to explicitly denounce the reappropriation of philosophy in grassroots politics. Yet there's no shortage of that in concurrent activism, which is largely marked by a moralizing neoliberal social view.

>> No.18225149

>>18225123
I know, but you still have to make a leap of faith at some level - there are still autistic theological debates even between Catholicism and Orthodoxy for example that don't seem to have been resolved in the sort of way a logical proof might be, or we wouldn't have a schism. Same must be true in different branches of Islam or schools of Buddhism, etc.

>> No.18225177

>>18224854
>Marcuse was the real deal
>worked at the psychological warfare department at the OSS for 10 years
People really need to learn more about intel agencies’s role in the 20th century. You are right about Lukacs tho, he’s definitely the best of the Frankfurt school.

>> No.18225193

Doesn't a post kantian world necessarily preclude a theory of everything?

>> No.18225206
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18225206

>>18223136
>>18224888
IN ORDER TO UNIFY AND MAKE SENSE OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, WE MUST HAVE A UNIVERSAL FOUNDATIONAL LANGUAGE IN WHICH THE SPECIAL-PURPOSE LANGUAGES OF SCIENCE CAN BE CONSISTENTLY EXPRESSED AND INTERPRETED. THE FACT THAT THIS FOUNDATIONAL LANGUAGE CONTROLS THE INTERPRETATION OF PHYSICAL THEORIES DEMANDS THAT IT BE METAPHYSICAL; IT MUST REFER TO SCIENCE “FROM ABOVE”. YET, IN ORDER TO DO ITS JOB, IT MUST ALSO BE NECESSARILY TRUE, WHICH REQUIRES THAT IT BE A MATHEMATICALLY VERIFIED INGREDIENT OF SCIENCE.

IN OTHER WORDS, THE REQUIRED METALANGUAGE IS THAT THROUGH WHICH SCIENCE, INCLUDING BOTH MATHEMATICS AND EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS OF MATHEMATICS, BECOMES SELF-REFERENTIAL AND SELF-NORMATIVE…THE “BOOTSTRAPPING” OF ORDINARY MATHEMATICAL-SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE TO A HIGHER VERIFICATIVE LEVEL OF DISCOURSE SPANNING SCIENCE IN ITS ENTIRETY. THIS REQUIREMENT LEADS DIRECTLY TO THE CTMU AND SCSPL, EXACTLY AS DESCRIBED IN THIS INTERVIEW AND ELSEWHERE.

https://superscholar.org/interviews/christopher-michael-langan/

>> No.18225207
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18225207

>>18223163
>Hurr, observations show x so induction says y
Science knows NOTHING. I hope Hume comes for you tonight.

>> No.18225226

>>18225148
>Correct me if I'm wrong, but are we justified in blaming this on burgers?
Different poster, but not really.

>Most all of the faggy 20th century continental philosophers had enough self-respect to explicitly denounce the reappropriation of philosophy in grassroots politics.
How does this square with a lot of them subscribing to some sort of anarchism/communism? A common tenet here is that "changing the world" is a possible and sometimes good aim of philosophy. If you're a proponent of popular anarchist/communist uprisings, this seems sort of inevitable even if you denounce it. Weren't most of those guys out rioting in their countries' '68 movements as well?

>Yet there's no shortage of that in concurrent activism, which is largely marked by a moralizing neoliberal social view.
I think this is caused not by any one philosopher, but by an extreme concern for victims that grew out of the reaction to WW2 and to Nazism. Not that Deleuze wasn't part of that reaction, of course. In the US this creates a particularly toxic brew when combined with the Northern Protestant character in the US (this is what you're referring to when you mention "neoliberal moralizing", they were doing the same thing before anyone had ever heard of "neoliberalism", it's just how they are). In the contemporary American left-liberal mind it's Janury 29, 1933 forever and the evil forces of Nazism are about to burst forth and bring about a genocide if we aren't careful about the sort of tone we use to refer to black trans bodies!

