/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.14475047]

Has there ever been written a serious and coherent critique of post-structuralist philosophy, eg. Deleuze's differential ontology? Most of modern literature trying to critique it seems to do so either on the grounds of vague language and incoherence, dismiss them as "post-modern neo-marxist" boogeymen, or merely critique parts not even (think Sokal, etc.) relevant to the philosophy itself.

The field of philosophy seems to be mostly dead, with the post-structuralist critiques of language and political institutions' claim to legitimacy being the latest entries. None of the current age "philosophers" (Peterson, Harris and the IDW or left-equivalent types) have (IMO) any comprehensive and satisfying works, only pop-philosophy/psychology bastard children or jumbled garbage like Maps of Meaning. (Although the ideas in MoM themselves are interesting and can be consumed through Peterson's lectures more easily) There's nothing to build on what's been said during the last century.

[Anonymous No.14475077]

Bump

[Anonymous No.14475088]

>>14475047
Post-structuralism is still a relatively new thing when taking in all of philosophy. Critiques will come. That being said Zizek has a critique on Deleuze though it’s known not to be very good.

[Anonymous No.14475200]

I think the most striking critique you could ever attribute to post-structuralist philosophy and notions of difference as a generality is that it could never ultimately be instructive. Since it refers to and builds of the notions of absence over presence, and description over prescription (and to some extent negative vs positive definitions as per Stirner), it's only ever a product, and not a producer.

The notion of difference is an attempt at creating a meta-thought that accounts for the inconsistencies in ontologies (and epistemologies) constructed from the identity of something. A positive identity, being self-referential and self-upholding will always tell you what that thing is. Upending this, and holding that the fundamental is negative - that is, to say the meaning of a thing is contained in its Other (infinitely deferred) - will always result in a confusion. Constraint and positive identities are necessary to inform, and not to only inform thought but also action.

A notion of difference will expand the possibilities for thought and action, but can never inform it. A notion of identity will restrict the possibiliity of though and action, but will by this also inform what's to be done and thought.

I think much of the confusion with post-structuralist thought is that it upends the notions of identity that came before it. It's like the culmination of nihilism, and implies a necessary synthesis between informed action and freedom of thought-space. What the philosophy scene currently lacks is the resolution of the problem of where one should reason by presence, and where one should reason by absence.

[Anonymous No.14475540]

>>14475088
I know Habermas has a pretty solid critique but I haven't looked into it much.

[Anonymous No.14475701]

>>14475047
They all critique each other; it's like Deleuze vs. Badiou vs. Laruelle; Foucault vs. Derrida vs. Agamben; etc.

[Anonymous No.14476255]

>>14475200
>post-structuralist philosophy and notions of difference as a generality is that it could never ultimately be instructive. Since it refers to and builds of the notions of absence over presence, and description over prescription (and to some extent negative vs positive definitions as per Stirner), it's only ever a product, and not a producer.
This sounds exactly like a Deleuzian critique of post-structuralism.

[Anonymous No.14476638]

>>14476255
lol this