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11483767 No.11483767 [Reply] [Original]

Can we attribute extension and motion to the things-in-themselves?

>> No.11483811

Guys

How is extension

How is anything anything

>> No.11483818

bump

>> No.11483900

>>11483818
Would you like to elaborate
Can't you pin literally everything on the things-in-themself, except you can't

>> No.11483932

>>11483900
Mainlander's argument is against the notion of time and space as a priori. He affirms them, however, as forms of perception a posteriori. The a priori forms of perception of Kant (time and space) are replaced with the present and point-space. Hence, what is required to begin the construction of time (as past present and future) is real motion, that is, activity outside the knowing subject. In other words, the sense of time relies upon real activity in the body, and when this ceases, time also vanishes. The distinguishing mark of this argument is that, when the pure apriori perception is not time but the present, motion does not have to rest on time, but can be something real. How else do we collect varying data than by experiencing an independent force. And, without motion and extent we lose the basis for this varying data. The things in themselves, in other words, become nothing but an eternal point, but how can this give us sense impressions?

>> No.11483939

>>11483932
>the sense of time relies upon real activity in the body, and when this ceases, time also vanishes

I feel like there are a lot of good reasons to believe this.

>> No.11483976

>>11483932
Question: I'm not that familiar with mainlander but from what I understand his grand thesis is that the universe's existence occurs via the death of god i.e. the movement from absolute eternal being into nothingness via universal entropic decay (pure unity -> pure multiplicity). What you've said seems to suggest that without our bodily sensations interpreting it, the universe actually exists as a single eternal point. How can this be reconciled with his idea of the death of god? How can the universe be tearing itself and expanding outward into pure multiplicity if there is actually no extension or motion occurring?

>> No.11483983

>>11483767

>you will never translate Mainlander in a freely available .pdf, ensuring that you have actually published same to the internet and making sure that it finds a few interested readers, and actually attaching your real name as translator
>you will never append to this translation, a brief biography and account of Mainlander's philosophy, an accurate repudiation of Nietzsche, and encourage everyone to apply Mainlander's philosophy to their own personal lives
>you will never make a personal turn in same document, specifying that now that your task is complete and you have actually accepted Mainlander's conclusions, you will now apply that philosophy to your personal life
>you will never use the occasion of this translation as your own personal note on where your husk may be found
>your edition will not therefore achieve notoriety in the anglosphere and receive a proper, professional re-printing, with you becoming a small, curious footnote in the history of ideas

Only today, I handled instead a work of Cioran in the store.

>> No.11483994

>>11483976
>our bodily sensations interpreting it, the universe actually exists as a single eternal point
No, you've misinterpreted, this is the opposite of what I'm saying. Mainlander argues that motion and extension are independent of sensation, and the form of our intuition is correlated to them through 1. the present (which is the real reference point for past and future) and 2. point space (by which we "draw" objects in three-dimensional space). Thus, the universe in itself is NOT a single point. Yet this latter idea seems to be implied in Kant and directly voiced by Schopenhauer (although he contradicts himself), that is, they do not attribute extension and motion to the things in themselves, on the basis that these belong to time and space. Mainlander disagrees with this and therefore it is the topic of my OP.

>> No.11484004

>>11483932
I dunno, what's the context that allows for motion, change, of any kind?

Seems like no context can be explained except in terms of another context, ad infinitum, wat the fuck is that

>> No.11484006

>>11483994
Ahhh yep you’re right I did misread you. That makes a lot of sense. Also may I ask how you became so familiar with Mainlander? Are you a German speaker?

>> No.11484018

By purely Kantian criteria space and time are representations. Extension, being the necessary property of spatial objects, therefore must be phenomenological.
Motion is the correlate of time, therefore it's a temporal property. Without motion there is no experience of change over time and vice versa. So it must also be representational and not strictly objective.

So no.

>> No.11484045

>>11484018
I kind of regret the conclusion I came to here because it assumes Kant is the final word on the topic. But the use of the term "thing in itself" tacitly presumes a Kantian viewpoint and the whole implication of the term is that the attributes of the things in themselves are indefinably because there is no way to access them without subjecting it to some mode of perception.

>> No.11484054

>>11484006
I do not know German (yet) so I only know of him through the crude translation on the subreddit: http://reddit.com/r/mainlander..

>>11484004
In any experiment we need instruments in order to get our readings, that is, our data, without which we have nothing. Let us say we are trying to detect very small particles; we need an instrument which is sensitive enough which can then transmit a signal telling us an impact has occurred. Now we know these particles only by their effects, that is, by the change which they incur upon the instrument. What is the nature of this change? Perhaps it is some sort of energy transfer, wherein the effected particles which make up the instrument are excited. Regardless, we never intuit the objects of study directly, always indirectly. That is, we never know causes directly, only that something was affected, and from this we try to build to ourselves the object which was the true cause. And this constructed object includes the properties which seem to be necessary for it to have the effect on the instrument which it had, but again, these are only the form of the object, what is its real substance we do not know. That is why we say we do not know what energy is in itself. From the uncertainty which comes from the limitations in our ability to measure things, we form crude objects which are our best attempts at representing things, for instance, the representations of atoms, wherein we show a probability sphere rather than give an electron a definite time and place, which we cannot measure. So we see how our objects do not exactly correlate to the things themselves.

Now, from all this we are left with the question, what is left without the subject (in this case the instrument)? Or what is left independent of the subject who is affected and the objects which he represents as guesses of what affected him? Mainlander says that we are left with force, or the idea of a sphere of activity? These forces must exist in multiplicity, otherwise all would be one unified substance which does not come into disagreement (impact) with itself. And for this force we need extension and motion, that is, something has to move (there must be real activity) to begin all this which leads to one thing being affected by another. One thing must have a sphere of activity which can be changed, affected by some other thing with a sphere of activity, and from this basic reality the appearance of things (our constructions in the form of space and time) have their foundations.

>>11484018
see above

>> No.11484063

>>11484054
Oh shit I didn’t realise I could read it now. Fuck I gotta get started I’ve been wanting to read him for years.

>> No.11484085

>>11484054

Thanks for your reply. Had never quite thought of "things" that away, existing only as their effects

Guess I'm wondering, where does subjectivity, objectivity itself or whatever precedes both "come from"