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/lit/ - Literature


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3530143 No.3530143 [Reply] [Original]

Why is solipsism taboo?

>> No.3530149

It's a truth claim about a commensensically unlikely statement.

>> No.3530150

Who's asking?

>> No.3530153

>>3530149
lol

>> No.3530155

Because it's atheistic? Pretty sure it's not taboo otherwise

>> No.3530161

>>3530150

I just pictured Norm Macdonald making this reply. Flawless.

>> No.3530166 [DELETED] 

Because everyone you tell knows you're wrong, yet they have no real way of proving it to you

>> No.3530169

>>3530166
if someone stab you is it a good proof that he exist ?

>> No.3530170

because solipsism stopped being edgy centuries ago, therefore it is hated and ridiculed these days.

just hop on the bandwagon, bro - we'll teach you how to be as edgy!

>> No.3530175

>>3530169

How do you know you're not being stabbed by a figment of your imagination?

>> No.3530181

>>3530170
But being edgy is what is hated and ridiculed today. Being post-edgy is the contemporary way of being edgy.

>> No.3530186

>>3530181

Disregarding the referent isn't the same thing as claiming to be post-referent.

>> No.3530187

If you sincerely sarcastically call things edgy then you are retarded

>> No.3530189

>>3530175
As far i a think about it i cannot see a way that my imagination alone is enough to kill me.. but hey i'm a skeptic anyways

>> No.3530195

Seriously, only the most retarded people on 4chan actually use the word 'edgy'

>> No.3530196

>>3530181
haha true dat muchacho
what's the current trend in philosophy i forgot

>> No.3530202

>>3530196
There is a wide variety of trends in philosophy

>> No.3530211

Because people know it is logically valid and are afraid.

>> No.3530214

>>3530211

How can other people be afraid?

>> No.3530218

>>3530214
That Anon never said he was a solipsist, dipshit, just that solipsism is logically valid

>> No.3530225

>>3530218

I was making a little joke about the soundness of the philosophy, not its validity, dipshit.

>> No.3530256

>>3530211
you havent read the critiques on wikipedia?

>> No.3530261

Because it isn't useful?

>> No.3530262

>>3530261
>philosophy
>useful
1

>> No.3530315

>>3530262
>culture
>useful
It's useful to create a society of educated people instead of the manipulated sheeple of today. Fuck your neolibaral standards.

>> No.3530323

Do you know what I hate? When someone mentions solipsism and the other person goes 'But if you really think that, why are you even talking to me? I don't really exist, according to solipsism! So what's the point?'

That is so fucking retarded. The 'world', including the people in it, is a system which produces stimuli in a way that is patterned so as to react in a certain way to my actions. I talk to you because I want to have a conversation, the same that I bite an apple because I like the way it tastes. Whether or not there is something like 'how it feels to be you' (or something that could be called 'your experiential perspective') has no practical importance, just like it does not whether there is something like 'how it feels to be the apple'.

>> No.3530327

>>3530315
elelel

within the circle of your "enlightened philosophers" you'd still disagree in respect to questions of ontology with each other

>> No.3530332

>>3530327
Um, excuse me, but do you not understand the concept of "dialectic"? If you don't, then shut UP

>> No.3530348

>>3530166
>Because everyone you tell knows you're wrong, yet they have no real way of proving it to you

This sounded good first, but actually it's not. If you tell someone about solipsism, they know that it is impossible that 'you are right', but not because you are not 'correct', but because it is incorrect to say 'you are' if solipsism holds.

For anyone talking to you about solipsism, talking about solipsism is an activity that in no way proves an interior 'first person perspective' or 'mind' (cf. Chinese Room; other minds problem).

>> No.3530351

>>3530196
speculative realism

>> No.3530356

>>3530332
>can't into subtext
stay narrow-minded, pal

>> No.3530367

>>3530327
You obviously only know about continental philosophy before the XX century. Nowadays ontology is pretty much linked to physics. Don't talk about what you don't know shit about, it makes you look like a retard.

>> No.3530383
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3530383

>>3530367
>Nowadays ontology is pretty much linked to physics.

oh dear.

>> No.3530415

>>3530383
http://tedsider.org/papers/nihilism.pdf
http://www.amazon.com/Writing-Book-World-Theodore-Sider/dp/0199697906
You're welcome.

>> No.3530418

>>3530367
>ontology is pretty much linked to physics

That does make me pretty sad. There is a very slim chance that ontology means something else than what I think it means, but my impression so far is that at least one of these holds true for any definition of ontology:

a) Ontology is necessarily religious
b) Ontology is impossible
c) There is no meaningful way to distinguish ontology from epistemology (because in our relationship to a putative 'world-in-itself', there are three variables: Subject, Object, and the relation between them (perception and action). Even if we assume that we don't have to worry about ourselves, there is still no way methodologically to chose to either look at the relation [epistemology] or the object [ontology] because either or these would necessitate that we have the other aspect 'in the bag' already. Otherwise you cannot solve the equasion, or to not put it in pseudo-mathematical terms, you have no access to either the process of perception or the object perceived that is uncontaminated by its counterpart).

>> No.3530428

>>3530415
>http://www.amazon.com/Writing-Book-World-Theodore-Sider/dp/0199697906

>refusing to accept that the map is not the territory

Of course it is 'theoretically possible' that it is possible for a representation to actually coincide with the 'structure of reality'... but both the assumption that it is indeed possible, and the claim that any one specific representation is THE correct one would be entirely faith-based for reasons I delineated already here: >>3530418

>> No.3530443

>>3530415
>Appealing to some unknown hack Theodore
Ha ha ha
You've done it again, analfucks!

>> No.3530447

>>3530443
i agree, people named theodore are terrible at philosophy

>> No.3530459

>>3530447
No, appealing to x is what makes it terrible.

>> No.3530490

>>3530415
>http://tedsider.org/papers/nihilism.pdf

First I was a bit disappointed that both your arguments about 'ontology today' refer to the same guy, but the article is funny. Not only do I find the question of composite objects to be a moot point (and not properly ontological either), but I like how Sider accepts that subatomic particles exist. What if they are made out of other shit? The question of composite objects is not one of ontology but one of levels of description, and these should be chosen for practical reasons, not as an exercise of professionalized navel-gazing.

>> No.3530495

>>3530418
>>3530367
>>3530415
As you probably already know, Ontology is the questioning about being. But it's not the declaration of being. It's a mistake to think that questions about the nature of reality are ontological questions in Physics. They're not. They're really epistemic questions. Those are questions about knowing the nature of reality, not declaring it's necessity of being. Even in the cases of producing theoretical concepts as 'being' a part of some model of nature it's still all epistemical when you look at what the science is doing.

Confusing those two things, Ontology and Epistemology, makes anything 'psuedo' learn to spot the difference.

>> No.3530507

>>3530418
c) is the closest one to what I was referring to (that epistemology/ontology part). Your way of putting it sounds too phenomenological. When you look at something you don't see "vision", you see A thing. If your senses fail, then they may lead you to think you're seeing something, but in fact, you aren't. To look at the relation is to look at my finger when I point at something, and that's something only autistic people do because they lack the intuitive tendency to look at what's being point at. We got adapted through making correct representations of the world. There is a reality, and it must have some kind of structure. It's very difficult to deny this, because it's not possible for us to be discussing this without there being some kind of structure which allows us to do so.

>>3530428
>faith
Not every belief is faith. My beliefs are based on evidence, faith isn't.
>>3530443
>Unknown hack
>Theodore Sider was the recipient of the 2003 APA Book Prize for his book, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.[3] A second book, Writing the Book of the World, has been published on January 13, 2012 by Oxford University Press. Sider is one of the leading figures in contemporary metaphysics.

Your ignorance is showing.

>>3530459
Do you want me to explain you what the concept of structure refers to when talking about ontology and what's the mereological nihilism? I can if you are to dumb to understand whats written there.

>appealing to x
this is something people do when they don't want to sound like they're pulling things out of their ass. If you read any scientific article you'll see lots of citations.

>> No.3530518

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hEN7TkBbtGo&hd=1

>> No.3530519

>>3530495
I don't understand how your post is supposed to answer the three posts you cited, since I wrote one of them and I disagree with Mr.Crust to some extent. What you say about ontology and epistemology makes it sound even more retarded than what I've heard so far. So according to you, any search for knowledge about reality is epistemology (what is reality like?) and ontology would be a search for why things are the way they are (why is reality like this)? That's not really what I've heard, ontology is supposedly an inquiry into the nature of reality, whereas epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge. However, any 'result' or ontology would have to take the form of knowledge, just as the nature of our knowledge cannot really be treated independently of the the content or reference of this knowledge.

>> No.3530523

>>3530490
>but I like how Sider accepts that subatomic particles exist
Read it again. "Simples" (some sort of basic particle, whatever it is) exists (so far, subatomic particles).

>What if they are made out of other shit?
>Hurrr I'm missing the point!

>The question of composite objects is not one of ontology
lol it is. Arguing the existence of composite obects is arguing the very conception of "object" we have. And we've always assumed objects exist, which is what "being" means (onto-->being).

