Theory of Form

[Anonymous No.15226952]

Well anons, was he right? Can you know things or just believe in them?

[Anonymous No.15227005]

>>15226952
I'm a solipsist

[Anonymous No.15227047]

why is he so based?

[Anonymous No.15227053]

>>15226952
when you use the words
> the hand
> the flower
> the guitar
and you distinguish each of them from
> the foot
> the apple
> the piano
you are employing "universals", which are platonic ideas. the universals par excellence are the numbers and the geometric figures.
you must aknowledge this before approaching to european philosophy, amerimutt.

[Anonymous No.15227068]

>>15227053
analytic cuck-boy, "there is a very great difference between creation and its cause". Being is a meme

[Anonymous No.15227121]

>>15227053
True, it is pragmatic to abstractly idealize sets of 'universals'. The issue is that some take this to mean that 'universals' concretely exist (i.e. similarities we observe descend from concrete/objective perfect 'forms', as opposed to such forms being abstract idealizations of concrete similarity — not universality). The existence of actual (rather than imagined) universals has yet to be demonstrated.

[Anonymous No.15227176]

>>15227121
So what about Beauty itself or Justice? When we observe a peculiarity that we recognize as justice or beauty, there is some abstracted idealization but it does not concretely exist? Also how does the Form of Justice compare to the Form of a circle? Can we say the actual circle exists? And if we do, is it faulty to assume that other ideals such as Justice exist if geometric Forms exist?

[Anonymous No.15227196]

>>15227121
1 -- what does "existence" mean?
2 (and most importantly) -- if they didn't exist, how do you recognize the same melody played on two different instruments at 2 different velocities. they are completely different to each others, they don't even share one single note, and yet you recognize the same melody, the same structure, the same form. or maybe compare the moon to the pupil, they don't share any perceptive quality and yet why don't you deem the moon square like a table, which also shares with the moon the same rate of perceptions as the pupil?
i know im not arguing theoretically, but this isn't the right place for that.

[Anonymous No.15227204]

>>15227053
You don't need to quantify over universals in order to deploy predicates. Read Quine.

[Anonymous No.15227206]

>>15227176
he is not me

[Anonymous No.15227214]

>>15227204
1. quine doesn't say it.
2. quine is trash (not for the reason you say)

[Anonymous No.15227215]

>>15227214
>quine doesn't say it.
Doesn't say what?

[Anonymous No.15227223]

>>15227047
Because Plato taught him in the based academy

[Anonymous No.15227225]

>>15227215
that
> You don't need to quantify over universals in order to deploy predicates

[Anonymous No.15227238]

>>15227225
Yes, he did.

[Anonymous No.15227276]

>>15227196
Plato believes in 5 causes
1. the material cause - the notes
2. the formal cause - how it's presented i.e. the melody
3. the craftsman - the person playing music
4. the purpose of the whole work
5. the idea/form - plato's theory of forms/ideas; the universal, immutable source of which the musician receives inspiration from e.g. Mozart's 3rd symphony's 5th cause, its form, is Beauty itself.

>if they didn't exist, how do you recognize the same melody played on two different instruments at 2 different velocities. they are completely different to each others, they don't even share one single note, and yet you recognize the same melody, the same structure, the same form

you can deny the 5th cause which is distinct form the formal cause, as Aristotle and other philosophers do, and still recognize the same melody. Plato's theory of form is not merely how something is presented, but that there is some universal that exists and causes e.g. all justice is caused by Justice itself

[Anonymous No.15227280]

>>15226952
>no one takes them seriously
but the opposite was true. Athenian council was so threatened by socrates influence that they killed him. if they didn’t see him as a threat
>made up idealistic fantasy
but so did the sophists. sophists were not realistic. this was the charge they give to Socrates..

"Socrates is guilty of crime in refusing to recognise the gods acknowledged by the state, and importing strange divinities of his own; he is further guilty of corrupting the young."

>refusing to acknowledge their gods

[Anonymous No.15227284]

>>15227176
If idealised forms exist in some abstract manner then the idealised froms of solid objects like a circle, and abstract concepts such as beauty, are both equally abstract idealisations.

[Anonymous No.15227312]

>>15227223
You realize that he was supposedly old enough to have fathered Socrates? Do you even know who this is?

[Anonymous No.15227314]

>>15226952
Funny meme, but the sophists were just the opportunistic rhetoricians of their day -- the equivalent of lawyers, politicians, media pundits, etc. Truth was not the object for them.

[Anonymous No.15227319]

>>15227280
Socrates =/= Plato

>sophists were not realistic
You realize Plato hated the sophists because >>15227314

[Anonymous No.15227325]

>>15227314
Not all lawyers are bad. Corporate lawyers and defence attorneys are scums for sure, but my friends who works in environmental law is a great guy.

[Anonymous No.15227329]

>>15227280
>if ancient peoples believed in gods it means they were loony world of forms transcendental idealists

[Anonymous No.15227335]

>>15227319
In what way is Plato’s ideas majorly different to Socrates?

