Kantian/Fichtean/existential query

[Anonymous No.15190164]

I've recently finished reading Kant. Now I'm starting Fichte. I have a question concerning the intellectual intuition of the pure I. When Fichte says the pure I is an activity, does he mean an activity in the sense that it acts as the categories (the activity of putting itself in the posited form of not-I in opposition to a set of rules that eventually (in the argument) make it a factual cognition), or does he mean it in the sense that it is pure self-consciousness (the activity of being alive/conscious). What I mean to ask is, is the pure I equivalent to being-there, as in, being conscious of oneself as existing, or is it instead the principle of identity (the totality of the categories) that makes of the (self?)given (intuition) a cognition?
Also, transcendental idealism thread in general. (I would like to discuss Kant with people, but none of my friends have read it.)

[Anonymous No.15190445]

But, /lit, please, don't fail me to such extremes;

[Anonymous No.15191094]

>>15190164
>When Fichte says the pure I is an activity, does he mean an activity in the sense that it acts as the categories...

The simultaneous self-positing and counter-positing of the pure I exists before the categories, as the categories themselves necessarily presupposes this self-positing. For example, before I can properly say something such as: I am cold, one must first say I am I. But in order to understand this I, it requires a form of determination to exist, or an outside thing (or in this case the cold).

> is the pure I equivalent to being-there, as in, being conscious of oneself as existing, or is it instead the principle of identity...

It is the former, but insofar as it is the former, it also stands as the bases for the latter. Actually, Schelling speaks about this in his System of Transcendental Idealism, where he asks how the leap in logic goes from the simple analytic proposition of identity, to that of a synthetic proposition. Schelling says that this precisely arises from the self = self, where the self is both simultaneously identical to itself (as analytic proposition), but also represents a duality of itself (as a synthetic proposition), thus showing how one can go from the principle of identity to synthetic knowledge.

[Anonymous No.15191201]

>>15191094
Ty, that was clear, concise and useful anon.
Just to keep the discussion going, I was wondering what do people interested in this epoch think about the idealist conception of morality. I have an intuitive obscure sense that everything reduces to the practical. I do understand, up to a point, that the moral call is itself a phenomenon that discloses freedom and absolute power within the transcendental me. The easiest way I have to intuit it is by improvising on the piano, when I feel that the key I'll play next is the right one. When I think about this call to action, again, confusedly and by intuition, I can relate it to a universal sense of beauty we hold as a transcendental condition for experience, but I cannot bring it to the systematic unity Kant boasts about in the Critique of Judgment. How does the Idea of the Highest Good attain reality as a postulate of practical reason? This is a concept that in me only lasts while I think about it, but my empirical self constantly brings it down and starts thinking about matter as if it was a thing in itself (and then the validity of the Idea vanishes). Also, do the first idealists think of the moral call as something more similar to revelation, or more like their logical understanding in their actual system of personhood (a system that, to me, seems too linguistic). I guess I don't have a specific question more than, do you actually fully understand (and not just by confused moments) the validity of morality and its primacy over speculative reason? Is there anything I am missing? Sometimes it feels as if literally they are just repeating I am I, and everything I feel I understand is just me mingling with the real (just as I would mingle with the real if I read Leibniz or watched Jojo, and therefore there is no real discovery under the stamp of the "critical philosophy").

[Anonymous No.15191475]

>>15191201
>what do people interested in this epoch think about the idealist conception of morality...

Two notable philosophers of this era that caught my attention with their moral philosophies, were Schelling and Schiller. Schelling proposed that the nature of morality lies in hand with the practical necessity of human freedom. That is, in order for human freedom to exist, we must reject a deterministic form of morality, and instead show that all humans have not only the freedom to do good, but also to commit evil. Another thinker of this era who interested me was that of Schiller. Schiller believes that the conception and foundation of morality lie within aesthetic education. Schiller takes that man is born with a duality of self, one which constantly seeks for continuous change (our intuition of time known a priori), and a constant seeking of stability (our intuition of space known a priori). This actualizes contradictorily and simultaneously in man's sensuous impulses and man's desire for static stability. Schiller believes that it is the aesthetic experience (perhaps one similar to your improvisation on the piano) alone that brings harmony and moral peace (or as Schelling puts it: infinite harmony).

> do you actually fully understand (and not just by confused moments) the validity of morality and its primacy over speculative reason?

