/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.15201563]

>tfw got filtered as soon as they started talking about not-being
Anons...

[Anonymous No.15203043]

>>15201563
Post quote

[Anonymous No.15203114]

>>15203043
No need to, I can't understand the entire part arguing about non-being and being, basically everything from the end of the discussions about divisions to the final part of the dialogue in which the final definition of the Sophist is given
Any secondary texts that can help a brainlet like me?

[Anonymous No.15203127]

>>15203114
Non-being is difference.

[Anonymous No.15203135]

>>15203127
Yeah, I know that gets discussed in the later part of the dialogue

[Anonymous No.15203145]

>>15201563
Plato is full of shit. Probably why it didn't make sense to you OP.

[Anonymous No.15203155]

>>15203135
What else do you really need? That's what the dialogue boils down to. That's how you ensnare the sophist and ensure the ability to speak intelligibly of "that which is not" without running up against the eleatic dilemma.

[Anonymous No.15203166]

>>15203145
I didn't have any problems with the other dialogues of his that I've read until now, and he's not full of shit, why do you think this?

>>15203155
>What else do you really need?
I'm not satisfied with my understanding boiling down to a few sentences that you can also read on wikipedia.

[Anonymous No.15203591]

>>15201563
did you read Gorgias?

[Anonymous No.15203594]

>>15203591
Yeah. I consider it one of the harder dialogues, but I also think that it drags on in some spots, which is why I don't like it much.

[Anonymous No.15203894]

>>15201563
The Sophist is about logic and unbelievably good and deep, more so than I can state to you, for lack of my competence. It discusses forms of thinking and speaking. A discussion that wants to shed light on discussion.
First it's teaches you on Notions (Begriffe), then Judgements (Urteile) and finally Inference (Schlussfolgerungen). It's the very same as in modern logic!

It starts introducing the issue: What is a sophist? Actually you also learn about what the philosopher himself is and why these to are extremely similar, yet polar opposites. So thinking about the sophist is actually self-understanding. Socrates even asks if the foreign dude is maybe a God. Platon is telling us that this dialogue shares something godly. By doing philosophy we're facing the realm of God. The philosopher is also doing historical reflection by recognising who his father was. As they see themselves as children of father Parmenides, we are children of father Platon.

The juicy part starts by the first logical distinction: Name (Proper noun) and Genus/Notion

Are sophist, philosopher and politician just 3 names for the same thing (notion)? Or are these 2 or maybe 3 different things (notions)? How can we find out? The foreign man show us his method: he gains understanding of a notion by employing divisions (doing "dihairesis"). He chooses to divide his notions up in the most ridiculous way (in an humorous manner to make fun of the sophists that do it this way to prove whatever they want). Think about the method of dihairesis and whether it's suited to get an understanding of the Sophist. The question is whether the employment of the method in this manner is the joke or if the method itself is a joke. Why is the distinction always in 2? Why is this not arbitrary?

For it to be a sensible method the notions you gain by dihairesis have to suffice a formal requirement: These must be notions that can only be understood by each other! Their opposition is no arbitrary relation. Opposites are united by the fact that they're opposed.
The underlying idea is that Genus/Notion itself is a unit of opposites, that Genus is indeed only Genus through this inner tension.

(to be continued)

[Anonymous No.15203911]

>>15203894
>Why is the distinction always in 2? Why is this not arbitrary?
Good questions, I've wondered that myself as well. It doesn't look to me like he's making fun of the method, though. Isn't he telling us with the Sophist and the Statesman that we should use division and collection as methods to reach the truth. Unless I'm missing something?

[Anonymous No.15204082]

>>15203894

It's important to think about the following: You could decide to not do dihairesis, but instead just list properties of the sophist and politician. Is this method just as good? Imagine A and B had shared properties, do they therefore have to be the same Genus? No, it could be just coincidental. (Sophist talk to people, politicians talk to people.) What if the properties of A and B are different, hell what if we even find opposite properties? Do we now have proof that A and B are different Genus, not just Names of the same Genus? (A is a politician who talks fast, B is a politician who talks slow.) Again, no, we have no proof that these are 2 Genus.

The opposition is worthless if the source of the opposition is something we first have to notice (= something foreign to the Genus). The opposition needed for correct dihairesis is one where the *source* of the break-up of the higher Genus comes from the higher Genus itself. The Genus has to give us its own division, for the division to actually tell you something about what the Genus in question itself is. Otherwise all you would do is just dividing one notion into random shit that doesn't actually help you understand something about your notion. This is what the foreign guy from Elea is doing when talking about the fisherman and when he gives us the first few dihairesis of the sophist.

