starting with Peirce

[Anonymous No.12106227]

So I'm a sciencefag and Peirce was my first serious adventure in philsophy. How am I supposed to get interested in reading people like kant, Hume, spinoza, Hegel, etc?
I'm already thoroughly convinced that the fragments of Peirce's system are more correct. I can only maintain interest out of a desire to put things in a historical context. I enjoy contemporary philsophy, but I think I may be infected with Peirce's evolutionary triangle fetish. I tried Whitehead, and found his supposedly irreducible catagories to have Peirce's triad at the bottom.
And the linguistic turns in analytic and contential philsophy just seems freaking dumb to someone who has taken the semiotic turn.
What am I to do?
Since I'm already confindent(though not cemented) in my metaphysics, should I focus on science, or continuing developing my own philsophy? If I do the later, do I have to read all those boring philsophers to make my work coherent?

[Anonymous No.12106238]

Do whatever you feel like doing.

[Anonymous No.12106247]

Try Stirner and Hume.

[Anonymous No.12106251]

>>12106238
I felt like making a humble narcissism thread. Now hand over the dopamine, pussy.

[Anonymous No.12106286]

>>12106247
How am I supposed to handle striner when I am a realist that knows about the dispersed mind(the mind is a sign that stands to a sign system as a preception of itself) I don't see how I can deal with striner when all the things I interact with, including myself are grounded outside of me.
Same for Hume, but also is and ought are the same thing.
What am I missing, I need some motivation to actually read these people.

[Anonymous No.12107159]

>>12106286
Signs do not exist by themselves. They always stand in for something else.
"Mind" is a sign, but the mind itself, when used as a sign, is used to designate the thinking being which resides in the body. It is limited by what the body can sense.
A sign is used to communicate the concept. It does not exist on its own, but the concept itself might be able to exist as an image of the mind, even if there were nothing to call it by.

[Anonymous No.12107267]

Sounds like you are almost ready for the Vedicpill

[Anonymous No.12108090]

>>12107159
>Signs do not exist by themselves
I don't fully agreement with this I'll try to get back to this further down this post, but I'm confused here.
>They always stand in for something else.
Everything a sign stands for is contained in the sign itself. A sign does not stand for it's ground, which is 'noumenal' except in respect for the general characters that are interpeted from it(I'm not sure about this) The sign doesn't stand for any thing contained outside of the sign, despite being grounded in 'noumenon'. The only meaning a sign has is the meaning it carries. What you need to know is that the meaning interperted from a sign, once interpeted, becomes the signs ground, and from this ground a new meaning is interperted, which is no longer the same as old meaning-which is now only a presists as a generality(you can't eat the same apple twice, but after you eat that apple you will always have eaten an apple) The meaning of a sign continually develops this way. Signs take on meaning which is not contained in the object of a sign according to chance, and logical inferences. The meaning of a sign is not what it proposes to mean but the inferences made from that proposition. After meaning is made that meaning becomes the next proposition which is again interperted as representing the meaning of that proposition and so on.
I said earlier that a sign can exist by itself. I don't mean that a sign can have meaning all on it's own. I mean that a sign must propose a meaning that does not-yet exist for it to come to mean anything at all. For example, it is true that the earth is round, and this has always been true of the earth. The signs that purpose a round round earth have always existed. They didn't mean anything before they were interperted, but what is true of those signs which purpose something about their 'noumenal' ground is still true even if it does not mean anything to something. A sign (at least certain kinds of signs) is a natural object that exist independently of it's meaning. Think of the words contained in a fortune cookie that hasn't been cracked. This is really cut and dry in mathematics.
> A sign is used to communicate the concept. It does not exist on its own, but the concept itself might be able to exist as an image of the mind, even if there were nothing to call it by.
This is where you are confused. A concept, is the meaning of a sign. Signs are more primitive than concepts. You have it backwards signs are not a function of the psyche, rather the psyche is a function of signs.
Sorry about the poor exposition, I don't have it in me to edit and revise anything I post here.

[Anonymous No.12108377]

As I said earlier, I haven't read Kant but based on Wikipedia I think his 'noumena' the actual existence of something beyond apprehension is the most important thing he did. Though of course he was wrong about it being an unknowable thing-in-itself, which unnecessarily limits the preceptual world to ideas about ideas and that hard line of demarcation makes for a false duality between noumena and phenomena. His analytic/synthetic and apriori/apost seems important, but why should I have to read boring old Kant for that? It's just not exciting. Isn't there anything novel I can read about? So far only only philosphical logic has been stimulating, things like parthood and modality.
Why would I study logic and phenomenology based on language when I already have the clearly superior sign/1-2-3 based versions. Why should I study hegelianism or nominalism other than to better understand why it's wrong?
My only avenues left to explore are the schoolastics, Heidegger, deleuze and platonism. Can someone tell me what's in it for me? Am I simply too intellegent for philsophy? Should I snort molly until I'm dumb enough to find philsophy exciting again?
If anyone has any good time-saving overviews or anthologies about these topics I'd appreciate it.