/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.17284000]

For me, it's reductionist physicalism.

[Anonymous No.17284017]

For me, it's quietism

[Pest Control No.17284039]

>>17284000

[Anonymous No.17284042]

[Anonymous No.17284044]

zoomers

[Anonymous No.17284063]

>>17284000
>>17284017
go back to twitter and tik tok

[Anonymous No.17284122]

"Exactly so, lord. As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, it is just this consciousness that runs and wanders on, not another."

"Which consciousness, Sāti, is that?" [1]

"This speaker, this knower, lord, that is sensitive here & there to the ripening of good & evil actions."

"And to whom, worthless man, do you understand me to have taught the Dhamma like that? Haven't I, in many ways, said of dependently co-arisen consciousness, 'Apart from a requisite condition, there is no coming-into-play of consciousness'? [2] But you, through your own poor grasp, not only slander us but also dig yourself up [by the root] and produce much demerit for yourself. That will lead to your long-term harm & suffering."

Then the Blessed One said to the monks, "What do you think, monks? Is this monk Sāti, the Fisherman's Son, even warm in this Dhamma & Vinaya?"

"How could he be, lord? No, lord."

When this was said, the monk Sāti, the Fisherman's Son, sat silent, abashed, his shoulders drooping, his head down, brooding, at a loss for words.

Then the Blessed One, seeing that the monk Sāti, the Fisherman's Son, was sitting silent, abashed, his shoulders drooping, his head down, brooding, at a loss for words, said to him, "Worthless man, you will be recognized for your own pernicious viewpoint. I will cross-question the monks on this matter."

Then the Blessed One addressed the monks, "Monks, do you too understand the Dhamma as taught by me in the same way that the monk Sāti, the Fisherman's Son, does when, through his own poor grasp [of the Dhamma], he not only slanders us but also digs himself up [by the root] and produces much demerit for himself?"

"No, lord, for in many ways the Blessed One has said of dependently co-arisen consciousness, 'Apart from a requisite condition, there is no coming-into-play of consciousness.'"

"It's good, monks, that you understand the Dhamma taught by me in this way, for in many ways I have said of dependently co-arisen consciousness, 'Apart from a requisite condition, there is no coming-into-play of consciousness.' But this monk Sāti, the Fisherman's Son, through his own poor grasp [of the Dhamma], has not only slandered us but has also dug himself up [by the root], producing much demerit for himself. That will lead to this worthless man's long-term harm & suffering.

[Anonymous No.17284132]

Consciousness Classified by Requisite Condition

"Consciousness, monks, is classified simply by the requisite condition in dependence on which it arises. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the eye & forms is classified simply as eye-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the ear & sounds is classified simply as ear-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the nose & aromas is classified simply as nose-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the tongue & flavors is classified simply as tongue-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the body & tactile sensations is classified simply as body-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the intellect & ideas is classified simply as intellect-consciousness.

"Just as fire is classified simply by whatever requisite condition in dependence on which it burns — a fire that burns in dependence on wood is classified simply as a wood-fire, a fire that burns in dependence on wood-chips is classified simply as a wood-chip-fire; a fire that burns in dependence on grass is classified simply as a grass-fire; a fire that burns in dependence on cow-dung is classified simply as a cow-dung-fire; a fire that burns in dependence on chaff is classified simply as a chaff-fire; a fire that burns in dependence on rubbish is classified simply as a rubbish-fire — in the same way, consciousness is classified simply by the requisite condition in dependence on which it arises. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the eye & forms is classified simply as eye-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the ear & sounds is classified simply as ear-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the nose & aromas is classified simply as nose-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the tongue & flavors is classified simply as tongue-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the body & tactile sensations is classified simply as body-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the intellect & ideas is classified simply as intellect-consciousness.

[Anonymous No.17284135]

Consciousness is just too complex

[Anonymous No.17284136]

>>17284000
Bergson retroactively refuted Daniel Chud Dennett.

[Anonymous No.17284138]

>>17284000
You have been filtered.

[Anonymous No.17284181]

>>17284136
Preemptively, anon. Preemptively.

[Anonymous No.17284492]

>>17284000
For me, it’s panpsychism.

If you really think about the three big classic thought experiments; Mary’s Room, the Chinese Room, and the China Brain, something like panpsychism is the only solution.