Actually, I disagreed with Kant's idea that practical reason takes precedence of the theoretical, due to the issues of maintaining such a stance. Firstly, Kant showed in his first critique that one must make bounds on reason in order to maintain freedom, he famously says: "I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith." That is, if reason has no bounds, then all falls to determinism. But by accepting Kant's terms, we fall into another issue. Kant, essentially speaking, divides the world into that of the phenomenon, which is governed deterministically, and the noumenal in-itself, which arises out of pure freedom. But the issue with this view immediately arises when we ask the question of nature. That is, if nature itself is determined, how then can we perceive ourselves as transcending such determinism? Hegel answers this question by showing that neither our own subjective cognition nor experience of objective reality alone can show give rise to a transcending consciousness, but that it requires both, that is simultaneously both objectivity and subjectivity (the absolute); and the only way that this absolute can be posited, is not in any particular or singular moment (for suspended reality is insufficient), but rather in the totality of all events, or holistically (as a whole). Schelling on the other hand, answers the question showing that from the Fichtean self-positing, consciousness must necessarily posit itself as being limited (or determined) in order to exist. This is from the fact that the self can only exist through its own limitations, or through the antithesis of the determined.

[Anonymous No.15191679]

The pure I is far deeper than any of the categories.
Finish reading Foundations of the Science of Knowledge while convoluted it is retraceable what he writes.
For the self to be self-conscious it msut first go through some 6 or 7 moments between the self and not-self.
Like the other anon said, (early) Schelling discusses the fundamental ideas of Fichte often simpler and less confusing to his own extent. I found reading Schellings early work all up to 1801 with the system of transcendental idealism to help me better grasp Fichte. I can also only recommend Hegel's "Differenz der Fichtischen und Schellingschen Philsophie" since he distinguishes them well and also traces other early german idealist philosophers like Jacobi, Maimon and specifically Rheinhold.
"Die Bestimmung des Menschen" nearly moved me to tears.

[Anonymous No.15192788]

>>15191475
>This is from the fact that the self can only exist through its own limitations, or through the antithesis of the determined.
I don't follow you here... In the previous sentence you seem to equate 'limited' with 'determined', but now you seem to be contrasting the terms?

[Anonymous No.15193121]

>>15192788
Firstly I apologize if my writing produced any ambiguity, and I hope I can help clarify it.

>...through the antithesis of the determined.

Being determined means to be limited. Here, when I say the antithesis, I am referring to the antithesis of the self with the non-self, not the antithesis of being determined.

[Anonymous No.15193221]

Btw, what do you people think about the purposiveness of nature. It is sort of assumed by at least Kant and Fichte that nature, not-I, is cognized by me with a purposiveness, and that therefore everything (I am conscious of) is teleological up to a point. What I don't get is how this 'me cognizing an object as something that serves for something' (which I'm not sure it actually is how I always necessarily cognize objects, being it from my will or from my theorical standpoint), goes from the empirical self to the pure I, suprasensible, moral action, etc., having a final purposiveness of its own. I get that it is a postulate of pure reason to assume purposiveness in order to bring an effective action to the moral world, but I don't get how it travels from a postulate of reason to a sort of ontological transcendental "being". Sometimes I wonder (I know it's unfair to read authors from this perspective) if they were conditioned to presuppose a purposiveness of nature because Darwin had still not arrived. The thought does not allow me to fully engage with their teleology (Kant's and Fichte's).

[Anonymous No.15193252]

>>15193221
PD. But this days I'm assuming a life-system based on freedom and therefore I still engage in their teleological systems, I just don't have the natural inclination towards it that I usually have for this sort of concepts. (Does this prove the power of duty as a testimony of my freedom? (Even if, empirically, this is a result of my upbringing?))

[Anonymous No.15193539]

