/lit/ - Literature

:(

>>5754674
What about it?

>>5758093

Just your thoughts! Currently reading it for my Phenomenology class, and so far I am pleased.

I never understand the move from the confirmation of the Ego to the confirmation (or, affirmation) or others, though. I think I'm stuck in the cartesian idea of doubt, working outwards from in, as opposed to inwards from out, but I never understood how one could confirm with such certainty the existence of others.

I agree, it's a nonproblem -- even if we can't confirm others, if this is the reality we exist within, whether or not it's real is irrelevant, as so far as I'm concerned, this is the reality I am faced with -- but I jsut never understood the certainty of it all.

I understand equipmentality, but not really solicitude? I guess I don't quite understand Heidegger's care structure very well, and if anyone could enlighten me that'd be sweet.

Like, I understand that Heidegger and Husserl are in agreement with one another on the idea that the world comprises objects of value, but with regards to our care for another -- be it indifference or whathaveyou -- comprising solicitude went a little over my head.

>>5754674
Its been a while since I've read Being and Time so I wont be able to use the jargon as freely

>>5758832
How can you understand equipmentality but not solicitude?

Think of ready to hand. You cant undo the history you have that allows you to do this. If you didnt have that history, you wouldnt do it, you would be reacting with the object in the same way. Its the same with people.

I mean, think about how you are talking to me right now. I want you to try and talk to me as if you had no history of language or interaction with people. You cant undo it.

>>5759002

Well, my understanding of equipmentality is that through our encountering of equipment, we encounter those, too, that have used the equipment. Please, let me know where I go wrong because I really do value any insight on this!

When I understand readiness-at-hand, I understand the world surrounding us that is not within our circumspective focus. I.e., when I drive a car without thinking about driving the car, the car is ready-at-hand, for me. The moment I realize "hey, I'm driving", then the car becomes present-at-hand, for it's now the object of my circumspective focus. Is this correct? I udnerstand them simply as being objects of focus, I guess. One being simply something taken for granted in the background (the chair you're sitting on, the keyboard you're using to type, etc), while the other (presence-at-hand) being that which you are focused on. These are just modes of being any object can occupy.

Equipmentality, from what I understand, is just out usage of various tools. I feel I don't REALLY understand it THAT well, but I feel as though the primary point that was illustrated to me is that our encountering of said tools, as previously stated, also in a sense allows us to encounter he who was to use said tool. Think of the passage where Heidegger explains the farmer tending to the edges of the field -- in walking along said field, we also encounter the farmer, in the sense that we encounter that which he had maintained. Solicitude was explained to me simply as being a form of care for others: the idea that it is an inherent part of Dasein's being-in-the-world to care for others, even if that caring is indifference. See, I rly don't get solicitude.

>>5758832
Wait, isn't that the priority of ontology over epistemology? Care to elaborate on what is so problematic? On a side note, I wouldn't affiliate Heidegger's analysis with "certainty," it seems to invoke some sort of cognitive function that I'd imagine Heidegger would not want to be affiliated with.

>>5759094
Problematic in what sense?

For me, solipsism's irrefutability is problematic. I can see why it's a non problem (yes, ontology taking priority over epistemology), but I feel like this nonproblem is in a sense attributed to the reality of this epistemic dilemma -- being that we CANT refute it.

And why wouldn't you affiliate certainty with Heidegger? He seems pretty adamant in his writings.

>>5759094

But, in case you meant problematic in the sense of moving inward to outward, I jsut feel as though I never grasped the idea that would allow me to confirm MY reality, and the realities of others, with the same certainty that the cartesian doubt allots. Whether Descartes went kind of ham towards his later years, not being able to adequately unify the soul to the body (which spinoza, I feel, completely saves). the idea that I cannot doubt that, in the moment, I am doubting, is rather sound. I can then infer that I must be doubting within a world, but as to the realities of this world I am thrown into (Heidegger), I feel as though there is no argument that delivers as much certainty as the cartesian cogito.

>>5759096
Ah, I see, I misunderstood what you meant originally. What I intended was that Heidegger doesn't use certainty as a term philosophically, but you were speaking in regard to his writing style.

I think, in part, Heidegger's claim would be that we already begin with Dasein qua Being-in-the-world-with-others-and-things. In this way, there is no fundamental problem of solipsism. Let me quote something from another work that I think we clear about this problem at least insofar as I interpret Heidegger and insofar as he makes claims regarding this issue.