If what’s important about the Brain is it’s functional organization then it can be multiple instantiated. You can recreate that exact system of signals in a computer, or in a few billion people waving flags at each other. If functionalism is true, you could make a genuinely conscious thing by rolling a rock around a field in a way that replicated the rules of logic gates.

The Chinese Room tells us that semantics can never emerge out of syntax alone, without adding anything extra in.

The only possible solution is that something has to already exist as a property of the component parts of a brain which *is itself proto-mental*, and which is only realized when that matter is put in a particular arrangement.

I think this is similar to how all matter has electrical properties, on account of being made up of protons and electrons which have intrinsic electrical properties, but it’s only have a material also has a certain set of other properties (forms a metallic structure) and is arrange correctly that those properties become apparent on the macro scale (a wire forming a circuit, allowing a bulb to light).


The only thing you need to get over is the idea that this means all matter is ‘conscious’, pan-protopsychism imply that in any way.

[Anonymous No.17284565]

>>17284492
Oh and Mary’s Room demonstrates that consciousness exists. It shows that there are ‘phenomenal facts’ which are not reducible to physical facts about the world.

Thus;

-consciousness exists.
-consciousness cannot be the product of ‘strong emergence’ merely on the basis of functional organization. At least not without accepting that very abstract structures that simulate computation could be conscious.

If you also accept that materialism is true, you must accept panpsychism. The only alternative is to reject materialism as just believe consciousness is the product of a soul and confront all the issues substance dualism has.

[Anonymous No.17284761]

>>17284492
>>17284565
None of these thoughts are yours and some of them are in direct conflict (you can't be a panpsychist and a functionalist at the same time). Less regurgitation, more thinking.

[Anonymous No.17284848]

I take the property dualist position: mental states 1) are properties of 2) and caused by brain states. And I have no problem explaining how interaction works, since physical states of the brain have mental properties.

[Anonymous No.17284854]

>>17284492
>>17284565
Mary's Chinese Brain Room is good, but those three thought experiments don't prove panpsychism is right. Panpyschists are for some reason just hostile to a non-emergentist dualism, and so are the emergentists and the reductionists. But that's the real way to go. It gets absurd when panpsychists start saying there's things like phenomenal properties at the subatomic level but we somehow can't access what they're like, even by introspection, much as the physicalists who tell us perception is physical can't explain why we can't introspectively access what our own experiences reduce to. That's the problem both have. And if you stick with another notion of the 'proto-mental' panpsychism becomes indistinguishable from reductionism. Emergentism avoids the problem but I find no reason to believe in things that just come out of nowhere and pop into existence and out of existence just like that. Substance dualism has no problems. People just find it """"""weird"""""" to speak of causal relations between spatiotemporal and non-spatiotemporal things for some confusing reason. Any other 'problem' is just pragmatic, things like saying the dualist theory is somehow bulkier and therefore worse than leaner alternatives.
>>17284000
>>17284017
You two are lame.

[Anonymous No.17284867]

>>17284000

[Anonymous No.17284893]

>>17284492
I don't see why consciousness should be attributed to things which don't exhibit conscious mindlike behaviour, which we inductively attribute to other humans and animals?

Some kind of non emergent dualism or idealism as >>17284854 says is the only real way to go.

[Anonymous No.17284956]

>>17284042
consciousness is not complex but it is extremely simple, it simply consists of the continuous self-revelation of itself
>>17284122
>>17284132
Buddhism was refuted by Shankara
>>17284136
Bergson was refuted by Guenon
>>17284492
>The only possible solution is that something has to already exist as a property of the component parts of a brain which *is itself proto-mental*, and which is only realized when that matter is put in a particular arrangement.
If it doesn't really result in consciousness until it's arranged into a particular configuration, than it's not pan-psychism, because then it would already be conscious before being configured into that configuration, as consciousness is a property of matter in panpsychism. Wouldn't it make more sense to say that consciousness is non-physical, and exists transcendentally outside of space and time (perhaps as their basis/source/cause) and that it simply observes the brain and brain states as its objects?

[Anonymous No.17285647]

>>17284956
Retroactively refuted by Whitehead and Heraclitus

[Anonymous No.17285669]

>>17284956
Postactively refuted by Deleuze (pbuh) and Laruelle (pbuh)

[Anonymous No.17285936]

>>17284565
BTW, David Chalmers (one of the leading voices in anglo Phil of Mind) is sympathetic to panpsychism.