>>15193221
Btw, what do you people think about the purposiveness of nature...
One can view nature from the view of a transcendental idealist system, or from a philosophy of nature. Firstly from a philosophy of nature: the interesting point is that we must acknowledge that the purposiveness of nature exists unconditionally, that is within itself as an object. But on the other hand, we also need to acknowledge that this purposiveness arises out of a consequence of our own faculties of judgment. This seemingly unsolvable paradox, however, is resolved once one takes note that the issue arises due to the fact that we take the perspective that nature is dead. On the other hand, in order to understand the mechanisms of nature (gravity, light, etc.), we can never look at specific or particular cases, but rather, we must look holistically, and see that nature is undergoing a continuous dialectical movement (quite revolutionary for the time considering this is decades before On the Origin of Species). Once one sees nature as alive, this issue immediately disappears. On the other hand, theoretical philosophy takes a different perspective. Starting from the proposition of self = self, the transcendental subject needs to continuously posit itself objectively and subjectively. But in order to do so, that is it to exist as both, the self cannot act as static being, but rather as a process of eternal becoming. Now eternal becoming is quite a paradoxical concept, as to how can something be in the process of becoming (presupposing an eventual arrival) while simultaneously infinite? This is resolved by the fact that the self must posit a continuously "retracting" limit in order to posit itself as continuously "expanding." One of the limits that arise is the will (or your freedom/natural inclinations). Thus one could see that the cognizing done empirically essentially fulfills the duty of the ultimate goal of the self's propensity towards the unconditioned.

[Anonymous No.15193703]

>>15193539
So, if I understood correctly, I further develop my opposing relationship with myself as not-I through an ethical acting upon the objects of nature (not-I), determining them into a purpose? Does this purpose have an Idea (a concept with an unconditioned basis towards which we tend)? Is it God/Communism/End of History?
If what I said is semi-correct, I guess I can sort of understand the transcendental standpoint. But I really cannot get a sense of the natural (philosophy of nature) standpoint. Is it the empirical daily standpoint (the heideggerian they)? When you say that I must acknowledge that the purposiveness of nature exists unconditionally, do you mean as a postulate of reason for an ethical action? Because then that seems to me the transcendental standpoint again, and if not I don't see why I assume that nature has an unconditional purposiveness. A continuous dialectical movement of nature is an evolution of our way of empirically presenting the not-I, or a series of qualitative changes in the categories we apply to nature? I don't know. I feel like I'm lacking that piece of first person empathy that will make it suddenly all way clearer. If you don't mind, could you expand on what you said? (I don't mind if you basically repeat it but with different wordings.)

[Anonymous No.15193773]

read some Wittgenstein to cure yourself and then start over.

[Anonymous No.15193842]

>>15193773
What does Wittgenstein think about the mechanics of his intuition on logic?

[Anonymous No.15193872]

>>15193703
>So, if I understood correctly, I further develop my opposing relationship with myself as not-I through an ethical acting upon the objects of nature (not-I), determining them into a purpose? Does this purpose have an Idea (a concept with an unconditioned basis towards which we tend)? Is it God/Communism/End of History?
Different idealists have different conceptions of what this unconditioned basis is. Hegel believed that spirit was on a constant ascent towards the absolute and that the world-spirit undergoes a dialectical process across history in order to realize itself as simultaneously necessary and free. Schelling, on the other hand, believed that the primordial division between the objective and subjective could only be reconciled through the aesthetic (that is why he places the importance of aesthetics above philosophy). A right-Hegelian would concern this tendency to be towards God, a left-Hegelian towards the secular emancipation of humanity, and a Marxist towards the end of commodity production and the stage of Communism (the "end of history" is really only Fukuyama, whom I think had an incorrect reading of Hegel)
>When you say that I must acknowledge that the purposiveness of nature exists unconditionally, do you mean as a postulate of reason for an ethical action? Because then that seems to me the transcendental standpoint again, and if not I don't see why I assume that nature has an unconditional purposiveness.
You can think of the philosophy of nature perspective as an unreflective perspective, such as a practical conception of the world. While the system of Transcendental Idealism would be the perspective of a reflective philosopher. An important point is that the process of eternal becoming exists outside of time (not that it doesn't exist, but rather it is presupposed in our daily lives).
> When you say that I must acknowledge that the purposiveness of nature exists unconditionally, do you mean as a postulate of reason for an ethical action?
While one maintains that purposiveness arises from our faculties of judgment (or as a postulate of reason), we must also admit that nature still has purposiveness even if we did not exist (that is it has unconditional purposiveness).
>A continuous dialectical movement of nature is an evolution of our way of empirically presenting the not-I, or a series of qualitative changes in the categories we apply to nature?
This dialectical movement occurs within both the practical philosophy of nature and the theoretical system of idealism. In the former, it is the manner in which mechanisms of nature exist holistically (that is as alive). In the latter, it arises as "a single step" through our intuition of outer objects as nature (so you could put it that nature is alive, as it is literally us). Generally speaking also, this is not really a category, but it is rather a process that even presupposes the categories themselves.

