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/lit/ - Literature

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1661139 No.1661139 [Reply] [Original]

fuck tao lin...
philosofags,
time for some compatibilism.
I've posted something like this before, but I had to run and abandoned the thread, but I think the matter at hand is, unquestionably, the most important debate in current analytic philosophy so read this fucking shit.
RIght so,
Benjamin Libitt (neurologist) made this experiment. People hooked up to a machine. They were told to flex their wrist whenever they felt like it. Their wrist muscle was hooked to a myogram and their brain activity was also measured. Results of Libitt: 500 milliseconds before the wrist flex there was a spike in neurological activity. 250 milliseconds before the wrist flex was the approximate time when the subjects became "aware" of their decision to flex. Conclusion: causal determinism necessitated the wrist flex and no free will fuck my life.

>> No.1661140

Problems:
1. It has not been empirically shown that the 500 millisecond spike was the actual "decision" to flex. It could very well have been a causal process leading to a propabilistic token event, not a 100% determined decision to flex, but a mere chance, (say 80%) chance that the subject would flex. What's more is that there could and probably were many other spikes which did not lead to a wrist flex. Therefore, it could be said that it was not the 500 millisecond spike which "caused" the wrist flex, but the 250 millisecond conscious point where the subject "chose" to flex.
2. Reaction studies (where subject is told to flex at a random stimulus, out of a few stimuli) have shown that it took around 250 milliseconds between the point of the conscious choice to flex and the muscle flexing itself. This would be contradictory to the previous 500 millisecond spike (as a strict causal determinant). Also, when subjects waited for the urge, (strictly waited), sometimes there was no urge present, and they would sit in the chair waiting for that urge to manifest....unless they told themselves via some internal cue, that they would indeed flex at some point.

volition is a conscious process. Suck my balls Holbach.

DISCUSS

>> No.1661157

2 fucking orwell threads some vampire bullshit thread and a fucking capsfaggot tier thread...

honestly...

>> No.1661181

bump


loosing all faith in lit in 3,

>> No.1661182

2,

>> No.1661184
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1661184

1
and its gone

>> No.1661188

I really don't understand what there is to discuss. The original conclusion isn't a sound one, and the problems explain why it isn't.

>> No.1661190

I've seen this study before. It doesn't bother me. Nothing changes for me on a personal level.

>> No.1661191

sorry i don't want to talk about free will and determinism, guess that means /lit/ is worthless

>> No.1661195

>>1661190
yeah, i mean, i'm perfectly willing to ignore the question of free will and just act as thought it exists

>> No.1661217
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1661217

I have the free will to ignore this thread

>> No.1661218

So,

/lit/ either agrees, or thinks that whether free will is an illusion or not does not matter.

im ok with that.

i guess we'll let this thread die, unless some hard determinist appears and starts menstruating...

>> No.1661235

Would the subject have chosen ro flex the muscle at all if they had not been told to flex the muscle

To me, this doesn't affect the existance of free will. If the "command" to flex came from the brain, how was it externally determined?

How was the subjects "awareness" to flex measured? I don't follow that part.

>> No.1661251

>>1661235
>if the "command" to flex came from the brain, how was it externally determined?

a bit obvious,
(being asked to participate, being given directions, etc.)

>How was the subjects "awareness" to flex measured? I don't follow that part.

This is my fault, because I didnt elaborate.
Basically they had this clock, (it's called the Libitt clock, look it up if youre interested) and they looked at it and pinpointed the time of their "decision" according to where the dial was.

>> No.1661256

>>1661191
Don't get mad at us, we can't decide if we want to post or not.

>> No.1661308

>yfw i solve the free will problem in all of its variations with 2 words.

deliberative occasion

>> No.1661321

>>1661308
>still believes in solutions

>> No.1661324

>>1661321
in a solution the problem ceases to trouble.

>> No.1661326

>>1661324
>still believes in problems and trouble

>> No.1661331

>>1661308

no.
that actually doesnt solve shit...

>> No.1661340

>>1661331
it does once you see the rest of teh system

>> No.1661343

>>1661326
well actually i don't but...this is a problem that troubles some people and it needs to be solved.

>> No.1661351

>>1661343
I disagree. Those people need to be troubled.

>> No.1661353

>>1661351
well this kind of trouble is debilitating and has no value as far as i can see. it's like a guy walking back and forth for no reason

>> No.1661357

>>1661353
Being debilitated can have value, depending on how we react to it. So can walking back and forth with no apparent reason.

>> No.1661358

>>1661357
disagree. when you do that you are in search of a solution. i provide a solution that preserves both branches of the dilemma in their proper place.

>> No.1661362

>>1661351
>>1661326

>arbitrarily loaded words for solution, trouble, and problem

your indifference is out of place here

>> No.1661369

>>1661358
You're confusing solution with meaning and/or value.

Also, you're using deliberative occasion outside of its meaningful use, and in this case it doesn't provide a solution as far as I can see.

>> No.1661371

>>1661369
well i am using it in an individual sense. it is nested in a lot of other stuff

>> No.1661372

>>1661362
>arbitrarily loaded words for solution, trouble, and problem
No, not at all. You can take any arbitrarily general meaning of those words as they are understood, and I'd still stand by that point.

>> No.1661378

>>1661371
As far as I'm aware, it has a legislative existence alone. That is, we can look at the problem through the lens of legislation and it's dynamics, but in order to do that we're probably taking for granted things like free will. So I can't see how it offers a solution.

>> No.1661391

>>1661378
i am defining it here as the moment of deliberation where you are operating in a space of reason, and thus can judge. the judgment here constitutes the structure of will-as-intention+reason

>> No.1661406

>>1661391
I can't see how that answers it, or at least not in any special way. Anything that has to defer our own decision to something else is ultimately going against there being free will. Radical choice on the other hand...

>> No.1661411

>>1661406
radical choice is free will without metaphysics.
free will is to me an underdeterminacy problem in the agency model. in ANY agency model when applied to the world.

>> No.1661426

>>1661411
Radical choice can involve metaphysics, but perhaps not in anyway which is particularly satisfying.

You can't solve an indeterminant problem with reason alone, you can only use reason to criticize the solution to the problem. Or at least, you can't solve all indeterminant problems with reason. Agency models also already assume free will, so I again can't see how that really gets you anywhere.

>> No.1661434

>>1661426
oh believe me it's going somewhere good but that's for another day.

>> No.1661442

>>1661434
Look forward to it.

>> No.1661612
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1661612

>>1661442
>>1661442

OP here

winrar this guy

>> No.1661619

> there was a spike in neurological activity
correlation != causation

>> No.1661650

>>1661612
That guy here, I am hoping Onion's onto something. I find many of her posts enlightening. I wish I could've posted some good links to what I was talking about, but the whole "reasoning without reason" thing is a little new to me, not particularly well covered, and it's very easy to find quacks.

While I remain unconvinced that she's found a way to prove freewill through agency models or similar, I trust that she'll find something interesting at least.