[Anonymous No.15227337]

>>15227176
Similarity does not indicate universality. Indeed there is no 'true' circle, and no instance of finding something beautiful is identical to another. A paradigm that is 'justice' exists, but it is not actually ideal/universal — it just a heuristic we apply to the great complexity of reality.

[Anonymous No.15227342]

>>15227276
> 5 causes
they are four and you duplicated the formal cause (your number 2 and number 5).
>you can deny
of course you can't. two different melodies can have the same notes, the same composer and buyer and the same purpose and still be different.
> as Aristotle and other philosophers do
the 4 causes are aristotle's not plato's you silly.

[Anonymous No.15227350]

>>15227329
>loony
They were atheists even in that time. And yes believing in gods is schizophrenic. And Socrates destroyed legitimacy of polytheism in Euthyphro

[Anonymous No.15227358]

>>15227342
No two notes or melodies are ever actually identical. You are perceiving similarity, not universality. See trope theory.

[Anonymous No.15227383]

>>15227358
even better, so, why do you recognize the same melodies from different notes?

[Anonymous No.15227410]

>>15227383
They're not the same. One recognizes similarity.

[Anonymous No.15227455]

>>15227410
you are playing with words. you can call "sameness" "similarity" if you want, but the point is that if i play on a guitar the piano sonata no. 11 by mozart you will never recognize any "similarity" with the 33th diabelli variation by beethoven, but you will recognize a "similarity" with the piano sonata no. 11 played on a flute. why?

[Anonymous No.15227476]

>>15227335
1. Socrates wrote nothing down
2. Socrates was primarily concerned with ethics, it was Plato who went on to fully develop theories on metaphysics and epistemology

>>15227342
No, I did not duplicate two causes and you point it out as if I just momentarily lost consciousness and wrote down the 2nd point as the 5th point, when I clearly differentiate between them. And yes the 4 causes are Aristotle's, but the 5th is Plato's theory of Forms, hence why I say Aristotle does not agree with Plato on the 5th cause.

Seneca explicitly says these things in Letter LXV from his collection of letters. And what is your source? Take pic related, it could be called 'Mother cradling her dead son' because this is the form it takes (the formal cause - cause #2). However, Michelangelo titled it 'La Pieta' because, as Plato would argue, it evokes the universal Form (not it's visual appearance, but it's virtuous inspiration) of Piety. Ask yourself, is this sculpture beautiful solely because of its appearance? If so, that is due to the formal cause. If it is beautiful because it derives beauty from Beauty itself, then that is because of cause #5.

[Anonymous No.15227512]

>>15227455
because the defining feature is the relations between the notes (intervals) and not the sounds themselves

[Anonymous No.15227519]

>>15227476
> but the 5th is Plato's theory of Forms
what? where is that in his dialogues? also aristle doesn't mention it. indee a theory can't be the imment cause of anything.
about seneca, post the exact quote please i don't remember having ever read anything similar in his letters.
> it could be called 'Mother cradling her dead son' because this is the form it takes (the formal cause - cause #2
no that wouldn't be the formal cause, that wouldn't even be a cause. that is just a label.

[Anonymous No.15227520]

>>15227455
Phenomenological similarity does not entail ontological sameness.

[Anonymous No.15227524]

>>15227358
two apples are not identical but they are identical in their appleness, whence this comes? i dont think universals and particulars are cause and effect temporally, their relation is like the fire and its heat (or luminosity)

[Anonymous No.15227544]

>>15227476
the appearance is literally clothed in forms lol

[Anonymous No.15227557]

>>15226952
discord.gg/tome

[Anonymous No.15227577]

>>15227519
>>15227544
I'll admit, Seneca says it better himself.
Seneca, letter LXV:
>To these four Plato adds a fifth cause, – the pattern which he himself calls the "idea"; for it is this that the artist gazed upon[6] when he created the work which he had decided to carry out. Now it makes no difference whether he has his pattern outside himself, that he may direct his glance to it, or within himself, conceived and placed there by himself. God has within himself these patterns of all things, and his mind comprehends the harmonies and the measures of the whole totality of things which are to be carried out; he is filled with these shapes which Plato calls the "ideas," – imperishable, unchangeable, not subject to decay. And therefore, though men die, humanity itself, or the idea of man, according to which man is moulded, lasts on, and though men toil and perish, it suffers no change. 8. Accordingly, there are five causes, as Plato says:[7] the material, the agent, the make-up, the model, and the end in view. Last comes the result of all these. Just as in the case of the statue, – to go back to the figure with which we began, – the material is the bronze, the agent is the artist, the make-up is the form which is adapted to the material, the model is the pattern imitated by the agent, the end in view is the purpose in the maker's mind, and, finally, the result of all these is the statue itself.

[Anonymous No.15227600]

>>15227512
indeed. not exactley an interval but a sequence of intervals. an interval is a a ratio between different wave lenghts. the specific sequence of ratios are the "universal" of that melody.