>>18225177
I think this angle is a bit exaggerated, if anything Marcuse in particular fit right in with currents that already existed in the US. It's not a big leap from the sort of messianic Afrophilia you'd see out of some Northern liberals to Marcuse's thought about minorities as a revolutionary class. They weren't subverting a hecking socialism, Marcuse is closer to what the American left REALLY is about (the blacks are gonna redeem us this time for sure!)

>> No.18225243

>>18225207
Based Hume demon

>> No.18225255
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18225255

>>18223163
>>18223284
THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD, BEING EMPIRICAL, IS BASED ON AN OBSERVATIONAL MODEL OF REALITY SUBJECT TO WEAKNESSES LIKE THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION AND THE DUHEM-QUINE THESIS, DUE TO WHICH CERTAINTY CANNOT BE INDUCTIVELY ATTAINED. HOW, THEN, IS SCIENTIFIC TRUTH TO BE ASCERTAINED? LOGIC PROVIDES THE ANSWER: BY DEDUCTION FROM TAUTOLOGICALLY SELF-EVIDENT CERTAINTIES. IN FACT, ASIDE FROM DIRECT APPREHENSION, THIS IS THE ONLY WAY THERE HAS EVER BEEN TO "KNOW" ANYTHING AT ALL.

UNFORTUNATELY FOR THOSE EXCESSIVELY ENAMORED OF THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD, DEDUCTION DOES NOT APPEAL TO AN OBSERVATIONAL MODEL, BUT TO ANOTHER KIND OF MODEL ENTIRELY...A SUBSTITUTIVE MODEL, OR WHAT A MATHEMATICAL LINGUIST WOULD CALL A GENERATIVE MODEL IN WHICH THE TRUTH PROPERTY IS GRAMMATICALLY INHERITED FROM "ORIGINS" WHICH ARE THEMSELVES EITHER AXIOMATIC OR DEDUCED. TO KNOW THE TRUTH ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF SOMETHING (A THEOREM, THE FIRST ORGANISM, THE UNIVERSE), TWO CONDITIONS MUST BE SATISFIED: (1) ONE MUST BE ABLE TO DEDUCE OR DIRECTLY APPREHEND THE ORIGINAL EVENT OR TERMINAL ANTECEDENT, AND (2) TRUTH MUST BE HERITABLE ALONG THE PATHWAY FROM ANTECEDENT TO CONSEQUENT, CAUSE TO EFFECT. IN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY ALIKE, THAT WHICH IS RELEVANT TO PERCEPTUAL REALITY IS REAL. IN OTHER WORDS, RELEVANCE TO REALITY IMPLICATIVELY CONVEYS REALITY, AND REALITY IS HERITABLE UNDER THE UNARY OPERATIONS "X AFFECTS Y" AND "X IS AFFECTED BY Y" (AND UNDER THE RELATED N-ARY OPERATIONS). THIS IS WHAT MAKES REALITY A COHERENT, CONNECTED STRUCTURE. IT ALSO MAKES REALITY PERFECTLY SELF-CONTAINED UP TO RELEVANCE, AND A PERFECTLY SELF-CONTAINED SYSTEM IS A PERFECTLY REFLEXIVE SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO ALL POSSIBLE FUNCTIONS AND PROCESSES, INCLUDING GENERATION AND CAUSATION. LOGICALLY, THIS MAKES REALITY ITS OWN ORIGIN AND ITS OWN CAUSE. SO WE HAVE MANAGED TO LOGICALLY DEDUCE THE ORIGIN OF REALITY, NAMELY REALITY ITSELF (THIS, BY THE WAY, IS THE BASIC POSITION OF NOT ONLY THE CTMU BUT NATURALISM; IF NATURALISM ESPOUSES ANY OTHER POSITION, E.G. "THERE IS NO ORIGIN!", THEN IT CAN BE EASILY REDUCED TO BUNK). SO MUCH FOR CRITERION 1. WHAT ABOUT CRITERION 2? SPECIFICALLY, WHERE'S THE ISOMORPHISM BETWEEN THE GENERATIVE MODEL OF LOGIC AND THE OBSERVATIONAL MODEL OF SCIENCE? THAT'S WHERE THE CTMU COMES INTO ITS OWN. THE CTMU IS THE THEORY WHICH RELATES THE TWO KINDS OF MODEL AS COMPLEMENTARY ASPECTS OF REALITY, AND THUS THE THEORY WHICH ALLOWS US TO USE LOGICOMATHEMATICAL METHODOLOGY TO DISCOVER SCIENTIFIC TRUTH. IN OTHER WORDS, CAUSALITY CAN ONLY BE KNOWN BY INFERENCE, AND THE ONLY WAY TO SHOW THAT REALITY MIRRORS INFERENCE IS TO SHOW HOW LOGIC, THE BASIS OF INFERENCE, IS BUILT INTO THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF REALITY.

