/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.13455121]

A developer owned a 240-acre parcel of land zoned for commercial and residential use. He prepared and recorded, after obtaining approval from all appropriate agencies, a subdivision plan that included a commercial center and a number of lots for single- and multi-family residences. The list of covenants, conditions, and restrictions recorded with the plan included provisions that required every building constructed in the subdivision to be of “simulated adobe style” architecture approved in advance by an association. A year later, the developer sold many of the lots in the commercial center, including several to a real estate firm. Each deed prepared by the developer contained a reference to the design restriction in the recorded plan. The developer also sold almost all of the residential lots, the deeds of which contained the same reference to the restriction. The following year, the real estate firm sold one of its lots to a burger franchise. The deed contained no reference to the design restriction. The franchise’s prefabricated restaurant, complete with a giant burger logo mounted on the roof, was constructed over the weekend.

A merchant, an original purchaser of one of the commercial lots, owned the lot next to the burger franchise. She did not learn of construction of the restaurant until she came in to work on Monday, and saw the giant burger logo. The merchant brings an action seeking a mandatory injunction compelling the burger franchise to demolish the restaurant. At trial, the merchant proves that the burger franchise did not seek or obtain approval of the association for its building.

Should the court issue the injunction?


A No, because destruction of the restaurant would be a tremendous waste of resources.

B No, because the burger franchise’s deed contained no restriction on the type of building that could be constructed on the lot.

C Yes, because the restrictive covenant runs with the land.

D Yes, unless the burger franchise can establish to the court’s satisfaction that its restaurant design has at least as much aesthetic merit as any “simulated adobe style” design.

[Anonymous No.13455154]

*rips up prompt*
Burn the burger store down, quarter the developer, and hang the real estate firm.

[Anonymous No.13455225]

B

Now fuck off jew

[Anonymous No.13455290]

>>13455225
Nope.

The court should issue the injunction because the covenant runs with the land. A covenant will be enforceable as an equitable servitude—allowing a covenantee, covenantor, or successor to enforce the covenant in equity by way of injunction—when there is (i) a covenant in a writing satisfying the Statute of Frauds, that (ii) touches and concerns the land (i.e., the effect of the covenant makes the land more useful or valuable to the benefited party) and that (iii) indicates an intention that the servitude exists, and (iv) notice is given to future owners of the burdened land. Here, the covenant was in writing in the subdivision plan and presumably it satisfied the Statute of Frauds. It touches and concerns the land—benefiting all of the lots and burdening all of the lots. The intention to create the servitude is established by the writing and can also be implied from the common scheme for development. There was sufficient record notice of the covenant because the plan was recorded and was noted in all of the original deeds prepared by the developer, including the one in the burger franchise’s chain of title. Thus, the covenant is enforceable and (C) is the best answer. (A) is incorrect because although an injunction is equitable in nature—so equitable principles govern—it is not a defense in equity merely to claim that granting an injunction will result in a waste of assets. (B) is incorrect because the burger franchise had record notice of the restriction. The deed from the developer to the real estate firm, which contained a reference to the restriction in the recorded plan, was in the burger franchise’s direct chain of title and could have been discovered by it. (D) is incorrect because a court will not modify the covenant—it will enforce it or not enforce it, but will not substitute its judgment of what is aesthetically pleasing for the requirements of the covenant.

[Anonymous No.13455297]

>>13455121
I think Sedona is the only place I've heard of doing this. Their McDonalds has turquoise arches instead of dumb fucking yellow because the city mandated it fit the aesthetic.

[Anonymous No.13455311]

c, real estate firm pays for demolition

[Anonymous No.13455317]

>>13455290
That’s what I thought.

Tbh the most just scenario is having the middleman who bought the deed from the developer and sold it to the burger joint pay for the construction costs of the demolished burger joint, as they failed to include the restrictive covenant and therefore misrepresented, however unintentionally, what was being sold.

[Anonymous No.13455347]

E
It should give control of the restaurant and the entire 240-acre parcel to the workers who built new buildings on it

[Anonymous No.13455391]

>simulated
>adobe
>style
D. I'll take a McD house over that trash.

