/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.18011246]

Philosobros, we got too cocky...
>>"My son is taking a course in philosophy, and last night we were looking at something by Spinoza and there was the most childish reasoning! There were all these attributes, and Substances, and all this meaningless chewing around, and we started to laugh. Now how could we do that? Here's this great Dutch philosopher, and we're laughing at him. It's because there's no excuse for it! In the same period there was Newton, there was Harvey studying the circulation of the blood, there were people with methods of analysis by which progress was being made! You can take every one of Spinoza's propositions, and take the contrary propositions, and look at the world and you can't tell which is right."

[Anonymous No.18011262]

Humanitrannies... we got too cocky ..

[Anonymous No.18011264]

>>18011246
Filtered by based Spinoza(pbuh)

[Anonymous No.18011278]

>>18011264
>filtered
Show me one (1) of Spinoza's proposition that is measurable, verifiable and can be utilized in industry and science

[Anonymous No.18011308]

Checkout this faggot's most famous video in which he just repeated the arguments of ancient Skeptics(Five Tropes of Agrippa) while larping as really smug about being a fucking original thinker for saying it. The real comedy is the gullible "I LOVE SCIENCERINOOO" retards in the comment section who are eating up this shit as other worldly wisdom.

https://youtu.be/36GT2zI8lVA

[Anonymous No.18011322]

>an iq of 124
kek, no wonder he was filtered by Spinoza (pbuh)

[Anonymous No.18011325]

>>18011278
>measurable, verifiable and can be utilized in industry and science
What use is that?

[Anonymous No.18011333]

>>18011278
>measurable
>verifiable
>can be utilized in industry and science
Kek what the actual fuck are you doing on a literature board? Unironically Reddit would be a better fit for you, and I say that with no hint of irony or humour

[Anonymous No.18011336]

>>18011246
spinozabros...

[Anonymous No.18011338]

>>18011308
>>18011264
Retards who can't into calculus will seethe, but he was ultimately right.

[Anonymous No.18011339]

>>18011246
In mathematics there is an assumption that you need to convince your readers. It is a valid criticism to say "I didn't understand X" or "I'm not sure why Y followed". Seemingly these same criticisms are taboo in philosophy and the burden of understanding is completely on the reader, meaning there is an incentive to be as dense and obtuse as possible in your writing so no one can critique you. This is also a big problem in theoretical machine learning where you see a bunch of bogus papers which survive review because they are obfuscated enough.

[Anonymous No.18011346]

>>18011338
Feynman couldn't into calculus either. Knowing how to solve integrals =/= understanding analysis on a deeper level. For that he'd have to dip his toes into metaphysics.

[Anonymous No.18011355]

>>18011322
He claimed his IQ was "only 124" (still probably higher than yours) whenever people claimed he was a genius for his advancements of physics. There is no proof he was ever officially tested.

[Anonymous No.18011356]

Feynmanbros....
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MO0r930Sn_8

[Anonymous No.18011363]

>>18011346
Analysis on a "deeper level" is bogus, which is what he just stated. Metaphysics is meaningless trite. Calculus isn't, which he obviously WAS capable of due to his accomplishments in physics.

[Anonymous No.18011375]

>>18011363
Why is it meaningless?

[Anonymous No.18011384]

>>18011355
My iq actually is higher than that (professionally tested), though admittedly not by much (131).

[Anonymous No.18011614]

>>18011278
measure this you materialist bugman
*fires a 9mm between your eyes*

[Anonymous No.18011629]

>>18011614
A Spinozist isn't really well placed to accuse anyone else of materialism

[Anonymous No.18011657]

>>18011246
>You can take every one of Spinoza's propositions, and take the contrary propositions, and look at the world and you can't tell which is right."
Someone doesn't understand the dialectic
The thing about Feynamn and most physicists is that they are just really good at syntactical manipulation, and seem to think that's all there is to thought. Even their intuition is guided by "what can be modified about this system to make this proposition true"

[Anonymous No.18011766]

>>18011338
leibniz was influenced by spinoza in his own philosophy and also discovered calculus independantly of Newton so....

[Anonymous No.18011782]

>>18011308
feynman was a lot smarter than u tho

[Anonymous No.18011785]

>>18011346
>Feynman couldn't into calculus either
whew

[Anonymous No.18011799]

>>18011246

I don't think there is anything surprising, offensive or even meaningful about that quote. He made it very clear that he didn't understand Spinoza and it just made him laugh, and also that he's much more interested in a general sense of "progressing through to something" during his thought processes. Hardly a direct attack on anything at all.

[Anonymous No.18011807]

humanities majors ITT coping with the fact that ""philosophy"" contributes nothing to society

[Anonymous No.18011827]

>>18011262
Got?

[Anonymous No.18011844]

>>18011346
he literally invented a new type of integration...

[Anonymous No.18011882]

>>18011807
>wanting to contribute to society

[Anonymous No.18012669]

>>18011356
welp.... one day boys

[Anonymous No.18012703]

>>18011807
What does "contributing to society" mean?

[Anonymous No.18012715]

>>18011614
based

[Anonymous No.18012739]

>>18012703
By increasing tax money generation.

[Anonymous No.18012791]

>>18011346
Kek dilate

[Anonymous No.18013422]

Feynman was a tranny and a midwit

[Anonymous No.18013452]

>>18011246
>Dutch

[Anonymous No.18013470]

>>18011807
(((society)))

[Anonymous No.18013471]

>>18012739
Taxes are a spook, Da Joos will just keep printing money out of thin air irrespective of your taxcuckery

[Anonymous No.18013482]

>>18011278
>can be utilized in industry and science
>if it’s useless to our corporate overlords, it’s false. All hail the mighty dollar!
Lobbying can be utilized by the industry as well, should it replace philosophy?