Then he comes to the 'cleansing' definition, but he tells us that can't be what the sophist is doing. (Now a cleansing happens in the discussion itself:) The next definition is an enlightening one. As with so many of Platon's text, even in the form of the text, you see the content mirrored. The form is showing you what he talks about. The text intentionally start sophistically.

(To be continued)

[Anonymous No.15204349]

>>15204082
This is excellent, keep going anon

[Anonymous No.15204590]

>>15203911
>>15204082
One more point to dihairesis before I continue: The division has to be an exhaustive one and 2 Genus you divide your higher Genus into have to relate/point to each other - this is what constitutes their unity. An opposition satisfies this logical character. But if you would e.g. divide a notion into 3 it wouldn't be clear anymore how the 3 parts are relating to each other and thus how they would divide the unity of the higher Genus exhaustively. You would have to explain that first before doing an exceptional dihairesis into 3 Genus (Kant too, felt the need to explain himself, when he once divided a notion up into 3 notions).

Now the continuation:
The philosophers have come to different definitions for the sophist by using that method. What does this mean? It means we've understood absolutely nothing. If we have various different definitions for a Notion, that just means we still have no good grasp of the Notion.

But does that mean we should use another method? No! The result could only be that further methods come to even more different results. We just have to get our shit together and recognise the mistakes we made thus far. How do we do that? By developing the problem at hand even further, before returning to our stalemate. The trolling the foreign guy from Elea is intentionally doing is a pedagogic one, but it also reflects how philosophical thought works. The question he was asked is connected to profound issues and therefore has to be answered in a satisfying, elaborated manner.

But let me come back: What would the sophists do in this situation? They just don't care. A sophist would think: "I just need to employ the 'correct' method until I get the result I want".

The sophists took up the idea of Father Parmenides that the idea of a wrong statement is meaningless. They protect themselves behind this thought of Parmenides in the most cunty manner: They infer from his saying that there is is no such thing as wrong opinion, because if so, how could you state it if the idea of wrong statements is meaningless?

>>15204349
Sorry, these kind of write-ups take time for me and I think I'm gonna go eat something quickly, so the next posts will take a little, please bear with me.

[Anonymous No.15204604]

>>15204590
>Sorry, these kind of write-ups take time for me and I think I'm gonna go eat something quickly, so the next posts will take a little, please bear with me.
I didn't mean to rush you anon, I was just afraid that you gave up and stopped posting
This is really helpful to understanding the dialogue and I'm glad that you'll continue

[Anonymous No.15205045]

>>15204604
>>15204590

So what was Parmenides saying? In Parmenides mind you simply cannot state something about the Nothing, since statements about the Nothing would speak of "nothing" and that would mean to "say nothing". Likewise, to him, the wrong statement is completely empty. Turned around, Parmenides is telling us: If someone is stating *something* (= not empty), you can't blame them.

What else is Parmenides teaching us because of the above premise? That 'all that can be known' (= being / truth) is without any difference whatsoever and absolutely changeless. Why? Because difference would mingle "Nothing" with the Notion. Change on the other hand would mean that something is NOT what it was before anymore. Instead truth is one and changeless, like a ball/sphere (that's their visual depiction for these properties). Parmenides' insight into truth is meant to devalue everything that makes up worldly life.
Notice that Platon too thinks of truth as changeless, whereas opinion is varying as well as different that things really are.

How does the sophist fit into that? The sophists thinks he is saying *something*, even though he sometimes says A and then B again and so on. Variety of statement *is* his very nature. That doesn't stop him to purport that his legitimacy is based on Parmenides teaching that the idea of a wrong statement is meaningless.

(To be continued)

[Anonymous No.15205404]

>>15205045
As Clinton once stated, we have to talk about "what the meaning of ‘is’ is" to prevent further confusion from now on. What meaning of 'is' and what terms is Platon using?

The "is" the Sophistes is discussing is the "is" of veracity, like in:
"That's how it is: ..." or "This is the case: ..." or "The following is: ..."
The ... here is the Greek "on" = the Being = the What-Is
... is a timeless statement. E.g.: "This is the case: Water is H2O."
(Side remark: You may correctly notice that whatever is perceivable is not even qualified to fill the placeholder.)

Compare "Water is H2O" to statements like:
"It is raining." (Something I may have said yesterday)
"It is not raining." (Something I may have said today)
Even assuming that both statements are the case, these are statements bound to a time deixis and therefore can't fill the placeholder.

Now back to Sophistes: What if we look at the following:
"This is not the case: ..." or "The following is not: ..."
The ... here is the Greek "me on" = the What-Is-Not = the Not-Being

But what *is* "me on"? Ha, you fool! It's even contradictory to ask this question. Why? Because you're treating the "me on" as *something*! And stating *something* is characterising it as *being*.