[Anonymous No.17285999]

>>17285669
>Postactively refuted by Deleuze
Preemptively by Simondon

[Anonymous No.17286170]

>>17285936
He is, and he's brilliant, but I have to say he's wrong about the panpsychism.

[Anonymous No.17286562]

>>17286170
Can you explain his basic gestalt? Was thinking about checking out The Conscious Mind but not sure if it's worth the investment.

[Anonymous No.17286942]

>>17284761
My point is specifically that we should reject functionalism, and instead embrace panpsychism. When you really draw out the multiple instantibiliy to its logical conclusion, you get things that are way more absurd than suggesting all matter has a hidden proto-mental aspect. Sorry if that wasn’t clear.

>>17284854
It’s not just weird, it’s completely logically incoherent to talk about two different substances interacting. How can you even define ‘causation’ if not with reference to them existing in space and time? If something exists outside the spatiotemporal how can we possibly say it acts ‘prior’ to some effect that it causes?

>>17284893
I would agree, my point is that you can’t have mental properties on a macro scale without there being something like proto-mental properties of at least some of the constituent parts.

>>17285936
I think on some level once you recognize that subjectivity is “real” it has to loom somewhere in your thinking.

[Anonymous No.17287350]

>>17284000
so embarrassing

[Anonymous No.17287475]

>>17287350
Such a bad book from somebody who once was a very good philosopher

[Anonymous No.17287546]

experience isnt made ouf material. doesnt matter if its produced by it or any else

[Anonymous No.17287586]

>>17284000
ITT: Cope.
Dennett is completely right and you know it.

[Anonymous No.17287715]

>>17287475
maybe you're thinking of the other Nagel?

[Anonymous No.17287767]

>>17287715
Unfortunately not. My post here >>17284565 is presenting a version of his argument for panpsychism.

[Anonymous No.17287819]

>>17284136
Bergson refuted science? interesting

[Anonymous No.17287868]

Dennett destroyed Mary and Chinese Room in his book on thought experiments. Basically, they both have you imagine things that are imaginable (entirety of neuroscience, an infinite book of syntax rules) and are therefore a misuse of intuition.

[Anonymous No.17287877]

>>17287868
*unimaginable

[Anonymous No.17287880]

>>17284000
For me, it's materialist panyschpism.

[Anonymous No.17287897]

>philosophy of mind

[Anonymous No.17288409]

>>17287897
After you’ve figured out where you stand on the question of God, the question of the mind is only other real philosophical problem out there.

[Anonymous No.17288497]

>>17286942
>it’s completely logically incoherent to talk about two different substances interacting
They don’t have to causally interact if consciousness is non-volitional and is simply aware of the brain and brain states. In the same way that one doesn’t interact with and impart some causal effect unto a celestial object observed through a telescope, non-physical consciousness can exist outside of and observe the brain, with volition residing in the brain as one of its functions and not in the observing consciousness.

[Anonymous No.17288844]

>>17287868
How does that invalidate the premise of the arguments?

[Anonymous No.17289278]

>>17284000
Consciousness explained away

[Anonymous No.17289411]

Working with Neural Networks, I don't understand the argument against physicalism.

Can somebody give me a brief?

[Anonymous No.17289923]

>>17289411
Here's the argument we've mentioned earlier, about Mary's Room.

Imagine there is a scientist, Mary, who was born and raised in an entirely black and white room such that she's reached adulthood never having seen any colour whatsoever. In this time she has become an expert in the science of vision, and knows *every possible physical fact about light/seeing/colour and so on* but she has never actually *seen* any colours herself. Mary exits her black and white room and says "wow!"

If physicalism is true, the collection of all possible physical facts about something encompasses everything true about that thing.

So you can know that "green" designates a light of a certain wave frequency, that grass is typically green, that green is opposite red on a colour wheel, that green tends to evoke a soothing mood in people and so on, but it doesn't matter how many facts you add to that list, you still 'learn something new' in the experience of actually *seeing* green.

This means that the totality of 'physical facts' about something does not exhaust it's properties. There is always something 'left over', and that is the 'mental properties'. Thus there is some sense in which the mental exists and physicalism is therefore false.

[Anonymous No.17290018]

>>17289923
oh
I guess was referring to "physicalism" in the sense that consciousness is the product of material physics

i guess that was probably wrong or inappropriately incomplete?

