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17241407 No.17241407 [Reply] [Original]

Has an analytical philosopher wrote about the philosophy of life in a way that has soul?

>> No.17242129
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17242129

>>17241407
Nein.

>> No.17242174

>>17241407
you mean like Hegel did?

>> No.17242996

>>17241407
Analytics haven't yet overcome Kant, so they never got to that stage.

>> No.17243015

>>17242996
Not for lack of trying, Kant was just a once-in-species genius

>> No.17243049

>>17241407
They don't usually write about philosophy of life in the first place. The closest to it is Thomas Nagel in The View From Nowhere. It's not going to be much, but that's the closest you'll get to something.
>>17242996
Read Carnap some time.

>> No.17243086

>>17243049
I've read his "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology". It's one my favorite analytic papers, but not sure why you brought it up.

>> No.17243123

>>17243086
The Aufbau is an extension of Kantianism beyond the psychologism of Kant, and Carnap was aware (before those who now take credit) that observation and theory are not so easily separated. Something which continentals and some later analytics alike understand well now.

>> No.17243278

>>17243123
I see, I've already been planning to read the Aufbau so it's good to hear that. I wouldn't call Kant "psychologistic" though. Under Kant, experience is formed through the laws of logic by the faculty of understanding. While logic is located in the understanding, it is by no means reduced to psychology. Rather it's treated as the most given thing, that which all experience depends on. So I think it would be a bit misconstruing to call it psychologism (though I hear some neo-Kantians later embraced psychologism but I haven't read those).

>> No.17243310

I dont understand why people have interest in analytic philosophy
I dont see how it could be better to spend time studying analytic philosophy instead of anything else, continental or pre XX century philosophy, or just science

>> No.17243354

>>17241407
No, angloids invariably contaminate anything they touch

>> No.17243391

>>17243310
I think the term "continental" has a pernicious effect, in that it lumps phenomenology with other less serious strands, such as french (post)structuralism, critical theory, etc. Ideally, all analytics should be reading Husserl just as they read Kant. But to answer your question, I think analytic philosophy originated because those philosophers weren't satisfied with Kantianism (because of the advent of modern physics, non-euclidean geometry, propositional logic, etc.), so they were trying to come up with alternative satisfactory philosophies. I like analytics because they tend to work on a high level of rigor, but as someone who still more or less accepts transcendental idealism I find a lot of analytic philosophy either arbitrary, unfounded, redundant, or simply unsatisfactory.

>> No.17243397

>>17243278
Fair enough. As I see it, Carnap was introducing a conventionalism which de-psychologizes (bear with me) the synthetic a priori without also universalizing (the way anti-psychologism folks usually tended to). If you think of it like this, he was saying we can design a structure for experience and impose it on it, but that we have more freedom in doing that than a Kantian might say. And how we pick a structure sometimes depends on pragmatic virtues, and--this is more muted but still true--on underlying conditions of our society, etc. Bear in mind he was a student of a student of Dilthey as well. Carnap is sometimes thought to have been a foundationalist phenomenalist. This isn't true though. In the Aufbau he picks a phenomenalist structure but he is explicit in there that other structures worked. In the Logical Syntax of Language he is even more explicit with his Principle of Tolerance that other structures are possible too. He anticipated Kuhn and others in these regards, Goodman and Quine learned a lot from him, and people like Davidson, Putnam, and Rorty learned a lot from them in turn.
>>17243310
I've been trained with analytic philosophy. When I reach deeper into the more obscure systematic treatises they've done, I find a lot of value. Then I read continental philosophy and see parallels and ways the two complement one another. You won't get that if you read surface stuff at a glance though, and unfortunately that's how analytics themselves sell their own tradition these days.

>> No.17243401

>>17241407
These days the divide is more artificial than anything, so probably.

>> No.17243471

>>17243391
>I like analytics because they tend to work on a high level of rigor
Why?

>> No.17243485

>>17243397
This seems like a very interesting project, but when you say psychologism immediately Mill comes to my mind, who said logic is just psychological mental processes. Since this is very far from Kant's position, wouldn't you say Kant is more closer to those "anti-psychologism" people?

>> No.17243487

>>17241407
>le "life" and le "soul" solely exist in languageeee....

>> No.17243515

>>17243391
I'm an analytic and I love the best my tradition has to offer but I also value a lot of the continental philosophy you consider less serious because they're essentially doing metametaphysics: they give critiques of some of the foundations of an object discourse. Are they, ironically, self-uncritical? Sometimes yes. But analytics are also pretty self-uncritical. I find analytic metametaphysics most interesting because it's at the edges of that stuff. But I get pretty tired quickly when I read some discourse in contemporary epistemology, ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of mind, etc, because it's so ossified and working within such a limited framework and I say that as a fellow analytic who just has other ideas about the fundamental metaphysics of the world than they do. It's really nice reading Carnap or Quine but it can get tiring to read no-names working on narrow topics within narrow taken-as-a-given discourse in parts of my own tradition. Phenomenology is pretty neat, you're right about that. Tips on where to start with Husserl and how to proceed?

>> No.17243523

>>17243485
Yeah he in a sense is closer. There's some parts in common with Mill, but there's a lot more room for nuance with the transcendental idealist position than the explicitly psychologistic views Mill had on things like arithmetic.