[Anonymous No.18013489]

>>18011278
>He doesnt know the impact of metaphysics and how they permeate his socalled science

[Anonymous No.18013492]

>>18011278
>industry and science

[Anonymous No.18013496]

>>18013492
>AAAHH I'M CONTRIBOOOOTING

[Anonymous No.18013502]

>>18011246
wow i can tell this guy is really smart by how many equations he has on his chalkboard

[Anonymous No.18013503]

>>18011333
The whole board is like this, newfag.

[Anonymous No.18013505]

>>18013482
>should it replace philosophy?
It did long ago.

[Anonymous No.18013508]

>>18011246
That forehead would render him an incel in 2021. Good thing he statusmaxxed and Jewmaxxed.

[Anonymous No.18013590]

>>18013503
The whole board is absolutely NOT like that.
Only newfags call people newfags.

[Anonymous No.18013924]

>>18011614
>

[Anonymous No.18013930]

>>18011629
>t. Someone who has read the Wikipedia page for pantheism rather than reading Ethica

[Anonymous No.18013997]

>>18013930
explain how he's wrong

[Anonymous No.18014011]

>>18011246
that's actually Hegel's method, but good guy Georg didn't stop at Feynman's "hurr durr the opposite is also true hurr hurr".

[Anonymous No.18014023]

>>18014011
Quick rundown?

[Anonymous No.18014054]

>>18014023
Read about Hegel's method, the dialectic and speculative Idealism in his Phenomenology of Spirit. Or read the chapter on Spinoza (few pages online) in his History of Philosophy. There he outlines Spinoza's idea, what is right and what is wrong about it, and what consequences are to be drawn. To Hegel Spinoza's has his place in the history of philosophy just as much as Leibniz and their successors, last but not least himself.

[Anonymous No.18014171]

>its another thread where IFLS trannies fight with metaphysics larpers
Sage

[Anonymous No.18014215]

>>18011308
He even winks at some point. Cringe

[Anonymous No.18014291]

>>18011246
>You can take every one of Spinoza's propositions, and take the contrary propositions, and look at the world and you can't tell which is right
Some people believe that functions and interactions between physical phenomena is all there is. It's just your garden variety materialism/scientism. The greatest irony is that materialism is unprovable. I can almost feel the s*yjaks spinning up with something like
>BUT ANON, THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS IN THE CLAIMANT
without the slightest conception that this is a tenet of scientism rather than some cosmic truth. When you step outside the lines drawn for you by doctrine, it becomes immediately apparent that the best argument for a materialistic outlook is inductive... same as much of the metaphysical philosophy the scientists look down on. Science is great for investigating phenomena. It's entirely insufficient when claiming that phenomena are all there is.

[Anonymous No.18014321]

>>18011339
Only good take in this thread.

[Anonymous No.18014343]

>>18013489
seriously, Einstein was a Spinozist and it shows in his physics

[Anonymous No.18014483]

>>18011339
Only in late stage philosophy were they ran out of good ideas and started to bullshit the reader.
Greeks are ok.
Nietzsche is good too.
There are others.
Most french philosophers are trash or literally CIA niggers fucking kids under the US payroll.

[Anonymous No.18014485]

>>18014291
>The greatest irony is that materialism is unprovable.
People that assert this never say things like
> Today I'm gonna reject my paycheck because materialism is unprovable
or
> I'm gonna jump out of the window because materialism is unprovable

Fucking faggots.

[Anonymous No.18014561]

>>18014483
Literal 16 year old from leftypol.

[Anonymous No.18014581]

>>18014291
>When you step outside the lines drawn for you by doctrine
So much this. It's also incredibly racist. What right do you have to denigrate the traditional knowledge of POC? Science was developed by racist white men!

[Anonymous No.18014598]

>>18011346
Reminder that Feynman only went into physics after being hard filtered by actual mathematics.

[Anonymous No.18014608]

>>18014598
source? I thought he got pretty good results in the Putnam competition?

[Anonymous No.18014872]

>>18011339
I'm not sure if this applies to contemporary theoretical physics. Good luck being taken seriously doubting anything without at least having a PhD and the right amount of citations on your papers

[Anonymous No.18014902]

>>18014598
In my experience physics is a lot more difficult than mathematics. In math you can always go back to the definitions; there is a logical thread you can follow. In physics, there seems to be much more memorization and reliance on intuition.

[Anonymous No.18014906]

>>18013997
Spinoza is not a materialist.

[Anonymous No.18015042]

>>18011807
Not to be a luddite, but we're grtting closer and closer to a climate catastrophe because of the """contributions""" of scientists. Had we listened more to ethicists instead humans would have had a shot at surviving past the 22th century.

Philosophy, especially ethics, was all along the greates contribution in the history of humanity, but we have ended up wasting it. Pearls to the swines, I guess

[Anonymous No.18015050]

>>18011246
>You can take every one of Spinoza's propositions, and take the contrary propositions, and look at the world and you can't tell which is right."
Does Feynman believe that modes can be prior to substances?

[Anonymous No.18015069]

>>18014906
He can be interpreted as one

[Anonymous No.18015115]

>>18015069
Not really, since extension is only one among infinitely many attributes. I mean, by the same logic we might as well call him an idealist, since 'thought' is an attribute of God too (if anything 'thought' seems to take precedence, since it is immediatly related to every other attribute, unlike 'extension')

[Anonymous No.18015136]

>>18015115
There's nothing other than Nature/"God", and Nature is subject to laws and forces. This is a near a "naturalistic" position (in the contemporary sense) on reality.

[Anonymous No.18015140]

>>18011614
>Idealist immediately turns to violence and murder when confronted with a challange to his schizotypal worldview
Like an algorithm, a true NPC.

[Anonymous No.18015143]

my iq is 92

[Anonymous No.18015147]

>>18015042
There is no "climate catastrophe" coming, your teachers lied to you, you dumbfuck zoomer.