---
Keep in mind: The modern view (something the Greeks didn't even think of) is to view a statement as a proposition.
E.g. the proposition: "T is flying"
This proposition is like a picture either portraying something or not, meaning it is either true or false. The truth of the proposition is seen as something external to the proposition, like a property. To a lot of modern philosophers the question whether a statement is true/false therefore differs from the question whether the statement itself "is". The contrast between "on" and "me on" is thus treated as something external to the ..., i.e. the What-Is or What-Is-Not (e.g. "T is flying").
---

Back to thinking Greek: We can't even say "The What-Is-Not (= the 'me on' = the Not-Being) is unspeakable."
Why? Because we spoke of THE "me on" and thus we obviously treated it as *something*.

Looks like we're fucked when it comes to the "me on". Being the Chad he is, next the foreign guy from Elea tells you that even with the "on" you're fucked, if you really think about what it actually is.

(To be continued)

[Anonymous No.15205497]

>>15205045
>Notice that Platon too thinks of truth as changeless, whereas opinion is varying as well as different *THAN things really are.

Correction.

[Anonymous No.15205803]

>>15205404
So both "on" and "me on" are completely confusing. As I said, modern philosophers therefore place the contrast of "is" and "is not" in front of the content of the statement, as something neutral to the content. For Platon moving outside of the content makes no sense whatsoever, he's better than that.

But let's step back first:
After the 'cleansing' the Sophist was defined as someone who makes up illusions through his speech. I.e. he makes "wrong" statements. How does he do this? He either says that *that which is not* is or that *that which is* is not.
We expressed this definition, but then (remember Parmenides) we've noticed why it is problematic to even speak about wrong statements. Why? Because if we say that there *is* wrong opinion (doxa), we are actually saying: Not-Being (=That which is not) is.

---
Again do not confuse: The "is" here is the "is" of veracity!
We have 4 uses of "is":
- Chad is tall. -> "is" of predication
- Light is Kira. -> "is" of identity
- Zeus is. -> "is" of existence
- This is the case: ... -> "is" of veracity

The "is" existence is combined with Nouns/Names, same as the "is" of predication! The "is" of veracity on the other hand is combined with what (...)? A sentence! Why? Because "being" (that which is the case) isn't named with Nouns, instead is "says" something. To make it clear:
- If I say "Chad is tall". What/Who does the Name "Chad" refer to? To Chad.
- What about a sentence? What does the sentence refer to? It refers to nothing, it "says" something.
- On the other hand: You can't "say" "Chad". You don't say anything by uttering a Name. See if I say something: "Table."
---

Ok, we were saying: the wrong is being identified with the Not-Being. (see 237a)

[Anonymous No.15206190]

>>15205803
>As I said, modern philosophers therefore place the contrast of "is" and "is not" in front of the content of the statement, as something neutral to the content. For Platon moving outside of the content makes no sense whatsoever, he's better than that.

You know what, we're gonna attack the modern view first, before we continue. It will also help us to better understand Greek thought.

(1)
"Chad is tall."
"He is tall."
You see you can replace a noun by a pronoun (pro-noun).

(2)
"T is flying."
Let's use the "is" of veracity: "This is the case: T is flying."
We can also say: "This is true: T is flying."
We can nominalise the sentence (make it into a noun): *That T is flying* is the case.
Or: *That T is flying* is true.
Now we can use a pronoun: "It" is the case. Or: "It" is true.

Ok. Look at (1) again.
What if Chad is in fact a manlet? We don't need to comment on that, but we can declare that Chad remains a *being* thing, even though the predication turned out to be false.

Now look at (2). If we thought modern, we would consider "is true" to be a predicate. (Modern philosophers deny the difference between "is" of veracity and "is" of predication. "It is true" is understood by them as "It is made true by X". They look at "is true" as a relational predicate between "it" and "X".)
Employing analogy: That would make our nominalised sentence ("it") into a *being thing* (like Chad) that would exists no matter if it is true or not. You would have to assume the being of abstract things (propositions) floating in some third realm of thoughts (This is what Frege suggests - the first two being the realm of subjective imagination and the material realm). The existence of "it" is seen as independent of its being-true.
So if we agree with this thought, we could treat nominalised statements of veracity as things, same as Nouns (Chad), but can we turn it around and also say "Chad is true"? No, huh. (The sophist answer to this observation would be: You can't say everything of everything.)

Another observation:
- "Chad is tall" says more than "Chad"
- "This is the case: T is flying" or "This is true: T is flying" do *not* say anymore than "T is flying"
-> By stating something you state its veracity. Or to say it with Wittgenstein: "The proposition shows its sense. The proposition shows how things stand, if it is true. And it says, that they do so stand." [Traktatus 4.021 - 4.022]

In summary: We will not consider "is true" to be a predicate.

