/lit/ - Literature

cause I am

>pantheism

because u don't know dafuq ur talkin o bout

>>3070024

I used to live next door to Spinoza. Obviously, a few years after he'd moved out.

The flat was right opposite a red light district, and there was a statue of him looking sadfrog.jpg

serious responses only please

>Pantheism
>Not panentheism

>>3070024
Because Leibniz is better.

I love Spinoza. Always have.

Because axiomatic logic tends towards tautology.

>>3070227
All logic is axiomatic.

>>3070227
A tautology is only in philosophical logic, in mathematical logic we do no assign a object anything besides and element of {T,F}. They could very well be {1,0} or {$,@}. A tautology expresses something that is not used in mathematical logic, namely a notion of truth.

>>3070239

Nice unprovable statement you have there.

>>3070227
>>3070239
>>3070259
Come on guys, logic has been dead since Godel.

>>3070259

Hold up on the "we" there pal.

>>3070290
You are joking right? Do you even know what Godel proved? He provided a completeness theorem for first order logic, he put logic on the map as a major study of mathematics.

>>3070289
Okay, well if you do, you no longer are doing mathematical logic.

>>3070321

No shit sherlock.

>>3070317
But then he proved incompleteness for any logic powerful enough to deal with arithmetic. Hence he denied the possibility of logic to be foundational.

Which made logic not that relevant as a field for philsophy.

Ps. You forgot about Hilbert and Frege lol.

>>3070340
What? Now I am confused as to what I am talking about.

>>3070346
No, this merely makes logic not relevant for total knowledge. Philosophy still has an interest in limited and contingent knowledges.

This is a shitter for someone who thinks you can think meaning though.

>>3070346
You have no idea what you are talking about. Well, let me help with my years of experience in this area. Well, he did prove that any formal system complex enough to express arithmetic is incomplete, however, this only hindered Logicism and Formalism. This did not make Logic irrelevant in philosophy, in fact, it made it ever more interesting. He was arguably the first mathematician to prove a theorem with meta-mathematical implications. This showed that we can use mathematics to tell us something about the world and how our minds work. This is why we now use forcing in Set Theory and other branches of mathematics. The implications of Implications is profound. We now have to come up with another explanation as to why mathematics works. He argued in Putnam and Benacerraf's "Philosophy of Mathematics" that all Constructivist theories of mathematics are doomed to failure, thus ushering in a new wave of Platonism. This made mathematics and logic central to philosophy.

>>3070366
The problem is that if you try to delineate logics not from a total point of view but for limited fields than logic is always post hoc.

That is: first you have some contingent truths and intuitions relevant to a certain field. Then you use them to abstract a certain general logic.

What happens then is not that logic drives the search of truth, but that logic is the result of certain pre-existing intuitions. Which have not affirmed because logical but because they were popular.

Which is alright when you are dealing with a field where you can have practical results, but it's not alright if you are dealing with philosophy.
Especially if then you decide to claim your, and your friends', prejudices rigorous just because you use mathematical symbols.

>>3070346
cont.
The reason why I did not mention Hilbert and Frege was because, if you knew anything about the history of the philosophy of mathematics, you would know that Frege was not well known in his life time. If it were not for Russell, Frege would not be read to this day. I did not include anything about Hilbert because Hilbert did not popularize logic. He did most of his work in other branches of mathematics like Analysis. I think it is fair to say you got owned on this one, however, since not many know of this subject, you should not feel bad. Just try to not talk out your ass.

>>3070402
That was not the original poster. This >>3070388
and >>3070403 is the original poster.

>>3070290
goddamn these threads are easy to derail.
You guys are fucking retarded.

>>3070388
I know very well what I'm talking about.

I can tell you that:
1) Godel does not tell us anything about how our minds works. Nor you can deduce anything like that from him. If you do you would go back into psychologism.

2) I think that platonism is absurd for the following reasons:
a) You have the problem of acces. How do we access mathematical objects?
b) You have the problem of foundation of this objects. This objects are not material, they are not mental (so the cannot be founded on our psychology like memories) and they are not social (they are not relative to societies like bank accounts) so what are they?

And this is only without calling into question Wittgenstein, whom makes platonism completely impossible.

I think that pragmatism is a much better solution: mathematicians have problems, have a good and precise language that accurately communicates infos, and they use it to invent solutions to problems.