[Anonymous No.18015229]

>>18015147
Keep deluding yourself, boomer

[Anonymous No.18015250]

>>18015136
Nature is not subject to anything, and calling it Nature does not make it material, since there are literally infinite attributes. Again, "extension" has no precedence over "thought", which means that whatever argument you can make to claim that Spinoza was a materialist can be made to claim that he was an idealist instead (both interpretations are simply wrong, of course).

[Anonymous No.18015273]

>>18011246

Partially true. Spinoza's philosophy has huge problems, but it has nothing to do with what Feynman says in the last phrase. Spinoza'S statements are very clear and his reasoning use perfect deductive logic. The true problem is, Spinoza's theology is a giant TAUTOLOGIC description of the universe, since Spinoza's God is the universe itself.

[Anonymous No.18015285]

>>18015042
>Not to be a luddite
Just be a fucking luddite anon, they did NOTHING wrong except lose. The industrial revolution and it's consequences have been a disaster for the human race.

[Anonymous No.18015294]

>>18011614
holy based

[Anonymous No.18015316]

>>18015042
Those who would have listened to the ethicist would have been swept from the face of Earth by those who listened to scientists. And even without climate catastrophy scientific relevations in neuroscience, genetics and AI will progress human evolution by augmenting human brain with machines, gradually removing all that we see as making the life worth living now.

We are material boys trapped in material world.

[Anonymous No.18015331]

>>18013489
This. To adapt Keynes's maxim, STEM spergs who believe themselves quite exempt from any philosophical influence are usually slaves of some defunct philosopher.

[Anonymous No.18015335]

>>18014485
W...w...what?

[Anonymous No.18015347]

>>18015147
The arctic is literally melting.

[Anonymous No.18015370]

>>18015147
But there is a microplastics catastrophe and EROI catastrophe.

[Anonymous No.18015421]

>>18011375
a) Where can it go after Hume? Ok, so you have a few apodictic truths and the rest of knowledge is doomed to be forever uncertain. Does any amount of vague speculation or semantic reconfiguration defeat that impasse? No. The only standard worth a damn is prediction/pragmatism.

b) At some point, we have to recognize that certain questions become anthropocentric. For example, is it really sensible to ask "Why?" life exists or even "How?" in relation to the presence of existence itself?

[Anonymous No.18015438]

>>18015421
>For example, is it really sensible to ask "Why?" life exists or even "How?" in relation to the presence of existence itself?
read Heidegger to find out

[Anonymous No.18015494]

>>18014581
t. ideological zealot slamming other people's ideas into the main vein

[Anonymous No.18015505]

>>18011246
didn't Einstein himself say he agreed with spinoza's conception of God? why is this 126 IQ (yes, he took an IQ test and got 126) midwit talking then?

[Anonymous No.18015601]

>>18015438
see a)
>>18015421

[Anonymous No.18015641]

>>18015421
a) read Kant

[Anonymous No.18015683]

>>18015641
Kant just reconstitutes the same impasse (although he does improve the lexicon to discuss it with). You guys are so low effort it's embarassing.

[Anonymous No.18015759]

>>18015421
there is literally nothing wrong with antropocentrism. It is utterly sensible to question why, in fact far moreso to attempt to satisfy the soul than an endless cycle of more "efficient" consumption under flase athiestic materialist presumptions, which have rotted modern society.

[Anonymous No.18015767]

>>18015601
>>18015683
>standard
stay a naive metaphysicist then

[Anonymous No.18015791]

>>18015683
I have no idea what you're talking about. Where's the impasse in Kant's philosophy?

[Anonymous No.18015878]

>>18014902
In physics you can't intellectually prove what you claim in the strong sense because it is an experimental science. "Pure" experimental research is honestly busywork, even though that's the core of physics at the end. Basic theoretical physics is throwing interpretations around until one fits what experiments you want, to be refuted later. That's the difficult part, but only for physicists that look for such conceptualizations. Not for the student who just learns that gravity follows a law of such or such form. All the derivation beyond that are exercises in (-relatively- simple) mathematics.
>memorization
That is not the mark of intellectualization.
>reliance on intuition
I guess you're using intuition to mean obscure thinking, which is the opposite of what mathematicians or rationalist philosophers would understand by the term.

[Anonymous No.18015912]

>>18015335
His point is somewhat crude... It needs refining.

The key here isn't that non-physicalists live for the most part as if something they think is illusory is true (some illusions are necessary), it's that they don't have any alternative predictive model whatsoever. They have no other paradigm with which to interface with the world that wouldn't produce spectacularly bad results, and generally confine practice of their beliefs to situations where the consequences are non-catastrophic.

So, a better example would've been: A religious man may pray for rain, but he's not going to pray for a truck bearing down on him to disappear, he's going to get out of the fucking road. Or, some kind of quasi-solipsist isn't going to test his ability to shape reality with his thoughts by jumping out a window and growing wings. There is a notable intellectual dishonesty there. Agnostics are a different story, because they don't dispute the pragmatic standard, they're just comfortable with the residual uncertainty/unknowns.

[Anonymous No.18015934]

>>18015912
Okay but those examples were still stupid. Non-physicalism does not entail a non-belief in the existence of ordinary objects. I could literally be a full-blown Berkeleyan idealist and still be entirely justified in not "rejecting my paycheck".

[Anonymous No.18015959]

>>18015934
Your terminlogy is loose. The point is that non-physicalists behave 'when it matters' as if the world is governed by the laws of physics. Rejecting the paycheck wasn't my example.

[Anonymous No.18015973]

>>18015505
Einstein was also a communist. Do you also agree with it too?

[Anonymous No.18016007]

>>18015421
>Where can it go after Hume?
Read Bolzano. Or Husserl. Or many others (Brentano and his school, Boutroux/Bergson, Lavelle, neothomism, Łukasiewicz and his school, etc). You can even read Leibniz (or even Malebranche) who is certainly "refuted" neither by Hume nor Kant.
Only terminal plebs like Carnap think Hume is the last word on the topic.
>so you have a few apodictic truths
If by a few you mean an infinity extending in many directions, yes.

