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13562549 No.13562549 [Reply] [Original]

I was wondering if someone could help me to clarify an Aquinasian point? It has to do with his views on the hierarchy of intellect and will, and how the latter manages to move the former in spite of the intellect being higher and nobler.
Iª q. 82 a. 4 ad 1 in here: http://www.logicmuseum.com/authors/aquinas/summa/Summa-I-80-83.htm#q82a4arg1
My problem is: how does it make sense that the will can be higher and nobler in some ways, depending on the way you look at the definition of the intellect. And how does 'truth' suddenly turn into a species of good, though it was argued before that truth is a nobler and higher object than 'good'.
I just can't help suspecting that I'm being deceived by some philosophico-semantical sleight of hand, and hence my comprehension is somewhat vitiated at the moment...