"Kant’s position goes back to Descartes as regards this peculiar conception of the a priori as an entity in the sense of a cogitatio. Kant never got beyond Descartes’s position, nor did he ever question its foundations. One might object that in a noteworthy section of his Critique of Pure Reason,which is titled [293] “Refutation of Idealism” (B 274–275), Kant did try to overcome the Cartesian position. But this objection is mistaken. In that section Kant tries to demonstrate the existence of things in space; i.e., he thinks it necessary that the being of the outer world (as we would put it) has to be proven, and he declares it an outright scandal that philosophy has no such proof. But insofar as Kant thinks the outer world must be proven he presupposes the Cartesian position, namely, that at the start I do not yet securely possess this curious outer world, but rather have to prove it in the strict philosophical sense of that word." Martin Heidegger, Logic the Question of Truth, Thomas Sheehan, pg. 242

In other words, to propose the problem of solipsism qua problematic, means to completely presuppose a particular way in which Dasein is structured. It is to presuppose the priority of consciousness and also privilege insofar as it can "prove" the existence of the "outer" world via its own intellect. I think, in part, in Being and Time, Heidegger is de-emphasizing consciousness as to avoid the traditional issues that come out from the modern tradition, e.g. epistemology. As such, Heidegger is retrieving Greek ontology, especially in regard to Aristotle in Division One. I forgot the name, but there is a claim that Being and Time Division One is basically a re-writing of Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, but i think this whole "pragmatic" life in Division one gets completely re-imagined in light of temporality.

>>5759108

ohhhhhhhhhhhhhHHHhhhh okay. I get it. So, would you say (in laymen's terms), that Heidegger would argue it is a misunderstanding of our being-in-the-world to presuppose that consciousness takes priority over ascertaining certains concerning the world in which we are thrown into? I.e., to presuppose that consciousness takes priority over the world around us is to completely disregard the world in which we are thrown into? Is that the argument? That, as it is a part of Dasein's Being to be-in-something, to posit that the something in which we are thrown into cannot be discerned through consciousness is to neglect an essential part of Dasein's Being, itself? It's a little wordy, so I apologize, but idkkkkk that still seems like it's presupposing that Dasein has this sense of duality -- being itself and being in the world. I mean, I don't doubt that we must be within smething, as this seems rather trivial, but i feel as though that argument is glossing over the nuances of the world we are within. I don't doubt we are necessarily in a world, I simply doubt the objectivity of the conclusions I draw of my surroundings.

>>5759121

ascertaining certainties concerning****

>>5759121
No, no, no. There is no Dasein in-itself, there is no world without Dasein and no Dasein without a world. They are equiprimordial. Dasein IS Being-in-the-world. There is no Dasein qua Dasein, or Dasein as such.

Sorry for my brief replies, kinda busy atm.

>>5759134

Don't be sorry man. Any reply at all is helpful! And okay, I understand. I think. I don't really understand that move, but I've only read Being and Time once, as of now. I have to write a paper of a topic of my choice (lol, the phenomenology of love), and I have to relate it to either Husserl of Heidegger. I think I'm going to use husserlian methodology to discern the essence of love (taking it as it is given to me, without presuppositions), but when it comes to heidegger... ehh. I think there's a thrown-into-ness of love, but as for other ideas I'm kind of lost. Perhaps leaping-ahead-of and leaping-in-for? Dominating v.s. aiding? I'll figure it out. Primarily I just want to understand heidegger

>>5759134
To elaborate further, we are always being-in-the-world-with-others. A sort of fun and humorous example from cinema, is the conception of Wilson in Cast Away. We always are with Others in the sense that when we speak, when we think in words, we presuppose a linguistic community. The way we comport ourselves, the we that we manifest in our existence, always presupposes a cultural world, a linguistic world. Even Descartes, in his attempt to posit the Cogito, presupposed Others and a linguistic community.

>>5759147
Righ right. I think the problem with Heidegger is that I literally have no idea why he dedicated Being and Time to Husserl. I just don't think Heidegger's 'phenomenology' is even in the same ball-park with Husserl. I think the true inheritor of Husserl was Merleau-Ponty. Heidegger just refuses to speak in regard to consciousness, and Husserl through and through privileges consciousness.