[Anonymous No.18016037]

>>18015959
>Your terminlogy is loose.
No, it's not.
>The point is that non-physicalists behave 'when it matters' as if the world is governed by the laws of physics
And? Again, even a full-blown Berkeleyan idealist can coherently accept that there are laws of physics that apply to every phenomenon in the world. This is literally not a point of contention for non-physicalists. Even in contemporary times non-physicalists like David Chalmers not only accept laws of physics, but even use them as premises for their own arguments.

[Anonymous No.18016095]

>>18016037
Yes, but (to repeat myself) they have no alternative model. Anything they claim above and beyond physicalism is entirely uncorroborated by empiricism. Which brings us back to the long ago reached impasse in metaphysics.

[Anonymous No.18016106]

>>18016037
>No, it's not.
>ordinary objects

[Anonymous No.18016200]

>>18016106
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ordinary-objects/
>>18016095
Why would they need an alternative model? A non-physicalist can fully accept that the physical world is ruled by physical laws. They only add that there are non-physical facts, but this does not have to entail any change in the physical world. For example an epiphenomenalist can accept that everything that happens in the physical world is ruled by physical laws, and still claim that said laws are not sufficient to explain consciousness. In fact, people who accept the Hard Problem of Consciousness do so exactly because they accept that the physical world is fully ruled by physical laws (take that bit out and there's no Hard Problem anymore).
>Anything they claim above and beyond physicalism is entirely uncorroborated by empiricism
It would be unreasonable to expect non-physical facts to be passible of empirical confirmation. Still, there can be epistemic and rational modes of confirmations. For example Chalmers claims (and imho he is right) that phenomenical consciousness is accessible to us as an intuitive datum (e.g. I know I'm having a visual experience because I am having a visual experience). This does not require any further empirical confirmation (I don't have to make experiments to find out whether I'm really having a visual experience)

Also, since I mentioned Berkeley earlier, keep in mind that if we are talking about empiricism then you should side with him rather than the physicalists (since they postulate non-observable entities, namely subject-independent objects).

[Anonymous No.18016269]

>>18014581
Weak bait

[Anonymous No.18016281]

>>18016200
>Also, since I mentioned Berkeley earlier, keep in mind that if we are talking about empiricism then you should side with him rather than the physicalists (since they postulate non-observable entities, namely subject-independent objects).
Bergson and James also have takes in this direction. Radical empiricism and physicalism are incompatible. The only reason they are commonly found together is not philosophical but psychological. While conceptually contradictory, they both satisfy the same "esprit fort" or "though minded" mentality.

[Anonymous No.18016423]

>>18016200
They'd need an alternative model to test their speculative assertions, obviously. It is one thing to point out that physcalist knowledge is incomplete (well duh), and quite another to assume gaps (hard problem) and fundamental categories (the non-physical) with no empirical corroboration.

>It would be unreasonable to expect non-physical facts to be passible of empirical confirmation.
Yes of course, but I don't accept that convenient hand wave. If you can't even positively describe the content of your assertions, then you might as well be writing fairy tales.

>This does not require any further empirical confirmation
The key word here is "further". The experience of visual sensation IS an empirical confirmation (and all apodictic truth still requires this empirical component). When you want to start digging into the mechanics of visual sensation however, further empirical investigation is required.

>(since they postulate non-observable entities, namely subject-independent objects)
Such object(s) are guaranteed to exist due to the apodictic truth of our lack of omniscience (which as I've noted, is a type of empirical confirmation).

[Anonymous No.18016447]

>>18011246
>presupposing deconstruction
if that's Fyneman
>>18015505
it's almost as if IQ doesn't mean anything and you're a retard for being in that cult

[Anonymous No.18016455]

>>18011278
this comment got more replies than it deserves.

[Anonymous No.18016464]

>>18011356
Feynman, the ultimate pseud

[Anonymous No.18016601]

>>18016423
>It is one thing to point out that physcalist knowledge is incomplete (well duh), and quite another to assume gaps (hard problem) and fundamental categories (the non-physical) with no empirical corroboration.
The problem here, to use Chalmers as an example, is that we have direct access to a datum that is not explainable not even in principle in physicalist terms. It is not a matter of current ignorance: no amount of scientific knowledge can possibly bridge this gap. If you want I can try to summarize why this is so.
>Yes of course, but I don't accept that convenient hand wave. If you can't even positively describe the content of your assertions, then you might as well be writing fairy tales
I generally would agree with this position of yours, but I don't think it applies to this case. The difference between the HP of consciousness and, say, the HP of unicorns is that we have no datum that confirms to us that unicorn exist, and the same cannot be said about consciousness (since we can be certain of being conscious). Unless you're an eliminativist, this is a real fact, and if physicalism cannot explain it not even in principle then physicalism is not an adequate world-theory (although it can still be adequate to describe a limited portion of reality, namely the one that concerns the physical world).
>The experience of visual sensation IS an empirical confirmation (and all apodictic truth still requires this empirical component). When you want to start digging into the mechanics of visual sensation however, further empirical investigation is required.
I think you're using the term "empirical" in an excessively vague way. I don't discover the fact that I am conscious by observing particular things: the act of observing is already the confirmation (the content of my observation is irrelevant). Another big difference is that in this case consciousness is confirmed deductively, while empirically confirmed facts can only be treated inductively. It seems to me that your definition would turn even mathematical proofs into empirical findings (to use some analytical jargon, I think this view of yours, if I understood it correctly, just mistakes the context of discovery with the context of justification).
>Such object(s) are guaranteed to exist due to the apodictic truth of our lack of omniscience (which as I've noted, is a type of empirical confirmation).
I think I missed the post in which you argued this point (which I don't really understand).

