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16603822 No.16603822 [Reply] [Original]

you DID read Kant's groundwork on the metaphysics of morals before reading notes from underground, RIGHT anon?

>> No.16603856

>>16603822
>you DID read Kant's groundwork on the metaphysics of morals
I did.
>reading notes from underground
I didn't.

>> No.16603860

>>16603822
I've read neither of them, can you explain how the two are intertwined?

>> No.16603929

>>16603860
Kant:
>What we find in fact is that the more a cultivated reason devotes itself to the enjoyment of life and happiness, the more the person falls short of true contentment; which is why many people—especially those who have made the greatest use of reason—have a certain hostility towards reason, though they may not be candid enough to admit it. They have drawn many advantages from reason; never mind about its role in the inventions that lead to ordinary luxuries; my interest is in the advantages of intellectual pursuits, which eventually seem to these people to be also a luxury of the understanding. But after looking over all this they find that they have actually brought more trouble on themselves than they have gained in happiness; and eventually they come not to despise but to envy the common run of people who stay closer to merely natural instinct and don’t give reason much influence on their doings.
>Since reason is not sufficiently competent to guide the will surely with regard to its objects and the satisfaction of all our needs (which it to some extent even multiplies) - an end to which an implanted natural instinct would have led much more certainly; and since reason is nevertheless given to us as a practical faculty, that is, as one that is to influence the mill;then, where nature has everywhere else gone to work purposively in distributing its capacities/ the true vocation of reason must be to produce a will that is good, not perhaps as a means to other purposes, but good in itself for which reason was absolutely necessary.
Dosto:
>I want now to tell you, gentlemen, whether you care to hear it or not, why I could not even become an insect. I tell you solemnly, that I have many times tried to become an insect. But I was not equal even to that. I swear, gentlemen, that to be too conscious is an illness--a real thorough-going illness. For man's everyday needs, it would have been quite enough to have the ordinary human consciousness, that is, half or a quarter of the amount which falls to the lot of a cultivated man of our unhappy nineteenth century, especially one who has the fatal ill-luck to inhabit Petersburg, the most theoretical and intentional town on the whole terrestrial globe. (There are intentional and unintentional towns.) It would have been quite enough, for instance, to have the consciousness by which all so-called direct persons and men of action live. I bet you think I am writing all this from affectation, to be witty at the expense of men of action; and what is more, that from ill-bred affectation, I am clanking a sword like my officer. But, gentlemen, whoever can pride himself on his diseases and even swagger over them?

>> No.16603951

>>16603860
>>16603929
essentially when kant looks at why we were given the faculties of reason, he consideres happiness (which he considers to be the satisfaction of our desires and inclinations) and self preservation. he makes an unusual empirical argument that when someone applies reason to their lives to figure out a means to an end the possibilities "multiply" and he is left with more desires than he can possibly practically satisfy, which makes him unhappy, resent reason, and envy the man who tackles the means to an end "like a bull with his horns down", as dostoyevsky would say. Notes from the underground tells the story of a man who cant live up to his own ideology, and ends up despising reason and finding perverse enjoyment in abasing himself.

>> No.16604203

>>16603822
Thanks for reminding me I haven't performed my daily ablutions yet.

>> No.16604208

>>16603856
same

>> No.16604289

>>16603929
>the true vocation of reason must be to produce a will that is good, not perhaps as a means to other purposes, but good in itself for which reason was absolutely necessary.

dont leave us in suspense. what is the will that is good in itself?

>> No.16605013

>>16604289
>dont leave us in suspense. what is the will that is good in itself?
before we can talk about the good will, we have to talk about the will in itself. kant believes that the will is a sort of causality possessed by living, rational beings. in contrast, beings that arent rational, like animals, act on natural instinct. they cant rationally will something into effect. now, a causality necessarily implies laws. without laws by which a cause produces an effect, a causality wouldnt be possible. thus, to have a good will means to act in accordance with moral laws (duty)

the good will is estimable in itself "by the virtue of the volition" and without qualification or consequence. the value of all other virtues by definition is contingent on the good will. for example, without the good will courage wouldnt be a virtue, and would have no moral worth and no longer be courageous. the good will is also what makes anything worth pursuing. if you were to act with happiness as your main end, what would happen when happiness and acting in accordance with moral law no longer align? to have a good will means to act dutifully with the sole intent acting dutifully.

>> No.16605193

>>16603822
honestly i'd rather be dead

>> No.16605195

>>16605013
circular nonsense. The good will is good because it signifies a tendency for good consequences. Moral laws are totally derived from those consequences. With reason alone, there’s no reason to do anything, and all moral laws are arbitrary. And by the way, happiness itself is not the end, but simply preference of experience in general. For who can prefer to do that which is other than what he prefers the most? And why should anyone do what leads to a less preferable life? Ironically Kant uses little reason in his reason-based moral philosophy.