Looking at it in a Greek way: The "It" in "It is true" is no pro-noun, but a pro-sentence. "It" refers to nothing, i.e. there is no abstract *thing* that "it" refers to. According to Platon you can't nominalise a sentence. If I state "This is the case: ...", then the "This is the case" is a unified expression revealing the truth (...). The truth itself (the ... or "it" in "it is true") says something. You don't say something about "it".

[Anonymous No.15206248]

>>15203894
>>15204082
>>15204590
>>15205045
>>15205404
>>15205803
>>15206190
Absolutely based

[Anonymous No.15206267]

>>15203591
Gorgias and Protagoras should be read first.

[Anonymous No.15206318]

Read Parmenides first.

[Anonymous No.15206607]

>>15206190
You can only say something about things that do not already contain what you're saying.

---

Ok, why all this talk about "is true" not being a predicate? Because this is not the way Platon is going to solve the problem stressed by Parmenides. Whereas the modern people can just talk about What-Is-Not-True because for them that's not the same as What-Is-Not, after all all propositions *are* (belong to the What-Is) in the realm of thoughts.

Where have we left off? Sophist was defined as someone who makes up illusions through his speech. He talks "pseudos" (that can mean falsehood or lie). Talking pseudos means talking contrary to your own understanding.

To say Something means to say What-Is. Everything that is said has this basic form and is presented as a „This is the case: ...“.
The problem still is (see 237e): He, who says Not-Something ("me ti"), says Nothing ("me den"). Or in more comprehensible english: He, who does not say Something, says Nothing.
So: Talking falsehood = saying Not-Something = saying Nothing

The Not-being (Nothing) can't be expressed, it can't even be thought. We can't mix Being with Not-being. We already were at this point a few posts before, I wanted to add a small thought. Why are we getting fucked here? This is an expression of the infinite negativity of thought. We tried too think about the Nothing and our line of thought has annihilated itself. (Compare to how Wittgenstein is forced to end the Traktatus) But this contradiction is fruitful, thought will take its own contradiction into itself.

We end here with the "me on" for now and then Platon gives us a compact excursion into traditional ontology. I won't go into that since it's complicated matter and I don't want to make this even longer by writing about all the Presocratics. Superficially we can state that everyone of them says something different about the "on" (Being), so they don't really help us understand what the "on" is. (see 250d) Platon respectfully puts it this way: Surely these respected people knew what they were saying, but for those like us it's not comprehensible unfortunately.

The foreign dude implies that since we had no progress with neither "me on" nor "on" individually, maybe they will clear up together. (see 251a) He suggests to reflect upon what we think when we think "This is the case: ..." or "It is so" (again we have "is" of veracity). The following reflection is hardcore, brace yourself.

[Anonymous No.15207017]

>>15206607
What do we think if we think "It is so"? We determine something. But we are not interested in *specific* determinants, but in determinacy.
Or let me phrase it that way: We are not interested in "What is the case" concerning a specific matter (other sciences can do that), we are interested in the "What is the case"-ness, the *form* of these determinant statements, the determinacy! This is a work of logic after all.

The foreign dude suggests 5 different determinants (Greek: eidos = forms) successively that you're supposed to find everywhere when you make a statement. They are the forms of all forms. Remember that we are now reflecting on the whole of what can be said in a ("It is so"-) statement.

The 5 eidos are: Sameness/identity, Difference, Motion, Rest and Being.

(1) Sameness
Sameness is thought in everything that is thought as determinacy. It is a priori.

-> The big is big.
-> It is what it is: big.

Everything that is "so", is how it is (= so)
and not any other way (here this eidos is pointing to the eidos of Difference).

(2) Difference
Understanding "big" means understanding that it's not "small" (opposition), nor is it e.g. "black". The fact that "big" and "black" are different is nothing you have to learn first. Thought is already (a priori) related to a totality of determinacy! The determinant you think of and the totality of determinacy - these two fall into one, this constitutes thought.

The eidos of Difference is connecting all forms with each other. All forms are different from each other. The illimitable, interminable whole, the totality, is *Form* in general (what even can be thought as determinacy). Again: How do you think something as determinacy? By thinking something as "so".

(1) and (2) in summary: Every form of every determinacy is itself and also different from all other forms. This is understood in thinking any form whatsoever, you don't have to learn it first. (Actually all of philosophy is like this: we're making explicit / 'remembering' what we already know.)

By thinking that forms are different, I'm simultaneously thinking that they're not the same. Thus the eidos of Difference is pointing to the eidos of Sameness.

E.g. the eidos Motion is what it is and it is not Rest, because Motion is different from Rest.