[Anonymous No.18016681]

>>18011614
Top kek

[Anonymous No.18016925]

>>18011356
>>18016464
I don't get it, Feynman gave an outstanding answer to that trolling clown

[Anonymous No.18016947]

>>18011278
This is your brain on empiricism

[Anonymous No.18017152]

>>>18016947
Rude

[Anonymous No.18017192]

>>18015042
>climate catastrophe because of the """contributions""" of scientists
>linking industrialization to science and not economic ideology
some real midwit shit right here

[Anonymous No.18017218]

>>18011246
>Here's this great Dutch philosopher
Portuguese Jew*

[Anonymous No.18017288]

>>18017192

tbf even if the problem isn't the fault of science it still could have been fixed/improved by the input of literally anyone who wanted to put the brakes on the way science was being exploited

[Anonymous No.18017295]

>>18016925
>that trolling clown
he clearly wasn't a trolling clown, and Feynman clearly sidestepped the question like a politician. total pseud answer

[Anonymous No.18017324]

>>18011356
what a seething stemtard

[Anonymous No.18017438]

>>18015973
Yes.

[Anonymous No.18017452]

>>18017438
based
https://monthlyreview.org/2009/05/01/why-socialism/

[Anonymous No.18017697]

>>18017295
>he clearly wasn't a trolling clown
he absolutely was
>sidestepped the question like a politician
the fuck are you on he gave an excellent answer. Do you think you can exhaustively explain the origin of the magnetic force to a random layman? The dude was fucking with him. He remained cold blooded and explained how you need an already established layer of knowledge to grasp even the most basic facts of everyday life, you can't just pretend to get an accurate description of magnetism from a physic's viewpoint and blame him he can't infuse you a master degree in physics on the spot.

[Anonymous No.18017700]

Physicists are famous for overestimating their expertise on unrelated fields they know absolutely nothing about.

[Anonymous No.18018162]

>>18016601
We're just circling the same point. Only apodictic knowledge is 100% certain. We both agree with this, right? Now when it comes to the rest of potential knowledge (which I call 'provisional'), then only an actionable model with predictive power (i.e. physics) can cut the mustard. I am not saying you are wrong for holding out a reserve of skepticism, I'm saying you have no alternative which can make any headway into provisional knowledge, nor any empirical indications (empiricism being the only conduit to knowledge) to recommend the possibilty of an alternative. Finally, speculated alternatives can only be described in negative terms (conceptually contrasted with physicalism) because there isn't the first clue of what one would be like in the concrete... This may not be a 'nail in the coffin', but I do propose that it is a giant red flag.

I am not using the term 'empirical' in a vague sense at all. Empiricism is fundamentally experience, and apodictic truths are only evident because they are experienced. The apodicticity of consciousness/awareness (what you are calling 'deductive confirmation', which isn't right because it is evident without a premise) does not negate the experiential (empirical) component of realization.

[Anonymous No.18018204]

>>18015140
yes, what are you going to do about it? draw some triangles, lol.

[Anonymous No.18018214]

>>18017700
this
>einstein solved spacetime.basedjack
>has never read Kant, nor attempted to argue against he notion of transcendental categories.

[Anonymous No.18018334]

>>18017697
you're an absolute pseud if you believe philosophy is about btfoing interviewers who are asking for a simple explanation of a physical phenomena, no matter what kind of terms they use. the whole point of an interview is to ask questions that challenge the subject. Feynman completely sidestepped the question so he can come off as a total debate bro. pure reddit status.

here's the door: reddit.com/r/philosophy

[Anonymous No.18018495]

>>18015147
I don't think there's a mass extinction, but a lot of people are going to die in in third world and in the underclasses. Rising sea levels are gonna fuck us up

[Anonymous No.18019059]

>>18018162
>Empiricism is fundamentally experience, and apodictic truths are only evident because they are experienced
So, mathematical truths and logical laws are empirical?
>The apodicticity of consciousness/awareness (what you are calling 'deductive confirmation', which isn't right because it is evident without a premise) does not negate the experiential (empirical) component of realization.
This is what I meant when I made a distinction between context of justification and context of discovery. So, it is absolutely true that I must be conscious to learn that 2+2=4 (this is the context of discovery), but from the standpoint of justification, the truth of the proposition 2+2=4 is completely independent from me (or anyone else, if that matters) knowing it. In this case, experience only offer an occasion to acquire this item of knowledge, but it does not offer the justification required for truths of this kind. If mathematical truths were to be empirical (only because I cognize them in my experience) then 2+2=4 would not be necessarily true: I would have to check from time to time wether adding 2 to 2 would still be equal to 4.
I would say the same about consciousness and self-consciousness. The knowledge of the fact that I am conscious is not justified by any reference to any determinate content of my experience (regardless of what I see, hear, smell, feel, etc. I will still be conscious). Moreover, if I am conscious I don't have to check at any given time wether I am still conscious: tautologically (and this is why I talked about deductive confirmation) if I am conscious now, then it is necessarily the case that I am conscious now (in other terms, if I'm conscious I know a priori that I am conscious - and aprioricity is completely incompatible with empiricity).
>Now when it comes to the rest of potential knowledge (which I call 'provisional'), then only an actionable model with predictive power (i.e. physics) can cut the mustard.
It is true that at the moment I have no alternative to offer (which I assume would have to be some sort of rationalist metaphysics), but at the same time I also pretty some reasons to assume that such an alternative exists, due to the fact that I am ALREADY able to cognize non-physical facts (namely, the ones related to my phenomenical consciousness). It might be true that mysterianism is correct, and that all we have access to is science and this cognition of our consciousness (which would never be explained, since it cannot be explained empirically), but unless this is proven a priori I don't see no reason to assume that a workable, non-empirical theory cannot be formulated.

Basically, on one side the fact of consciousness definetely refute physicalism as a world-theory, and on the other it could be a "hint" for a metaphysical system which can account for both the domain of the physical and the one of the mental.