[Anonymous No.15227604]

>>15227225
That's literally the whole point of Quine's theory of ontological commitment

[Anonymous No.15227624]

>>15227312
looks like Aristotle

[Anonymous No.15227638]

>>15227624
Protagoras

[Anonymous No.15227661]

>>15227524
>whence this comes?
It's a subjective human classification.

[Anonymous No.15227708]

Can someone explain the Parmenides dialogue?

[Anonymous No.15227713]

>>15227600
None of that indicates the existence of concrete universals. Matter/energy/fields in our universe can organize/localize in similar ways. Our perceptual capacities have evolved to detect (and even exaggerate) these similarities. This does not mean that any two instances of (thing) are actually identical.

Your best example of a potential universal would be something like an electron, but even then you'd have to admit that their relativistic energy and spacetime positions/orientations are variable (and there are possibly other differences we can't detect).

[Anonymous No.15227716]

>>15227577
seneca is odd here. he seems to conflate the model, meaning the idea, with a model, meaning a previous work, thus subsuming the imitation as a general cause, while nothing of that is in what we have about plato or in the ancient commentaries to his works. a few lines earlier he calls aristotle's third cause (formal cause) "idos", by wich he seems to mean the subject, then he calls plato's alleged 5th cause "idea".
it's strange i will give it a look. still, no one but seneca says plato categorized 5 causes.
at a first look it think seneca's 5 cause are: agent, material, final, formal, and "the subject".

as for our discussion, yes, you can elminate your "5th cause", the important one is your 2nd cause

[Anonymous No.15227755]

>>15227713
you have to stop to think in terms of "existence" until you will define "existence" itself (trust me, it's impossible, i was a sensualist myself once, and i read a lot of sensusalist works).
> Our perceptual capacities have evolved to detect (and even exaggerate) these similarities
again, you are playing with words, i already answered you here:
>you can call "sameness" "similarity" if you want, but the point is that if i play on a guitar the piano sonata no. 11 by mozart you will never recognize any "similarity" with the 33th diabelli variation by beethoven, but you will recognize a "similarity" with the piano sonata no. 11 played on a flute

the ratios i was talking about do exist, whether you recognize two melodies as similar or not, it doesn't depend on arbitrariness. maybe it would be easier to get it in this other example of mine:
> compare the moon to the pupil, they don't share any perceptive quality and yet why don't you deem the moon square like a table, which also shares with the moon the same rate of perceptions as the pupil.

[Anonymous No.15227779]

>>15227661
i mean, even animals know what kinds of fruits appeal them most, but humans have deeper access to this

[Anonymous No.15227787]

>>15226952
The forms are as real as discerning north, east, south and west. They exist as concepts in our head with practical implications drawn to them. There are no cardinal directions independent of the human mind, that doesn't mean you cannot know about cardinal directions, they re correct if you believe in them or not.

[Anonymous No.15227791]

>>15227713
two things will never be identical lol if they were they wouldnt be two but one; what is in question is what they share in common

[Anonymous No.15227851]

>>15227716
>still, no one but seneca says plato categorized 5 causes
I'm willing to concede that, but Seneca continues,
>Plato, at any rate, says: "What was God's reason for creating the world? God is good, and no good person is grudging of anything that is good. Therefore, God made it the best world possible."
Please explain why the formal cause is different from the final cause, that is the end pictured by the artist as he creates. In particular, how is Plato's theory of the Forms different or the same as either the formal cause or final cause. I'm actually writing a paper about this and it's important for me to understand.

[Anonymous No.15227949]

>>15227851
the final cause is the effect i want to obtain by doing something, while the formal cause is what distinguish something to anything else. when i think "i'll enjoy myself" , enjoyement is the final cause, which i can indifferenly reach through many formal causes, for instace having a walk in the woods or reading a novel. in either cases, the material reason why i'm enjoying myself is a release of neurotransmitters into certain synapsis of my brain.
in ethics the formal cause and the final cause do coincide, since morality itself is a purpose. we'll have to wait for wittgenstein to know clearly that "the Good" is meaningless in logical terms.

[Anonymous No.15227978]

>>15227204
>Quine
>amerishart "philosopher"
No thanks

[Anonymous No.15228011]

>>15227121
>the difference between an apple an a guitar is purely pragmatic
lol ok retard

[Anonymous No.15228050]

>>15227978
Go back to boards specific to your shithole country, wog.

[Anonymous No.15228051]

>>15227755
>you have to stop to think in terms of "existence" until you will define "existence" itself (trust me, it's impossible
Existence is the superset and cause of all things. I think that's a reasonable definition, no?
The germane point here though, is that I'm distinguishing between the concrete (how things actually are) and the abstract (how we imagine them to be). 'Universals' are abstract... No two instances of a symbol, geometry etc. are actually identical, we just use idealized abstractions as a pragmatic way of referencing them (indeed our perception is limited such that we must do this).

>you will never recognize any "similarity" with the 33th diabelli variation by beethoven
Won't I? I'll recognize them both as music, yes? Who is playing with words here? The issue isn't that that similarity doesn't exist (it obviously does), it's that similarity is not universality (nor does it indicate a universals as the provenance of tropes). Again, I'd recommend looking into trope theory.