(3) What do we thus know about Motion? It's characterised by Sameness, Difference and Rest.

(4) Motion is different from Rest. Motion is *not* Rest. Notice: Difference already contains the "not".

(5) Could it be Motion is the very same thing as "Being"? No because Motion is *not* Rest. Motion thus has part in Not-Being. Therefore Motion is different from Being.

[Anonymous No.15207080]

>>15207017
I have to prepare for a video conference now. Gonna be back in a few hours, don't let the thread die till then if anyone is reading. There still is a good chunk left.

[Anonymous No.15207203]

bump

[Anonymous No.15207605]

I like this thread. I don't want to see it die.

[Anonymous No.15207979]

>>15207017
>>15207203
>>15207605

Here we go again.
If (5) were not true "is" and "is in motion" would have the same meaning and then things couldn't be "resting". So for things to be able to be "in motion" or "resting" - Being must be a separate thing.

Important remark, we shall focus on later: Notice the difference in stating:
(i) Motion is different from Rest
and
(ii) Something "in motion" is different from something "resting"

We are now in 257b in the text and the foreign dude from Elea is telling us that to him it seems that speaking of "me on" (What-Is-Not) is not about the *opposite* of the Being, but just about the something different. He explains his thought through analogy of Not-Being and Not-big. It's stated that Not-Being relates to Being the same way that Not-Big relates to Big.

Big | not big | small
Being | not being | X

Not-Big does not mean small, it could be anything, as long as it's not big. So it's no determinant, but a repulse of a determinant (Big).
What about Not-Being? How does it relate to Being which is determinacy ("It is so")? Not-Being in fact does not leave the realm of Being (!), since doing so (identifying Not-Being with X) would reject determinacy (as the opposite of Being) and leave us with nothing and Parmenides would be right. But Platon tells us X does not exist.

Let me recap: Parmenides recognised that philosophy reflects upon Being and that Being is universal. He characterised Being with oneness (indifference) and thus had to exclude the Non-Being to grasp this indifferent allness. But now you couldn't really think the concept of wrong statements anymore. Platon on the other hand stopped focussing on Being itself, but instead is talking from forms which are a totality. He sheds light on how every form is determined and that Being is thus full of difference. Determinacy is constituted by the relation of every form with each other. The allness according to Platon is one with difference.

(To be continued)

[Anonymous No.15209140]

>>15207979
In (i) I'm putting the eidos in subject position. It's about an eidos' logical difference from other eidos. By stating this I'm understanding what I think, while I think.

In (ii) I'm using them as predicate. I'm using them to determine things, which are not my thought, while I think.

There is an inner relation between difference of determinants and the Being / Not-Being used as predicate.
-> Because motion is different from rest ((i): difference of notion), you can use this determinant to differentiate that which is "in motion" from that which "is not" ((ii): difference of what is determined by through a notion).

Another example:
(i): Red-ness is different than being heavy-ness.
(ii): A is red and thus different from B which is not red.

---

Now Platon is explaining the wrong statement through introduction of the 'negative' form. How is it introduced? In 257c he compares knowledge/science (being one and also divided up into its disciplines) with Difference. Knowledge is one, it's about Being, but we divide it up into disciplines according to the form it refers to. Knowledge in general has no particular form. Knowledge is only knowledge insofar as it's knowledge about this and not that, but it's characterised through it's universality. The same kind of division can be found with the general idea of Difference.

We gained insight that form itself is difference. In their determining nature forms are predicates to things. By dividing the forms in their predicate function we can oppose a Not-Being to every Being. (In this way Not-Being *is*.) Through this division we can introduce notions like Not-red, Not-good, Not-heavy, ...
We see that Being and Not-Being are not outside of the realm of determinacy. That which is not is a *being* opposite to the Being.

See 257e: "Did we not understand that the Not-Beautiful "is" by its being marked off from a Genus of Being (= the Beautiful, in this level (i) we have various forms existing next to each other) and again opposing it to a Being again (ii: here we look at the form through its predicate function: the thing that "is not beautiful" is opposed to a different thing that "is beautiful")?"

[Anonymous No.15209493]

>>15209140
Let us rephrase the difference between (i) and (ii):

(i) Difference of one form from another form -> Being determinate

(ii) Difference insofar as something differs from something else regarding their exhibiting of this form. -> Being determining

It's a dual difference. You can't reduce one to another. These two differences make up a logical determinant.

(i) Form is determinate. -> In this determinacy we express that it's different from other forms.
(ii) In its being determinate we also express that it's determining. -> This allows us to differentiate it from the 'negative' form (all that which is not determined by the form, e.g. the Not-red as opposed to the Red when it comes to the form of Redness).