[Anonymous No.18019082]

>>18019059
*but at the same time I also have some reasons
I rewrote that sentence and left accidentally a "pretty" in it, my bad

[Anonymous No.18019097]

>>18019059
>So, mathematical truths and logical laws are empirical?

Not him, but to add to what you said: there is a difference between the epistemologic character of a given piece of knowledge and the way an individual comes to learn of it. I individually may learn that 1 + 1 = 2 by means of putting two apples together, but that does not make such piece of knowledge empirical, since it CAN be known regardless of any empirical observation, and what is more, it's not subject to the problems typical of induction.

[Anonymous No.18019098]

>>18011657
this

[Anonymous No.18019236]

>>18019097
That's one of the points I was trying to make with that distinction of contexts. Sorry if I havent been clear enough

[Anonymous No.18019245]

>>18011325
absolute cope

[Anonymous No.18019284]

>>18011657
> t. brainlet who didn't pass 5th grade math

advanced physics and mathematics are deeply creative fields, in ways that are probably beyond you.

[Anonymous No.18019329]

>>18019284
If anything, from a philosophical standpoint the activity of mathematicians is too reliant on intuition. Hegel understood this quite well when he pointed out that while mathematical theorems pinpoint necessary truths, the steps of their demonstrations are not themselves necessary (today we would say that there is no algorithm which can lead to the formulation of every mathematical theorem).

[Anonymous No.18019340]

The problem of universals is the only question that ultimately matters and it's a philosophical problem.

[Anonymous No.18020300]

>>18019097
Seems like a dubious distinction to me. If no systems are truly self-referential (they always refer to the concrete world at their foundation), then all knowledge is indeed empirical. The brute fact is that no, nothing can be known without an experiential component. Trying to carve out a grey area with levels of abstraction (a la synthetic a priori)—or at the other end with necessary intuitions—is grasping at straws imo. It strikes me as an attempt to sanctify an area of knowledge without going full idealist. Now, I can appreciate the pragmatism in distinguishing between what is learned and Kant's pure intuitions, and even in treating mathematical systems -as if- they were truly self-referential, but the ontological reality of such distinctions has simply not been established.

>>18019059
>So, mathematical truths and logical laws are empirical?
Indeed they are. No such abstract systems would be possible without observation of the empirical relations they are abstracted from.

>truth of the proposition 2+2=4 is completely independent from me (or anyone else, if that matters) knowing it.
Is it? If no agent ever existed which could make such a proposition, how could it be true? This isn't like saying if we all died tonight the earth would still be there tomorrow, you're trying to say that an abstraction would still be true had there never been abstracting agents.

>The knowledge of the fact that I am conscious is not justified by any reference to any determinate content of my experience
How do you sensibly divorce the content of experience from the knowledge of it? How would you know that you were conscious if no content at all was apparent? You're uncritically accepting aprioricity as an ontologically real distinction, but I submit that the experiential component of knowledge can never be discarded. Which again, is not to say that such distinctions do not have their uses, but they are all subsets of empiricism imo.

>I am ALREADY able to cognize non-physical facts
You don't even know what 'non-physical' could possibly mean, so no—you aren't.

>Basically, on one side the fact of consciousness definetely refute physicalism as a world-theory
And there's the assumptive leap. There is no competing world theory, and the incompleteness of physics is not a refutation (and especially not a definitive one).

[Anonymous No.18020332]

>>18011246
Whatever happened with the crisis of the foundation of mathematics? Did everyone just collectively agree to not think too hard about it?

[Anonymous No.18020340]

>>18019329
>If anything, from a philosophical standpoint the activity of mathematicians is too reliant on intuition
It's just a philosophical prejudice that intuition is somehow inferior to rationality when rationality cannot work without intuition (while intuition can work without rationality). You couldn't have written you own post without intuition.

>Hegel understood this quite well
Hegel was wrong on that count, he shouldn't have strayed so far from Kant.

>while mathematical theorems pinpoint necessary truths
Not even true in the general sense

>the steps of their demonstrations are not themselves necessary
Meaningless statement, demonstration depends on the axiomatic and language used. None of Hegel's philosophical reasoning is any more necessary than basic arithmetic by the way. You make it sound like Hegel is simply unsatisfied with using human heuristics for knowledge. Fat chance he was going to make any progress without them.

>today we would say that there is no algorithm which can lead to the formulation of every mathematical theorem
Those are completely different statements. Tarski's undefinability theorem (if that is what you have in mind, or perhaps you think of Gödel's incompleteness- in any case Tarski's result is more fitting here) is not concerned with philosophical necessity of demonstration. Even Gödel's incompleteness (which is more focused on the demonstration side of things) isn't about philosophical necessity.

[Anonymous No.18020356]

>>18020332
Mathematicians have always been almost perfectly fine without much concern for fondations, and analytic philosophers eventually realized mathematicians don't care about their opinions on mathematics, so the controversy kinda faded out. Once you stop clinging to childish hope of absolute unmitigated deduction of all arithmetic from first principles it all starts looking like much less of an issue.

[Anonymous No.18020369]

>>18020356
Yeah, sweeping things under the rug always works.

[Anonymous No.18020381]

>>18011246
Feynman is the foucault of physics: seems super smart, but it's pure pseud status:
https://psyche.co/ideas/pseudophilosophy-encourages-confused-self-indulgent-thinking

[Anonymous No.18020382]

>>18020369
academics are pseuds

[Anonymous No.18020403]

>>18020356
This is what has always gotten me about mathmatics. Im too autistic to just go, ok this works, but how does it work... idk it just does work.

Like I cannot remember it specifically, but there was a way back in elementary to do division, and it was more a trick that got you to the right answer rather than them explaining a reason (i think it had to do with how a base 10 system functions, but they never really explained it idk) and I just couldnt intuite it. I was completely fine, even very good with statistics and parts of algebra going into high school, but I never got those "tricks" that were not self evident and just had to be known.