>practical reasons
Do you know the difference between natural language and metaphysical/fundamental language? Or do you want me to pass you another link where it's explained in detail?
>>3530495
>Confusing those two things, Ontology and Epistemology
What if I told you those tow things are already extremely linked?
The point is adapting our views on metaphysics to what we learn from physics, cognitive sciences and epistemology.

>> No.3530526

>>3530518

see:

>>3530323

>> No.3530536

>>3530507
>When you look at something you don't see "vision", you see A thing. If your senses fail, then they may lead you to think you're seeing something, but in fact, you aren't.

It is very naive to assume that there is a clear cut distinction of two types of events of perception, and that there is no overlap between these two. You are basically black-boxing the entire process of perception (what I would take to be a part of epistemology, although 'actual' epistemology probably has a ridiculous focus on linguistic representation)...

>We got adapted through making correct representations of the world.

That's really not a good way of phrasing it in a philosophical debate, our representations have 'adapted' along with us in a way that works more or less. This attribute has almost nothing to do with what 'correct' implies in Sider's claims.

>There is a reality, and it must have some kind of structure. It's very difficult to deny this, because it's not possible for us to be discussing this without there being some kind of structure which allows us to do so.

The fact that we can have a discussion about our modes of representation hardly proves that these representations are 'accurate'.

>>3530507
>Not every belief is faith. My beliefs are based on evidence, faith isn't.

You have faith in induction.

>> No.3530543

>>3530519
>I don't understand how your post is supposed to answer the three posts you cited

That post is telling you, that you don't know how to distinguish between an ontological inquiry and a epistemical inquiry. It's not answering a question, it's telling you of an observation, (as noted by the a last part). Does big bad ol' science make you feel uncomfortable is that the real problem here? Is that why you are confusing things.

And again you have demonstrated your confusion with the two. Thank you.

>> No.3530546

>>3530523
>lol it is. Arguing the existence of composite obects is arguing the very conception of "object" we have. And we've always assumed objects exist, which is what "being" means (onto-->being).

The problem I have with this is that what we 'have always' been talking about when we say 'exist' is precisely in the domain of 'natural language' and the distinction between the two positions on composite objects has absolutely zero bearing for that. It's a technicality. Whether or not T 'exists' in addition to a, b, and c does not matter. When you say

>we've always assumed objects exist

let's call these objects ~O. They have certain shapes and attributes. For ~O, it does not matter whether we believe its real nature to be T(a,b,c) or just a,b,c. This is the case because the argument does not 'scale up' to the actual level of the object. Neither its shape nor its attributes are in any way affected by whether or not it 'technically exists' as one or only as a pattern or assemblage.

>> No.3530550

>>3530523
linked doesn't mean they're interchangeable, it doesn't mean you can swap like synonyms.

>> No.3530551

>>3530543

I'm glad you are enjoying this, but here is the problem: I don't understand what you are trying to tell me. Now you will probably feel superior because of this, but you shouldn't. Even if you were right (I think you are wrong), the fact the you cannot communicate your message to me is at least partly your fault (I think to a large degree).

>> No.3530569

>>3530211
>logically valid

But illogical when it comes to cooperation - the very same cooperation which one might argue is a bedrock and foundation of community and civilisation.

Man is not a solitary island and, unless a hermit, how can one hope to live within society, let alone exist, if he cannot cast off his solipsistic mindset?

>> No.3530571

>>3530536
>It is very naive to assume..
Induction, man, induction.

>That's really not a good way of phrasing it in a philosophical debate
>Reliabilism

>This attribute has almost nothing to do with what 'correct' implies in Sider's claims.
Sider talks about the fundamental structure of reality. He doesn't talk about this concrete subject because by today it's been widely accepted with little exception.

>The fact that we can have a discussion about our modes of representation hardly proves that these representations are 'accurate'.
We were talking about structure, not about accuracy. Representations are more or less accurate, but the structure is out there, and our cognitive systems do their best to represent it.

>You have faith in induction.
I believe in induction: it tends to work. Faith has nothing to do with experience, on the contrary: faith is supposed to go AGAINST experience (which is obviously what I don't do). But good job trying to discredit me through this, anyway.
You believe in induction too. If you don't, try jumping from the window (you won't).

>> No.3530573

Solipsism is dangerously egocentric to the point of distrust and introversion though.

>> No.3530574

>>3530550
i don't swap it like synonyms. I try to specify clearly when my perspective is epistemological from when it's ontological. When talking about truth it's difficult not to talk about both at the same time.

>> No.3530577

>>3530569
>>3530573
Man it is so annoying that most of the protests towards solipsism are "B-but the implications are so scary!" You're not really doing anything but betraying your fear of the possibility.

>> No.3530580

>>3530569
It's logically valid only from a very narrow perspective which sticks strictly to the structure of our language.

>> No.3530582

>>3530569
>But illogical when it comes to cooperation - the very same cooperation which one might argue is a bedrock and foundation of community and civilisation.
>Man is not a solitary island and, unless a hermit, how can one hope to live within society, let alone exist, if he cannot cast off his solipsistic mindset?

see:

>>3530323

If you want to live in a society because you enjoy that, the possibility that no one else has an experiential interiority really detracts nothing from that behaviour or its rationalizations. Psychological egoism can easily account for the vast majority of social behaviour, you are just being quaint.

>> No.3530586
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3530586

>>3530149
>>3530149

> It's a truth claim about a commensensically unlikely statement.

>> No.3530590

>>3530571
>If you don't, try jumping from the window (you won't).

ground floor, joke's on you. You are right about faith though, but wrong about the rest. Just saying. Specifically saying that the idea that you see 'a thing' and not 'vision' is based on induction is wrong in a sloppy, dumb way. What you are doing is a conflation for practical reasons, the problem is that you don't acknowledge it as such (the inverted counterpart of my argument against the Sider paper above).

>> No.3530591

>>3530577
Scary? Why? If it was true, it would change nothing, why should it?
The only way I can take solipsism seriously is from a schopenhauerian/buddhist way of viewing individuality as an illusion. But it profoundly counterintuitive (and goes against all evidence) to think nobody has a consciousness or individuality like I do. It's like Kant when he says God created the physical world in a way that makes us think every evidence goes against his own existence to probe our faith.

>> No.3530595

It doesn't add anything.
You can't really call it knowledge.

>muh world is just me
>implying that tells you anything more about the world around you than you already knew

>> No.3530598

>>3530591
>But it profoundly counterintuitive (and goes against all evidence) to think nobody has a consciousness or individuality like I do. It's like Kant when he says God created the physical world in a way that makes us think every evidence goes against his own existence to probe our faith.

NO ITS NOT. It is exactly unlike that. I am agnostic-pragmatic about the possibility of solipsism, that is I think that it is not possible to solve the other minds problem and it is also (and partly thus) completely unimportant what the 'truth' behind this is. You have NO ACCESS WHATSOEVER to anyone else's mind, only to your own. There is absolutely ZERO, ZILCH evidence for the existence of other minds. There is exactly one perspective, mine (i.e. yours), and the idea that everyone else has one because they also have hands and feet, just like me, is analogical and not evidence based.

>> No.3530599

>>3530590
There are 2 things I was stating:

1) You see "something" out there. It's not your senses fucking around all the time just for giggles.

2) What you see may or may not be right. But, through inductive inference, you reach the unconscious conclusion that it must be always right (and it's almost always right).

>> No.3530603

>>3530598
I have evidence: people talk to me and have different ideas than mine. There are different hypotheses I could consider to explain such a thing, but the less paranoiac-retarded one is that there are other minds like mine, able to do such things like mine.

>> No.3530610

>>3530599
>may or may not be right
In the sense of accurate, not in the sense "there is actually nothing"

>> No.3530612

>>3530598
> You have NO ACCESS WHATSOEVER to anyone else's mind, only to your own.

I have access to my mind?
What the hell does that mean?
What is the "I" that is doing the accessing?

>> No.3530613
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3530613

Still arguing about solipsism; tsk, tsk.

>> No.3530615

The only thing you need to read if you want to understand solipsism, and why it's retarded, is Bertrand Russell's brief thoughts on the subject

>> No.3530621

>>3530612
>What is the "I" that is doing the accessing?
It's interesting, because "I" could be erased from our language and nothing would change. It's something that has no use, and when taken out of context (e.g. you don't know who wrote a letter) it adds no information.

>> No.3530625

>>3530603
>I have evidence: people talk to me and have different ideas than mine. There are different hypotheses I could consider to explain such a thing, but the less paranoiac-retarded one is that there are other minds like mine, able to do such things like mine.

I think you should read up on the Chinese Room experiment, that would really help you. The impression that people are talking to you is 'evidence' of other minds in the same way that the forces of nature are 'evidence' of the existence of gods (because I experience myself as an agent, surely every 'act' must have an agent, like lightning striking, snow falling, etc.). You are not talking about 'evidence', you are talking about phenomena that seem to indicate a certain possibility, but do so mostly if viewed in the context of a world-view that already endorses belief in that possibility...

>> No.3530634

>>3530625
Cogito ergo sum.
Everything else could be illusion.
Does anyone actually go through life acting as if they're the only real thing on the planet? (real question)
It would make sense for this to be a possibility, but I couldn't imagine trying to live that way.