[Anonymous No.15193896]

>>15193703
cont.
The later German Idealists such as Schelling and Hegel essentially applied a meta-critique on Kant himself. Saying that even before one can apply the categories of reason, there are things that one must consider, such as sense-certainty, consciousness, self-consciousness, etc.

[Anonymous No.15194070]

>>15193896
It is kind of a never-ending story because our criteria of knowledge--experience and reason--can only go as far. I think Kant knew this and that is th reason he drew the line at the categories. The rest is purely speculative philosophy.

However, I do think--as Kant did-- that there is something more out there and it is devilish tempting to try to bring it to the fore. The only problem is that one cannot communicate one's findings about the realm of noumena. Intuition and personal insight ias af far as one can go. In order to comnunicate one's finding, one can only employ reason which is bound to the categories.

[Anonymous No.15194082]

Btw, this is an outstanding post. I only wish half the posts here were as good. Most is full of memes and bigotry(from and to any direction).

[Anonymous No.15194306]

>>15194070
I agree with you, and in fact, many later critiques of the German Idealists stem precisely from the limitation placed on reason by Kant. Kierkegaard, for example, showed that Hegel's dialectic and conception of God were wildly detached from reality (he notably said that Hegel would have been the greatest thinker in history if he had put his philosophical system as speculation and speculation only). This inadequacy, which Kierkegaard criticized, can be seen in the primacy he puts of faith over reason itself. Later continental philosophers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger both continued this critique; the former famously said: "There are no facts, only interpretations.", and the latter criticized all past metaphysicians of dodging the question of being. Again, this reading of the Idealists can be seen, quite comically, in the two ways that many interpret German Idealism: either one proclaims the Idealists as charlatans who essentially built a philosophical system that expounded nothing of value, or one can views all truly critical philosophy that dealt with the nature of consciousness, self-consciousness, etc. beginning with Kant and ending with Hegel.

[Anonymous No.15194474]

>>15194306
I consider myself in the the second group. Kant project was a modest one which is the reason why even the analytics find it tenable(at least partly). On the other hand, Hegel's philosophy is bold and requires a strong stomach.

I cannot refrain fron thinking how things would turn out if the world we lived in was different. What if more people had experiences/glimpses of the noumena? What if people were more intuitive? In our epoch, intuition and personal experience of the reality in its most basic level is almost impossible. Compare one's interaction with the world today and someone who lived three thousands years ago.

The culprit is technology. On that I agree with Heidegger. Technology manages to lulluby everyone. I wonder whether it is even possible to have a genuine experience in this world. One where nature and man are in dialogue, where the chasm between object and subject is bridged.

[Anonymous No.15194659]

>>15194474
Well if you are going to reference Heidegger here, it wouldn't be technology itself that prevents us from seeing the noumenal, but rather our mode of revealing. That is, the fact that everything has become technologized, and we can only view objects in relationship to their usefulness as products or resources that we can exploit (the issue doesn't lie intrinsically with technology). Another possible reason for the superficiality of modern times could be seen from Baudrillard, or perhaps from a more Marxist perspective, Adorno. Another point regarding genuine experience could also be the decline of art in recent times. Many of the German Idealists viewed art very highly, Schopenhauer, for example, believed that music represented the noumenal form of the in-itself. For example, if we consider the composers of the 19th century (Beethoven was born in the same year as Hegel, and Wagner was, for a time, close friends with Nietzsche) with those of the modern era, we can only laugh at how far we have fallen culturally.

[Anonymous No.15195026]

>>15194659
I take your point about our mode of revealing, However, the essence of technology is no other than that of Gestell/enframing. With its totalitarian and all-pervasive ways technology manages to binds us all in a spell. It prevents a different mode of revealing.

Reason rules supreme. Everyone one goes one finds himself, that is, insofar as he is a thinking thing. For example, you can in the middle of a vast Nature Reserve(even the name is wrong) and even there, away from the tentacles of civilization and Reason, you will find its marks. Signs, well walked paths that indicate the presence of other, trash, an airplane flying above your head. And that is the case if you have gone there without any gadget, e.g. your smartphone.

The only truly pristine, free from human activity place that is left outer space. The paradox is that, in order to get there and to sustain life, one needs to rely on technology. The world that is revealing itself to us is radically different from anything we have experienced so far. It is the age of Mephistopheles and it has not even begun properly.