For me I don't understand why that experience of seeing the grass isn't "physical".
It is information directly represented through the physical context of that event.
If she were to know "absolutely everything" about that thing then that everything should encompass all spacial temporal context within which it can be observed and then later abstracted through learning from that experience.
The information or experience for me seems to be physical.

[Anonymous No.17290122]

>>17290018
I would say it’s all physically instantiated, it’s all made of physically processes, but there is something irreducible in the experience of ‘greenness’ that isn’t in propositional knowledge about green things.

Could you image building a robot that used cameras to sort objects based on their colours, but also believe that this robot isn’t having phenomenal experiences of colour? There is no ‘inner light’ of a conscious mind so to speak, and that’s the non-physical thing this argument is trying to get at.

Your first person phenomenal experience isn’t physical, even if it’s entirely constituted by physical matter.

David Chalmers argues for matter having property dualism. All that exists is matter, but at least in the context of brains, they have both a physical and a mental ‘aspect’.

[Anonymous No.17290133]

>Denial Dennet

[Anonymous No.17290144]

John H. Spemcer: The Eternal Law
Plato,
Sextus Empiricus,
Berkeley,
Schopenhauer,
Plotinus.

[Anonymous No.17290145]

>>17287586
Except he's not.

[Anonymous No.17290264]

>>17290122
>Could you image building a robot that used cameras to sort objects based on their colours, but also believe that this robot isn’t having phenomenal experiences of colour? There is no ‘inner light’

I do work in computer vision and more or less design software that detects and classifies objects.

I feel like the distinction between the robot's perception of color and the human's perception of color are different, but that distinction seems arbitrary. They simply understand "color" at a different level of cognitive depth. The robotic perception of color is narrowed down to near what is absolutely pragmatic for it to complete an objective, while the human perception is informed by layers upon layers of abstraction in attempt to glean a much broader dimensionality of relevant information from the color.
That distinction is represented in the action of their learning or executive properties.
The human has a deeper and more interconnected web of neurons which represent that broader relational abstraction.

Your first line however reminded me for whatever reason of whether P=NP. Which in some discussion, I have heard and entertained an interpretation that describes the potential equality of P and NP, as whether the act of knowing is equivalent to the act of learning. It seems more intuitive but obviously not provably that they are not.

I'm not sure this tangent really addresses the issue directly and in hindsight may simply be more of the relationship between the knowledge of direct experience and the higher order knowledge of abstract relationships within that experience.

I feel like "greenness" is reducible, because 'we' do reduce it.
That "greenness" is not within magical bound of humanity to me, and any neural network of greater or equal depth or complexity and structure would have its own roughly equal or more complete perception of "greenness".

Pardon if this is incoherent. I'm tired.

[Anonymous No.17290288]

>>17288844
>How does that invalidate the premise of the arguments?
What an idiotic question, both in form and in content.

[Anonymous No.17290350]

>>17284956
>self-revelation
kek what a pseud consoomed by the self

[Anonymous No.17290423]

I don't disagree but I just think analytic philosophers are hacks. It's just observing psychological phenomena through a scientific lense. It's been done decades before this book.

[Anonymous No.17290620]

For me, its reductive Nietzscheanism

[Anonymous No.17290628]

I like Mysterianism, mystery is a good thing

[Anonymous No.17290636]

>>17290628
It humbles us

[Anonymous No.17290659]

>>17290620
based, rational explanations really are just cope at the end of the day

[Anonymous No.17290721]

>>17290659
Cope.

[Anonymous No.17290888]

>>17290264
could you clarify what P=NP means?

[Anonymous No.17290895]

>>17290144
God I am lonely.

[Anonymous No.17290963]

>>17290888
N = 1 dummy, did you flunk out of middle school?

[Anonymous No.17290969]

>>17290888
Google "Introduction to Complexity Theory" and read around.

[Anonymous No.17291348]

>>17286942
>How can you even define ‘causation’ if not with reference to them existing in space and time?
Easily, just define causation as the efficient ground of or basis for change. And all you need to define change is for some means to differentiate two states of affairs at different times. You'll need time for this, but absolutely NOT space. Hence, not spatiotemporal, just temporal. The non-spatial-but-still-temporal is non-spatiotemporal because it is non-spatial.

