/lit/ - Literature

I refuted him with my ass

no but its only because he is a Chad and Chad always gets to be right

>>7103101
>goblin faced man
>chad

Chomsky did quite soundly.

of course not, how could anyone argue with this incredible continuum of facts

>>7103122
what the fuck is this

>>7103111
>goblin faced

He has near Ben Stiller tier ears but he is definitely Chad tier

>>7103127
a slide from a Sam Harris lecture in a debate. not making it up. he argues that morality is objective because the sad woman is sadder than the happy woman

http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/why-dont-i-criticize-israel

how can a neuroscientist be this fucking stupid

>>7103168
He also has a degree in philosophy

>>7103153

>>7103153
>>7103172
oh my fucking god

>>7103181
Why are all these animefags coming to /lit?

>>7103181
nice anime reaction gif breh

>>7103198
They're your fellow philosophy posters, anon

>>7103198
>>7103202

I mostly do it for these sorts of reactions tbh fam

>>7103168
http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/the-moral-landscape-challenge

>>7103227

What a clown

He can't be refuted because he doesn't want to be refuted in the first place and in his mind he won't be refuted regardless of how good the argument against his ideas are.

>>7103198
>>7103202

>>7103111
>tfw you'll never have a goblin face so you can scare away the politically correct people.

You can't refute someone who refuses to acknowledge reality and instead insists the discussion be about their ridiculously convoluted hypothetical situations designed to prove their point

>>7103115
this
or rather chomsky oversaw a sam harris selfdestruct

>>7103539
love me some MS paint memes

>>7103172
a lot of philosophy grads don't seem that well read to me. it's weird

>>7103539
i'll have it no other way tbh

>>7103078
He refutes himself by opening his mouth. I hope my friends gain power. He'll get a one way trip to GULAG.

>>7103539
There is literally nothing wrong with the last response.

>>7103539
>4chan was founded on discussing this
Well, now we are fixing that and making it a better place, things evolve. Anime is degeneracy.

>>7104791
Hi Zizek

>>7103078
Yes, anyone can.

>>7104833
Then do it.

>>7104838
His entire argument comes from failing to understand the is/ought problem.

>>7103539
I support this way of thinking 100%. Anime belongs in the garbage.

>>7104841
"A simple solution is through the addition of a goal to the formulation. The problem can therefore be bypassed with a simple if: "If you want to achieve goal X, you should do Y which has been shown to lead to X." Sam Harris espouses a view similar to this when dealing with the issue of morality, but one that would generally need two additions rather than one: "If morality has to deal with not causing the suffering of conscious creatures, and if you want to live a moral life, you should take actions that don't cause the suffering of conscious creatures." This hinges on accepting this as a definition of morality, where as some would claim that there is no reason to accept that morality should or could be defined in this (utilitarian) manner, however these same people would probably be using a very abstract (or possibly none at all) definition of morality where morality can not be defined as long as the universe lacks overall "objective" purpose"

>>7104848

Arguments like these belong in the garbage. People bitching about people posting cartoon pictures are far more fucking annoying than animefags, especially if they start derailing threads. If you want to complain about this and any other arbitrary bullshit go to some other board.

>>7103078

Because arguing that there is an objective morality without the existence of a deity is ridiculous. Harris argues that this objective 'golden rule' is based on providing the least harm/best living circumstances to the most people. This rehashed and materialistic approach is not only a rehashing of Bentham's philosophy (but secularized), but it's also highly flawed and vague. It lacks any real practical application, and if you actually apply it to real situations, you still end up with no authoritative and objective morality without a deity.

TL;DR Harris fails to provide a basis for his atheism, whilst still holding the believe that there is a objective morality

Just watch him get humiliated in this debate against William Craig.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yqaHXKLRKzg

His justification for objective morality uses human subjectivity as a basis.

Therefore, it's steaming garbage.

>>7105028
They only derail threads if you let them derail threads. Just ignore them when they start crying about it, and if you want to be a passive-aggressive faggot, keep replying on-topic with other anime reaction images to annoy them. Just don't do it with every single post or the mods might misunderstand it as avatarfagging.

Just using anime reaction images isn't breaking any rules, as long as the posts they're attached to are on-topic. And if the idiots waste their time reporting your posts, they'll probably just get warned/banned for frivolous reporting.

>>7105061

Ah, I see.

Anyway, does anyone have a link to where Harris would explain how he came to the conclusion that pleasure itself is intrinsically good?

>>7105078

or 'wellbeing', whatever he calls it.

>>7104823

My gott! You *snif* picked me deshpite thish anonymoush poshting!

