/lit/ - Literature

[Analytic and Synthetic Judgeme(...) No.13499198]

"Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A; or B lies outside the concept A, though connected with it. In the former case I call the judgement analytic, in the latter synthetic."
Does Kant provide a sufficient distinction between these two judgements, or are critics such as Quine correct in their assessment that his definitions are untenable or vague?

[Anonymous No.13499492]

>>13499198
I am certain 95% of Kant readers do not properly understand hoe notions (Begriffe) work and come to be in the Kantian system of philosophy.
At point of full commitment there is no doubt his definitions are sufficient; only thing left to criticize is the system as a whole, which leaves you to return to a pre-Kantian era, having lsot more than you gained by fighting a minor pedantic aspect you contrived to be mor significant than it actually seems trivial.
>also
>Kant and vague or untenable (lmao)
>never

[Anonymous No.13499600]

>>13499198
I've only started reading this, I'm still on the transcendental aesthetic. I'm hoping that Kant will reinforce the tenuous ground he is laying his critique on, but considering he is already talking about catagories, I'm afraid I will be disappointed.
My big problem is he starts his critique with a Cartesian epistemology, if Descartes can be justly blamed for Kant's nominalism, I do not know much about our history. Wherein the world of appearances are merely representations in the mind with a nominal relationship to the corporeal universe, a haphazard presumption. Kant waves away the more tenable alternative, that the mind is represented in, not to say embodied in as I am inclined to, a real world of appearances. I fear I do not logic well enough to find to something substantial to say about the analytic/synthetic distinction in itself, and do not know what Quine is on, I guess it has something to do with the given, and doesn't accomadate continuity. I do find it too vague to build a critique on. My problem is the analytic synthetic distinction in the case of a priori judgements. The apriori synthetic judgements that Kant claims any scientific metaphysics must be grounded in, only hold water if you take his nominalism for granted, and you don't ask to many questions about how apriori knowledge can be given from apriori judgements. If representations, and the apriori knowledge abstracted from them, aren't assumed to be nominal and they represent a reality, how could a synthetic judgement be made from apriori knowledge without being posterior to it's reality? If you know something apriori about reality, it must have been prescinded from a posterior universal, now how could it be said to be an apriori synthetic judgement if the judgement is made by synthesizing an apriori abstraction with posterior knowledge of reality? From a realist perspective, apriori knowledge must follow from the world of appearances, which are real and can't be abstracted away, only prescinded.

[Anonymous No.13499970]

>>13499198
Seeing as you're getting into the realms of the implications of the principles underlying formal logical systems, one of the most difficult philosophical topics to actually discuss in natural language, i doubt you'll get a great response on /lit/.

I think Kant's distinction is useful for understanding the implications of his work, but i don't know if there'd be a way to formally express the difference between analytic and synthetic. (which afaik is the crux of Quine's criticism.)

It's useful for understanding Kant's work in that he takes the form and content of human thoughts to be essentially analogous to logical propositions. (for more on this see the paper The Generality of Kant's Transcendental Logic) He needs the distinction because when an object is given for rational consideration, we can either examine its consequences and determine the ideas/facts which are contingent on it, (analyse) or we can make it a constituent part of a larger conception. (systematize)
These brief considerations dont answer to all the implications of the question you pose but idk i had a go.

Guenon gets really bitter about Kant (without ever really understanding him) but imo it's possible to reconcile the Critique of Pure Reason with Guenon, Kierkegaard, really any proudly irrational thinker when we consider that its aim is to determine what may be known rationally, and intuition often does not use reason as a basis.
What do other Kant dilletantes on /lit/ think. Is Critique's domain the extent of what may be known by the human mind, or just the preconditions which make empirical knowledge possible?

[Anonymous No.13499978]

>>13499970
>or we can make it a constituent part of a larger conception. (systematize)
*synthesize
whoops
although i suppose systematize and synthesize have kinda simliar meanings

[Anonymous No.13500065]

>>13499492
>hoe notions

[Anonymous No.13500688]

>>13499970
I appreciate the in depth response. Do you think the issue of making a distinction is similar to how our reason cannot go beyond it's own intuition? Or is it really quite a nebulous organ of language that we should be examining?

[Anonymous No.13500840]

>>13499492
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cS0jTbzd8Q8#t=3m39s