Compare to the Perception (Wahrnehmung) chapter of Hegel.

The foreign dude from Elea states at one point that some people may say they committed patricide by rejecting the idea of Parmenides, but now we seem to have grasped things better. Parmenides was focusing on the meaning of the sole "Being" of veracity while disregarding the content. We could say he just looked at the "It is".
Platon instead enlightens us: Forms are determinate. We have to think about the "It is *so*", where *so* stresses the determinacy. This way we have allowed Difference into our idea of Being. But if we do not develop (i) this into (ii) we fall back into the conception of Parmenides:

(Parmenides) It is
(i) It is *so* -> If we let "it" remain universal, then the forms do not relate to each other by exclusion, they just float next to each other. The difference would just be a verbal one, none of content.
(ii) *That* is so.

Notice: By doing the above we move from an "is" of veracity to an "is" of predication.
(i) The former has no constraints of place and time. "The world" is no matter of predication: We may say "It is so" or "It is not so", but as long as we are ignoring the content like Parmenides did, the only sensible thing to say is "It is so".
(ii) Here the *It* becomes a *thing* (Gegenstand) with place and time. By being "so" the thing *is not* "not so". The "not" is not external to the content.
- T does fly.
- T does not fly.

We notice that the idea of "thing" (Gegenstand) is not an empirical one, but a logical one, one that stems from overcoming Parmenides. The "thing" is what the form differs in and through which it opposes its negative form.

[Anonymous No.15209614]

>>15207017
Where should I look into to learn more about the five eidos you speak of?

[Anonymous No.15209901]

I don't understand why Plato had to write an entire dialogue to show that you can talk about what something isn't.
If I say "X is flying" and X actually isn't flying, I am obviously talking about something that isn't the case.

[Anonymous No.15209913]

What should I read to prepare myself before reading the Sophist (and Parmenides, Philebus)?

[Anonymous No.15209923]

>>15209614
It's from Sophistes 254d - 257c, so reread that first.

Also:
- Fiona Leigh: Modes of Being at Sophist 255c-e (DOI: 10.1163/156852812X607270)

I will post more later. I have a video conference again, right now.

>>15209493
Look at the following forms:

- Beautiful and Heavy -> they are different
- Beautiful and Not-Beautiful -> these are opposites, let's think who/what they predicate of

Something can be beautiful with or without being heavy.
But: Something can either be beautiful or not.
Beautiful and Not-Beautiful predicate of the thing. The idea of opposition is the idea of the thing (Gegenstand)! Difference is the requirement for opposition/negation.

How did Parmenides and Platon proceed, seen through this lens?
Both knew: Difference -> Negation
Parmenides: There is no negation. -> Therefore: There is no difference.
Platon: There is difference -> There is negation

Now let's finally tackle the concept of wrong statements.

(to be continued)

[Anonymous No.15211043]

Bump

[Anonymous No.15211610]

>>15209923
There are 2 ways of saying something that is not:
(a) T does not fly ('negative' form which we already discussed)
(b) "T does fly." - But this is not the case. (the "pseudos" of the sophist)

With our current analysis, we showed how the idea of Parmenides ought to be corrected and we've proven in what way the Not-Being *is*. The sophists too, will have to concede to what we said about the eidos and the relationship between Difference and negation. But they're sophists! The foreign guy from Elea tells us that they may accept that the Not-Being is in reflection upon things and forms (see (a)), but they may contend that the Not-Being is not present in speech. (see 260d-e)

We have to focus our argumentation on the proof and explanation of the phenomenon of *speaking what is not*. We will explain what it means for there to be pseudos, after we initially defined the sophist as someone who spreads exactly that and we will destroy his defence of purporting that there is no wrong opinion. This is Platon's final Fuck you to the sophist here.

Let us finish the exposition on the kinds of "not":

(i) Difference of forms: "It is" is being unfolded into "It is so and so and so..."
(ii) Opposition of form and its 'negative' form -> this opposition allows us to think the Difference of things (determined by the form in question)

Going from (i) to (ii) we again the logical Notion of *thing* (Gegenstand) as the variety of objects that can partake in the forms.

But let us unfold the idea of the negation even more:
(iii) Thinking "it is" and "it is not" of the same thing = this is the meaning of pseudos (b), i.e. saying *it is* about what is not - or saying *it is not* about what is.

What did just happen? We moved from a discussion of metaphysics and ontology to (iii) philosophy of mind and epistemology!


