/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.11574455]

Is there any reason NOT to adopt a strictly coherentist epistemology?

[Anonymous No.11574494]

you can't derive an is without an ought

[Anonymous No.11574495]

>>11574455
I'd imagine because intuitively you could have all of your false beliefs cohere, in principle at least, which would suggest something over and above coherence is needed

But I don't know much about epistemology so idk

[Anonymous No.11574520]

>>11574495
>I'd imagine because intuitively you could have all of your false beliefs cohere
What defines them as false then? I assume you mean false as in inconsistent with observations that can be made about observable/intuitive reality, but I'd argue that the existence of those observations jeopardizes that epistemology's status as coherent, without adequate reasoning against the observation in question.

[Anonymous No.11574529]

>>11574455
Just in case this is not just to start a conversation here, and you dont know about SEP yet:

For justification

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/#Con

>Unfortunately, coherence theorists have generally struggled to provide the details necessary for their theory to advance beyond the metaphorical stage, something which has not gone unnoticed by their critics. Following the seminal work of C. I. Lewis, contemporary scholars have taken on that challenge with considerable success in terms of clarity and established results, although a fair number of the latter are to the coherentist’s disadvantage. Some results support a weak foundationalist theory according to which coherence can boost credibility that is already there, without creating it from scratch. However, on the face of it, the impossibility results negatively affect this less radical form of coherence theory as well. It is often observed that while it is relatively easy to put forward a convincing theory in the outline, the ultimate test for any philosophical endeavor is whether the product will survive detailed specification (the devil is in the details, and so on). What the recent developments in this area have shown, if nothing else, is that this is very much true for the coherence theory of epistemic justification.

For truth

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-coherence/#Cri

>According to the specification objection, coherence theorists have no way to identify the specified set of propositions without contradicting their position. This objection originates in Russell (1907). Opponents of the coherence theory can argue as follows. The proposition (1) “Jane Austen was hanged for murder” coheres with some set of propositions. (2) “Jane Austen died in her bed” coheres with another set of propositions. No one supposes that the first of these propositions is true, in spite of the fact that it coheres with a set of propositions. The specification objection charges that coherence theorists have no grounds for saying that (1) is false and (2) true.

There are some points to be made to answer your question, but it is also one of the main theories regardless

>>11574494
Mind expanding that?

[Anonymous No.11574565]

>>11574529
>Mind expanding that?
Not him but I suppose no derivations can be made at all, or anything for that matter, without an idea that it ought to be done for one reason or another

[Anonymous No.11574577]

>>11574529
Tell me what you think of this reasoning >>11574520

[Anonymous No.11574580]

>>11574455
philosophy is gay. stop wasting your time,OP

[Anonymous No.11574613]

>>11574565
If that is what the other anon is saying, that seems irrelevant.

Odysseus washes up on the shores of Ithaca in Homer's The Odyssey. Whether this fiction is based on reality and whether this actually happened or not in history is separate from the question, should I ask if Odysseus, actually, washed up on the shores of Ithaca.

>>11574577
>>11574520
Well yes, this criticism is the one I posted here in the, For truth, section

>>11574529
>According to the specification objection, coherence theorists have no way to identify the specified set of propositions without contradicting their position. This objection originates in Russell (1907). Opponents of the coherence theory can argue as follows. The proposition (1) “Jane Austen was hanged for murder” coheres with some set of propositions. (2) “Jane Austen died in her bed” coheres with another set of propositions. No one supposes that the first of these propositions is true, in spite of the fact that it coheres with a set of propositions. The specification objection charges that coherence theorists have no grounds for saying that (1) is false and (2) true.

Its the problem of trying to step outside a system that you just deemed to be total. If it is all engrossing, you cant step outside of it and talk about it. These are two separate things, what goes on inside the system, and talking about the system.

[Anonymous No.11574668]

>>11574613
>should I ask if Odysseus, actually, washed up on the shores of Ithaca.


of course he did, you do know what that means do you
the illustrations of the psyche where those ideas are able to conduct themselves almost mechanically through our shared consciousness is as tangible as dirt or any physical object

[Anonymous No.11574718]

>>11574668
Im glad that idealism and continental philosophy are dead

[Anonymous No.11574793]

>>11574455
Does it actually mean anything?

[Motoko No.11574810]

>>11574718
According to Putnam Positivism and its offspring are forms of idealism in the sense of Kant.
So we're not dead baby B)

[Anonymous No.11574818]

You have to force some process and you need always to. Declare the field of belonging of your statements. Pretty useless

[Anonymous No.11574829]

>>11574810
>Positivism
You should be

[Anonymous No.11574868]

>>11574494
is and ought are the same thing; Hume was a retard

[Anonymous No.11574931]

>>11574868
Derive an ought from an is for us, then. Should be easy.

[Anonymous No.11575109]

>>11574529
For me I don't feel us coherence theorist really have the burden of proof in this way.
Coherence isn't an ought proposition, it's descriptive of how humans reason.
If there are many corroborating facts and they all check out with one-another the veracity of the matter is strengthened. And in this sense "strong" is the highest adjective you can attach to the veracity of anything. This reflects the reality of human knowledge: We can never truly be 100% sure about anything in the external world. I'm sure most people would intuitively agree with this.

What should be put under examination is the cockamamie notion that truth must spring from some supreme source. this is either metaphysical nonsense or some linguistic confusion, thinking that because we invented the word 'truth' that such a thing really exists in the platonic sense.