/lit/ - Literature

You're just describing Baudrillards simulacrum. Idealists never recovered from the 20th century

>>22677683
>a representation of a representation to obscure the representation of a thing whose representation obscures it
I reckon not

>>22677683
We have limited cognitive resources so the metacognitive capacity that allows for this is bottlenecked. However, that can be surpassed when taking psychedelics. Everything encountered while tripping on n-dmt is representational insofar as it's all the fractal dissociation of the self.

What did he mean by this bros?

>>22677683
"Representation" is an action, not an object in our mind. We observe the world, straight away, directly without mediation. We can be wrong, but insofar as we are wrong, we do not need to posit a mediating object that we are right about to understand that wrongness.

>>22677683
It doesn't apply because you only need a representations for independently existing things like objects. For the representations, its esse est percepi, so we can be aware of them without mediation.

>>22678311
well women do tend to have higher verbal iq than men, who have higher nonverbal iq. I suppose that lends to this position.

>>22678331
What do you mean? How could we be wrong about the world if we don't re-present it in some way (e.g. forming mental images)? I'm confused by this.
>>22678340
This is what I think that happens. After a certain point, your point of comparison isn't the world (e.g. matching the mental image to the corresponding part of the world). Rather, it's comparing one representation with another, and only generalities can be compared, not specifics.

>>22678365
Ok thanks, now what did he mean here?

>>22678389
men are long term time preference and delayed gratification, women short term time preference and immediate gratification

>>22678373
>What do you mean? How could we be wrong about the world if we don't re-present it in some way (e.g. forming mental images)? I'm confused by this.
We can just be disposed to say the wrong sentences or otherwise committed to the wrong sentences, there is no need for a mental representation there. When I say "it looks red" but its actually blue, its tempting to think there must really be something red there, like a qualia or something, that I am looking at in my mind that really is actually red, but if I said "I think the eifel tower is 12 feet tall" we do not feel tempted to say that there is a mental object that actually is 12 feet tall, my sentence is just wrong. "Seeming" talk doesn't indicate another special kind of thing, its just us hedging our bets.

>>22678411
I wasn't convinced that you addressed the problem adequately, since the analogy comes off as an attempt to ignore the causes behind incorrect propositions about experience. What do you mean by saying the wrong sentences or committed to the wrong sentences? Why would you say something incorrect in the first place? If the naive representation of the world was mistaken, and that led to the incorrect sentence, then that would makes sense.

>>22678436
All sorts of causal reasons could cause you to say false sentences. That is a story for biology and psychology, not epistemology. As long as we know what constitutes the truth value of a sentence, there is no problem with leaving the account of error to the merely causal sciences.

>>22677683
>>22677683

Hmmm, not really. Representation of representation is not an explanation of a concept via the concept in need of explanation (example: Explaining awareness via awareness = cartesia theater). Or rather an phenomena via phenomena it self.

Forming a representation via representation only produces new thoughts which are distinct from those which were in need to be represented.

In short, the homunculus argument is a logical fallacy, meaning it is an error in argumentation. Forming the representation of representation is the action of a mind and not logical deduction or induction.

>>22678331
NTA
But what exactly do you mean by "Representation is an action?" and how would this relate to explaining imagination where we can bring representations of objects in our perception?

>>22678496
Imagination is non-representational. It does not even purport to show you anything in the world. Different matter.

>>22678452
What constitutes the truth value of the sentence is whether its semantic value matches the outside world. And if somebody intends on making a true statement, and is wrong regardless, then we have to figure out where the source of the misunderstanding is. And if the source is located in perception, then we have to accept that perception isn't directly "receiving" the world but is instead filtering it in some way.

>>22678496
>what exactly do you mean by "Representation is an action?"
NTA, a representation acting directly at its representational level as opposed to interfacing its representative representations of representations to mediately ascertain wrongness
or something of that nature, idk

>>22677683
yes, that is called epiphenomalism

>>22678625
It is not epistemically or philosophical significant what causes an error, its an entirely causal story which is best left to psychological or biology. There are not two kinds of perceptions - true ones and false ones, which are otherwise identical, there is an action, perception, which either succeeds or fails at giving us truth. There is no common substance to veridical and non-veridical perceptions. When perception succeeds us it leads to us believing a true sentence directly depicting the real layout of the world, when it fails, it is not perception at all, it gives us nothing of epistemic significance, it doesn't make it correct to say anything.

>>22678625
Heard of the slingshot argument against the correspondence theory of truth? What about propositions lacking in extension, such as those regarding fictitious entities or qualia?

>>22678642
read: it is a phenomenon causing another phenomenon rather than, say, a substance causing a phenomenon

>>22678643
So, what makes it possible for perceptions to be truthful at all, and to be more truthful than not?

>>22678649
>Heard of the slingshot argument against the correspondence theory of truth?
I just looked it up, and I can tell I'm already partial to it.
>What about propositions lacking in extension, such as those regarding fictitious entities or qualia?
I see where you're coming from. I only meant that statement within the context of reporting on what was perceived. I want to stay focused on representationalism. I otherwise agree with what you're saying (in that I'm not a radical empiricist or something).

>>22678708
It is truthful if it delivers to us a true sentence, the causal mechanism behind how photons hitting our eyes and so on is processed into awareness of a sentence, a state of affairs, a "this such", is a question for neuroscience and such.