>the ratios i was talking about do exist,
I thought we couldn't think in terms of existence? Yes they exist, but no two ratios are identical. Obviously the moon and a pupil do share a "perceptive quality" (they are arrangements of matter in similar geometries); just as the table and the moon share the "perceptive quality" of being external to our bodies.

>>15227791
No, the question is: "Do they share everything in common?" If not, what is perceived is similarity, not universality.

[Anonymous No.15228062]

>>15228011
From the point of view of physics (nature), they are no different.

[Anonymous No.15228110]

>>15227713
>best example of a potential universal would be something like an electron
I think this is right. Reality can be understood as Spacetime embedded with fields. Those fields -- electrons, photons, etc -- can perhaps be understood as 'universals'. On the other hand, it could be that these particles/fields can be defined geometrically -- i.e., specific distortions of spacetime in dimensions > 4.

[Anonymous No.15228140]

>>15228051
>"Do they share everything in common?"
what are you on about? they share their very ontological form in common, two apples are what they are because they are apples

[Anonymous No.15228166]

>>15228051
The idea I have of circle now is the same as I had back in elementary school. Nothing changed about it. It actually is the identical idea which occurs under different circumstances.

[Anonymous No.15228173]

>>15228140
Circular reasoning, anon.

[Anonymous No.15228204]

>>15228051
> Existence is the superset and cause of all things. I think that's a reasonable definition, no?
not at all. i think that is not even a definition but a vague categorization which smells of ontology. let's make it easier: how do you distinguish between the existence of the colosseum and the non-existence of a golden mountain, avoiding the common-sense argument which is utter trash logically speaking? what are the specific criteria?
> distinguishing between the concrete (how things actually are) and the abstract (how we imagine them to be).
this is not the germane point, it is the only point. how do you distinguish between abstract and concrete? and more difficultly how do you distinguish between actual rule and random convention?
>I'll recognize them both as music, yes?
yes, but i was being more specific. why do you recognize the diabelli variations as diabelli variations and mozart's piano sonata as mozart's piano sonata, if not by a sequence of ratios (which you call abstract, altough melodies are very concrete).
> Obviously the moon and a pupil do share a "perceptive quality" (they are arrangements of matter in similar geometries); just as the table and the moon share the "perceptive quality" of being external to our bodies.
this is rather obscure. you use locutions such as "perceptive quality", "arrangements", "geometries" which are nothing but synoyms of "ideas" or "universals". in the end, you are arguing for a sensible quality of the platonic ideas, which is a stance even more radical than mine. and yet, you still can't explain why we perceivr the moon and the pupil as having the same form and not, for instance, the table and the moon. after all, the moon shares no more "perceptive qualities" with the pupil than with the table

[Anonymous No.15228205]

>>15228166
No, it isn't. You don't imagine infinite points, you don't imagine all the mathematical properties of a 'circle', nor does that idea remain static from moment to moment. The state of your brain is not identical from moment to moment. It only seems identical to you, because you do not typically experience the granularity and incoherence of your mental processes.

[Anonymous No.15228430]

>>15228204
>how do you distinguish between the existence of the colosseum and the non-existence of a golden mountain
They both exist, but the golden mountain only as an idea — we do not empirically discover it out in the world. Likewise, 'non-existence' is only an idea, not an actual alternative state to existence.

>how do you distinguish between abstract and concrete? and more difficultly how do you distinguish between actual rule and random convention?
We employ empiricism as rigorously as we can. It may not establish perfect certainties (aside from the apodictic), but it's all we have.

>if not by a sequence of ratios (which you call abstract, altough melodies are very concrete).
"Ratio", "melody", are not concrete — they are abstract descriptions of the concrete. What is the hard boundary between a 'melody' and a 'beat'? If we carefully measured a sequence of seemingly identical snare hits, would we not find tiny variations in pitch and timing? Understand that we are idealizing the concrete, not discovering concrete universals.

>you use locutions such as "perceptive quality", "arrangements", "geometries" which are nothing but synoyms of "ideas" or "universals"
Your assertion doesn't make it so. I would call these things functions of similarity, and empirical investigation so far supports my take. I wouldn't particularly object to calling them 'universals', if not for the assumptions such usage tends to generate (that universals are concrete 'templates' as opposed to abstract idealizations).

>we perceive the moon and the pupil as having the same form
I don't. If you do, then I would submit this is due to ignorance.

[Anonymous No.15228452]

>>15228205
What you refer to are the different circumstances under which the idea occurs: a concrete symbolic image, the mathematical description, the chemical or physical state of the brain and so on. Yet, the concept itself (in Germany we have the word 'Begriff' for it) remains the same. It does so because something that occurs to us as a circle will always be a circle for us no matter what the actual 'real' thing behind the occurence is. Certain phenomena are perceived as circles, we can imagine a circle in our mind, and as you are right that each of these single circles, imagined or perceived or mathematically described, are different, all of them remain circles for us. The Begriff persists among all its variable single events, it is free of difference and identical with itself, because otherwise we could not understand each others and language would be impossible.

