/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.11984180]

Why should Dasein be transparent to itself? I never understood this in Heidegger. In Being and Time, he criticizes Kant and Hegel for attempting to do ontology with ontical understandings of supposedly primordial aspects of the subject or res cogitans, for example Hegel's dialectic or Kant's transcendental schema of the imagination "hidden in the depths of the soul."

That point is obviously well taken, but why SHOULDN'T Kant be right in a deeper sense, namely that there simply are things hidden in the depths of our soul, things which Dasein could never unearth because they are conditions of thought and not objects of thought?

For instance I don't quite understand Heidegger's dismissal of Kant's deduction of the transcendental aesthetic of the forms of space and time. I understand his dismissal of Kant deriving the specific theoretical forms "space" and "time" from our every-day experience of "enworlded" spatiality/temporality, and then putting the cart before the horse by presuming that the systematically/theoretically exposited forms are the real conditions of the every-day experience. But I feel Kant would simply grant this, and say, "Sure, but something is still conveying sense data from our retinas and 'giving it to us', 'as' that supposedly primordial enworlded spatiality. It may very well be that I erred in describing that initial spatiality in rationalistic, discursive terms, but the point stands: what is really primordial is that there is a form of spatiality whatsoever, and that is given by some fact 'hidden in the depths of the soul' and not by some immanent and/or transparent necessity of Dasein."

How would Heidegger respond to attempts to naturalize and biologize him? To read him through a cognitive scientist's version of Kant, let's say? tldr: Are there "depths of the soul" that are both inaccessible to Dasein's/the transcendental subject's self-knowledge, and determinative of that knowledge nevertheless? (These could be construed materialistically/biologically for example.)

[Anonymous No.11984224]

>>11984180
Heidegger is talking about first person experience, wrapped up in certain jargon. You do not care about space and time in the way that Kant puts it. The emphasis is how we care about things, this is going to be called ontology, which to Heidegger has primacy compared to transcendental metaphysics which is wrapped up in how we know things, rather than, how we care about things.

Of course, Heidegger doesn't think that when he is talking about these universal, essential, characteristics of Dasein of how they care about things, that he isn't doing something similar to Kant when creating systems for the possibility of knowledge

[Anonymous No.11984267]

>>11984224
I don't understand because it seems like you contradict yourself here:
>The emphasis is how we care about things, this is going to be called ontology, which to Heidegger has primacy compared to transcendental metaphysics
>Of course, Heidegger doesn't think that ... he isn't doing something similar to Kant when creating systems for the possibility of knowledge

I agree with the second one, I think. Heidegger is doing a sort of transcendental critique, but in a phenomenological mode. The analytic of Dasein is not just psychological or "practical," even as prior or primordial to metaphysics, it's a (transcendental) account of the possibility and origins of metaphysics as well.

But again, that leaves me wondering how Heidegger would deal with cognitive science. For instance, for Kant the forms of intuition are simply set apart from the understanding and reason. They just are. The different faculties do not "stem" from a common, logically/metaphysically deduced source. They are simply separate faculties or functions. Who is to say this isn't correct, ultimately and supra-discursively? How does Heidegger answer it?

[Anonymous No.11984282]

it doesn't seem to me that he would respond to attempts to naturalize and biologize him in any way different from attempts to naturalize and biologize the rest of the world. it wouldn't surprise him, and i don't think it would make him want to change his mind either. and if someone brought a cognitive scientist's version of Kant to bear on him i get the feeling he would go back inside his little cottage and read Holderlin in a shitty mood until that person left.

idk. it just seems like Heidegger would be able to talk about the unfathomable depths of Kant's soul in his preferrred language as much as Kant would be able to do the same for Heidegger, and Hegel variously for both. who's fundamentally right? they all are.

kind of a meme answer i guess but that's my sense.

[Anonymous No.11984365]

>>11984267
>I don't understand because it seems like you contradict yourself here:
I'm reporting about Heidegger, I don't hold these beliefs. But yes, Heidegger does have a contradictory project going on. He wants to give a universal account of first person experience. That isn't possible if you're making arguments, justification, evidence, etc. The only way you can pull that off is by being poetic

>But again, that leaves me wondering how Heidegger would deal with cognitive science.
He wouldn't care. He says multiple times that there is nothing wrong with what the sciences are after, just that he is after something else. Heidegger is after giving an account of what it is like to experience being human, the sciences and cognitive science are going to gives accounts of what it is to be human