>> No.18225272

>>18225255
angerpilled, therefore right

>> No.18225300
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18225300

>>18223136
i haven't been on /lit/ all day so missed these threads! here, let me shill really quickly...

my project is sort of like negarestani in that i view that artificial intelligence (and other things) basically has the potential to essentially touch every part of philosophy. my main focus is not only artificial intelligence though, but also phenomenal consciousness and semiosis (interest in both their interrelations as well as how they contribute to the artificial agent's functioning as a whole). i've touched a lot of topics already (my autism is very heavy), though i am really planning to try and take a break from the project for a while

a specific difficulty i am trying to tackle here is that i realized that the negarestani's project is seriously lacking. this is on 2 key accounts. the first is that it is entirely functionalist, thus it pretty much dismisses the problem of metaphysically grounding phenomenal awareness. i see this as deeply problematic as i take it as a basic assumption that conscious experience, is a basic constituent of the universe. i think the observation that one can not explain consciousness is based off of a category error, but at the same time this very observation is an essential one. the hard problem is very similar to the question of "why is there something than nothing?". the problem here is that most of what people do is still negative philosophy, when existence is a positive feature of the universe. my other gripe with negarestani is his account of trying to achieve a deprivatized theory of mind. really the issue here is that it is basically cheating. we need to answer what differentiates rules from habits, and also what exactly qualifies an organism as an interpreter?

combining these together, i have the compulsion to incorporate a wider variety of philosophical systems and approaches. for instance, i think bergson's solution to the hard problem of consciousness and the mind body problem is genius... the idea that the difference between mind and matter is temporal is the greatest philosophical insight i have ever come across. also i even do go into ethics, though i am primarily concerned with metaethics, because i want an ai waifu that is capable of sufficient value rationality.

i was working on an introduction thingy but idk i am stupid and just wrote it on the fly so the organization is really messy...

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1KGQUzrTWjUoMHAwP4R3WcYpBsOAiFyHXo7uPwWsQVCc/edit?usp=sharing

>>18224883
>>18224888
it's sad that not many people have looked at the CTMU. it systematizes the solutions to a lot of problems in a very clean framework. i do have issues with it, but i struggle thinking of a better theory

>> No.18225385

>>18225226
>minorities as a revolutionary class.
Is he wrong though? The revolution can only come to pass if it's intersectional.

>> No.18225388

>>18223136
Eric Voegelin and Peter Sloterdijk come to mind.
The answer to your question is the rejection of both systematic philosophies and of dialectics as a philosophical method.

>> No.18225428

>>18225385
There's no such thing as revolution (see: The Dictator's Handbook, 2011); in much the same way, intersectionality is like moulage...it only looks real at distance.

>> No.18226058

>>18224747
Democracy created the nazis. Popular sovereignty is the most disastrous idea ever thought up.