(To be continued)

[Anonymous No.15211709]

>>15211610
To make it clear, once more - thus far we unfolded the idea of negation like this:
(i) heavy *is not* round
- "heavy" and "round" are in no relation of exclusion, but in one of difference, otherwise they are indifferent: they exist next to each other

(ii) a *is not* b where 'a is red' and 'b is not red'
- "is red" and "is not red" have an inner relationship !
- whereas "a" and "b" in principle are indifferent to each other, you could fill it with whatever you want as long as 'a is not b' when it comes to the form of redness

(iii) ist best understood (initially) in a dialogic situation between subject 1 and 2:
(iii) S1: "a is so" , S2: "a is not so"
- S1 and S2 are talking to each other, conscious of what the other one is saying and therefore conscious of the contradiction
- a thing ("a") is being combined with a form and its negation
- S1 and S2 are *not* indifferent to each other!
- each of them understands that what they themselves are saying is the point where the other one is stating falsehood
- the "not" we are reflecting upon has been taken into the unity of what S1 and S2 are saying
- negation constitutes their unity
- in each consciousness there is both statement and counter-statement

We reach (iii) when we turn (ii) into: "a *is not* a"
(iii) is a deepening and accentuation of (ii)

Through interaction of S1 and S2 we gain the notion of "wrong statement" / "wrong speech", that is combining a thing with a form and its opposite (in my consciousness). I understand myself as contradicting what the other one is saying.

[Anonymous No.15212275]

>>15211709
I should have mentioned it before maybe, but Platon is rounding things up pretty nicely. He introduces us to the logical difference of nouns and verbs. Speech is not simply a concatenation of words, but a unity. Only a sentence has meaning. "Table Dick Horse" and "Fly Run Write" do not. The most simple sentence is made up by noun and verb. They have distinct roles in the sentence: the noun is the subject (actor) and the verb is the predicate (the act). We already employed this division in our understanding of the judgements above (see (i) and (ii)).

Like with a circle the beginning and the end do meet each other:
The division of speech into image (true speech) and illusion (wrong speech) is also dihairesis. The source of dihairesis is our primordial and universal reflection on what is / what is not. For the philospher dihairesis is both the method and its content. Nothing that we determine is given to us (empirically). The notions we need we gain through self-reflective self-examination. The need for dihairesis can only be justified through my own reflection.

To elucidate the difference of philosopher and sophist we unfold the idea of negation one more final time:

Through thinking (iii) we gain the idea of a distance between *what I say* and *what is*. If I take the idea of this distance into myself, I create my idea of Not-knowing (= unknowing).

This is (iv): "I know that I do *not* know"
(iv): Knowledge of Not-Knowing
- relating to myself I understand the difference between what I think and what is
- the distance between mental action and the What-Is is contained as a Knowledge
- this is philosophical knowledge

(iv) is what unites the philosopher with the sophist. It's the reason for the depth of their similarity. Both employed enough reflecting to have reached this point. Both know that they do not know and they relate the Notion of Not-Knowing to themselves. This is what constitutes the dignity of the sophists. This is what separates both from the rest of the Athenian society who think they have knowledge.

While the philosopher takes in the contradiction as an insight into his philosophical practice, the sophist's take is: "I know nothing, but I don't care". He subordinates the relationship of Being and Not-Being to purposes of his own. His distance to truth terminates the authority of truth for him. The sophist is not determined through an orientation towards truth. Truth does not reign him. He uses true and false for his gain, but does not consider to need true and false to picture his purpose.

Platon completes the exposition by telling us that the sophist is creating illusions, not because of stupidity of not knowing any better, but being fully aware of his unknowing.

[Anonymous No.15212447]

>>15212275
Did you take a course on philosophy? Where did you learn to dissect that knowledge like that?

[Anonymous No.15212450]

>>15212275
> "I know nothing, but I don't care"
Actually, it's more akin ''I know nothing, but it's irrelevant.'' The vanity of ontology. If you know nothing, you can't know truth, or know if truth even exist.

Extremely high quality posts BTW. It's a little disheartening to find for free on 4chan a better exposé of Plato's Sophist than anywhere in my unversity's cursus which I paid thousands of bucks. You honor Plato's tradition by giving this for free while academics swindled me of my precious money like sophists would have done.

[Anonymous No.15212841]

>>15212275
> We already employed this division in our understanding of the judgements above (see (i) and (ii)).
To add to that:
If we discuss predication we have on a more basic level of the logical structure of a sentence:
a) the thing that is being talked about: "the tomato"
b) that which is being stated about the above: "is red"
We can negate b) as we've already seen and thus think the difference between a tomato and a banana.

Compare to a "feature placing sentence" (see Strawson): "It is raining".
Here we do not have a *thing* being talked about - nothing we could differentiate from something not raining.