>> No.3530637

>>3530603
>I have evidence: people talk to me
>implying those are not a bunch of perceptions thrown at you
>implying they are not illusionary
>implying your evidence is not masturbatory horseshit

nice defense mechanism though

>> No.3530642
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3530642

>>3530615
>Bertrand Russell

>> No.3530640

>>3530612
>I have access to my mind?
>What the hell does that mean?
>What is the "I" that is doing the accessing?

There is a point to be made that my entire experience of the universe is one coherent experience. However, the point still stands that if I cut my finger, I am able to feel the pain and see it in my reaction in the mirror, but if I cut your finger, the feeling of being cut is not and can never be part of this one experience that is my entire acces to everything (including myself). The entirety of existence (as far as 'I' can tell) is one reality-tunnel, that seems to be anchored to one particular human, me. Other humans exist and are observable in this tunnel, but the idea that there is one reality-tunnel anchored to each of them is fundamentally outside the boundaries of verification or experience.

>> No.3530643

>>3530637
How does somebody go through life living on this assumption, though? I mean, is it possible?

>> No.3530646

>>3530634
>Does anyone actually go through life acting as if they're the only real thing on the planet? (real question)
>It would make sense for this to be a possibility, but I couldn't imagine trying to live that way.

see:

>>3530323

>> No.3530652

>>3530643
we put up with it and there's nothing we can do about it

it's... like... surreal, homie

>> No.3530667

>>3530652
>it's... like... surreal, homie
xD awesome way of putting it

>>3530646
I guess that makes sense... but I feel like in a way if I truly believed completely in solipsism, I would eventually start putting on as nice of a facade on the outside while going as far toward self-satisfaction, fuck it all on the inside. If I did that right now, though, I would feel really bad.

>> No.3530673

>>3530667
On the bright side, a solipsist would have no reason to anticipate death, because it's not like a consciousness has ever ended before, for all he knows.

>> No.3530677

>>3530667
>If I did that right now, though, I would feel really bad.

Yeah you would, it's called a super-ego.

>> No.3530684

>>3530667

>xD

Don't be 12 years old.

>> No.3530694

>>3530677
>believing in freud's tirpartite of ego, superego and id
>shiggy

nuttin more than prearranged perceptions labeled as singular ego, babe

>> No.3530706

>>3530551

If you can't comprehend even the most basic of message, what makes you think there is incoherency with the other side so much? If you can't elaborate on your limits of understanding the other side, what makes you think you have a handle with the topic at hand?

>> No.3530710

>>3530574
>When talking about truth it's difficult not to talk about both at the same time.

ITT: can't into distinguishing particular from necessary

>> No.3530724

How does a solipsist justify his 'own' existence of mind? Why does he fail to extrapolate out and consider that the same arguements he makes for his own existence aren't equally valid to applying to the existence of others?

Surely to justify your own being of nature requires a certain set of observations which if extrapolated lead to the assumption that 'others' must also have minds through their activities also.

>> No.3530734

>>3530724
Wow you completely don't get the argument.

>> No.3530756

Since this is /lit/, Does anyone know any good solopsist literature?

>> No.3530759

>>3530756
Descartes and Berkeley

>> No.3530757

>>3530756

Atlas Shrugged

>> No.3530796

>>3530756
Henry Rollins' book qualifies.

>> No.3530809

>>3530759
Descartes isn't really solipsist. I mean, it was not his intention... His "hyperbolic doubt" was supposed to be solved by his philosophy.

>>3530710
I bet you could elaborate.

>>3530637
You missed this part:
>There are different hypotheses I could consider to explain such a thing, but the less paranoiac-retarded one is that there are other minds like mine.

I need a reason to believe such a retarded nonsense, and guess what: there is none. I need evidence of some kind to believe something is like it is. I might be wrong because a lack of evidence, though. "Perceptions" aren't thrown for no reason. i perceive something. If there is nothing what could explain those "perceptions"? Where do they come from? Shouldn't anyone taking this paranoia of "nothing is real, everything is shit" be taken into a mental institution?

You need a reason to believe and you need a reason to doubt. If not, you're

a) Schizophrenic.
b) Trolling.
c) Some asshole trying to look smart with his pseudo-philosophic bullshit.

>> No.3530817

In Philosophy of the Mind there is the subject of monism, a position of saying reality is one kind of stuff. Solipsism is a form of monism. Solipsism posit that essential there is ultimately one kind of stuff, the mind. Basically it says there is just your mind, that's it. At times it slips into Idealism, which posits that there is only your mental process, or your sense impressions.

Monism is a direct retort to Dualism, which posits there essentially only two kinds of stuff your mind and your body. Solipsism has the same problem as Dualism: there is no explanation for causal interaction. Solipsism can't explain how the mind is able to react to sudden and random stimuli, if essential there is only your mind. It's a paradox. Solipsism can't be right. It's not taboo to believe it, it's plain stupid.

B. Russell is right that solipsism is "psychologically impossible to believe and is rejected in fact even by those who mean to accept it."

"I once received a letter from an eminent logician... ...saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others. Coming from a logician and a solipsist, her surprise surprised me."
~Russell, Bertrand

>> No.3530824

>>3530625
I think you should read Wittgenstein.

I doubt the experiment of the Chinese Room was meant to be an argument for solipsism.
I'm talking exactly about evidence: experience which seems pretty reliable. There isn't any valid reason to doubt about the existence of other minds, while there are a lot of reasons supporting explanations for the forces of nature without the need gods.

>> No.3530840

>>3530809
>I need evidence
just fuck off to >>>/sci/ already

>pseudo-philosophic
what's the difference between authentic philosophy and pseudo philosophy? pls

>> No.3530860

>>3530840
The first line of >>3530824 applies to you as well.
It's really funny how there's people who still believe it's perfectly ok to swallow any made up bullshit.

>> No.3530863

>>3530817
Russell is even more irrelevant than Descartes

>> No.3530871

>>3530863
His analysis of definite descriptions and his arguments against non-correspondentist theories of truth are good, though. But yeah, overall he's pretty irrelevant.

>> No.3530880

>>3530824
>I doubt the experiment of the Chinese Room was meant to be an argument for solipsism.

But it does work for that. Most people are quick to deny 'machine intelligence' thinking that their biological intelligence is all that exists.

>> No.3530887

>>3530817

Not sure if I buy that. If solipsism is true, then couldn't the mind artificially generate its own "external stimuli" and then have your consciousness react accordingly? I frequently catch myself surprised at sudden thoughts or emotions that well out of my subconscious, so I think its quite possibly for the mind in a soliptist existence to simultaneously generate and react to information. Like in a dream.


The real reason solipsism is taboo is that the whole theory is a fallacy. Solipsism is a textbook example of Poisoning the Well. If in a debate I immediately persuade the audience that my opponent is a liar, there is nothing he can possibly say to refute me. Same with Solipsism. Its a theory that intrinsically precludes any counter, so according to both logicians and scientists, not a valid theory.

>> No.3530894

>>3530880
So your question is "what if there were only androids all around you"? like in the Brain In Bucket mental experiment? Well, then it would be impossible for me to know if there is really other people or not. But why should I consider such a possibility? Why should consider the most bizarre explanation possible if everything points at a much more simple explanation?

>> No.3530902

it's 2deep4others to understand
but others is you so it's 2deep4u ultimately
where you is me

>> No.3530906

>>3530863
>>3530871

>A thread about solipsism
> quotes a philosopher that directly talks about solipsism
>An anon and a trip say he is irrelevant.
>dafuq?

Are you to two stupid on the subject, or is denial fashionable now?

>> No.3530912

>>3530887
So solipsism consists on considering there is only a mind existing which has fun trolling itself? That sounds pretty absurd, not to talk about what's the point in trying to convince someone about this (one of your illusions, which try to make you believe they're real all the time, suddenly decides, well, actually YOU decide, to make you realize there's all this plot you decided to create to make you believe there is a reality existing)... Sounds like the plot twist of a bad Hollywood thriller.

Well, I agree with the second part of your post, anyway.

>> No.3530916

>>3530912
>That sounds pretty absurd
yeah, we call it 2deep4u around these parts. it's an abstract concept

>> No.3530920

>>3530906
The whole discussion about solipsism is dead nowadays. We're discussing dead subjects for the sake of it. After Wittgenstein none has ever taken solipsism seriously again (if anyone eve did before).

>> No.3530923

>>3530916
>2deep4u
I was actually pointing at a 2holyshitthisisfuckingretarded4u sense of "absurd".

>> No.3530927

>>3530923
yeah, that's exactly how 2deep4u is interpreted by plebs

>> No.3530936

>>3530894
Umm, no. I wasn't trying to say anything like that –'Androids, 'brain in a jar'..

I was outsourcing the word 'solipsist' to someone who only believes only in the minds of their particular organism. In this instance, we have a biological organism who denies that cognition –and potentially self-awareness– is capable of existing in a digital form, as their own experience hinders them from conceiving of anything else. As far as I'm aware, there is no term for this, but 'solipsist' is the closest fit.

If the solipsist is someone who only accepts the existence of their own mind, the biological solipsist would be someone who only accepts the existence of 'mind' within biological organisms.

>> No.3530946

>>3530817
>Solipsism can't explain how the mind is able to react to sudden and random stimuli, if essential there is only your mind.

That's bullshit, though. If there is only mind, the stimuli are part of mind. What about this needs to be explained?