[Anonymous No.17291357]

>>17287715
Just curious what you mean, did Ernest Nagel become bad or something? Thomas Nagel and Ernest Nagel are the only two Nagels you really see talked about in philosophy, and they're both respectable, but apparently unrelated to one another.
>>17287475
I haven't read most of it, is it that bad? It's not like he's really saying new things there in contrast with what he says in The View From Nowhere, is it? And that's a good book.

[Anonymous No.17291806]

>>17284042

why is the most important aspect of a phenomenon the stuff it's made of?

this is materialism - explain the material and you explain the thing. the material then becomes the thing to be explained, ad infinitum.

it's so boring and dull, shortsighted and insincere.

if you truly care about matters of life in a philosophical way, you needn't seek too far to find yourself bewildered.

"The story is told of something Heraclitus said to some strangers who wanted to come visit him. Having arrived, the saw him warming himself at a stove. Surprised, they stood there in consternation – above all because he encouraged them, the astounded ones, and called to them to come in, with the words, “For here too the gods are present."

[Anonymous No.17293065]

>>17288409
>implying there is a problem

[Anonymous No.17293223]

>>17290888
Imagine you're given a problem represented mathematically.
Then consider there is a classification of complexity for resolving and validating its solution.

A P or Polynomial problem is a problem that is computationally solved deterministically. There is a finite deterministic algorithmic solution to always solve that problem with a calculated number of steps/time.

An NP or Non-Deterministic Polynomial problem is resolved in a nondeterministic capacity. We dont necessarily have an algorithm for always "determining" the best strategy at each step of the problem but we can validate whether a proposed solution is correct within P-time. We approach the solution non-deterministically (we explore all possible strategies for a given step/context in parallel). The most famous example is probably the Traveling Salesman (given a set of spacial points find a strategy for always determining the shortest possible route that visits them all).

P=NP/P!=NP questions that relationship.
If we can validate a solution to an NP problem in P-time, why haven't we found a way to solve the problem in P?
Is it maybe impossible?
Can we prove that there are problems where the validation is solvable deterministically, but not the problem itself?
Its possible there is a P solution we simply havent discovered yet.

[Anonymous No.17293630]

>>17290264
I agree that a robot that build for a specific task won’t have the same level of general cognitive ability as a human, which can perform a hugely diverse set of tasks, so the question for me is ‘do we have a good reason to assume that as a computer approaches the level of complexity of the human brain, will it actually gain genuine consciousness?’

We can probably agree that there is something that it is like to be a chimpanzee or a dolphin, even if we can’t actually know what that experience is like.

I’m saying that just because a computer could outwardly replicate the behaviour of a complex organism like a human, that doesn’t imply that here exists ‘something that it is like’ to be that computer. The computer isn’t ‘having experiences’.

I don’t think that the functional arrangement of matter into a structure that can do computation can become ‘conscious’ in the sense of there existing something that it is like to be that thing, purely based on just how complex the computing structure becomes.

Imagine you take every person on earth and arrange them such that each person stands in for a neuron in an exact replication of a human brain. Instead of chemical signals each person is given a couple different flags and instructions on how to signal the people down stream from them, based on the signals they get up stream. I think we would both agree that if you did that the result would be something that behaves exactly like a real human brain. It would produce the exact same outputs based on the exact same inputs as an actual brain. The question is, did we create an actually conscious thing? Is there something that is actually *experiencing* existence in that state? Or is it just merely replicating the input/output existence?

If we believe that human consciousness is solely based on the organization of the brain, and that as a brain get more complex consciousness *emerges* out of that process, then we would also have to accept that our World Brain is also a conscious being. Maybe that makes sense to you, but it feels deeply counterintuitive to me.

[Anonymous No.17293698]

>>17293630
>will it actually gain genuine consciousness?’
What do you mean by "genuine"?
I consider that consciousness to be the representation of that abstraction.
I don't think there is any clear limit or distinction between a genuine or non-genuine consciousness.
Any NN sufficient or greater depth or complexity will develope a similar or more complex sense of self and agency.
A lesser NN will have a less developed one.