>> No.17243625

>>17243515
Yeah I agree with you. As much as I disagreed with Quine, I had a lot of fun reading him. Regarding phenomenology, a little known fact is that Kurt Gödel was a Husserlian, and in fact wrote a nice article (or lecture?) introducing it. I would start with that article, then maybe Husserl's Cartesian Meditations. Here is a passage from Gödel's article (titled "The Modern Development of the Foundations of Mathematics in Light of Philosophy"):
>Now in fact, there exists today the beginning of a science which claims to possess a systematic method for such a clarification of meaning, and that is the phenomenology founded by Husserl. Here clarification of meaning consists in focusing more sharply on the concepts concerned by directing our attention in a certain way, namely, onto our own acts in the use of these concepts, onto our powers in carrying out our acts, etc. But one must keep clearly in mind that this phenomenology is not a science in the same sense as the other sciences. Rather it is or in any case should be a procedure or technique that should produce in us a new state of consciousness in which we describe in detail the basic concepts we use in our thought, or grasp other basic concepts hitherto unknown to us. I believe there is no reason at all to reject such a procedure at the outset as hopeless. Empiricists, of course, have the least reason of all to do so, for that would mean that their empiricism is, in truth, an apriorism with its sign reversed. But not only is there no objective reason for the rejection of phenomenology, but on the contrary one can present reasons in its favour.

>> No.17243726

>>17243625
I recently read Word and Object. It gets more interesting as it goes, and by the end I found it very interesting. It's a shame everyone focuses on the indeterminacy of translation stuff in the early part of the book, instead of what Quine says about paraphrase/analysis. That's the key to understanding how he differs from Carnap, and sheds light on "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," but I have yet to see anyone bring that up. Haven't looked much since finishing the book though.
>a little known fact is that Kurt Gödel was a Husserlian, and in fact wrote a nice article (or lecture?) introducing it. I would start with that article
Interesting. I'll look it up, thanks. Thanks also for the rec on Cartesian Meditations. How does Logical Investigations fare, is that a good next work? Related: I have Brentano's Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and read a bit of it before. I sort of wonder why he (Husserl's teacher) and his other students Twardowski and Meinong aren't retroactively included with Husserl as doing phenomenology. I guess it's limited in that they're focused mainly on the problem of intentional inexistence. But it's important stuff.

>> No.17243949

>>17241407
>Schopenhauer claimed that in his last year in Berlin, he had a prophetic dream that urged him to escape the city.[134] As he arrived in his new home in Frankfurt he supposedly had another supernatural experience, an apparition of his dead father and his mother, who was still alive.[134] This experience led him to spend some time investigating paranormal phenomena and magic. He was quite critical of the available studies and claimed that they were mostly ignorant or fraudulent, but he did believe that there are authentic cases of such phenomena and tried to explain them through his metaphysics as manifestations of the will.[135]

Wait what. So he believed in ghosts and shit after all?

>> No.17244046

>>17243726
I admit that the first time I read the "Two Dogmas" I had a Kantian conception of analytic-synthetic in mind, so Quine criticisms didn't make much sense until I later found out the attacks were specifically targeted on Carnap (which is the reason I'm planning to read the Aufbau). That said, I wished Quine had also said something about Kant's version. He just weaseled out of it by saying it's imprecise or something of the sort.
To my knowledge Logical Investigations were written before his "Transcendental turn" (when the neo-Kantian Natorp apparently convinced him of a sort of transcendental idealism), so I'm a little less interested in those. I think "phenomenology" was the label Husserl chose for his methodology, which later became the name for the whole movement. But aside that the label, it could be said of other philosophers like Kant and Schopenhauer that they were doing a sort of proto-phenomenology in so far as they were loosely employing a similar method.

>> No.17244113

>>17243949
You need to study German idealism, anon.

>> No.17244152

>>17241407
>the philosophy of life
Typical nonsensical German megalomania.

>> No.17244167

>>17244152
soulless anglo

>> No.17244591

>>17244046
Interesting stuff. I recently got a copy of The World as Will and Representation so that I may take a look at it as well.
>I wished Quine had also said something about Kant's version.
There's some level of connection actually. Carnap and everyone before Quine, or even many today, and this includes Kant, accepted analysis as a sort of equivalence between the analysandum and the analysans. This is the 'definition' relation, and close to (if not straight up the same as) synonymy. In Word and Object Quine clarifies his view: he doesn't think of analysis as anything like that. His positive view of analysis is much weirder, but in short, he would say two mutually exclusive analysans can be valid analyses of the same analysandum just as long as it fits our pragmatic needs. An example he gives is the Zermelo vs. von Neumann constructions of the natural numbers, they can both be right for him because analysis isn't actually unique construction/synonymy as it is for Carnap, or even Kant and anyone else.

>> No.17244979

>>17243949
He talks of dreams in the Fourfold root. Schopenhauer says that we cannot differentiate between a dream sequence and the external dream whilst we currently experiencing said dream, it is only when we awaken and the external world of representation re-enters. What is odd about this excerpt is that he never considered dreams as ever having prophetic or inherent meaning what so ever, he does mention shortly that dream sequences only use content from the possibility of experience, just like abstract representations (i.e representations of representations, concepts) are necessarily abstracted from any possible mode of representation.

>> No.17244985

>>17243310
Things that actually have use in our life like ethics, politics, religion, logc are done better by analytics.