>> No.3530947

>>3530912
What else is there to do but create when there is only you?

It's like when children have imaginary friends, they're completely absurd just the same.

>> No.3530948

>>3530936
so a biological solipsist would accept he's the only one who has a mind even though existing other people? like "everybody else is an android"?

>> No.3530953

>>3530887
>The mind makes up random stimulation to simulate it's in a world of random external stimuli

That's absolutely redundant and stupid, and offers no solutions to the causal interaction problem with solipsism. Your just truncating the causal property with 'mind artificially generate its own "external stimuli"'

Solipsism is impossible and therefor it would be stupid to believe it.

Here is why:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/solipsis/#H7

>> No.3530959

>>3530947
Children learn to make imaginary friends from the existence of real friends. Imagination is only the ability to create alternative mental representations from your representations you've already experienced. It's a purely logical productive ability.

>> No.3530960

>>3530817
>"I once received a letter from an eminent logician... ...saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others. Coming from a logician and a solipsist, her surprise surprised me."
>~Russell, Bertrand

Wow, that is a perfect example of the dumbest critique of solipsism possible. Other 'people' 'talk' and 'have opinions', whether they 'exist' or not. Scepticism towards their existence does not fucking matter, she is surprised at the low number of solipsists among people, this is a relative observation which can just as much be the number of imaginary solipsists among imaginary people. FUCK YOU RUSSEL YOU RETARD, JUST READ MY POST: >>3530323

>> No.3530963

>>3530824
>There isn't any valid reason to doubt about the existence of other minds, while there are a lot of reasons supporting explanations for the forces of nature without the need gods.

you are arguing from common sense. have fun with that.

>> No.3530968

>>3530953
That doesn't disprove anything.

Language could be a game we made to entertain ourselves.

>>3530959
So the problem is "where did we learn to do it?" Maybe we just did it. Maybe we thought it would be fun to plant a single cell on a rock in space and watch what happens, like an ant farm.

I don't think solipsism has ever been disproved. People just ignore it because it's also impossible to prove.

>> No.3530975

>>3530963
Have fun not being able to guess if there is a lion or not at the other side of the door before opening it.
Common sense is what constitutes our beliefs until we find evidence supporting counterintuitive information. It's not like humans are purely rational beings.

>> No.3530981

>>3530968
>it's also impossible to prove.
Well, there it is. There is literally an infinity of things we could believe which seem more plausible than solipsism but we don't, because we have not a single reason to do so. It's like a philosopher trying to prove the existence of God after the Middle Age: people will just laugh at him.

>> No.3530985

>>3530953
>That's absolutely redundant and stupid, and offers no solutions to the causal interaction problem with solipsism. Your just truncating the causal property with 'mind artificially generate its own "external stimuli"'

But there is no such problem. If everything is mind, the stimuli are not external.

>> No.3530986

.>>3530824
>There isn't any valid reason to doubt about the existence of other minds

Proving other minds is exactly the same as proving anything exists outside of our senses which is a pretty fundamental question in most everything..

>>3530975
Common Sense is the enemy of logic.

>> No.3530991

>>3530975
>Common sense is what constitutes our beliefs until we find evidence supporting counterintuitive information. It's not like humans are purely rational beings.

Yes, but philosophy prides itself on being disitinguishable from common sense...

>> No.3530994

>solipsism
>taboo
It's not taboo, people decide to ignore the idea because it is pointless and unprovable.

>> No.3530996

>>3530981
>There is literally an infinity of things we could believe which seem more plausible than solipsism but we don't, because we have not a single reason to do so.

This is wrong. The plausibility of these different explanations cannot be compare in a meaningful way because there is no external framework which is neutral to these explanations. You are determining the plausibitity of these explanations based on how closely they match what you already believe...

>> No.3531006

>>3530946
>stimuli are part of mind.

No retard. The problem isn't where, the problem is HOW COULD IT INTERACT. How could there be a interaction between stimuli and the mind if there essential the same? To suggest it's in a part of the mind is bogus. That's automatically presupposes the mind is parts interacting with each other to work, which defeats the whole monism point of solipsism. How could it possible interact if there is only the mind?

>> No.3531013

>>3530994
You say that but the whole of Buddhism is essentially solipsistic and it has plenty of followers.

>> No.3531019

>>3530968
>That doesn't disprove anything.

Yeah it does it disproves the coherency of solipsism

>> No.3531034

>>3531013
No, they just doubt the objectiveness of perception. Solipism stricktly says everything you perceive is made up by your mind. The first idea is actually provable, the second is not.

>> No.3531039

>>3531019
That article begins with a biased and flawed definition of solipsism. Disregarded.

>> No.3531045
File: 77 KB, 403x512, tolly.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
3531045

For those of you talking your mouths off, solipsism generally isn't considered a philosophy. It's more rather used as a tool, a viewpoint or stance when conceptually debating genuine philosophies.

To consider solipsism is purely solipsistic!

>> No.3531051

>>3530143
>solipsism
>taboo
>not just a useless and tiresome concept
>not just incoherent narcissist scepticism

>> No.3531052

>>3531039
>biased and flawed definition of solipsism.

Nope

>> No.3531056

>>3531034
How are those different at their core?

Whether it is one mind over all or one being or one process doing all things it's all the same.

Buddhists believe that only the thought that you are at the very moment exists as a process of the universe which is all connected.

>>3531045
That's the taboo of it. Whenever brought up in discussion it's usually used accusingly.

>> No.3531064

>>3531052
>Solipsism is sometimes expressed as the view that “I am the only mind which exists,”
>sometimes

He is attacking one form of solipsism as defined by him in a way he can render it incoherent. The article does not disprove anything.

Solipsism can't be proven either.

>> No.3531065

>>3530887
>then couldn't the mind artificially generate its own "external stimuli" and then have your consciousness react accordingly?

Don't we call those 'hallucinations'?

>> No.3531079

>>3531056

Then why is everyone in this thread approaching solipsism as if it's a real thing?

Am I naive?

>> No.3531093

>>3530996
And what I believe is what all the evidence I have supports. Solipsism is retarded, accept it.
>>3531013
Buddhism isn't solipsistic. Who a belief system based on the premise that individuality is illusory is solipsistic? It's the absolute contrary of solipsism.
>>3530991
Philosophy is based on common sense. Only when you find a reason to doubt you can look for an alternative. This is why philosophy prides itself on being rational.
>>3530986
Logic has nothing to do with common sense, how can they be enemies if they've never met.
>>3530986
We instinctively believe in the existence of other things. There's 0 reasons supporting we're wrong. The same with other minds.


Guys, I'm getting tired of discussing with people who don't know who Wittgenstein is. it's like we're repeating the same shit all the time... Too much stoners and baby's first philosophy.

>> No.3531096

>>3531093
>Who a belief
How

>> No.3531110

>>3531093
>Muh philistine worldview is the ultimate answer
>Fucking s-s-stoners, man

Never change, haughty all-mighty Analfucks!

>> No.3531120

>>3531110
>0 rebuttals
Keep mad with your impotence, subhuman fellow. At least put some effort into it...

>> No.3531121

>>3531093
>a belief system based on the premise that individuality is illusory is solipsistic?
Yes, because in it lies the belief that there is some single thing that is everything and not everything at once.

Wittgenstein never disproved solipsism. He disproved a specific form of solipsism, the one referred to in >>3530953.

>> No.3531142

I'm the only being in the universe that actually has free will. Everyone else exists, but is subject to determinism.

>> No.3531166

>>3531121
But that single thing isn't and individual mind. It's more like panentheism, which is a very different question.

>> No.3531167

>>3531166
>and
an

>> No.3531172

Because I say so.

>> No.3531183

Why would I waste my time talking to you? You're just a product of my mind.

>> No.3531200

>>3531166
Curious, after all - what is your ontological standpoint you're defending/arguing from?

Material monism?

>> No.3531207

>>3531121
>Wittgenstein never disproved solipsism.

No.

He never said it's correct either, and was talking about the confusion of reconciling with the privacy of the mind, not with what solipsism is, just a notion solipsists are pointing at. He wasn't defending it, just using it to make a point.

Learn to distinguish that.

He used solipsism as a vehicle to talk about the mind's inability to directly communicate with the world. That already tells you he's not not talking about solipsism anymore, nor any version of it that.

Solipsism, even in it's most articulate form is flawed because fundamental it's self contradictory, it's a paradox, it's complete bullshit.

"Wittgenstein holds solipsism itself to be a confusion, but one that sometimes arises when one tries to express the fact that “I have a point of view on the world which is without neighbours"

From http://www.iep.utm.edu/wittgens/#H10

>> No.3531212

>>3531006
>How could it possible interact if there is only the mind?

How could my organs possibly interact if they are part of one body? Are you retarded?

>> No.3531217

>>3531093
>And what I believe is what all the evidence I have supports.

You cannot have evidence of other minds because they are in principle inaccessible to your experience (inaccessible to your mind). Your inability to understand this is not surprising though, lots of people have a hard time with logical thought.

>> No.3531219

>>3531093
>Philosophy is based on common sense. Only when you find a reason to doubt you can look for an alternative. This is why philosophy prides itself on being rational.

The reason to doubt the existence of other minds is that they are inherently not observable.