>Imagine you take every person on earth and arrange them such that each person stands in for a neuron in an exact replication of a human brain. Instead of chemical signals each person is given a couple different flags and instructions on how to signal the people down stream from them, based on the signals they get up stream. I think we would both agree that if you did that the result would be something that behaves exactly like a real human brain. It would produce the exact same outputs based on the exact same inputs as an actual brain. The question is, did we create an actually conscious thing? Is there something that is actually *experiencing* existence in that state? Or is it just merely replicating the input/output existence?
The consciousness exists, just in a different physical medium that represents the mechanics and information necessary.
While not a direct parallel it is not uncommon that we refer to groups of individuals as singular collectives of unified purpose or objective or agency.

I do accept and acknowledge the concept of a "world brain".

[Anonymous No.17293731]

>>17290888
We classify problems in computer science based on how much longer they take to solve as you make those problems ‘bigger’.

Would you agree that if somebody handed you a solved sudoku, you could check to see they didn’t make any mistakes pretty quickly? You could definitely do it much faster than it took them to solve it in the first place.

Now imagine rather than a 9x9 it was a 16x16 board. If it took you 1 minute to check before it might take you 3 minutes to check now. But for the other person to solve it, before it took them 10 minutes, now it took them an hour. They try a 25x25 game, which you can check in 7 minutes, but they needed 5 hours to solve.

You can see that as the problem gets more difficult, the amount of time it takes you is increasing in a basically linear way, while the time it takes for them is increasing much faster than that. And this would also be true if it was computers doing it.

Computer Scientists would say that your task (sudoku checking) is a ‘P’ problem. And they would say that the other task (sudoku solving) is a ‘NP’ problem.

The P/NP question is whether or not it is theoretically possible make an algorithm that can quickly solve a problem which we know can be quickly checked. Basically is there an algorithm that can possibly solve sudokus at a similar pace to our algorithm for checking right solutions?

[Anonymous No.17293777]

>>17291357
I just have a low tolerance for philosophers who believe they can debunk whole fields of science with a bit of philosophical reason, especially when they don’t even have a particularly strong grasp of the science itself.

This is a good run down of problems
https://partiallyexaminedlife.com/2013/02/07/evolution-is-rigged-a-review-of-thomas-nagels-mind-and-cosmos/

[Anonymous No.17293854]

>>17287819
Actually Bergson IS science, Denett is working in a juvenile epistemological framework (because he is a dumb dumb Angloid with 0 (zero!) Soul).

[Anonymous No.17293888]

Excuse my ignorance, but doesn't Godel's Incompleteness Theorem have implications toward the P = NP issue?

[Anonymous No.17294635]

>>17293888
>Excuse my ignorance, but doesn't Godel's Incompleteness Theorem have implications toward the P = NP issue?
none that I can think of

[Anonymous No.17295258]

>>17293777
>Nagel’s critique of natural selection is in part an extension of an argument that helped establish his reputation, one that most philosophy students will know from his classic 1974 paper, “What is it Like to Be a Bat?” Here he argues that mental states, while caused by brain states, cannot be adequately explained by them. That’s because we can make no inferences from specific brain states to what it is like to have the subjective experiences associated with them, a point well illustrated by the case of echolocation in bats. We’ll never know what it’s like to be bats, no matter how much we can say about bat brains. But science is in the business of such inferences, and Nagel is correct to say that the fact that we cannot make them in this case is a prohibitive challenge to any attempt to explain consciousness by reducing it to matter. We call this the “mind-body problem.”

>In Mind and Cosmos, Nagel claims that the failure of a materialist reduction of mind to matter has implications for science in general, including natural selection. Since the brain does not adequately explain consciousness, neither can natural selection, even if it adequately explains the brain. The mind-body problem becomes the mind-evolution problem

Disgusting. How can anyone take Nagel seriously after claiming something like this?

[Anonymous No.17295318]

>>17293888
Nope.

P != NP by the way, that's pretty much the consensus. We just don't have proof. An intuition for why this is the case comes from our ability to do fast verification of great work vs creating great work. The asymmetry between being able to recognize great works and being able to generate them (NP) means that P must not equal NP. Sure, there exist some works where generating them is just as easy as verifying them (conversation for example), hence why P is understood to be a subset of NP. But for those works which are hard to generate but easy to verify, they cannot be P because that would mean there exists some easy algorithm to generate these masterpieces by Shakespeare, Beethoven, etc.

[Anonymous No.17295361]

Anything other than panpsychism is cringe. Materialists are especially embarrassing-
>it’s just an illusion
>everyone is a bugman like me!