>>3070420
Oh, how cute! You read one book on the philosophy of mathematics and you think you can simplify a complex field with two bullets. Allow me to destroy this comment. Well, Godel did show that we cannot reduce mathematics into an algorithmic process. This means that we cannot program a computer so that they can handle abstract ideas like mathematical induction. This has been argued by some philosophers of mind to show that our mental processes also cannot be reduced to an algorithmic process. Do you see why? Also, you claim that we should prescribe to pragmatism but you fail to understand that Godel's realism has been adopted by modern pragmatists. Penelope Maddy and others have combined Quine's indespensibility argument for mathematical objects with Godel's realism in order to avoid the pitfalls of constructivism. If you have ever read anything beyond a basic introduction, you would see why the (a) and (b) are minor problems. Well, with Quine's indespensibility argument, we do not need to answer (a) because (a) applies to science also. To answer (b) we can posit that they are independent abstracta. Once again, we don't really run into a problem anymore than that which is found in science. Your turn.

>>3070420
Also, I forgot to point out how Wittgenstein never understood Godel's proof. There are plenty of sources that will back this up. Wittgenstein did make Platonism seem difficult to justify but as pragmatists (as you assumed) we do not need to abide by the stringent philosophy of Early Wittgenstein. We have a much more expressible theory of language in Putnam, Davidson and Quine.

You are either a Spinozist or not a philosopher at all.

>>3070450

Yes I see what you meant on the mental part, I misunderstood you.

But starting from Quine here things become a lot more difficult because I have none of the interests of most analytic philosophers so I tend to be slightly confused by his argument since every argument is a set of trades and I'm not interested in what he offers:

1) I'm not a realist, nor a naturalist. So I don't have a particular problem with denying his claim or denying the ontological commitment of anything. So as you see I don't see his argument as particularly convincing.

2) I seriously have problems at understanding the notions of indispensability. Meanings conveyed through natural languages are indispensable for scientific theory. Though a lot of people in the face of the evolution of language will have a hard time to admit a platonist view of natural language.

3) I get the feeling that Quine is only thinking about physics. But what about psychology: does that mean that a mind substance exists? Does that mean that objects like consensus and justice studied in social science now have an existence independent from humanity? And why not theology too? It has a couple of epistemological problems but it's our best science regarding god.

As for calling the independent abstracta:

I don't think you have solved the problem. All you have done is put adjectives together "abstract" and "independent" and thinking that you have given me a solution when the problem is exactly their existence.

If the solution was as simple there would never have been the whole universalism vs nominalism problem.

I can understand abstractness, as independence from space and time, but it's the coupling of the independence that concerns me. What sustains them?

>>3070501
This will take some time and clarification. For your first point, this seems to be an expression of our particular beliefs, so there is really no refutation I can give. However, I do not understand what you mean by " So I don't have a particular problem with denying his claim or denying the ontological commitment of anything". You must have some kind of ontological commitment or else your universe consists of nothing, not even you. Next point, I think you are misunderstanding what Indespensibility is intended to mean. Indespensibility does not mean that we are committed to the meanings of terms by virtue of the terms in the language, this would be analyticity, something Quine despises. What me means by the argument is that we need to posit the existence of certain phenomenon and objects to round out our scientific theories. We do not need to posit the existence of entities in theology, for example, because the theory does not have much predicitibility. The same can be said for the other cases in your third point. Quine does not believe he solved any problem, for he denies there is a problem at all. He does not believe that proving the existence of anything in of itself is possible. Thus, we do not have a problem of proving the existence of irrational numbers anymore than we have a problem proving that there is a moon that rotates around the Earth. You are right on your second to last point, there is much here to debate. However, I never made the claim it was not debatable. You said that logic was not central to philosophy. I argued it was vital. You said not if we adopt pragmatism. I showed otherwise. I am not professing my views, they are very different from this I assure you. I am only refuting your statements.

>>3070501
cont.

Your last point is of metaphysics. I cannot really answer this because I am not a metaphysician, however, I will say that the concrete/abstract distinction is the next to go in philosophy, so you are not the only one who finds this troubling.

I tend to agree with Schopenhauer who sees logic as a guiding "maiden hand" of philosophy but not necessarily essential, and I modify that view by Nietzsche's genealogical study of logic as an extension of prejudices which empower certain modes of thinking which are practical expressions of Will to Power. From that historical perspective, looking at logic as something man made over time and accruing different conventions of elaboration, symolisation, alteration, demonstration, logic as an internally validating system is consigned the value "false" and "erroneous" and "blinkered", but all those values are also held up to be vital to the human struggle for increasing and expressing one's power.

cause havent read him i guess. it will be done some time.

