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11384718 No.11384718 [Reply] [Original]

Would it be fair to say that the main idea of the Protagoras dialogue is that virtue is essentially wisdom? I would also like to know how Socrates’ thoughts on the pleasant and the painful relate to utilitarianism. Consider this passage

>Well then, I shall say, if you agree so far, be so good as to answer
me a question: Do not the same magnitudes appear larger to your
sight when near, and smaller when at a distance? They will acknowledge
that. And the same holds of thickness and number; also sounds, which
are in themselves equal, are greater when near, and lesser when at a
distance. They will grant that also. Now suppose happiness to
consist in doing or choosing the greater, and in not doing or in
avoiding the less, what would be the saving principle of human life?
Would not the art of measuring be the saving principle; or would the
power of appearance? Is not the latter that deceiving art which
makes us wander up and down and take the things at one time of which
we repent at another, both in our actions and in our choice of
things great and small? But the art of measurement would do away
with the effect of appearances, and, showing the truth, would fain
teach the soul at last to find rest in the truth, and would thus
save our life. Would not mankind generally acknowledge that the art
which accomplishes this result is the art of measurement?

If we could somehow measure all possible pleasure states, to derive what will be most good or most beneficial to us, then shouldn’t we aim for that goal? Isn’t it our own lack of knowledge that prevents us from attaining what is most good? As Socrates says, one does evil unwillingly, because he doesn’t know that any pleasures of his doing evil will be negated and even surpassed by the pain that follows. So it follows that we could eliminate evil and maximize the good if only we had the knowledge to do so. Should we focus on this goal in this era, or is still too far off?

>> No.11385061

>bringing real discussion to a wooden weeaboo mating call mouthpiece carving convention
MODS

>> No.11385893

>>11385061
I figured maybe not that many have read Protagoras.

>> No.11385911

>>11385061
Best decsription of 4chan I've ever seen

>> No.11386111

Bump

>> No.11386169

>>11384718
>isn't it our own lack of knowledge that prevents us from attaining what is most good
This stance is indeed attributed to Socrates, there is even an explicit definition that virtue is knowledge in Xenophon's Memories on Socrates.
>so it follows that we could eliminate evil and maximize the good if only we had the knowledge to do so
Indeed.
>can we somehow relate Socrates' thoughts on the pleasant and painful to utilitarianism
I do not think so, because the notion of good and evil from Plato's perspective does not correspond to the utilitarian understanding of them. When Aristotle discusses the nature of pleasure in the ninth book of the Nicomachean ethics he summarizes Plato's outlook on pleasure (in order to dispute it) - pleasure, according to Plato and his followers is not good. Good is exclusively related to thought, therefore the only truly happy are those living the vita contemplativa. Namely, the philosophers. I think Aristotle captured the essence of Plato's take on both pleasure and happiness, which is clearly in a stark contrast with utilitarianism. Classical utilitarianism (Bentham/Mill) boils down to equating pleasure with good and pain with bad.

>> No.11386247

>>11386169
>Good is exclusively related to thought, therefore the only truly happy are those living the vita contemplativa. Namely, the philosophers. I think Aristotle captured the essence of Plato's take on both pleasure and happiness, which is clearly in a stark contrast with utilitarianism. Classical utilitarianism (Bentham/Mill) boils down to equating pleasure with good and pain with bad
But doesn’t Mill address that base pleasures are inferior to pleasures such as the philospher’s wisdom? Or do you think that this no longer becomes pleasure? So long as it is pleasant, and I do think that wisdom is pleasant, we can say that it is pleasurable, or brings forth pleasure. If not, then how could we appreciate it as being good? The only reason why we shouldn’t indulge ourselves with short, intense pleasures is because we suddenly find ourselves empty and in pain without them, either purely due to their absence or their negative effects (drugs, for example). So the lasting pleasures such as wisdom actually give us a more sustainable pleasure that we never regret. One of the criticisms of utilitarianism is that it wouldn’t certainly be most good to hook ourselves up to pleasure machines that never cease in satisfying us, and this would seem the best method, since it has the intensity of base pleasures and the consistency and purity of the higher pleasures. Something would definitely seem off about this activity, but if it is truly bad, then there must be some eventual deficiency in pleasure in comparison to some other strategy in living the best life, such as one of virtue and wisdom. But how can this be measured exactly? If we could conjure up Heaven as we wanted it to be, then what would we say that makes it Heaven? Could people ever agree on what the best lifestyle would be, or is it more subjective?

>> No.11386791

Bump

>> No.11387002

>>11386247
>but doesn't Mill address that base pleasures are inferior to pleasures such as the philosopher's wisdom
Mill does make a hierarchy of pleasures and if I remember correctly the issue is that the difference between them can only be quantitative, but not qualitative. E.g. that the pleasure of scoring well on a test is the equivalent of eating a hundred chocolate bars. I cannot guarantee that I am correct, but I would like to approach your questions from a different perspective.

>I do think that wisdom is pleasant... if not, then how could we appreciate it as being good?
According to Aristotle (Nicomachean ethics, book 9), wisdom is indeed pleasurable. Moreover, pleasure is supposed to follow the majority of virtuous actions. The obvious exceptions being when, for example, you harm yourself in order to help someone else. And this counterexample is an useful display how the pleasurable does not equate the good.