[Anonymous No.13455440]

A landowner devised her home “to my daughter for life, then to the eldest survivor of her two children, my grandson and granddaughter, for life, remainder to the eldest surviving offspring of the two grandchildren who is alive at the death of the last life tenant.” After the landowner’s death, the daughter lived in the family home for 15 years. Upon the daughter’s death, both of her children were alive, so the home passed to the grandson, the eldest. He lived in the house for three years, and then conveyed it to the city historical society, which converted it into its headquarters and museum. Eight years later, the grandson died. At the time of his death, he was survived by his widow, his two sons, the granddaughter, and the granddaughter’s daughter, who was the eldest of the niece and nephews. Four years after the grandson’s death, the granddaughter’s daughter brought an action for ejectment and to quiet title against the city historical society. The jurisdiction has a statutory period of adverse possession of 10 years, or five years if entry was made by the adverse possessor under color of title.

How should the court rule in the granddaughter’s daughter’s action?


A For the society, because it has occupied the home for the statutory period required for adverse possession.

B For the society, because it purchased the home in fee simple absolute from the grandson.

C For the granddaughter’s daughter, because the society has not been in adverse possession for the requisite period.

D For the granddaughter’s daughter, because a purchaser of property from a life tenant cannot acquire a fee simple absolute through adverse possession.

[Anonymous No.13455545]

>>13455440
The granddaughter’s daughter prevails because the statutory period for adverse possession did not begin to run against her until the grandson died. The doctrine of adverse possession provides that possession for a specified statutory period in the requisite manner will establish the possessor’s title to the land. For possession to ripen into title, it must be: (i) actual; (ii) open and notorious (i.e., such as the usual owner would make of the land and sufficient to put the true owner or the community on notice of the fact of possession); (iii) hostile (i.e., without the true owner’s permission); and (iv) continuous. The statute of limitations that determines the time period for adverse possession does not run against the holder of a future interest (e.g., a remainder) until that interest becomes possessory, because the holder of the future interest has no right to possession (and thus no cause of action against a wrongful possessor) until the prior present estate terminates. Here, the society has possessed the home for eight years; however, as against the granddaughter’s daughter, the holder of the remainder, the statute did not begin to run until the death of the grandson. Prior to the termination of the grandson’s life estate, the granddaughter’s daughter had no cause of action against the society because she had no right to possession. Upon the grandson’s death, when the granddaughter’s daughter’s interest became possessory, the statute began to run against her. Thus, as against her, the society has not been in adverse possession for the requisite period. (A) is incorrect because it fails to account for that fact; as against the granddaughter’s daughter, the applicable statute did not begin to run until her interest became possessory (on the termination of the grandson’s estate). (B) is incorrect because the society could not purchase from the grandson a fee simple absolute; the grandson was only a life tenant in the home. Consequently, when the grandson conveyed the home to the society, the society received a life estate pur autre vie (for the life of the grandson) rather than a fee simple absolute—the society could not receive from the grandson what he did not own. (D), on the other hand, is incorrect because the society could eventually obtain title in fee simple absolute by means of adverse possession, even though it could not receive a fee simple absolute by means of the conveyance from the grandson. If, e.g., the society had maintained its possession for the statutory period starting at the grandson’s death, such possession would have ripened into title against the granddaughter’s daughter. Thus, (D) is not an accurate statement.

[Anonymous No.13455549]

>>13455121
C desu

[Anonymous No.13455656]

>>13455347
Unironically based
t. fascist

[Anonymous No.13455731]

I’m studying for the lsat and this triggered me

[Anonymous No.13455988]

>>13455121
E. Yes, because to do otherwise would violate consistency in rule of law and thus provoke instability.

[Anonymous No.13457433]

>>13455121
E.
The cause of action here is from the city and homeowners against the developer and would likely result in some form of monetary compensation at the end of the lawsuit, not an injunction for specific performance.
Lawsuit would've been dismissed by the court earlier on before the trial began due to failure to state a claim.

[Anonymous No.13457469]

>>13455545
nice

[Anonymous No.13457487]

It’s C, I do this for a living