>>15209901
The matter was this pressing because sophists and philosophers are so close. He attacked those who do not care for truth and took away their ability to protect themselves behind the authority of Parmenides. Platon furthermore showed us how traditional ontologies were lacking, he corrected his early theory of ideas (forms) while at it and shed light on the idea of negation, the method of dihairesis, the concept of notions, the logic structure of a judgement, the Greek understanding on the meaning of "is (true)"...
Sophistes is an extremely complex and valuable dialogue.

Final addition:
(i) In the difference of the forms their determinacy is found
(ii) Determinacy contains a "not" -> the idea of a thing is connected to the idea of opposing predicates (see Gareth Evans "Identity and predication" for more)
(iii) Here something happens that causes us to discuss thinking apart (distanced) from Being -> transition from ontology into philosophy of mind (Geist)

>>15211709
> - "heavy" and "round" are in no relation of exclusion, but in one of difference, otherwise they are indifferent
> - whereas "a" and "b" in principle are indifferent to each other
I shouldn't have used the word "indifferent" here, since it's misleading, maybe "detached" would have been better.

>>15212447
I'm studying philosophy and took a course on Sophistes under Sebastian Rödl. 4chan and this prof of mine were the reasons I started with philosophy. If you're interested in going further than what we did in this thread I can recommend his book "Self-Consciousness and Objectivity" to you.

>>15212450
I just felt like it, it took long enough. I don't think I can give you any good advice, anon, except for the cliché'd "Do what feels right". You know your situation best.

[Anonymous No.15213011]

We are completely perplexed, then, and you must clear up the question for us, of what you intend to signify when you use the word "based". Obviously you must be quite familiar with what you mean, whereas we, who formerly imagined we knew, are now at a loss.

[Anonymous No.15213134]

>>15203114
>>15209614
>>15212841

>Any secondary texts that can help a brainlet like me?

Apart from for the stuff that I already mentioned in my posts the following was suggested in my course:

- Bostock,, Plato on "is not"
- Brown, Being in the Sopist
- Owen, Plato on Not-Being
- Grover, Camp, Belnap, A Prosentential Theory of Truth
- Kahn, Essays on Being
- Ackrill, Plato and the Copula
- Edward Lee: Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist
- Heidegger, Lectures on Sophistes
- Peter Geach, Micheal Dummit (both criticise correspondence theory of truth)

>>15209901
Also the following ones to better understand what problem Platon is actually trying to solve here:
- McDowell, Falsehood and Not-Being in the Sophist
- Irad Kimhi: Thinking and Being (3rd part of the book)

Fuck it, I'm gonna relist what I already mentioned as well:
- Frege, The thought
- Fiona Leigh: Modes of Being at Sophist 255c-e
- Hegel, Phenomenology, chapter about Perception
- Gareth Evans "Identity and predication"
- Strawson, Individuals
- Rödl, Self-Consciousness and Objectivity

>>15212447
I did not stress this yet, therefore a second reply: I'm still trying to become as good as to be able to dissect knowledge like that on my own. But there is no other way than to read philosophy and try to follow the thought. Write some essays, even if it's just for yourself to see what you've understood. After you had your own exposure with the text and tried to digest it, read what others wrote and so on. Don't be intimidated by my posts, most of what I wrote is just memorised from the course I took, pic related.

[Anonymous No.15213199]

>>15213134
What would be your thoughts on reading Copleston's books as my first steps into philosophy? I'm watching Rick Roderick's lectures to see if I recalled anything from high school and I'm started to be very interested. Don't know if I'm big brained enough to go deeply into every subject like this though.

[Anonymous No.15213221]

>mfw plato makes another homer reference

[Anonymous No.15213242]

>>15213221
Why do you come in one of the best /lit/ threads in months and post basedshit?

[Anonymous No.15213304]

>>15212275
>>15211709
Haven't read these effortposts yet but I will

[Anonymous No.15214066]

>>15213199
If you're really interested in it, sure give it a try, but I personally do not recommend introductory books. You can read up on your history and anecdotes at a later time as well.
If you're interested in philosophy, engage with it right from the start. I'm influenced by the approach of my university here, but I would just say pick a staple that intrigues you and choose the translation you can work the best with.

If you don't know what to possibly start with, pick one of these:
- Platon: Politeia
- Aristoteles: Nicomachean Ethics
- Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (short, challenging language)

[Anonymous No.15214141]

>>15214066
Thank you

[Anonymous No.15214357]

>>15213221
It usually relates to the point he is making, not just "hey, I get that." For example, in Ion his point was that even though artist's have characters sail or tend to horses in their stories they do not actually have first hand understanding of that so there is no actual knowledge there.

[Anonymous No.15214365]

>>15209913
Protagoras definitely. And Gorgias

[Anonymous No.15214464]

>>15203894
this thread was bound to mediocrity then a kraut gave us all a lecture on Plato and the best thread on /lit/ in months. Thank you very much anon