Maybe all that is just wild musings of my imagination. Maybe I am wrong. Maybe humanity will find a different way. Maybe this too is speculative philosophy.

As far as art is concerned, there is not much I can say. I find myself rather in-artistic. All I can think is that it is impossible to have "serious art" (to use Adorno's term) prescribed by Reason and order alone.

[Anonymous No.15195265]

>>15195026
I would agree with your point that technology and its influences are all-pervasive in our modern times. It seems that at every moment of our lives, we are constantly bombarded with information; and sometimes it appears as though when one talks to another, they are talking to a mere mirror that has absorbed and regurgitates information fed to it digitally. A Schiller quote here highlights the issue of our time: "Man defines himself by his deeds- and what kind of image of man do we see in the mirror of our present times?" Also, I found it interesting that you referred to this age as that of "the age of Mephistopheles." When I read Faust, I considered Mephistopheles not as the standard conception of evil, but rather as he puts it himself, "the spirit of Negation" (which is in a Hegelian sense, not outright evil). He openly bargains with God in a jestful manner (as he knows that he cannot beat God). Thus, in my opinion, were one to consider the age of Mephistopheles, it would require a certain degree of cynic irony and awareness of the perversity of the era. Now I wouldn't consider the era Faustian either since that would require people to be consciously aware of their own bargaining of morality, and our era is much too blind to be Faustian. Perhaps what I would call this era would be Oedipal. Specifically in the sense that Oedipus was completely blind (that is of his parenthood and the truth in the beginning), but the progressive movement of totality within the play (this totality I would say, is technology spinning out of control) revealed the tragic truth to him, which ultimately left him blind again(albeit in a different way).

[Anonymous No.15195295]

So do you guys actually think that we cannot, as Fichte says, have an intellectual intuition of our pure power of apperception? I honestly don't think I can. I can tell myself that I can, and I can have consciousness of being conscious, but I don't think 'consciousness of consciousness' implies a qualitative difference with consciousness of anything else. At the end of the day, my speculative standpoint (which is the one who talks) tells me that it is a matter of narratives. I do have room for faith though, and I do believe I am the owner of my actions. But if I cannot sense my power of unity I also cannot sense my freedom, because it is the power of unity itself, as far as I've understood.
On a related side-note; how does the phenomenon of duty come about? Is it a magical phenomenon, like the angel (phenomenon) with the message of the numenon-intelligible. Btw, when idealists say intelligible, do they mean concepts of the intellect (such as virtue, power, cognition, etc). How does it come about that a concept of the intellect determining my action is considered my own self-determining? Isn't there a sort of dreadlock/duality in which I can both see my own self-determination as unconditioned and free and at the same time conditioned by my own intelligible concepts as objects? What I mean to ask is, does duty come "before" the action (I know that I would do this in this specific situation, even if I never told myself what I knew), or it is self-made in the moment itself of the action (I realise this is my duty, for not reason at all according to my actual and past conceptual system)? Every time I think about the value Kant attributes to duty I get inspired and confused. Is there any practical way to show me what a free action feels/looks like? I honestly doubt whether I've acted freely even once (maybe when I discovered my own consciousness, and thus created myself).

[Anonymous No.15195426]

>>15195295
But if we could, or if we can, then technology as mode of producing capital-consciousness can be overcome. At least of what I'm sure is that each moment of being-with-technology can be overcome with a salto mortale, leap of faith. What I'm not sure is that I can always believe that, or that I can sense my own power of de-distancing my own self towards myself, and to bring technology-consciousness to a destruction. I know it can be done, but I cannot do it. We're reaching a point of indistinction though. I have a very intimate relationship with my laptop. And because I fetichize all the objects into which I've put a bit of my spirit I do find myself in the files of my computer. So in the mountains I usually feel more of a technology-self than at home at night when I honestly and consciously interact with the words I write in my laptop.