[Anonymous No.18020445]

>>18020369
There is nothing to sweep. People realized that what their first thought was a shitstain is actually just a carpet pattern they didn't like. Since then they realized there were some nice way to extend the carpet anyway, so they stopped complaining.

The formalist project was interesting because its failure led mathematicians to understand pretty well to which extent they can't have their cake and eat it. But the simple reality is most of mathematics is unconcerned by the specifics of foundations, and most mathematicians work the same however you found mathematics.

Because, think about it, any decent foundation of mathematics has to account for the bulk of the actual practice of mathematics, especially the age-old, ironclad things like arithmetic and geometry. You can't create an autistic system that throws out 2500 years of history of arithmetic, say "b-but my system is more autistic according to my own spergtastic criteria so it's better" and expect people to take you seriously. One way or another, you have to accommodate the arithmetician, because he kinda made the place. Which also means no one who seriously works at the center of arithmetic has much to fear from foundational work.

This is of course a broad statement. There are for instance works that relate the truth or falsehood of the Riemann Hypothesis with general property of consistence of some axiomatic systems, which means proving some general foundational theorem might automatically entail the Riemann hypothesis (or its negation, depending on what is proven). So naturally this would interest number theorist. But mind that in this case, the interest for foundations comes downstream from the interest for the Riemann hypothesis, not the other way around.

In the end, fundamental mathematical logic is just one niche of the mathematical ecosystem, and it's neither the oldest, nor the biggest, nor the most legitimate one. It's also no less arbitrary than any of them, since there is no canonical procedure for choosing axioms, languages, and rules of demonstration (the most common heuristics are in fact: what do you want to study? and what kind of object do you want to be able to produce with your language? so in a way this circles back to the primacy of mathematical objects, and not logical systems).

[Anonymous No.18020458]

>>18020403
Ultimately the rabbit hole of why things work has no bottom, the next best thing to knowing it all (which is impossible, probably even in theory) is knowing all current humanly known mathematics (impossible in practice), and the next best thing after that is being at the forefront of one specific subject and furthering it for a lifetime (only a small minority of researcher really do that).

[Anonymous No.18020476]

>>18019340
KING.

[Anonymous No.18020485]

>>18011278
Prove in a measurable and verifiable way that your life is of any value and that I should give a shit about industry or science?

[Anonymous No.18020513]

>>18020458
>Ultimately the rabbit hole of why things work has no bottom
True enough, But I do enjoy the structured axioms of philosophy usually. Its a "given x and y we can cogitate z" I can appreciate a baseline statement, and then the branching logic from that statement.

[Anonymous No.18021310]

>>18011246
And physics today circlejerk string theory and only a little while before feynman's time they circlejerked the ether. Having unfalsifiable claims is a problem not only in philosophy but also in physics. There's good and bad philosophers and good and bad physicisist Kant for example put a lot of effort into not making claims of this kind.

[Anonymous No.18021347]

>>18020300
>Indeed they are. No such abstract systems would be possible without observation of the empirical relations they are abstracted from.
Again, one thing is discovery and another is justification.
>Is it? If no agent ever existed which could make such a proposition, how could it be true? This isn't like saying if we all died tonight the earth would still be there tomorrow, you're trying to say that an abstraction would still be true had there never been abstracting agents.
Yes, since the existence of anything is not a condition of justification of, say, "2+2=4". In fact as I have mentioned earlier, there is no empirical content that could justify the necessity of a mathematical truths (if things were to be in the way you've described, "2+2=4" would not be necessarily true).
>How do you sensibly divorce the content of experience from the knowledge of it?
I don't think this point is that esoteric. Regardless of what I am seeing, I know I am conscious; regarding of what I'm hearing, I know I am conscious; regardless of what I am smelling, I know I am conscious; etc. In the exact moment I have a representation, ANY representation, I know I am conscious in general, regardless of the representation's content. In fact, there is no such content that could prove to me that I am not conscious: as such the recognition of my own consciousness does not depend on any of its particular contents.
>You don't even know what 'non-physical' could possibly mean, so no—you aren't
Do you know how the HP work? I can summarize it in my words, if you want. Also the term "non-physical" is meaningful, as long as the term "physical" is meaningful.
>And there's the assumptive leap. There is no competing world theory, and the incompleteness of physics is not a refutation (and especially not a definitive one).
It is, if you understand the argument. Also it is not required to offer an alternative when you refute a theory. Demonstrating that a theory is absolutely incoherent, as in, demonstrating that it is false even by its own standards, is surely enough. The arguments behind the HP of consciousness do exactly that, for they show that physicalism cannot coherently be a world-theory if cosciousness is introduced in our ontologies.

[Anonymous No.18021396]

>>18020340
>It's just a philosophical prejudice that intuition is somehow inferior to rationality when rationality cannot work without intuition (while intuition can work without rationality). You couldn't have written you own post without intuition.
Intuition entails no necessity, so it's not really a prejudice.
>Hegel was wrong on that count, he shouldn't have strayed so far from Kant
He's objectively right on this one, but ok.
>Not even true in the general sense
Name a mathematical truth that is not necessarily true then.
>Meaningless statement, demonstration depends on the axiomatic and language used. None of Hegel's philosophical reasoning is any more necessary than basic arithmetic by the way. You make it sound like Hegel is simply unsatisfied with using human heuristics for knowledge. Fat chance he was going to make any progress without them
It's not a meaningless statement, it is perfectly intellegible. Once taken together the steps of a demonstration lead to a necessary mathematical truth, but taken by themselves they are not necessary. Let's say that in a geometrical demonstration the first 2 steps are tracing a segment and dividing it in 3 parts: why are these steps necessary? What does necessarily lead me to take these 2 steps BEFORE having demonstrated that geometrical theorem? Certainly not any algorithm, or any other necessity of such kind.
>Those are completely different statements
Not really, it's the same exact thing. Also, I have no idea why would you think the comments on Gödel and Tarski are pertinent to what I said (at best they only offer more arguments on my side - and no, the fact that, with Gödel, it is ruled out that an algorithm could possibly underlie every theorem does not become irrelevant only because Gödel did not specifically talk about philosophical necessity)

[Anonymous No.18021448]

>>18019245
Justify utilisation by industry and science as meaningful or good. In fact, if you're interested in truth even in a strictly scientific/naturalist sense, you must consider it bad and dangerous.