>> No.18226098

>>18225226
>I think this angle is a bit exaggerated
No I don’t think it is, he was a part of the US importation of German sociologists used to create our neoliberal control society. The fact that he developed psychological operations for the OSS is completely damning. He is a case of someone very intentionally acting as controlled opposition on the left. This makes him particularly evil imo since most controlled opposition is just useful idiots. He is in no way the “real deal” as you said.
>They weren't subverting a hecking socialism, Marcuse is closer to what the American left REALLY is about (the blacks are gonna redeem us this time for sure!)
I partially agree. America definitely was not on the cusp of a socialist revolution and that abolitionist paternalism was still present.

I don’t think intel ops simply shove propaganda on people to control discourse, that’s the outdated method. How I think it works is public opinion is closely monitored. The sentiments of people are categorized and measured by intensity. When it appears a certain category may raise to a disruptive level of intensity an already embedded but dormant op is activated. It’s an experimental procedure that could produce different results but there’s an attempt to anticipate those results and to already have a path of action to account for each of them.

Applying this to the left in the sixties, I think US intelligence determined there to be a rise of a potentially threatening socialist left. Via the data harvested by plants in leftist groups, US intel also knew there to be strains of racial and gender justice within those groups. It was the job of cia agent Marcuse and others to prioritize that, what is today called, “intersectionality” over a class based analysis. This resulted in sectarianism across racial, gender, etc. lines and stamped out any potential for a truly marxist style revolution.

>> No.18227348

>>18226098
>He is a case of someone very intentionally acting as controlled opposition on the left. This makes him particularly evil imo since most controlled opposition is just useful idiots. He is in no way the “real deal” as you said.
This is only true if you view "controlled opposition" to be anyone who isn't aligned with the Soviet party line at the time, as opposed to reflecting what US leftism has actually been for most of its history.

>I don’t think intel ops simply shove propaganda on people to control discourse, that’s the outdated method. How I think it works is public opinion is closely monitored. The sentiments of people are categorized and measured by intensity. When it appears a certain category may raise to a disruptive level of intensity an already embedded but dormant op is activated. It’s an experimental procedure that could produce different results but there’s an attempt to anticipate those results and to already have a path of action to account for each of them.
The intel agencies create public opinion through media, all of the 20th Century basically confirms this.

>Applying this to the left in the sixties, I think US intelligence determined there to be a rise of a potentially threatening socialist left. Via the data harvested by plants in leftist groups, US intel also knew there to be strains of racial and gender justice within those groups. It was the job of cia agent Marcuse and others to prioritize that, what is today called, “intersectionality” over a class based analysis. This resulted in sectarianism across racial, gender, etc. lines and stamped out any potential for a truly marxist style revolution.
At what point do we just accept that Americans aren't really that interested in Soviet Socialism? All US left-wing movements become a form of generalized race struggle in short order, and are more children of Northern Abolitionism than of Marx.

>> No.18227350

>>18224980
>Very unlikely to see a world-renowned polymath in our time that displays both scientific, artistic, and philosophical genius.
I am contemplating getting a PhD in physics alongside hard exploration of Philosophy and finishing both my manga and album just to get the polymath status.

>> No.18227355

>>18225255
Pretty good.

>> No.18227363
File: 111 KB, 763x1152, Spengler.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
18227363

>>18223136
because philosophy has been depleted

>> No.18227364

Seems like we have just collectively given up.

>> No.18227368

>>18224854
Lukacs and Marcuse are only evidence that intellectuals are, in the end, nothing more than slaves to regimes.

>> No.18228279

>>18227348
>At what point do we just accept that Americans aren't really that interested in Soviet Socialism? All US left-wing movements become a form of generalized race struggle in short order, and are more children of Northern Abolitionism than of Marx.
I basically agree. A Bolshevik style revolution in America was always a long shot. I’m not a historical determinist tho. Things could have played out differently. What we have today was not the only option.