>>7105092
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AxGLL0yuBYs

>>7103202
>>7103198
Who's your favorite Touhou /lit/?
This thread was derailed because you let me derail it faggots

>>7103198
Why are all these normalfags coming to 4chan?

>>7105078

The subjective is just as much a part of reality as the objective. What else could intrinsic value look like other than well-being? And well-being doesn't need to be defined because it's a basic phenomenon. Just like you can't define red, you can only label it. Certain experiences feel bad, and other experiences feel good. This is the only thing that the term "intrinsic value" could possibly apply to in the universe.


People confuse ontological objectivity/subjectivity with epistemological objectivity/subjectivity. There can be and are epistemologically objective facts about ontologically subjective reality. That is to say that there are mind-independent truths about subjective experience, i.e. not just opinions. It is not an opinion that certain phenomena can be said to "feel good" and others can be said to "feel bad". This might sound unsophisticated, but again, what else could intrinsic value look like other than such a basic phenomena (basic in that it can only be labelled as such).

A code of morality can be said in some sense to be "objective" if such a code applies equally to all conscious creatures as a means of increasing their well-being.

Even an appeal to a creator for objective morality has to take into account personal well-being. Would anyone care what a creator said if his code of conduct didn't increase well-being now or provide the promise of increased well-being in the future?

>>7105184

>What else could intrinsic value look like other than well-being?

To my understanding of Harris' morality he believes that an act which creates some suffering can be considered intrinsically good if said act created more well-being than the suffering, like when a doctor administers a shot: there is pain, suffering, but the act serves a higher purpose as it makes the sufferer healthier. This makes sense in a way but it doesn't consider who is receiving the benefit, the well-being. What if the doctor giving the shot for example was instead some freak raping a child, and somehow in the long run the act created more well-being than suffering? You could sort of argue that the rape was intrinsically good in that case, but what if all of that well-being went straight to the rapist, or some nazi, or a member of isis? I wouldn't consider that a good thing, in fact I'd consider it an evil thing, but to my understanding of Harris' ideas, he would be perfectly fine with it, and even maybe say that it would be someone's moral obligation to rape the child if they knew that it would have those consequences. Even if perhaps the entirety of the well-being created can be quantified to be the equivalent of preventing someone from stubbing their toe. I don't believe that well-being itself is good is intrinsically good, I believe the person who receives it must deserve it.

>>7105268
>This whole paragraph

Anyone who can't discuss morality without bringing up Nazis, rape, evil, and Isis should really sit this one out.

>>7105268
>muh utilitarian monster
Nice strawman scenario

>>7105287
I really don't give a damn about those boogey monsters and whatever. I mentioned them because they're simply the most common conceptions of evil. However, if you don't think they're 'bad' on at least some level, you should 'sit this one out' as well.

>>7105291
My only point is that I would think it is 'bad' if 'bad' things happen to innocent people to benefit 'bad' people. If Harris accounts for this somewhere, and if his arguments are sound, I'm very willing to change my mind.

>>7105268

Harris has said (if I'm remembering correctly) at least two things with respect to such cases as the one you've presented. The first is that it's somewhat silly to speculate that perhaps a really bad event could happen in such a way as to actually increase overall well-being in the future. The best possible scenario of human and animal wellbeing can't come about by random accidents whereby terrible things actually have overall good consequences. Not that such things couldn't conceivably happen in isolated cases, but the absolute best case scenario overall would necessarily include people being kinder and more compassionate to each other.

The second thing he said is just that the way that the human mind works leads him to believe that states such as love and compassion are just better states to experience in terms of well-being.

As for an act which causes suffering leading to well-being in the long term, such suffering would have instrumental value, not intrinsic value. That is it would be valuable precisely insofar as it led to well-being, but would have no value in and of itself.

I agree with Harris, but I don't think his argument on well-being is airtight. He says basically that "a universe in which everyone experiences the worst possible misery is the worst state there could be, and any change from that state would be good".

I personally think that "morality" can only mean acting to increase intrinsic value. Harris treats events in objective reality (i.e. the well-being of conscious creatures) as objectively valuable, or at least implies this is the case. But from my subjective stand-point I don't experience the well-being of others, I only experience my own well-being, and the same is true for everyone. But I think that the best way to maximize intrinsic value from my stand-point (i.e. my own well-being) is to care more about the well-being of others than I do about my own, which aligns with the basic gist of what Harris is saying.

He basically derives his view of morality from Buddhism, as do I. The First Noble Truth can be seen as an acknowledgment of the primacy of suffering and its intrinsic negative value.