[Anonymous No.18021490]

>>18021448
I'm not entirely sure I understand your challenge. Are you asking me to "justify utilization [of a proposition/idea] by industry and science as meaningful or good"? If so:
It can be used to improve human quality of life through finding cures and treatments to illnesses.

[Anonymous No.18021501]

>>18021490
>It can be used to improve human quality of life through finding cures and treatments to illnesses.
That's not a justification, just an arbitrary statement (which isn't even absolutely verifiable in itself)

[Anonymous No.18021606]

>>18011807
>coping with my greatest point of pride
Heh...

[Anonymous No.18021649]

>>18015316
I think that's the fantastic dream.
But the progress of neurosciences, psychology is not that good, lots of disasters, mistakes, replicability crisis... and on top of it all, it cannot shed its metaphysical prejudice, it's physicalism all the while being incapable to explain consciousness or even the activity itself, not that I have a problem with that. I'd just the framework even if it was absurd if I observed effects / results, but I'll in keep in mind the flaws all the time.

[Anonymous No.18021659]

>>18020445
>just try not to think too hard about it

[Anonymous No.18021671]

>>18021501
>That's not a justification, just an arbitrary statement
Well anon, I don't have a big book of objectively true good values to pull from, but I think most people agree not getting sick is better than getting sick.
>(which isn't even absolutely verifiable in itself)
I'm not sure what your standards for "absolute verification" are, but there used to be a lot of polio in the United States, and now its virtually eradicated, and there were some propositions and ideas involved in the process of making that happen.

[Anonymous No.18021750]

>>18011246
I just don’t get how anyone can honestly glom onto one epistemological system (in Feynman’s case positivism) and tote it around as the only thing that matters. I don’t like Spinoza, but following his method of logic is informative, especially because it differs from my own. Anything less than the embrace of everything stunts the mind. All Feynman knows is positivism, if he ever steps outside it he will recoil because he doesn’t understand it. It works fine if you never leave the lane you choose.

His mention of Newton is funny too as others itt have likely pointed out. Newton spent more time using gematria to scry the Bible then he did writing the principia. Feynman can comfortably gloss over that because he believes in the absolute authority of science. Science has no need for inconvenient historical facts because it “escapes from” history by supposedly accessing what before would have been thought of as a transcendent plane of the gods.

[Anonymous No.18021755]

>>18011246
>(((Dutch))) philosopher

[Anonymous No.18021788]

>>18011614
anon this is very based

[Anonymous No.18021791]

>>18011614
lol

[Anonymous No.18021902]

>>18021347
>Again, one thing is discovery and another is justification.
I think you're semantically moving the goalposts. 2+2=4 is only necessarily true in the sense that abstracting agents have defined that language so this is the case (it is a consequence of our mathematical axioms). Were the language never defined anywhere, the axioms wouldn't exist and so neither could the consequents. What ostensibly would still exist are the root empirical relations that such languages are abstracted from in the first place, and so the truths of any abstract system are ultimately contingent upon the empirical if you don't hand-wave away their provenance. Justification isn't possible without discovery, and furthermore justification doesn't happen at all without abstracting agents. If you want to argue that 'justification' is a useful abstract distinction to make (it is), that's fine; but it is not an ontologically concrete, parallel category to empiricism.

>regardless of what I am (...)
No, not regardless at all, because experience/sensation is still required. It is absurd to claim that because -any- sensation fulfills the requirement, that this recognition is not empirical in nature. Generality does not shift us into a new fundamental mode of perception. You're merely re-stating the apodicticity of awareness, but this doesn't change the very simple fact that apodicticity is only empirically apparent, and no amount of semantic hair-splitting ever will.

>the term "non-physical" is meaningful, as long as the term "physical" is meaningful.
Yeah, like I said, 'non-physical' can only be understood as some nebulous negation of the 'physical'. It describes nothing of it's own, so what is its specific meaning beyond the mode of negation? Does 'nothing' exist/have specific meaning, or is it a purely conceptual (and totally vague) contrast to the extant?

>HP
The 'hard problem' is an -assumption-. It assumes a gap and assumes universal qualia (as opposed to more parsimonious tropes) that are by no means established, and then proceeds to make hay out of said assumptions. If you were to be intellectually honest, you'd have to admit that your own appeal to uncertainty/incompleteness also casts doubt upon the supposed irreducibility of 'consciousness' that you propose (the difference being that your only prediction is the failure of neuroscientific reduction, meanwhile they're still making rapid progress).

[Anonymous No.18022076]

>>18011338
No shit. I feel like dunning kruger effect is heavy here though.

[Anonymous No.18022812]

>>18011356
You learned about this video from Theoria Apophasis, didn't you?

[Anonymous No.18023029]

>>18011246
>hey dad can you help me with my homework?
>sure thing, son, I am after all a scientist and just about one of the cleverist people around
>its by some guy called Spinoza
>???????? [holy shit I am getting filtered hard by this, I better laugh to cover my confusion and save face with my boy] h-ha ha ha, you laugh now too son
>OK dad, ha he ho [oh great my dad is a gay retard, cant wait for mom to tell me he got cucked and my dad is really a homeless crackhead, anything but this]

[Anonymous No.18023069]

>>18011614
ok this is epic

[Anonymous No.18023078]

>>18011782
>Science man smart therefore science man right
Insanely cringe