>> No.16605199

I just want enjoy book

>> No.16605427

>>16605195
>The good will is good because it signifies a tendency for good consequences
kant examines this as a reason for why the will might be good if you actually read his groundwork. he ultimately dismisses it because when youre considering something that is good without qualification, in and of itself, you cant consider externals outside of it.
>circular nonsense.
if you actually read kant his conception of the will is similar to the self moved mover of aristotle.

the crux of this argument is kants belief that the rational being's will is free to determine itself without any alien causes. to have a free will and a will that acts under moral law is one and the same because to choose to act morally presupposes freedom of the will. so kant endeavors to show how theoretical rationality necessitates free will. however, because theoretical freedom falls within the realm of pure reason, only practical freedom, the characteristic of rational agents to regard themselves as free, can be proven. because practical freedom implies being committed to viewing moral laws as applying to oneself, and because to be free is to act in accordance with moral law, it is sufficient to only prove rational beings are practically free. kant says in his groundwork that for every rational being "we think of a reason that is practical, that is, has causality with respect to its objects". in a word, to have practical will is to have a will capable of generating a reason for acting from itself. to view oneself as having a practically free will, he would have to regard his will as generating the motive for acting. conversely, if we view ourselves as merely acting on impulse, we cant view ourselves as having a practical will.

to look at this from another way, if we were to believe impulse is sufficient to believe something, then it cant also be that good reason is necessary to believe something. since a belief not caused by recognition of reasons for believing cant be rationally justified, if impulse is a sufficient reason for believing, no beliefs are justified.

essentially, to kant the good will is good because duty is the motive it determines for itself to act on.
>With reason alone, there’s no reason to do anything, and all moral laws are arbitrary.
kant addressed this in the preface to his groundwork. with the freedom of the will i already addressed that shows duty applies to all rational beings, moral law lies in the realm of pure practical reason. by nature and by the previous reasoning moral law cannot concern us as men, because that would have an empirical basis and it doesnt pass judgement on the origin of practical concepts, but it considers us as rational beings
>And by the way, happiness itself is not the end, but simply preference of experience in general. For who can prefer to do that which is other than what he prefers the most? And why should anyone do what leads to a less preferable life?
sounds like youve never read notes from the underground.

>> No.16605496

>>16603951

Higher reasoning is merely the result of evolution. Everything exists in a system of systems. Reality has rules. The better you know them, the more you can achieve. Predicting future events helps you survive and thrive. As competition increases, so must our ability to reason.

Morality has objective rules too. Our brain creates generalized rules, saying stealing is bad. If you steal from others, you will live in constant fear of being stolen from. This applies to all rules. The more morally good you behave, the more at ease your mind will be. Your subroutines can be directed at achieving success instead of survival. Vice versa, if you commit acts of evil, you will spiral into a hell of your own making. Your brain will make you unable to have any kind of real relationship with anything and anyone.

>> No.16605516

I'm a fucking renegade. I don't need to be spoonfed shit from a college sylabus.
I read what I want when I want

>> No.16605527

>>16605427
>he ultimately dismisses it because when youre considering something that is good without qualification, in and of itself, you cant consider externals outside of it.
how do you define good? and why can’t you consider externals? Isn’t it the case that a certain will in one environment can be good, while the same environment in another can be bad?
>to choose to act morally presupposes freedom of the will.
No, it presupposes the innate idea of what actions lead to preferable outcomes.
> to kant the good will is good because duty is the motive it determines for itself to act on.
This is so vague. Duty to do what? Where is duty? Where is obligation? These words are nonsense.
> sounds like youve never read notes from the underground.
not an argument

>> No.16605547

>>16605496
kant actually considers why nature has given us faculties of reason. he considers happiness and self preservation, but on the assumption that evolution produces in us organs that are optimized for a certain effect, the reasons he considers like happiness and self preservation fall short because impulse can do these better, and reason can actually be detrimental to them. he ultimately concludes humans have the faculties of reason to reach a sort of higher good than mere happiness, which is why his philosophy is transcendental
>>16605527
dude, im not gonna do your homework for you any more. read his groundwork if you want to find out what he thinks, its like 30 pages

>> No.16605563

>>16605547
I couldn’t get through the groundwork because it’s nonsense. I’m offering a simpler, more coherent view of morality and all you can say is “you haven’t read x”

>> No.16605572

>>16605563
>I couldn’t get through the groundwork
literally proving my point

>> No.16605587

>>16603822
Notes from the Undergroundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals

>> No.16605591

>>16605572
which point was that, exactly? All I’m saying is Kant is spewing nonsense that overcomplicates morality, showing that there is a simpler view