>>5759148

is not Dasein's equiprimordiality a huge presupposition, though?

and I understand that, as we comport ourselves in our everydayness, we are with-others. That I get. But I don't really understand how he generalizes this to assume that ALL man was ALWAYS in this state. I apologize if my poor interpretations make it for a rather one-sided discussion, I just really want to understand where it is I lose track.

>>5759159

Well, whenever you read 'descartes' in b&t, if you read it as "husserl" you'll quickly understand why the dedication was made. Plus, husserl was heidegger's mentor.

I've yet to read MP but I'm sure I will somewhere between now and my PhD. only in the 2nd year of my bachelor's, currently, double majoring in math and philo. I really like husserlian methodology, but I need a second read-through of the cartesian meditiations and Ideas to really further my understanding

>>5759163
Right right. I am not necessarily in agreement with Heidegger either per se. Nevertheless, I don't think Heidegger really fleshes out this issue further than he thinks it to be the 'case.' Dasein is being-in-the-world-with-others-and-things, and that is structurally constitutive of Dasein. If you want a more inclusive approach that isn't so 'one-sided' I would take a stab at Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception, I think he attempts to flesh out this issue of the for-itself and the in-itself much more than Heidegger is willing to oblige. However, I think Heidegger wants to get at this fundamental relationship between Dasein and the world that is pretty neglected in modern philosophy, especially in regard to Kant and Descartes.

>>5759167
Haha. Yes I already knew that. But I think in terms of Heidegger's Influence is it much more the following:

Aristotle -> Kant -> Kierkegaard -> German Idealism -> Husserl

Husserl is just sort of the contextual setting, but, at least in my opinion, does not play any significant role in BT.

>>5759176

oh don't get me wrong, I think heidegger is fucking brilliant. I just don't see how he can be so certain of dasein's constitution. It's ironic -- being and time is meant to address the issue of the 'sum' being taken for granted, but all his 'rectifications' of this issue are founded on presuppositions... is that not, in a sense, a taking for granted???

>>5759183
I think, in part, one could take a more epistemological deconstruction of Heidegger. Nevertheless, I think in the process of doing that, you are just completely missing the stakes in Heidegger. The insight is lost and with it, the whole text. If you are willing to oblige, I think this is in line with what Wittgenstein meant by the claim, "Don't think, look!" in philosophical investigations. That is, don't be so entrapped by metaphysics and traditional epistemological problems. Look at how the phenomena manifests itself, look at how language is used in its every-day occurrence. Look at how the human being exudes and comports itself in its existence. I think if one is more indebted to that sort of 'philosophy,' the premises naturally flow much more easily. That has been at least my experience of the text. I am not saying don't critique what Heidegger says, but I think we can be a little more charitable and look at the stakes.

>>5759189

oh for sure, again, don't get me wrong. The conclusions he draws based off of said presuppositions are (hence, my claim), brilliant. His methodology is quite sound, after the fact. It's just that I really can't escape the certainty of the cartesian move :(

>>5759194
If you want, I would look at Merleau-Ponty's section of the Cogito in Phenomenology of Perception. He gets at what he calls a lived-solipsism that might flesh this out in much less jargon-heavy treatment.

http://libgen.org/book/index.php?md5=98c3e0d27cdc190fd3858310ccbbe7fd

Here is the text, the chapter starts on page 387. If you endured Heidegger and Husserl, Merleau-Ponty should come extremely easy.

>>5759098
think about like this, your cartesian doubts and thoughts, are actually experienced as being located somewhere, in the world. That is, you do not feel your thoughts are located in your feet or beyond that wall over there, rather they are felt as if they are located about 4 inches back from between my eyes, in my head, which is on a body in a world.

So when you employ cartesian doubt, you aren't in an abstract, matrix style white room, rather that doubt is specially located in a body in a world. That is the body-in-a-world-thoughts-in-head experience pre-exists the Cartesian doubt, or lays underneath it.

>>5759208

yes. I get that. that's what I said essentially in the post you replied to. I can, with great certainty, confirm my existence through the Cartesian method. from this, then, I can infer that there must be some world in which I exist. from this, then, I too can infer that it is within beings constitution to exist within something, or to exist somewhere. but after that, the certainty, I feel, is lost. to confirm others or draw 'objective' conclusions regarding my surroundings, other than their existence of some sort, seems impossible.

>>5759204

thank you! over xmas break I certainly will! :)