>> No.3531224

>>3531212
not the guy you're replying to, but i don't think you quite understand. in their most popular variations:

dualism: mind ≠ brain
monism: mind = brain

>> No.3531225

>>3531093
>Wittgenstein

How is Wittgenstein even pertinent to this discussion? And it better not be this shitty beetle-box again, either.

>> No.3531226

>>3531172
>the only living jedi in new york

I like that.

>> No.3531228

>>3531183
>Why would I waste my time talking to you? You're just a product of my mind.

see:

>>3530323

>> No.3531234

>>3531228
I don't want to talk to 'you'.

>> No.3531237

>>3531224

I wasn't talking about the mind body problem, maybe I shouldn't have used the comparison from the body. 'How can the cogs interact if there is supposedly only one watch?' would also work. There seems to be some naive idea of interaction somewhere at the bottom of this supposed 'debunking' of solipsism.

>> No.3531239

>>3531234
>I don't want to talk to 'you'.

I'm sorry you are an idealist.

>> No.3531249

>>3531239
>Trying to trick me
Goodbye

>> No.3531272

>>3531249

I'm not even trickering. If you seriously think that it makes a difference for your interactions with others whether or not they exhibit an attribute that can by its very definition neither be observed by you or have any effect on anything you can observe, you are clearly an idealist.

>> No.3531534

>>3531200
>Material monism
Well, I believe there's a single structure which constitutes everything. I hope this answers your question.

>> No.3531547

because nobody knows how to pronounce it

>> No.3531557

>>3531225
lol I was referring to On Certainty's Wittgenstein. When he totally destroys radical skepticism and talks about what can we doubt, what's the paper of doubt in science and what happens with moorean propositions. It's pretty relevant imo.

>>3531219
>The reason to doubt the existence of other minds is that they are inherently not observable.
Your mind isn't inherently observable either. Minds aren't inherently observable. The law of gravity isn't inherently observable. It doesn't matter. As I said before, inference is magic.
>>3531217
>You cannot have evidence of other minds
Have you ever seen the species of cat? I don't talk about "a cat", I talk about the species. They might all just be dogs with a strange genetic condition. Inference, man, try it. Scientists do and it's fucking awesome.

>> No.3531558

>>3531547
Well, that's a good point.

>> No.3531570

>>3531557
Btw, I'm obviously talking about INDUCTIVE inference. Just to make it clear. I cannot deduce it, obviously.

>> No.3531624

>>3531557
>>>3531219
>>The reason to doubt the existence of other minds is that they are inherently not observable.
>Your mind isn't inherently observable either. Minds aren't inherently observable. The law of gravity isn't inherently observable. It doesn't matter. As I said before, inference is magic.
>>>3531217
>>You cannot have evidence of other minds
>Have you ever seen the species of cat? I don't talk about "a cat", I talk about the species. They might all just be dogs with a strange genetic condition. Inference, man, try it. Scientists do and it's fucking awesome.

You are retarded.

>> No.3531686

>>3531624
And you could articulate it into a real argument.

>> No.3531694

>>3531686
Oh, wait, you can't.

>> No.3531707

>>3531534
Like Spinoza?

>> No.3531734

>>3531237

You'r like the pot calling the kettle black if you think the causal interaction problem is naive

You don't understand interaction.

It's not the where, be it in the physical sense or metaphysical sense, it's the how could there be any kind of interaction if there is only your mind. That automatically eliminates any kind of ambivalence the mind has. If you think the mind is of different parts, you're not talking solipsism anymore, you got rid of that when posit the mind is of multiple interacting parts. Making up any interaction make solipsism impossible.

If you think wallering in the kind of sophistry you are displaying is giving your noodle some exercise in wrangling and idea. it's not. your just inflating the idea you know what you're talking about, you're making yourself believe your own bullshit.

>> No.3531807

>>3531707
More or less. But with nature being more like Schopenhauer's Will instead of something that works rationally.

>>3531734
I think he talks about some kind of solipsist mind which interacts with itself in a schizoid personality disorder way.

>> No.3531866

>>3531807

any 'interaction with itself' or 'schiziod' would make any model of solipsism invalid.

>> No.3531903

man, you know, ontology and epistemology and stuff may have historically played a key role in the development of science and things like that, but if it's all about shit like what's in this thread, it just seems like a waste of time

>> No.3531958

It's not. But it goes nowhere. It's unverifiable and unpractical.

>> No.3531968

>>3531903

Yes, 4chan is a great way to judge the worth of philosophy. People here totally know what they are talking about.

You're either interested in it, or you find it tedious. If you find it tedious, then why even bother complaining about it?

>> No.3532315

It's both irrefutable and indefensible, and therefor not worth bothering arguing about. The only people still concerned with solipsism are those who just finished their first week of Phi. 101.

>> No.3532351

>>3530143
its not. its just boring.

>> No.3532372

>>3530598
But I can perceive other minds and even morph into them with psychedelics. Of course you're probably some sort of materialist.

>> No.3532379

>>3530840
>what's the difference between authentic philosophy and pseudo philosophy? pls

>then tells him to go back to /sci/

fucking post-modernist idiot

>> No.3532382

It is my goal to destroy the concept of logic.

>> No.3532691

Ok, guys. Solipsism is inherintly unable to be proved yet unable to be disproved. Stop trying.

>> No.3533475

>>3532372
>But I can perceive other minds and even morph into them with psychedelics.

No, and no. You will feel like you are experiencing another mind, but you may also feel that you have turned into a bird, or a couch, and those are also not actually happening...

>>3531734
>That automatically eliminates any kind of ambivalence the mind has. If you think the mind is of different parts, you're not talking solipsism anymore, you got rid of that when posit the mind is of multiple interacting parts.

Why? Can you link to some explanation of the problem of interaction that is coherent? My entire access to the universe consists of sensory perceptions and 'thought', for a lack of a better word (although one could argue that pretty much everything is qualia, including thought as a sensory phenomenon). Now solipsism would only mean that what I experience does not correspond to anything that exists independent from this experience. What is the problem? If I can experience 'different things' (not real things, but the experiences that we commonly take to correspond to 'real things'), why can I not also experience their interaction (not 'real interaction' but the experience of 'things' (not real things) interacting)?

>> No.3533478

OP's arm-sucking fish is adorable. Polite sage for not advancing disgussion.

>> No.3533482

>>3531686
>And you could articulate it into a real argument.

Okay:

>>3531557
>Your mind isn't inherently observable either. Minds aren't inherently observable.

Qualia. Every mind is observable, but only to itself (or rather any observation itself is only possible in the context of one particular mind, whereby any act of observation vouchsaves the 'existence' of the mind it takes place in, but not of others).

>>3531557
>Have you ever seen the species of cat? I don't talk about "a cat", I talk about the species. They might all just be dogs with a strange genetic condition. Inference, man, try it. Scientists do and it's fucking awesome.

What the fuck are you even talking about? 'Species' is an analytical category, no one with even half a brain would claim that species 'exists' in an ontological manner (even aside from the fact that species is an abstraction from the totality of observed particulars, whereas your argument for other minds is a projection from one observed particular onto an a priori non-observable group of other particulars which are elements of members of a species (minds, parts of humans)).

>> No.3533483

solipsism ISN'T taboo; it's solipsism. TABOO is taboo. One thing can't be another thing.

>> No.3533484

>>3533475
>those are also not actually happening...
If perception is reality then yes they are.

>> No.3533502

>>3533484
>If perception is reality then yes they are.

If perception is reality, solipsism holds, the 'other minds' are really just part of the great flow of perception (what I call 'a mind', or 'my mind'), and their 'existence' is not 'out there', in a way that would invalidate solipsism, but it is only in my perception that they exist. So they would only exist as long as I perceive them, and cease to exist once I stop. Other minds would only exist as perceptions in my mind.

>> No.3533505

>>3533502
If perception is reality solipsism can hold but there are other options too.
Other minds can continue to exist when not perceived even if your perception is your reality,

>> No.3533507
File: 2.95 MB, 200x200, 1361807011564.gif [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
3533507

>>3533483

>> No.3533522

>>3533505
>If perception is reality solipsism can hold but there are other options too.
>Other minds can continue to exist when not perceived even if your perception is your reality,

Possible, but they would be fundamentally unobservable still. It's like saying it is possible that alternative universes exist that are entirely inaccessible and unobservable. Their 'existence' would be entirely moot to us, and calling it 'existence' would be somewhat idealist in itself.

>> No.3533531

>>3533522
So? I am still turned into a bird.

>> No.3533533

>>3533507

This is the best image I've ever seen on 4chan

>> No.3533536

>>3533531

No you are not. The 'actuality' is relative to 'the rest' of experience (=: reality). If you videotaped your trip, you could later see that you did not 'in fact' turn into a bird. 'In fact' here only refers to that state of mind commonly accepted as accurate, mostly because it encompasses the longest duration of life time and is the most functional one. Whether or not the entirety of perception corresponds to anything or not, the relative difference between the coherence of sober perception and other sober perception and the difference between sober perception and an acid trip still holds, and can sensibly be expressed by referring to the acid trip as 'illusory'. This is only a relational statement about the two modes of experience, and in no way is the status of this statement altered by whether or not we believe experience in general to correspond to anything like 'physicality'.