[Anonymous No.15195461]

>>15195295
>but I don't think 'consciousness of consciousness' implies a qualitative difference with consciousness of anything else...
You're right, there is essentially no qualitative difference in the Fichtean sense. Both self-consciousness (self-positing) and consciousness (counter-positing) necessarily presuppose each other. Fichte would bring this to a more cogito ergo sum style, with the duality of the positing arising from the pure-I. Someone like Hegel, on the other hand, would say that there is no difference between being (counter-positing) and thinking (self-positing) and that rather they are one and the same.
>how does the phenomenon of duty come about?
Firstly when dealing with duty, we must tackle the issue of will first, as duty presupposes the free will to either fulfill the duty or reject it. In order for the pure-I to exist, it must posit it's own determination (for to be everything you become nothing). This arises through the appearance of will (so one could actually say that speculatively, that is from the eyes of God, there is no free-will), and through our own practical acknowledgment of our freedom. No regarding duty as the fulfillment of moral or ethical duty. One would say that our conception of good and evil is an intuition known a priori that accompanies our faculty of judgment. Ethically, on the other hand, would arise from empirical experience, that is through our interaction with a community of individuals.
>What I mean to ask is, does duty come "before" the action (I know that I would do this in this specific situation, even if I never told myself what I knew), or it is self-made in the moment itself of the action (I realise this is my duty, for not reason at all according to my actual and past conceptual system)?
Speculatively it comes before the action, practically it comes during the action itself.
> Is there any practical way to show me what a free action feels/looks like? I honestly doubt whether I've acted freely even once (maybe when I discovered my own consciousness, and thus created myself).
Practically speaking, every action that you have undertaken since your birth is a free one. Your belief that you have never acted freely most likely arises from the lethargy of modernity, where most people are reduced to a state of passivity. Your issues regarding determinism from an unbounded reason are fair, and if you truly wish to experience freedom then it would be the most radical gesture of the leap of faith.

[Anonymous No.15195544]

>>15195461
>>15195461
Well, ma'am or sir I must say you're quite based. For now I'll try to nurture my own sense of freedom and keep on speculating about my conditions for the whole of qualia I am conscious of. Thank you for your answers. I'll probably have more questions regarding the nature of everything but in case the thread dies before my reason awakens: it's been a pleasure, ty.
(Btw if you could expand on that 'for to be everything you become nothing' just a bit, even prosaically, it'd help me make an image I am at the moment holding in an intuitive tension a bit more clear)

[Anonymous No.15195590]

>>15195544
For the self to intuit what is the self, it requires it to understand what is not the self. If there is no counter-positing or limiting (things that are not the self), there can be no way to determine the self itself. Thus, if there is no limitation, that is self exists as everything, then there is essentially speaking no self at all.

[Anonymous No.15195941]

>>15195295
>intellectual intuition of our pure power of apperception
I think that there is too much focus given on the "pure I" in Fichte, although I have no read much of his work. I think that the distinction between subject and object is the main obstacle in developing one's intuition. Heraclitus said "...out of all things one, and out of one all things"(Diels B10).

In order for one to develop one's intuition one must practice. It is a way of being in the world. In our times, this way of being in the world has been almost completely abandoned. We live in a world of outward expansion while intuition means the exact opposite. It means to look inside(in- + tueor). It is opposite to the zeitgeist to be foster one's intuition. It is a process that takes time and it requires a lot of errors. But, by turning your gaze inwards, you gaze not only upon thyself(pure I) but also upon nature(pure otherness).

All these sounds nice but at the end of the day it is just words. Experience must accompany them. For once, I am struggling to do that myself. I know what I have to do but it is hard. There is a saying from the Greek Revolution of 1821 about freedom:" Freedom requires virtue and courage". Only few can stand on top of the mountain.

>how does the phenomenon of duty come about?
For Kant it comes through reason. Only reason can issue commands/laws from which our duties stem. Will is a product of reason because only rational being have a will. Freedom is the defining property of the will which makes will autonomous. The reason why a concept of the intellect(idea) gets to determine your actions is because freedom is an idea presupposed in the activities of rational agents.


Nature, on the other hand, is ruled by the iron fist of necessity, it is heteronomous. A human being is both rational and natural(insofar as he is governed by his inclinations too). Due to the tension between reason and nature in man, the determining of such a will in accordance with reason would be a constraint. Coming up with a categorical imperative is an instance of rational activity. In this deliberating one becomes truly free. The categorical imperative is nothing but a crystallization of reason. Thus, the intellect gets to determine your actions .

[Anonymous No.15196039]

I forgot to add that the categorical imperative is the way of bypassing Nature. It frees one from the heteronomy.

[Anonymous No.15196862]

>>15196039
No it isn't. You can't be free from your nature. It is your nature to act regardless of what you believe about the mere concept of 'freedom'.