The notion of good, according to both Plato and Aristotle, is rooted in teleology. Namely, every being has a purpose, and the purpose is to do good; good not necessarily in moral terms, but in terms of doing what it is made for. And in order to answer the question "What is this thing made for?" you need to know the special characteristic that differentiates the species it belongs to from all others. For example. a man is a man because he is a rational being. Therefore for a man to be good (to fulfill his purpose) he needs to adhere to the rules of reason. Finally, by fulfilling his purpose man has achieved the greatest good, which results in happiness. Up to this point both Plato and Aristotle agree. But the difference is that, unlike Plato, Aristotle claims that there is more than one constituent of happiness. Prudence in itself is not sufficient. Many "lesser" pleasures are necessary as well, such as not being poor, hungry and so on and so forth. Plato on the other hand excludes pleasures from the best life, i.e. prudence in itself is sufficient (namely contemplating the ideas).

Summa summarum,
>or do you think that wisdom is no longer pleasure
For Aristotle it definitely is, but pleasure comes only as an ornament, as a reward if you like for doing what you are meant to do - obeying the law of reason. On the other hand, for Plato pleasure is not necessary for a good life. A good life consists of being prudent, i.e. in contemplating the eidetic world.

Please bear in mind that in my entire post I have followed Aristotle's understanding of Plato's stance on good, happiness...

In addition, since you have mentioned some objections against utilitarianism. I believe that they all come down to the fact that in theory utilitarianism will always have to allow heinous acts for the sake of a greater good. For example, killing a child in cold blood in order to rescue ten other people. Or more realistically, utilitarianism would justify the imprisonment of innocents for the sake of preventing societal unrest. You get the idea.

>> No.11387034

>>11387002
I forgot to address a part of your post.
>could people ever agree on what the best lifestyle would be, or is it more subjective
Both Plato and Aristotle believe in the uniformity of reason in all human beings (just like Kant). So, at least in theory, an ideal world would be possible.

>> No.11387297

>>11387002
>The obvious exceptions being when, for example, you harm yourself in order to help someone else. And this counterexample is an useful display how the pleasurable does not equate the good.
Even if an act is not pleasurable, it can still be the most pleasurable, and therefore the most good. Evil confronts us, and will take form in many ways, and we hope to pick the lesser one. Again, the result may not be good at all, but it is the most good, or most pleasurable.

>"What is this thing made for?" you need to know the special characteristic that differentiates the species it belongs to from all others. For example. a man is a man because he is a rational being. Therefore for a man to be good (to fulfill his purpose) he needs to adhere to the rules of reason. Finally, by fulfilling his purpose man has achieved the greatest good, which results in happiness
This sounds reasonable. But shouldn’t we then concern ourselves on how to become most rational? and whether or not we can become perfectly rational? I was wondering what should be our goal of we ever had perfect wisdom, but I’m not sure if this is even possible, and the simple goal of always striving to be more rational seems, to me, as good or greater as any other goal. I still think that we seek the most pleasurable, but that wisdom and virtue are the most pleasurable. But on wisdom, is it possible for technology to be more rational, or have more wisdom, than a human? If so, then aren’t we outdone by our own creations, and therefore useless? In this case, I think I would agree with Aristotle in that other pleasures are important, too.

I’m just throwing ideas around, trying to apply these ideas to humanity’s purpose in the future or whatever. I haven’t read Aristotle and I’m trying to go through all Plato’s dialogues at the moment, so it’s my fault if I don’t understand everything, but I’d still like to discuss the philosopher’s role in the distant future, if he even exists.

>> No.11387717

Bump for a later reply

>> No.11388071

Bump

>> No.11388161

>>11387297
>even if an act is not pleasurable, it can still be the most pleasurable, and therefore the most good
I was simply explaining what Plato/Aristotle have in mind when talking about pleasure, and they do not equate pleasure and good. Furthermore, it seems to me that the claim that pleasure equals good is not tenable. We could easily think of many situations where the good thing to do excludes pleasure, because good is (I believe) the equivalent of moral, and the right thing to do is simply not the most pleasurable choice in most scenarios.

>can we become perfectly rational, can we attain perfect wisdom
I share the common sense sentiment of the Greeks - we cannot, because we are merely human. The rational part of the soul is our link with divinity, it is what we share in common with God (gods obviously if we are talking about Plato and Aristotle), but since we are lesser beings it is in principle impossible for us to obtain absolute knowledge - omniscience is the attribute of God and nobody else.
>the simple goal of always striving to be more rational seems to me as good or greater than any other goal
I wholeheartedly disagree with you. Life is not a mathematical task and there is no miraculous formula for happiness that all humans share in common. Your own, individual experience is constitutive for whatever endeavors you might want to pursuit, and the individual, namely the experience that belongs only to you, cannot and should not be translated into a rule for everyone else. The result of doing so is totalitarianism - the fundamental flaw of it being the notion that all human beings can strive towards the same ends, which is simply untrue.
>humanity's purpose in the future
I honestly have no idea. Of course I have my own political preferences but, as I have already said, the very idea to enforce a single perspective on everyone else is unacceptable. But then again some kind of a consensus is necessary, without it there would be no society. It is a paradox - in the practical, everyday sense it is obvious that there should be certain standards that apply if not to everyone than at least to a group (a single nation for example), but from a philosophical point of view it is wrong to do so. I do not know how to resolve this paradox.

p.s. Sorry for the late responses