[Anonymous No.15228526]

>>15228452
The point is that there is no 'perfect sameness' — this is just an ideal, an artifact of limited perception. An idea is circumstancial itself. At what point does a thought cross over into a realm devoid of circumstance? Categorization is possible because of tropes, not universals.

[Anonymous No.15228548]

>>15228204
>how do you distinguish between the existence of the colosseum and the non-existence of a golden mountain
The Colosseum is spatiotemporally situated. The golden mountain is not.

[Anonymous No.15228643]

>>15228430
> They both exist, but the golden mountain only as an idea — we do not empirically discover it out in the world. Likewise, 'non-existence' is only an idea, not an actual alternative state to existence.
"empirical" is not a magic word that will save you from actually defining things. please, don't use synonyms, just tell me how you tell that a golden mountain is "only an idea" (= doesn't exist) and the colosseum is "empirically discovered in the world" (= exists)
> We employ empiricism as rigorously as we can. It may not establish perfect certainties (aside from the apodictic), but it's all we have.
in respect to the rules, empiricism, provided that by empiricism you mean science (which is only half-empirical) , is highly inductive. the experimentum crucis just states that matter follows prevision for a number of times for a fairly enough number of individuals (=common sense). a man who believes in angels is following a similar intuitive reasoning.
> "Ratio", "melody", are not concrete — they are abstract descriptions of the concrete.
again, you haven't separated what you call abstract from what ypu call concrete, i mean, in clear, definitive, critical terms, valid for any possible object of our experience.
> If we carefully measured a sequence of seemingly identical snare hits, would we not find tiny variations in pitch and timing?
doesn't it prove my point, since we practically distinguish and recognize precise ratios? following your own argument (which isn't mine btw) how is a "perceived" ratio less "real" than a flower?
> Understand that we are idealizing the concrete, not discovering concrete universals.
this is a psychological (not epistemological) statement you infer a posteriori.
> Your assertion doesn't make it so. I would call these things functions of similarity, and empirical investigation so far supports my take. I wouldn't particularly object to calling them 'universals', if not for the assumptions such usage tends to generate (that universals are concrete 'templates' as opposed to abstract idealizations).
you keep using undefined terms like concrete vs abstract, you are very assertive about it and yet you can't define them.
> I don't. If you do, then I would submit this is due to ignorance
so, are the stars in the EU flag randomly distributed or they resemble other objects of your experience which otherwise would have nothing to do with them?

[Anonymous No.15228704]

>>15228173
holy shit you are really retarded

[Anonymous No.15228725]

>>15228548
this is the very best definition one could find. originally, it was discovered by kant. but kant himself asked: how is space an empirical notion? it is an apriori, it is an intuition. indeed, how do you decide that something is spatiotemporally situated and something else not? if 10 or 1.000 people say "this rose is here" and one person says "this rose isn't here", how do we decide who is right? isn't it just a convergence of judgements, and in the end a matter of "common sense"?

[Anonymous No.15228761]

>>15227005
based me

[Anonymous No.15228850]

>>15228725
You're conflating metaphysics with epistemology.

[Anonymous No.15228902]

>>15228526
It is an ideal which we cannot represent or perceive hence it is apriori as Kant would put it. The idea of a circle is the condition of the possibility that we know what a circle is for longer than a ingle instance. It is not a concrete symbol but a formal necessity, the idea doesn't exist other than as a form which frames what we are talking about it. If we talk about corona for example there is also this ideal form which frames what we are talking about even if we have had completely different experiences with corona.

You are using words right now. Why would you do this if you thought I didn't have an idea what you could mean? You are using words which mean something because we share apriori conditions. Of course, outside of this human perspective circles don't exist neither as ideal forms nor as concrete observations, but they exist to you, don't they? Or do you not know what a circle is? If you do know it then it's because of this apriori condition which frames each single circle as 'a' circle. Replace circle with whatever word you want.

[Anonymous No.15228914]

>>15228725
You asked about the meaning of "concrete existence". The answer is: to exist is to occupy a spatiotemporal region. Hence, verifying existence is reduced to verifying spatiotemporal occupation. That doesn't automatically resolve all questions regarding the existence of particular things, but it tells you explicitly what the task involves.

[Anonymous No.15228957]

>>15228850
not true at all. i didn't touched anything similar to metaphysics, im talking about the actual, phenomenic world.
problem is the judgement of spatial extension (time isn't even needed) doesn't resist to a skeptical inquiry. we would have to fall into inductive "logic", common sense and such trash.
provide me an univocal, non-arbitrary way to judge the spatiality of something and ill be happier than you.

[Anonymous No.15228979]

>>15228957
>non-arbitrary way to judge the spatiality of something
What do you mean?

[Anonymous No.15228982]

>>15228914
i already answered here >>15228725
there is no way out, anons. i would dream to tell you : "well, that's it. space is the perfect criterion". still, as i said, space is an intuition not an empirical perception.

[Anonymous No.15228988]

>>15227557
Its every day bro with that fluoride channel flow!