>>7105309

Valuing the well-being of others more than your own and the active cultivation of states of love and compassion are argued to be the best way of increasing your own well-being because suffering is caused not by what you experience, but your desire for and aversion to certain experiences. Desire/craving/attachment/aversion are self-preserving responses we have evolved to keep us alive, but to experience them without satisfying them is the nature of suffering. To care about others without any remnant of self-cherishing is to (more or less) be free of concern for what happens to yourself, which means free of craving and aversion and hence free of suffering.

This is relevant with respect to Harris because like I said before, this is basically where he gets his views on morality from.

>>7105309

>The first is that it's somewhat silly to speculate that perhaps a really bad event could happen in such a way as to actually increase overall well-being in the future.

It is completely irrelevent if such an event is highly unlikely (and I believe them unlikely). If something like this were to happen, Harris would be calling something 'bad', 'good', and believe that science itself says it is so. If his philosophy were described as something of just a guideline, or an approximation of objective morality to be followed for practical solutions to moral dilemmas, a theoretical event like this wouldn't be a problem. But since he is proposing that well-being is intrinsically good, no matter who experiences it or why, extreme examples like this are very important to the discussion and not to be ignored.

>The second thing he said is just that the way that the human mind works leads him to believe that states such as love and compassion are just better states to experience in terms of well-being.

I don't mean to be rude but the idea that pleasurable emotions are beneficial to someone is very obvious.

>As for an act which causes suffering leading to well-being in the long term, such suffering would have instrumental value, not intrinsic value. That is it would be valuable precisely insofar as it led to well-being, but would have no value in and of itself.

Do you mean that in my overly emotional example the child's trauma would have no significance if the net result is 'positive'? I don't quite understand what you're trying to convey.

>I agree with Harris, but I don't think his argument on well-being is airtight. He says basically that "a universe in which everyone experiences the worst possible misery is the worst state there could be, and any change from that state would be good".

I understand that and agree.

>I personally think that "morality" can only mean acting to increase intrinsic value. Harris treats events in objective reality (i.e. the well-being of conscious creatures) as objectively valuable, or at least implies this is the case. But from my subjective stand-point I don't experience the well-being of others, I only experience my own well-being, and the same is true for everyone. But I think that the best way to maximize intrinsic value from my stand-point (i.e. my own well-being) is to care more about the well-being of others than I do about my own, which aligns with the basic gist of what Harris is saying.

Okay, I agree, but this doesn't have much to do with my problem with the value of wellbeing if 'evil' people are experiencing it.

>The First Noble Truth can be seen as an acknowledgment of the primacy of suffering and its intrinsic negative value.

The First Noble Truth is simply that suffering exists, and gives some examples as to what cause it, it doesn't provide any opinion on its moral value.

>>7104853
You mean you can solve the is/ought problem by assuming your "ought" right from the start completely independent of any "is?"

Get this man a McArthur grant!

>>7105347

> It is completely irrelevent...

I more or less agree with what you're saying. Harris's response I think is that in his "moral landscape" a turn of events whereby something 'bad' resulted in greater 'good' would be a necessarily lower "peak" (i.e. have less overall well-being), than a state where everyone has learned how to maximize the well-being of themselves and others and have worked toward that goal. Dealing with overall well-being takes something away from individual instances of something 'bad' being for the greater 'good'.

> I don't mean to be rude...

The significance of Harris's statements on love and compassion is that such states motivate us to act for the benefit of others. If the best way to feel good ourselves entails wanting to make others happy then instances of intentionally causing suffering, no matter what their long-term consequences, would be discouraged according to Harris's system of morality. Wanting to cause harm is just a bad way to increase well-being because of the depths of well-being that come from wanting to do the exact opposite.

> Do you mean that in my...

I completely misspoke there. I think (my opinion, not Harris') that the suffering would have intrinsic negative value to the child. The person causing the suffering might enjoy doing so, but they would enjoy much more the state of being that would motivate them to want to help the child.

We can also think of well-being in terms of when it occurs. Does greater future well-being make up for present moment suffering? If well-being is intrinsically valuable I think an argument could be made that it is only valuable in the present moment. Past suffering doesn't still cause suffering, and future suffering hasn't been experience yet. Just a thought.

> Okay, I agree, but...

If we take our own subjective well-being to be intrinsically valuable (which I think we can't help but do anyway), instead of taking well-being across the universe in general as being intrinsically valuable, I think the problems you've presented in part disappear. Valuing the well-being of everyone, in and of itself, leads to the kind of scenarios of eventual greater good caused by suffering no that you've presented. But if each person acts to increase their own well-being, and such action entails a motivation and selfless concern for the well-being of others, then it doesn't matter if causing suffering now leads to greater well-being later. To cause suffering now will harm my well-being, so I shouldn't do it. It will also condition me to care less about the well-being of others and make me more likely to harm them in the future as well.