>>3070589
The question is: abstractions independent of what? The logicians flirtation with platonism, essentialism, and metaphysics is what makes them look ridiculous.

>>3070588
What I mean by no ontological commitment is that my allegiances fluctuate. I'm no troubled by the thoughbt that quarks are not real entities but useful fictions for example. I realy beieve that the strongest versions of skepticism have no received a reasonale refutation.

But going back to the argument I think you are making a weaker case than what quine proof purpots to do.
I do agree with you that some time platonism is useful to the mathematician and I believe there is no reason to impose the costrictions of intuitionism, but this is healthy pragmatism not platonism. Because if pragmatism is about knowing when to put in parenthesis skepticism is also about when to take it out of parenthesis. If platonism may be useful for the working mathematician it is not useful for the historian of math as it would lead him subsume the whole math as a collective enterprise towards an absolute truth rather than a series of instruments invented to respond to a series of needs.

I feel like that the pragmatists excessive support of platonism and certain realisms are an excessive reaction to the fear of faling into skepticism and of being misunderstood by the scientists they want to please so much.

>>3071222
All of your posts are so poorly written and yet I force myself to read them because I'm convinced you're not an idiot.

Can you be less careless and write more clearly?

>>3071227

I'm sorry. It's a combination of english being my second language and being at work writing on my cell phone.

Can you tell me what you are not finding clear? I'll try to explain myself better.

cos im not a fookin' shtudent

>>3071227
No, he is a fucking idiot.

>>3071222
I asked you if you knew anything about this shit, you said yes. Now I am confronted with this shit post and your dimwitted inexperience is being exposed. Quine did not write a proof for Indespensibility. It is an argument that was drawn out from "Word&Object" and "On What There Is". I am not making a weaker case, I am stating the case that Quine makes, if you need a citation for this, look at what I mentioned. "Healthy Pragmatism" is a new word. What it is commonly referred to is "reluctant platonism". Also, the historian of mathematics is often time a mathematician, and if he is not, he should not consider himself a historian of mathematics. Also, Quine (along with 90% of mathematicians and philosophers) would argue that mathematics is not a "series of instruments". If it were, how would be able to justify the fixed objective truth values and model structures of mathematical systems? This is a much harder problem that mere ontological commitment. So Quine would argue that platonism is more use to the historian of mathematics than the practicing mathematician. You last point is hilariously bad and it is often what pseudo-intellectuals like you say when they are shit out of ideas. We are not falling into skepticism. In what way are we? Also, how does this have anything to do with the relevance of Logic? Stick to the argument at hand. Also, I don't think it is true that philosophers try to please scientists. Just because the school of Empiricism has its roots in science is irrelevant. Philosophers of Science shit on Physicists all the time, and the converse also holds.

>>3070450
>This means that we cannot program a computer so that they can handle abstract ideas like mathematical induction.
What if we programmed a series of tiny computers, like a non-biological neural network?

>>3071222
cont.
Also, I would like to make it known that I am not expressing any of my own personal views (except with the instance of my very last sentence on the abstract/concrete distinction). I am not here arguing my own philosophy. I am showing you that you have not thought out any of your positions and that you are talking out your ass. I am more well read in this area than anyone you will ever meet. I am not writing these replies in hopes to gain anything from this conversation, I am writing these replies so that I can get you to admit that you are talking out your ass. You need to realize that you cannot make wild ass claims and expect to go unchecked. Never talk out your ass because there is always someone in close proximity who knows what they are talking about.

>>3072147
That would be awesome! Too bad that doesn't solve the problem that you would need to show that there exists a formal system that is rich enough to express all of mathematics is complete (which you cannot because Godel proved this statements negation with the Incompleteness Theorem).

>>3070501

Matter is a series of bubbles in space-time. All we do when we are is bend this essence. There is no meaning or attribute outside of the nothingness of space-time.

>>3072202
Die in a fire, we have a good thread going.

because ism is the death of thought, bub

because he wore a blond wig and was a filthy little shota.

>>3072251
Wrong

>>3075215

How so?

>>3072128
>>3072153
So Platonism is valid because of "Euclidean geometry", is basically what you're saying, although you're substituting mod. math theory for Euclid, all the same objections against that (found in Kant) hold.

Please fuck off.