>> No.3533545

>>3533536
I become what I believe to be a bird. By the definition of bird in my internal reality, I am one.

>> No.3533549

>>3533545

That's okay, but it has nothing to do with solipsism as far as I can tell.

>> No.3533556

It's wannabe pseudo-philosophical edgy teenager drivel.

>> No.3533557

>>3533549
No probably not.

>> No.3533685

>>3533556
Go back to >>>/sci/

>> No.3533725

>>3531207
>Solipsism, even in it's most articulate form is flawed because fundamental it's self contradictory, it's a paradox, it's complete bullshit.

This

>> No.3533773

>>3533475
Are you even making a point?

Any form of interaction, whether metaphysical, magical, or real will automatically add causality. That right there, makes sure your experience can't possibly be independent. Any interaction divides things into corresponding parts and establishes the impossibility of the parts or the whole to be independent with there experiences. It make the alone part of solipsism impractical and voids it. So, that by itself will invalidate any form or version or type of solipsism.

>> No.3533808

>>3533685
But he's right. Go ask some philosophy professor.

>> No.3533814

>>3533808
Of course he's right. He copypasted a shitpost I made on /sci/.

>> No.3533834

I like how the most ardent defender of solipsism is also the most articulate person ITT and he probably doesn't even believe in it

>> No.3533857

>>3533482
>Qualia
This isn't even a thing, how can it be observable. Try to make a proper definition of this shit to me if you can.
>Every mind is observable
Have you ever seen one? What do they look like?
>or rather any observation itself is only possible in the context of one particular mind
Ok. This ISN'T the same as observing a mind (e.g. you don't eat spoons).
>whereby
Ok, that's what they call inference. You infer you have a mind, because it's working. Then you infer others have a mind to, because it looks like it's working.

>no one with even half a brain would claim that species 'exists' in an ontological manner
Bad "news" for you:
http://www.ontology.co/substance.htm

Also:
http://www.philosophy.uconn.edu/department/millikan/c2.pdf
http://www.philosophy.uconn.edu/department/millikan/enemies.pdf
Welcome to 21th century metaphysics.

>> No.3533865

>>3530143
>Why is solipsism taboo?
becuase it isnt interesting.
nothing follows from it.

>what if the sky were purple?
it isnt.
>but what if it was?
then it would be purple.

>> No.3533890

>>3533857
>This isn't even a thing, how can it be observable. Try to make a proper definition of this shit to me if you can.

"Qualia (pron.: /ˈkwɑːliə/ or /ˈkweJliə/; singular form: quale (Latin pronunciation: [ˈkwaːle]) is a term used in philosophy to refer to individual instances of subjective, conscious experience. The term derives from a Latin word meaning for "what sort" or "what kind." Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, or the perceived redness of an evening sky.

Daniel Dennett (b.1942), American philosopher and cognitive scientist, writes that qualia is "an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us."[1]
Erwin Schrödinger (1887-1961), the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take:

"The sensation of color cannot be accounted for by the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Could the physiologist account for it, if he had fuller knowledge than he has of the processes in the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the optical nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so."[2]

The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes largely from the fact that it is seen as posing a fundamental problem for materialist explanations of the mind-body problem. Much of the debate over their importance hinges on the definition of the term that is used, as various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain features of qualia. As such, the nature and existence of qualia are controversial." (wikipedia)

Qualia are not 'observable', they are a necessary part of every instance of observation.

>Ok, that's what they call inference. You infer you have a mind, because it's working. Then you infer others have a mind to, because it looks like it's working.

No, I call the totality of my experiences 'my mind'. I don't call the experiences of others anything because I have no access to them.

>> No.3533891

philosophy: eff you, my arbitrary definitions and modes of thought are better than yours, therefore you're logically inconsistent, QED

>> No.3533912

>>3533773
>Any form of interaction, whether metaphysical, magical, or real will automatically add causality. That right there, makes sure your experience can't possibly be independent. Any interaction divides things into corresponding parts and establishes the impossibility of the parts or the whole to be independent with there experiences.

But it's just the interaction of experiences. Or the experience of interaction. There is not necessarily a correspondence between things that interact and the experiences of these things if our experience of interaction could be explained by the interaction of experiences (as opposed to 'things').

>> No.3533914

>metaphysics

laughing_chinese.jpg

>> No.3533926

>>3533857
>http://www.ontology.co/substance.htm

Oh wow, Aristotle is totally a contemporary philosopher who is taken seriously by us today... and NOWHERE in this link does anyone even claim that species is substance. You fuck. Don't just post a link, quote a passage of the link that is actually fucking relevant. Although I shouldn't expect that to happen if you can't even make your own text into meaningful replies...

>> No.3533961

>>3533890
http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm
>So when we look one last time at our original characterization of qualia, as ineffable, intrinsic, private, directly apprehensible properties of experience, we find that there is nothing to fill the bill. In their place are relatively or practically ineffable public properties we can refer to indirectly via reference to our private property-detectors-- private only in the sense of idiosyncratic. And insofar as we wish to cling to our subjective authority about the occurrence within us of states of certain types or with certain properties, we can have some authority--not infallibility or incorrigibility, but something better than sheer guessing--but only if we restrict ourselves to relational, extrinsic properties like the power of certain internal states of ours to provoke acts of apparent re- identification. So contrary to what seems obvious at first blush, there simply are no qualia at all.

>No, I call the totality of my experiences 'my mind'.
The totality of your experiences depend on your mind. But most of your mental processes aren't even experienced. You don't have access to your own mind, you only have access to your mental states and your experiences. that's all (e.g. when Wittgenstein talks about pain: you don't know that you're feeling pain, you just feel pain, etc.)

>> No.3533970

>>3533926
>Oh wow, Aristotle is totally a contemporary philosopher who is taken seriously by us today
If you care to read the rest, you'll see how today his conception of substance is used in epistemology and ontology by realist philosophers.

I just don't feel like explaining what I think is basic. I can respond simple questions but I'm not in the mood to write a 15 pages long essay on a discussion about solipsism.

>> No.3533975

>>3533926
>and NOWHERE in this link does anyone even claim that species is substance
So cute, he doesn't even know how to read!
Here, I'll do it for you:
>For Aristotle, 'substances' are the things which exist in their own right, both the logically ultimate subjects of predication and the ultimate objects of scientific inquiry. They are the unified material objects, as well as the natural stuffs, identifiable in sense-experience, each taken to be a member of a natural SPECIES with its 'form' and functional essence.

>> No.3534060

>>3533961
>You don't have access to your own mind

Just wanted to highlight this...

>> No.3534064

>>3533975
>each taken to be a member of a natural SPECIES with its 'form' and functional essence.

Taken to be a member of a species, not taken to be the species, you fuckhead. That is precisely what I am saying: A specific cat is a 'thing' that exists in a way that is more 'ontological' than the species 'cat', which only exists as an analytical abstraction. Unless you are a Platonist, which judging by your posts I wouldn't even rule out.

>> No.3534074

>>3534064
But each individual is a member of the species thanks to maintaining the same substance pattern
(from the first Millikan link)
>Substances are those things about which you can learn from one encounter something of
what to expect on other encounters, where this is no accident but the result of a real
connection.

>> No.3534079

>>3534074
>no accident but the result of a real
>connection.

Well, if it isn't your fucking induction again...

>> No.3534084

>>3534074
>But each individual is a member of the species thanks to maintaining the same substance pattern
>(from the first Millikan link)
>>Substances are those things about which you can learn from one encounter something of
>what to expect on other encounters, where this is no accident but the result of a real
>connection.

That still does not mean that a species is a substance. You encounter a cat, not a species. You can never encounter a species.

>> No.3534085

>>3534074
Individuals of a substance are as ontologically relevant as the substance itself, but there's a difference: we can only reach substances by inference (making an abstraction), which doesn't mean they have "less" ontological weigh, since pertaining to that substance is what makes the individual be what it is. I'm not a platonist, for sure, but I'm not an empiricist.

>> No.3534092

>>3534084
You can never encounter species because species consist on a certain structure. You don't see a "structure" itself, but any individual thing has some kind of structure.

It's tha same with mereological nihilism: there are no real objects (assuming all objects have parts), just simples (whatever they might be, let's take they are subatomic particles) organized in a certain way. We never see simples, we only see their structure, and that structure shape what we perceive as objects.

>> No.3534094

>>3534092
>shape
shapes

>> No.3534101

>>3534085
>pertaining to that substance is what makes the individual be what it is. I'm not a platonis

Err.... you're close enough in my book. Also, now you are referring to the abstraction as the substance, supposedly more so than the particular, which is the opposite of what one of your links starts with:

>For Aristotle, at least some of the time, the paradigm cases of substances were, as he put it, 'this man, this horse', i.e. particular things of that kind.

If you are going to rest your argument on a definition that is much more narrow than the links you posted, be so kind as to provide it. And as far as 'pertaining to that substance is what makes the individual be what it is' is concerned, that is the very essence of Platonist ass-backwardsness. The abstraction is an abstraction from the particulars, not the other way around (ontologically). Our concept of species is not the blueprint that pre-existed the universe, it is the result of our observation of actual particulars pre-existing the concept we came up with (duh).

>> No.3534107

>>3534101
>Our concept of species is not the blueprint that pre-existed the universe, it is the result of our observation of actual particulars pre-existing the concept we came up with (duh).