[Anonymous No.17295386]

>>17295361
Cope

[Anonymous No.17295434]

>>17295318
That metaphor of problem = great creative work, verifying a solution = recognizing a great creative work, did you read that somewhere or did you come up with it yourself?

[Anonymous No.17295600]

>>17295434
I actually heard it from a stanford lecture on the topic, forgot which.

[Anonymous No.17296620]

>>17293698
Not that anon, but what do you feel about something like a rock or the sun having consciousness right now? I think that I'm on the same side as you and I believe those and other "things" (in quotes because I do not believe in discrete entities per se) should be just as much experiencing the phenomenon inside them as we experience the layers of mental abstractions we create. Of course I'd say the sharper the gradient between things the less you can talk about a particular consciousness or subjective perspective, so a rock would be too similar to what's around it to be reasonable considered as much but the sun may not despite having no psychological ego or mental abstractions like humans, but all experience seems like a continuous field to me with some regions of sufficiently self contained reactions to support a sense of self.
I know this sounds like ridiculous babbling to a lot of people but it really makes sense to me and feels like the best solution. To me consciousness seems to just be the experience of existence in whatever form it is.

[Anonymous No.17296642]

>>17296620
>the sharper the gradient between things the less you can talk about a particular consciousness or subjective perspective
the more you can talk about those, I mean

[Anonymous No.17296695]

Consciousness is unfalsifiable and thus not part of scientific discourse. It's useless to talk about, just like metaphysics is. It does not change anything.

[Anonymous No.17296726]

>>17296695
You can indirectly study consciousness, like in the famous split-brain epileptic patients. You can never identify or measure it, but by comparing what people report of their conscious experience with brain structures you can glean bits of information.

[Anonymous No.17296781]

>>17295600
I'm very interested in this, if you can recall some details to help me find it, that would be stellar.

[Anonymous No.17297289]

>>17293698
By genuine I mean having a first-person perspective, I mean that there exists something that it is like to be conscious.

A NN can represent ‘pain’. It can intake sense data, evaluate that the input indicates damage, and output the reaction of writhing/attempting to escape from pain/screaming, and also backpropagate that into the network’s representation of it’s environment such that in the future it behaves in a way that avoid the source of the damage.

But if I were to touch your hand to a hot kettle, you don’t experience the complex set of neurons firing in your brain, you just experience *pain* in your hand.

Do you think it’s possible for a computer system like a neural network to ‘represent pain’ without it actually having the *experience of pain* like a person would have?

It sounds like you are arguing that consciousness emerges out of a neural network (biological or silicon) as it gets more complex. What’s the minimum complexity you need? My point is that this seems like a radically new property coming from nothing. It’s a hard emergence unlike anything we see elsewhere in nature

[Anonymous No.17297513]

>>17296781
Man, it was like 5+ years ago. I don't know if it's even available anymore. It was an introduction course to computer algorithms iirc and the lecturer was talking about how to develop an intuition for P and NP. I watched it back when I was first learning about software development.

[Anonymous No.17297574]

>>17297513
coursera, youtube, dude, gal, hairy, bald, black, white?

[Anonymous No.17297604]

>>17297574
It was on stanford.edu. They used to offer free moocs. I don't think they do anymore. At least not of that quality.

https://online.stanford.edu/

Honestly, P and NP is such a commonly referenced concept in algorithms you can probably find a decent explanation anywhere else.

[Anonymous No.17297747]

>>17297604
I'm interested in the metaphor for very specific reasons, bald white dude, right?

[Anonymous No.17297751]

>>17284132

is this huayan buddhism or from a different source

[Anonymous No.17297757]

>>17297747
No it was a young guy with brown hair. Seemed like a PhD student. He was talking about how when he first encountered it in undergrad, this is how he developed an intuition for it and he gave the example I stated (roughly speaking).

[Anonymous No.17297767]

>>17297757
THANKS

[Anonymous No.17297778]

>>17297751


nvm found it

[Anonymous No.17298942]

>>17295318
Can you prove that Shakespeare is in NP, anon? Anyway, this nonsense is not why we think P =/= NP. There are theorems (often called barriers) which say something to the effect “certain types of proofs cannot settle P vs NP. Keywords for 3 well known barriers are relativization, algebrization and natural proofs.

[Anonymous No.17299507]

>>17285936
He is sympathetic only in so far as its a 'competitive theory' that we cannot exclude, but still thinks the combination problem is very difficult to overcome.