> The First Noble Truth is...

You're right about the First Noble Truth as a statement. And maybe I'm reading too much into it, but the answer to the questions "why are these truths 'Noble'?" and "why is the truth of suffering first?" I think can be answered with "because suffering is the only thing with intrinsic negative value".

>>7105042
>[YouTube] The God Debate II: Harris vs. Craig

Jesus. Go read the comments in there...

>>7105370

In reality there are no such things as "oughts", only "is's". Even the actions and decisions of humans are causally determined without any element of free-will. Individual well-being is just another domino in the series of causal factors, and if through information or other means we find that there is a more fulfilling way of being then we either have the motivation and concern for our own well-being to achieve it, or we don't. There is no "ought", just causes such as motivation, well-being and understanding conditioning us to act in particular ways (i.e. leading to effects), or not.

>>7105425
>In reality there are no such things as "oughts", only "is's".

>if I pretend the problem doesn't exist it will go away

>>7105428
You're just a monkey on a floating rock in space. Your feelings don't matter. "muh feels" is not a valid argument.

>>7105428

The problem comes from a linguistic distinction between the concepts of "ought" and "is". In a universe without free-will, there just isn't such a thing as an ought, only causes leading to effects. Thinking that one ought to do something is itself a causal factor which will lead to a certain effect.

>>7105413

>I more or less agree with what you're saying. Harris's response I think...

Harris isn't addressing the issue, as far as I can see. He's just saying that if everyone worked together, there would be more happiness than if the unlikely event happened. That doesn't change the fact that such an event is bad, and his morality is saying that it is good. It doesn't matter how high or low its 'peak' is, or how great it would be if it didn't happen. Is he trying to make the argument that a 'bad' event causing a greater 'good' is somehow impossible? If so, how?

>The significance of Harris's statements on love and compassion is that such states...

The idea that kindness causes happiness and that happiness causes kindness is a principle I (try) to manifest within my life each day (that I remember to), so the idea that his philosophy encourages this is an intuitive thing for me to grasp. But that itself does not prove pleasure is intrinsically good no matter who experiences it or why. To my understanding of this, it's just a way of saying my theoretical rape example is more unlikely than I originally thought, which to me is irrelevant.

>I completely misspoke there. I think...

You ask if greater future well-being would justify present suffering, I don't believe there is a universal yes or no answer to this, because I believe it depends on who gets the well-being and who gets the suffering. 'Good' things should happen to 'good' people, and 'bad' things should not, and 'good' things should not happen to 'bad' people if it at the expense of an innocent person. The problem is that in Harris' 'scientific theory', a thing like that can potentially be considered 'good', and is thus not an end-all absolute answer to the philosophical questions regarding morality, otherwise there would not even be a potential, theoretical situation where such a contradiction could occur.

>If we take our own subjective well-being to be intrinsically valuable...

You're telling me that helping others leads to more personal happiness than hurting others. All I know about psychology agrees with this, but it does not mean that if the net positive result of an unlikely 'bad' event were to solely benefit a 'bad' person, that the pleasure would mean the suffering of the innocent would be 'good'. As I said earlier, I believe one must 'deserve' well-being. I don't believe it is hard to do so, but I do not believe it is a universal quality inherent in all people.

>You're right about the First Noble Truth as a statement. And maybe I'm reading too much into it...

Although I'm very interested in Buddhist philosophy, I'm very skeptical of this conclusion of yours.

Please just tell me if Harris can prove that 'bad' things happening to innocent people for the sole benefit of 'bad' people can be considered a 'good' thing in any way. I don't have much time left to post here.

>>7105097
glorious

>>7105097
>those subtle chuckles here and there

>>7105104
I guess /lit/'s 2hu is Patchou, but the 2hu of my heart is Marisa.

>>7105480

I don't think so. He thinks that torture can theoretically be justified to stop terror events, but no I don't think he would say your example would ever be a good thing.

>>7105527

No, he wouldn't, he's human. But according to his proposed morality, any event which creates a net 'positive' of wellbeing is good by definition, -objectively-, and my hypothetical example does just that while being abhorrent. Naturally I'm not a philosopher or scientist, so I could just be misunderstanding everything, I guess.

>>7105458
>You're just a monkey on a floating rock in space.

>>7103539
Anime hadn't degenerated 100% into moeshit when 4chan was founded.