Even if you assume that there is some-such blueprint, it is entirely naive to assume that our concepts of the world could ever exactly match that blueprint (seeing as all past 'explanations' we have come up with on the issue of blueprints have been overthrown by us sooner or later).

>> No.3534126

>>3534101
I'm not a dualist. I just talk about real stuff in our physical world that our sense can't get due to biological limitations. And I use concepts from an aristotelian tradition, this is the most antiplatonic you can get.

The link about Aristotle was to respond to the anterior post. The other two links are the ones which define the concepts I use (which take Aristotle's concepts, but making them compatible with contemporary science).

>Our concept of species is not the blueprint that pre-existed the universe
lol of course not. But reality has a basic structure. Things (as we perceive them) depend on that structure. I'm not a fucking idealist, I don't talk about ideas, I talk about structure (shapes, as Aristotle would say). it's not the same, since what our intellect can or can't reach has nothing to do with the fundamental structure of reality.

>> No.3534132

>>3534107
>our concepts of the world
Well, physics are at it. Our representations get everytime more complex and accurate. I know a representation will never equiparate THE WHOLE REALITY. But we make limited representations which get closer and closer to the highest percentage of possible accuracy (even if the limit is 99,9%, or what quantum physicists encounter at levels which everything looks like an absolute chaos).

>> No.3534136

>>3534132
>physics
physicists

>> No.3534607

>>3533912
>There is not necessarily a correspondence between things that interact

Hmmmm.

This self-contradictory and is absolutely ridiculous. If your entire argument hinges on this, you're either dumber than you think or are trolling.

>> No.3536421

>>3534607
>This self-contradictory and is absolutely ridiculous. If your entire argument hinges on this, you're either dumber than you think or are trolling.

You are not parsing the sentence as intended. I mean there is not necessarily a correspondence between:

a) things that interact

and

b) the experience of these things

>> No.3536429

>>3534132
>I know a representation will never equiparate THE WHOLE REALITY.

I still don't see how it makes sense to say that this 'structure' 'exists' in any meaningful way if it is either fundamentally inaccessible to us or (which is somehow tied up in the first possibility) we have no way of determining whether we are actually conceiving of the 'true' structure or just of an approximative representation. I don't think referring to such things as 'existing' makes any sense, because normally you say something exists if thereby you can meaningfully differentiate the scenario in which it exists from the one in which it doesn't. If structure is inaccessible to us, these scenarios are functionally the same, the only difference is a belief you have...

>> No.3537317

>>3536421
>I mean there is not necessarily a correspondence between

Wrong. And stop back tracking your only making it worse.

While the necessity of things can never be experienced, the correspondence will always be experienced. If that weren't true than any if-than logic would be impossible.

Solipsism is impossible because it self-contradictory and stupid.

>> No.3537333

>>3536429
>I still don't see how it makes sense to say that this 'structure' 'exists' in any meaningful way if it is either fundamentally inaccessible to us
There's a structure, if there isn't, then NOTHING can be predicted.
>inaccessible
It's not, since we can make representations.
>'true' structure or just of an approximative representation.
It can be true AND an approximation. This is how induction works: we have a believe, a justification and predictions which get corroborated. We don't have absolute truths (those only exist in abstract axiomatic systems like maths), but we have beliefs with a fuckton of empirical support. This means we can trust over 99'9% on them. Of course, this is still not 100%, but we'll have to deal with it.
> I don't think referring to such things as 'existing' makes any sense
If you don't think there's a structure according to which the Law of Gravity acts, try jumping from a window of a high building: you don't have absolute certainty, but it would be stupid (or just merely insane) to defy such law.
>normally you say something exists if thereby you can meaningfully differentiate the scenario in which it exists from the one in which it doesn't.
Dying or living: which do you think will be the scenario if you jump and structure exists?
>If structure is inaccessible to us,
It's not.
>the only difference is a belief you have
the same beliefs that keeps you alive when you cross the road and see a car coming, etc.

Only philosophers discuss this kind of subjects, since any other living animal just believes in it (and this might be the difference why philosophers try to have low reproductive success).

>> No.3537338

>>3537317
>Solipsism is impossible because it self-contradictory and stupid.
It amazes me how today anyone still has to state this.

>> No.3537344

>>3537317
>Solipsism is impossible because it self-contradictory and stupid.

Wow, nice. Surely instead of explaining why that is supposedly the case, stating it for the 5th time in this thread should do the trick!

Also, I am not backtracking, and I still don't understand how interaction is supposedly impossible if everything only exists in my experience. What I mean by no correspondence is that what I can perceive are my experiences, the idea that beyond these there are actual things to which they correspond can fundamentally never be verified or falsified.

>> No.3537357

>>3537333

Nothing you said is an argument in your favour. This is a philosophical discussion, not a 'do I want to jump out of the window?'-discussion. Also:

>It can be true AND an approximation.

How can you even post this? Why would you be so retarded as to conflate truth with functionality, which is completely out of place in a discussion of whether or not the structure of reality is accessible to our observation.

>> No.3537375

>>3537357
>This is a philosophical discussion
I don't think you really understand what word means. We talk about truth and structure. If something id stat is true, I could be able to make a prediction. If my predictions fail, then my "truths" are bullshit.
>How can you even post this?
How can you be so ignorant? Percentages are true and approximations.
> Why would you be so retarded as to conflate truth with functionality
I didn't.
I talk about INDUCTION. Google the meaning of this word, please. We can reach truths by induction, idiot. This is not functionality, it's probability.

>> No.3537379

>>3537375
>what that

>> No.3537384

>>3537357
>>It can be true AND an approximation.
>How can you even post this?
Today the number 23 45 67 12 34 10 won't win the lottery.
Here you have something true. Do I know it with 100% accuracy? No, but the probabilities of this being wrong are ridiculous.

>> No.3537386

>>3537375
>Percentages are true and approximations

AHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA

>> No.3537390

>>3537375
>We can reach truths by induction, idiot. This is not functionality, it's probability.

AHHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAH

>> No.3537399

And all this retardation about truth, induction, and approximation, despite the fact that EVEN IF INDUCTION WAS A METHOD OF PROOF (IT ISN'T), THAT IN NO WAY CAN BE USED TO DISCREDIT SOLIPSISM. Any predictions you make about the things that 'happen' have nothing to do with whether they are 'out there' or whether they are entirely contained in and limited to your mind. Imagine that you have a very, very long dream. You can induce things in the dream, but the 'truth' of the induction is relative to the events in that experiential framework. This says nothing about the status of the framework as such. BITCH.

>> No.3537417

>>3537399
We weren't talking about solipsism, we were talking about structure and truth, but whatever.
>>3537390
>>3537386
Do you have any real argument? Because I'm starting to suspect you don't really understand what "truth" means (in a correspondentist sense).

>> No.3537430

>>3537417
Well, let me tell you this:

If a percentage is true, it is not an approximation. It is simply a statistical feature of a set of data. What you mean by 'approximation' I assume is a probability. In that case any actual percentage you employ as a probability to predict the future is 'true' only in respect to the set of data it is derived from (in the past), and is only an approximation (of probability) with respect to future events. These attributes refer to two different sets of events that do not overlap.

As for the second gaffe,

a) induction is not a method of proof, it does not prove the truth of anything, so no, we very much cannot reach truths by induction, we can reach high confidence.

b) Probability is not truth, either. Probability rests on the assumption that all the past events from which the probability is derived are actually comparable and that the future event you are trying to predict is also comparable to these other events. And even if this were perfectly the case (as opposed to roughly), this would still not mean that the probability is a 'truth' in any meaningful way, because it does not describe any particular event, but (a little bit like the species from above) it is an abstraction over a class of events. No single event happens 0.63 and does not happen 0.37, every single event either happens or does not happen.

>> No.3537436

>>3537344
>Surely instead of explaining why that is supposedly the case

It's already been explained. Why keep repeating it?

Yes you are back tracking, and you're doing a piss poor job about it. You keep reiterating correspondence of experience doesn't signify interaction. And worse, you can't seem to get your head around the problem with that.

No wonder you think solipsism is possible.

>> No.3537454

>>3537430
>reach high confidence.
as in
>This is how induction works: we have a believe, a justification and predictions which get corroborated. We don't have absolute truths (those only exist in abstract axiomatic systems like maths), but we have beliefs with a fuckton of empirical support. This means we can trust over 99'9% on them. Of course, this is still not 100%, but we'll have to deal with it.
from >>3537333? Yeah, ok.

>>3537430
>Probability is not truth
Probability is not truth. I said:
>We can reach truths by induction
We don't have absolute certainty, since we can only trust (and we're justified to trust) on our belief. We make lots of successful predictions with x hypotheses, so we believe it's true. It can be proven wrong in the future, but by the moment we have no support to claim it's not.
Probability allows us to make representations, and those representations match (so far) facts. well, we reached truth by probability.

Now about structure: how can we know there's a structure? because we can use all those abstractions and they work most of the time. i they work there's only one reasonable explanation: they share some kind of structure with reality.

>> No.3537460

>>3537454

>we have a believe
belief

>i they
If they

>> No.3537465

>>3537436
>You keep reiterating correspondence of experience doesn't signify interaction. And worse, you can't seem to get your head around the problem with that.

