Kant's Counterargument to Anselm

[Anonymous No.13581378]

>"Being is evidently not a real predicate."
How did he come to this conclusion? Is it accurate? Yes I have read his reasoning, but while I can understand the argument that existence in itself does not add anything to a concept, but I'm not sure this is really what Anselm is trying to say in his argument. He is not principally referring to existence in itself as a property but to existence in concreto as opposed to existence merely in the understanding, and Kant even admits that what exists in concreto is superior to that which is a pure concept of the understanding, namely, in that "through pure concepts of the understanding, apart from any conditions of sensibility, it is impossible to represent any objects" (B596, A568), if I understand him correctly. For Anselm, for that than which nothing greater can be conceived to be truly so called, it must exist in concreto, not merely as a pure concept of the understanding, and while existence in itself may not be predicated of anything—I am not sure that Anselm's argument depends on the contrary being true—surely existence in concreto or existence in the understanding could be predicated at least of existence, even if existence is merely a relation between subject and object. It would thus be predicated of the relation, that is, either x (as an existent) could relate to y as something which is immediate to y, or x could relate to y as something of which y may only conceive. Not only this, but if x and y are immediately related in that x, since it exists in concreto, is therefore sensible to y, then is not x as a concrete object not now superior to x as a mere object of thought, making it superior not in quantity (as the object is not in Kant's example of money), but in quality, namely, in its utility? A hundred real dollars are surely more useful to me than a hundred imaginary dollars, not superior in themselves but in their relation to me—and existence is a relation. In the same way, a concrete God is superior to an imaginary one.
Or maybe I'm just stupid. This objection seems too simple to me to be plausible. Surely Kant would have considered such an objection, right? Or if it was plausible then surely someone would have already proposed it in the literature by now, right? Is there anyone who has? I feel like I have to be missing something.

[Anonymous No.13581998]

Bump

[Anonymous No.13582223]

Kant is incomplete.
Read Schopenhauer's critic of Kant and the FOURFOLD ROOT.
The The World As Will and Presentation (Daniel Kolak translation).
Then Hegel.
Then Husserl.
Then Bergson.
Then Whitehead.
Then Damascius' Problems and Solutions Concerning First Principles.
The Corpus Aeropagiticum
Then Eriugena

Yes, German Idealism was solved 1000 years ago.

[Anonymous No.13582280]

>>13581378
I think his opposition to being is strange, but I realized it belong to one universal proposition to Kan't critical philosophy. Setting all former so-called metaphysics to phenomena, so claiming it has a limitation. He critiques all of pure reason argument of god with this way, and by that contradicts to almost every theology at that time.
Even if he gave up predicate argument on it, he still would criticize his argument with another presupposition of Anselm's idea. That is my thought.