[Anonymous No.15229016]

>>15228979
a method to attribute the quality of "extended" to an object of your experience regardless of all the possible divergences of opinion of those who judge it.

[Anonymous No.15229201]

>>15228982
You're conflating Kantian intuitive "space" with objective physical Spacetime. By your impaired understanding, Kant would have been refuted by Einstein. He wasn't, because he was talking about something else.

[Anonymous No.15229212]

>>15229016
Spatiotemporally situated objects need not be 'extended'.

[Anonymous No.15229255]

>>15228643
>"only an idea" (= doesn't exist)
Ideas do exist, but their 'content' is abstract description (interpolation of our experience). If you didn't see a distinction between the abstract and concrete, you wouldn't use "golden mountain" as an example. How would we communicate without synonymy?

>a man who believes in angels is following a similar intuitive reasoning
Yes, for the vast majority of potential knowledge, induction is the best we can do. You are the one hung up on a notion of perfect certainty, not I (maybe that's why you're an idealist?). A man who believes in angels does not follow the same reasoning, because he selectively relaxes his standard of deeming probability with respect to angels as opposed to whether or not being struck by a speeding train will kill him.

>separated what you call abstract from what you call concrete
Sure, because our entire mechanism of perception functions via varying degrees of abstraction. We can't help but communicate in abstraction, but this does not mean that all abstractions are interchangeably accurate in describing our experience/what is probable. This is all consistent with the notion that we idealize the concrete (which we can't directly experience) rather than discover concrete ideals. You also seem to be placing all the burden of definition upon me, while allowing yourself considerable laxity with "universals" and "forms".

>doesn't it prove my point,
No, it doesn't, because I have not denied the reality of similarity, only that of universality.

>this is a psychological (not epistemological) statement you infer a posteriori.
If you accept that our perception is limited, then you accept that idealization is a necessary consequence of the synthesis of our experience.
This not certainly rule out the possibility of concrete universals, but it diminishes the probability of such.

>you keep using undefined terms like concrete vs abstract, you are very assertive about it and yet you can't define them.
I have defined them, and I am not the first to do so. Pretending to be ignorant of a distinction which you can obviously appreciate, and requiring perfect knowledge/certainty from me but not yourself, is just silly anon.

>or they resemble other objects of your experience which otherwise would have nothing to do with them?
Does anything in the universe have "nothing to do" with everything else in it? It's relative, anon — a spectrum of similarity, not a binary state of universality/non-universality.

[Anonymous No.15229273]

>>15229201
> Kantian intuitive "space" with objective physical Spacetime
they are the same thing you fucking retard.
again,
> how do you decide that something is spatiotemporally situated and something else not? if 10 or 1.000 people say "this rose is here" and one person says "this rose isn't here", how do we decide who is right? isn't it just a convergence of judgements, and in the end a matter of "common sense"?
>>15229212
tell me one object "spatiotemporally situated" and not extended. if you are thinking about the electron, it is described as a function in quantum mechanics, not an spatiotemporally situated object.
still, you can change "extended" with "spatiotemporally situated" in the example above, if you like.

[Anonymous No.15229278]

>>15228902
Yes, I understand anon. I am saying that these supposed 'qualia' are in fact instances of tropes. Universality is not required to communicate and categorize, only synonymy.

[Anonymous No.15229283]

>>15227223
It really says a lot that many of Plato's pupils went on to become the Thirty Tyrants.

[Anonymous No.15229295]

>>15227312
Yea Plato schooled this old geezer cuz he was a dum dum

[Anonymous No.15229304]

>>15227325
Does he make you horny

[Anonymous No.15229342]

>>15229273
>they are the same thing you fucking retard.
No, they are not. If they were, Kant would be refuted by Relativity.

[Anonymous No.15229373]

>>15229273
>tell me one object "spatiotemporally situated" and not extended. if you are thinking about the electron, it is described as a function in quantum mechanics, not an spatiotemporally situated object. still, you can change "extended" with "spatiotemporally situated" in the example above, if you like.
Lol. You have clearly never studied physics in your life. Everything in physics is a field.

[Anonymous No.15229408]

>>15229255
>Yes, for the vast majority of potential knowledge, induction is the best we can do. You are the one hung up on a notion of perfect certainty, not I (maybe that's why you're an idealist?). A man who believes in angels does not follow the same reasoning, because he selectively relaxes his standard of deeming probability with respect to angels as opposed to whether or not being struck by a speeding train will kill him
i think this is the core of your answer, excuse me if i don't answer back to all but im going to dine.
epistemology DOES require perfect certainty. it has to do with the purpose of our knowledge. for practical purposes i will rely on induction and all its apparate of concepts like likelihood, while for knowledge i need absolute certainty.
and i am an idealist as much as bertrand russell who in his principia mathematica held these precise realist position which he later developed as "logical atomism" , as he calls it. in short, i'm a friend of science, not a mystic, not a believer, not an hegelian, just, regular empiricism is too naive and rough.