Correspondence of experience with what? I talked about the idea that experiences correspond to things that exist independently of the experiences (which cannot be proven). I 'cannot get my head around' the problem because no one has deigned to even hint at how there is supposedly a problem here. If I have missed it, please simply cite the post in which the actual problem is spelled out.

>> No.3537471

>>3537454
>well, we reached truth by probability.

THAT IS NOT WHAT TRUTH MEANS. If that is what truth means, I can also say 'you are a male between 17 and 25 years old', and that is 'true' unless you prove me wrong.

>> No.3537517

>>3537471
1. You say "a p is q"
2. There is a p which is q
3. What you said is true

When you say
>THAT IS NOT WHAT TRUTH MEANS
You seem to mean
>THAT IS NOT WHAT KNOWLEDGE MEANS

Of course, you dont know if I'm 17-25. But you can believe it and have some kind of justification, and it can be true too.

Knowledge != truth
Justified belief != knowledge

Again, I can say:

>Today the number 23 45 67 12 34 10 won't win the lottery.
Is it true? Well, we'll see it later. I know it? No. Am I justified to assert such a thing? Yes, because there's a very high probability I'm right.

>> No.3537579

>>3532691

Solipsism is God?

>> No.3537626

>>3537465
>I talked about the idea that experiences correspond to things that exist independently of the experiences (which cannot be proven).

That right there is the problem. You're not hearing yourself and are completely oblivious to your on illogic.

>> No.3537676

>>3537517
You said that 'We can reach truths by induction', but you said yourself that 'it can be proven wrong in the future'. What that means is that we can happen to reach truths by induction, but we cannot know whether what we believe in is true.... It's bullshit.

>> No.3537716

Probably because it's just schizophrenia

>> No.3537757

>>3537676
>You said that 'We can reach truths by induction', but you said yourself that 'it can be proven wrong in the future'
No. We can reach truths by induction. By induction, we can make theories which allow us to make predictions. Theories aren't truths as in mathematical truths, they're just trust worthy hypotheses. Why would we trust theories if they aren't absolute truths? Because we have lots of evidence supporting them (and nothing has ever proved them wrong so far).

We cannot certainly know if our theories are just beliefs or knowledge. But we can trust in them because they've been tested, and had successfully predicted what became facts. If you know, it cannot be proven wrong. If you believe, you can always be proven wrong. The problem is: you will never know with 100% accuracy if you predicted facts successfully by chance or because your beliefs were true 8so, real knowledge).
>What that means is that we can happen to reach truths by induction, but we cannot know whether what we believe in is true
Well, we believe (and by the moment we are highly justified to believe) that we have real knowledge about a lot of stuff. probably, some of this stuff will be proven wrong in the future... We still don't know exactly what.
Does this mean
>It's bullshit?

No. Because we can trust on it: we have high probability of being right about what we predict, which means that our representations' structure must match *some* of reality's structure (it's possible for chance to happen, but not ALL THE FUCKING TIME).

>> No.3537985

>>3537757
>Theories aren't truths as in mathematical truths, they're just trust worthy hypotheses.

That's bullshit. You have conceded yourself that through induction we can only get confident about what beliefs we hold, BUT THEY MIGHT TURN OUT TO BE WRONG. That is not truth, just stop. stop.

>> No.3538003

>>3537757
It's so retarded. We can only arrive at things that you have conceded might turn out to be untrue. That is literally the only fucking thing that a truth has to do, it has to be NOT UNTRUE. It's not 'a different kind of truth' if it is potentially NOT TRUE AT ALL.

>> No.3538008

>>3537757
>No. We can reach truths by induction.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_induction

>> No.3538017

>>3537985
>BUT THEY MIGHT TURN OUT TO BE WRONG. That is not truth, just stop. stop.
So you're saying all the predictions science has ever done could just be all by chance?
You get that truth means correspondence with reality, right? If our theories have been corresponding with reality during ages, you say it might be by chance. You can doubt, but with a reason. You need to be justified to believe, and you need to be justified to doubt. Believing for no reason and doubting for no reason (what you're doing right now) is stupid.

Thanks to induction we can get outside of our planet, for example. Do you think this happens by chance? Are you so stupid to believe that our theories might have NOTHING to do with the real world? I don't believe it, nobody can be so retarded.

>> No.3538026
File: 6 KB, 390x470, Oh-You-Make-Me-Cry-Laughing-Meme-Rage-Face-.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
3538026

>>3538017
>the real world
why so dogmatic? ;'(

>> No.3538040

>>3538017
>Do you think this happens by chance? Are you so stupid to believe that our theories might have NOTHING to do with the real world?

No, I said this about 50 posts ago: 'it works' is not the same as 'it constitutes truth'. Pi is 3.14 and g is ~10. It works, but it's untrue.

>> No.3538058

>>3538026
It's not a dogma. It's a fact. Why so sceptic? it's not even rational. So you doubt about the existence of the real world? You doubt about your own existence? Not even Descartes reached such level of retardation with his hyperbolic doubt.

>>3538040
So it could be wrong but yet still work. By magic? I doubt it. Chance? Well, see my last post. If it works it must be for a reason, for example because we found out a way to represent the structure of the world.

>Pi is 3.14 and g is ~10
Mathematical truths are not the same as truths about the world. I say "tomorrow the sun will rise", and it ends up happening. Would it still be "untrue"?

>> No.3538066

>>3538040
Btw, justification isn't the same as truth. When I say "it works" is a way to say "it justifies my claim of truth". Things might work and still be it by chance (which, not always happens).

>> No.3538096

>>3538058
God, you're an idiot. Did you even look at the link posted before? Why don't you go take a minute to research the problem of induction. It'll make this much more easier for everyone.

>> No.3538102

>>3538058
It wouldn't be a dogma, but you made it so. The 'real' in 'real world' has ontological implications. All you had to do is say 'material world' or 'observable world' instead of 'real'

>Why so sceptic? it's not even rational. So you doubt about the existence of the real world? You doubt about your own existence? Not even Descartes reached such level of retardation with his hyperbolic doubt.
Neither of those, just pointing out to a fallacy

>> No.3538162

>>3538096
I know what the problem of induction is. Did you even read the WHOLE link? Predictive power, idiot, do you know what it means? We don't know 100% accuracy (as said on at least other 3 posts), but we still be more corroborated to take it as the correct theory. And then what, a theory works because of luck? Man, that's a lot of luck.

>>3538102
>The 'real' in 'real world' has ontological implications
no fuck
>All you had to do is say 'material world' or 'observable world' instead of 'real'
You cant observe an unreal world. And matter can't exist if there's no reality.

>> No.3538165

>>3538162
>but we
we''ll

>> No.3538189

>>3538162
>You cant observe an unreal world. And matter can't exist if there's no reality.
hurrrrrr hence the ontological implication. which is fundamental, which derives from which, or are they in fact mixed into a whole etc

>> No.3538200 [DELETED] 

>>3538189
I say "real world" because I've been arguing with people who wouldn't be able to gasp the implications. If I say material or observable they would probably come up with some idealist bullshit. Don't overrate /lit/'s intelligence.

>> No.3538206

>>3538189
I say "real world" because I've been arguing with people who wouldn't be able to get the implication. If I say material or observable they would probably come up with some idealist bullshit. Don't overrate /lit/'s intelligence.

>> No.3540000

>>3538058
>I say "tomorrow the sun will rise", and it ends up happening. Would it still be "untrue"?

If it is going to happen, it is true, if not, not. The problem is with the claim that through induction we 'reach' truth. It's not quite 'in our grasp'. Through induction we reach convictions most of which will never turn out to be wrong, but that means that we still don't know whether they are in fact 'true' or not. Saying that we have thus 'reached' truth is completely misguided and obfuscating.

>> No.3540001

>>3538058
>If it works it must be for a reason, for example because we found out a way to represent the structure of the world.

Maybe the reason is that our prediction is correct for a certain number of cases for not for some other cases for which we claim our thesis to hold, because there is a fundamental distinction between these cases that we have not considered? Like for example movement at speeds that are close to the speed of light do not follow the rules we used to describe 'slow' movement, but we did not know that and claimed to have found the rules of movement in general, which was wrong.

>> No.3540016

It's not taboo. It's more of a dead end. Technically it's correct but pragmatically there is nothing one can do about that. We have to assume that if something seems to be true than we must take it as so.

>> No.3540026

Solipsism has nothing to do with truth. In the context of this universe a truth will be a truth even if it happens that this universe is an illusion.

>> No.3540027

>>3530586
What movie is this from?

>> No.3540029

>>3540016
>Technically it's correct but pragmatically there is nothing one can do about that.

Hah! This. And this is coming from the person who argued against the debunking of solipsism for the entire length of the thread.

>> No.3540049

it bores people

>> No.3540069

>>3540016
Is that basically saying that you can doubt pretty much everything except your own existence, but we have to rely on something to make any progress in understanding the world. So assuming what we see is what is really there so we can progress with science?

>> No.3540373

>>3540029
That's been stated a fucking lot of times during the thread.

>> No.3541058

>>3540027

it was a show called Quantum Leap. starred Scott Bakula

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0681131/

>> No.3541972

>Chinese room argument still trotted out
jesus