[Anonymous No.15229422]

>>15229373
im a medicine student we had 2 exams on nuclear physics and OF COURSE not everything is a field in physics, you absolute brainlet.

[Anonymous No.15229469]

>>15229422
What, in the ontology of physics, is not a field?

[Anonymous No.15229471]

>>15229408
>>15229255
the dianoetic science is the ladder to the divine nous; this ladder is the axis intellectus of man in his anagoge to the noetic realm. it is through simple scientific dianoesis that we reach unto the logoi and contemplate the energeia of the eternal Logos.
empiricism is philodoxia

[Anonymous No.15229576]

>>15229408
>epistemology DOES require perfect certainty
Well, I think that's rather oversimplifying things. We can distinguish between apodictic and provisional knowledge, and further recognize that provisional knowledge is not purely arbitrary (reasonable certainty is not equivalent to substantial doubt). Finally, I'm not seeing how you can claim apodictic knowledge of universal forms (trope theory is a valid alternative).

[Anonymous No.15229594]

>>15229576
not the same anon but arent tropes exactly modes, instances of universals?

[Anonymous No.15229656]

>>15229594
If you mean "universal" in an abstract, idealized sense, sure. 1+1=2 is abstractly universal, but no element or application of it is an instance of concrete universality.

[Anonymous No.15229701]

>>15229656
what is the difference between abstract and concrete in this case? i don't think this is relevant in any way, oneness and unity are abstract but the by your logic they are the most concrete universals, since literally every single thing partake of these two

[Anonymous No.15229727]

>>15226952
Platonists sound based. Sophists sound gay and normie.

[Anonymous No.15229799]

>>15229701
The distinction is that there is no actual universality going on, only pragmatic approximation — the ideal is facilitated by lack of scrutiny. Saying that everything is unified under existence does not demonstrate a universal, since there is no parallel set with which to compare the entirey of existence.

[Anonymous No.15230017]

>>15229799
what an elusive response. explain how there is no universality, only a pragmatic approximation
i didnt say that things are unified under existence, but each thing is one thing, it is just an example of obvious universality

[Anonymous No.15230446]

>>15226952
Universals are constructed as you experience, but for your mind they are as real and important as the physical world itself.
Your anima or animus are crucial factor in your social relations.

[Anonymous No.15230535]

>>15230017
Examine any supposed instance of unversality closely enough, and the idealization will fall apart. Case in point, 'oneness' is a relative — not universal — concept. You could say everything is 'one' under existence (not universal, see above), but beyond that the concept only describes relative localizations of the concrete (i.e. there is no discrete quality of 'oneness', only relative degrees on a spectrum of locality).

[Anonymous No.15231457]

>>15230535
i have no idea why you're bringing existence up to the discussion; what kind of comparison you is needed?
>everything is one under existence
what is something not under existence? this is not the point of the discussion

> the concept only describes relative localizations of the concrete
how does this even relate to oneness holy shit

[Anonymous No.15231565]

>>15231457
You're out of your intellectual depth. Move along.

[Anonymous No.15231712]

>>15231565
im waiting for you to explain to me how oneness is a relative ''concept''. i'll assume you misunderstood me: i didn't mean the oneness within which all entia find themselves, but each ens itself participating in oneness, or oneness as universal condition.
you just affirm things in the depth of a puddle, how do you expect to be taken seriously enough to demand a well constructed reply?

[Anonymous No.15231901]

>>15231457
also the concept does not describe but define; every ''concrete'' is localized and relative to its idea

[Anonymous No.15231994]

What do I need to read to understand Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist and The Statesman? I think I understand Theaetetus satisfyingly enough, but the other three dialogues are kind of a mystery to me. I can only describe them with 2-3 sentences.

[Anonymous No.15232022]

>>15230446
>anime or animus
Get out with that pseud shit

[Anonymous No.15232072]

>>15231712
Is our local cluster a singular thing? Our galaxy? Our solar system? Our planet? An apple tree? An apple? Where is the hard boundary between your body and its surroundings? It's all relative.

Is it possible there are some irreducible and discrete quanta if you dig deep enough? Sure, but it could also be that all 'things' are relative localizations in a field that is the entirety of existence. Discrete instances of 'oneness' are not a given.

Do you get it now, peabrain? Or have I embarked on a Sisyphean task in attempting to elevate your naive intuition?

[Anonymous No.15232098]

>>15227949
>we'll have to wait for wittgenstein to know clearly that "the Good" is meaningless in logical terms.
you just outed yourself as a brainlet, embarrassing
just kidding, i want to provoke you into elaborating on your point

[Anonymous No.15232276]

*FLEX*

[Anonymous No.15232390]

>>15232072
what is a non-localized incorporeal ens in spatiotemporal and coporeal realm? you are still missing the point completely, the distinction is not in materia but in the forms themselves, the extension upon which they are ''imprinted'' are obviously not broken
i don't even deem reasonable to keep replying to you insofar as you are so self-absorbed in sterile materialist analysis, it renders earnest discussion unworthy of any effort.

[Anonymous No.15232449]

>>15226952
Platonist are pedophiles too

[Anonymous No.15232580]

>>15226952
sophists would've just agreed with him since his own ideas are just as absurd. Of course we get the seething AARs instead.

[Anonymous No.15232668]

>>15231994
Statesman and the Laws go together.

[Anonymous No.15233076]

>>15226952

[Anonymous No.15233614]

Form is emptiness, emptiness is form

[Anonymous No.15233683]

>>15227325
>my friends who works in environmental law is a great guy.
weird, i know a guy who works in environmental law and is a massive cunt. funny how anecdotes work, hey?

[Anonymous No.15233922]

>>15232390
Oh I see. So if we just assume that 'forms' precede our perception as concrete templates, rather than being artifacts of our necessarily abstract perception (idealization), then the problem goes away. Well why didn't you just say so?

>NOOOOOOOOOOOOOO YOU CAN'T JUST ARGUE FOR STERILE PHYSICALISM... ONLY THE HECKIN IDEALARONY FORMERINOS ARE EARNEST!!!!
Good riddance.

[Anonymous No.15233969]

>>15226952
anyone who expresses themselves by mimicking the opponent with funny spelling immediately loses my attention

like you have to be either a boomer or a child

[Anonymous No.15233983]

>>15227053
While that would make sense, I think Plato does distinguish geometric figures from the forms, and considers geometry to be good only for training your mind toward for the "upward looking" orientation needed for Platonic philosophical contemplation.

[Anonymous No.15234664]

>>15233922
i might not be on the level you guys are arguing at, but i've been in this shithole long enough to know any response that ends with insults and
>noooooo
type memes is generally the "wrong" one

[Anonymous No.15234803]

>>15234664
>anecdote
>illogical standard
>wrong in scare quotes

Forgive me if I'm skeptical of your capacity for logical judgement.

[Anonymous No.15234813]

>>15234803
all those words but you still argue in memes and stoop so low as to respond to a shitposter.

[Anonymous No.15234849]

>>15234813
Nice cope. There was an argument before the meme.

[Anonymous No.15234897]

>>15227053
>you are employing "universals"
No you're not, you're just participating in a language-game.

[Anonymous No.15234913]

>>15226952
>know the forms
“I assure you,” he said, “that you do not yet, if I may put it so, have an inkling of how great the difficulty is if you are going to posit one form b in each case every time you make a distinction among things.”
“How so?” he asked.
“There are many other reasons,” Parmenides said, “but the main one is this: suppose someone were to say that if the forms are such as we claim they must be, they cannot even be known. If anyone should raise that objection, you wouldn’t be able to show him that he is wrong, unless the objector happened to be widely experienced and not ungifted, and consented to pay attention while in your effort to show him you dealt with many distant considerations. Otherwise, the person who insists that they are necessarily unknowable would remain unconvinced.”
“Why is that, Parmenides?” Socrates asked.
“Because I think that you, Socrates, and anyone else who posits that there is for each thing some being, itself by itself, would agree, to begin with, that none of those beings is in us.”
“Yes – how could it still be itself by itself?” replied Socrates.
“Very good,” said Parmenides. “And so all the characters that are what they are in relation to each other have their being in relation to themselves but not in relation to things that belong to us. And whether one posits the latter as likenesses or in some other way, it is by partaking of them that we come to be called by their various names. These things that belong to us, although they have the same names as the forms, are in their turn what they are in relation to themselves but not in relation to the forms; and all the things named in this way are of themselves but not of the forms.”

[Anonymous No.15235258]

>>15227053
stopped reading at par excellence, pseud

[Anonymous No.15235598]

>>15234913
>you wouldn’t be able to show him that he is wrong, unless the objector happened to be widely experienced and not ungifted,

I've read the full quote over several times now, and my impression is that we just have to trust that the forms are real, and by denying them, we are either inexperienced and/or ungifted. Sure, I'm willing to buy stupids gonna stupid on these discussions, but I'm not inclined to trust that justice or the good exist as forms rather than things that stand in relation to ourselves.

[Anonymous No.15235630]

>>15227577
To my mind it doesn't seem like Seneca is saying Plato listed 5 causes as he's saying Plato's theory of universal forms is for Seneca a 5th cause.
>>15227716
I think there's a difference between the Aristotelian idea of eidos and the platonic universal which is why it could charitably be a 5th cause.
The eidos is the formal arrangement of the material
The Platonic universal is the perfect or prototype of that form
The eidos is... well... idiosyncratic, it contains imperfections of the Platonic Universal form. More to the point it can change over time, like a stone that wears away. But the Universal idea of 'stoneness' remains forever.
The Telos is different again - the cause of running is to bring good health, but the cause of good health is from running, to paraphrase Aristotle.
An example I remember is Stanley Kubrick once described why he preferred to shoot on location to in a studio, and he gave the example of stones... you can identify a 'fake' stone made from plaster at sight, even though it should by rights look like a 'real' stone formed by nature. Both share the same Senecian 5th cause, but have different hyle, eidos, agent, and teleos. Because they're both "stones"