>>22678628
>representation acting directly at its representational level

How exactly can representationa act?
What exactly do you mean by direct representational level?

Do you mean an object which would be otherwise represented via some medium?

>>22678775
Are our perceptions more likely to be true than not? If so, why? (in a general sense, so more than a "this such" but a consistent trend among the "this such")

>>22677683
>representation as is used in metaphysical idealism
>representation as is used in an everyday sense to mean metacognition
These are not the same you fucking cunt

>>22678395
clueless retard who is permanently online
>>22678389
the core idea of his view here (rel. to his philosophy) is that it's basically impossible for a woman to take an objective perspective on anything

>>22678906
>How exactly can representationa act?
NTA. that's the problem, representations can't act. if you are a social smoker for example you need to create a condition where you can smoke with other people. there is not action you can take from 'social smoker' alone., and if you are a social smoker it is always represented by other things. but there is one thing, I guess, that is true between all the representations- 'social smoker'.
It's kind of like how if you only know an idea by talking to another person, you can only talk about the other person and not the idea.

>>22678775
>There are not two kinds of perceptions - true ones and false ones, which are otherwise identical,

>It is truthful if it delivers to us a true sentence

Apart or you claiming (if you are the same anon) that there is no such thing as true perception and then that there is, you are proposing that perception is true if it delivers us true sentance but how do we know when perception does deliver us true sentance?

>>22678940
They're not. But metaphysics is the template that the reality that we experience is derived from. Any other definition of metaphysics makes it the equivalent to learning the obnoxious rules to a fairy tale.

>>22678962
NTA no.2 i am curently guessing few things.

a) That you and NTA no.1. are either the same persone or a group
b) That you are trolling by posting meaningleas contradictory word-salads
c) That you are high as fuck trying to write your thoughts down

>>22679013
>But metaphysics is the template that the reality that we experience is derived from

Metaphysics is the template that wqs derived from reallity that we experiance.

>>22679016
c

>>22679027
Well shit anon, have funn and vibe away.
If i may: https://youtu.be/LnmSSkNLYhs?si=cslBNXO7B_6NTtrB

>>22678956
>the core idea of his view here (rel. to his philosophy) is that it's basically impossible for a woman to take an objective perspective on anything
based

>>22677683
>observe the world and form a representation in our minds
That's not what Vorstellung means
There's no difference between the object perceived and the perception of it is what Vorstellung means, that there's no qualified object outside the subject. There's no copying or modeling, the perceiving is the thought and thinking is the perceived—the world is an extension of ourselves.

>>22679013
>representation, the term describing the form of cognition about outer experience, is a template to also describe the formation of metacognitive mental objects
I don't know what to make of what you've said - I'm sorry but it just seems sloppy

>>22679511
>There's no difference between the object perceived and the perception of it is what Vorstellung means, that there's no qualified object outside the subject.
Then how are illusions possible?
>>22679552
I don't understand your problem about what you said. That sounds perfectly reasonable to me.

>>22678625
>And if the source is located in perception, then we have to accept that perception isn't directly "receiving" the world but is instead filtering it in some way.
Not only filtering, but constructing it using senses as raw material. Isn't this the core idea of Kant's Critic?

>>22678365
>muh verbal iq
gossiping about Chad and manipulating your way through the social ladder aren’t signs of intelligence
bees and ants are the most intelligent beings on earth by your retarded argument

>>22678643
>when it fails, it is not perception at all, it gives us nothing of epistemic significance, it doesn't make it correct to say anything.
but from the perceiver's point of view it's still a perception, because he doesn't know in advance whether it's true or not.
you too don't know whether something's true or not, you just imagine like you do right now for the sake of making the argument.

>>22681016
>I don't understand your problem about what you said. That sounds perfectly reasonable to me.
I'll reference the OP pic here: The first refers to to how the will appears in to us in sensibility, which is, as representation. That is, representation of will according to our cognition's structuring of sensibility according to the pure forms of intuition (space and time) and causality.
But the second is just the changing of an existing mental object.
The first is an attempt to describe the difference between metaphysical reality and appearance. The second is a trivial observation about everyday cognition. When you say 'represenation' of our own thoughts, many other words could be substituted in and the meaning remains unchanged. But in the case of idealist metaphysics, you cannot just call it a 'model'/'reformation'/'image' or anything else because there is something so specific being meant by 'representation'. So, metaphysical representation also describes the process of forming representations of will - metacognitive 'representation' is literally just thinking...
I hope that makes it clearer why your cross-use of the terms (without significant clarifications (as yet forthcoming)) is sloppy.

>>22681488
I just realised that >>22679511
hit the nail on the head succinctly already. If you don't see how what he said explodes your comments then you clearly haven't read Schoppy
>lmao

>>22681488
What are you referring to as "first" and "second" here?

Bump

>>22677683
Words are representations of a representation, in Schopenhauer's terms. I can't be bothered to point out where he said this, but it does explain the concept of a "representation of a representation", and why it doesn't go further than this.

>>22681496
You never tried to explain illusions. It seems like you’re trying to excessively posture to avoid addressing the elephant in the room.

>>22684833
They simply can’t do it. The Schopenhauerian idealist cannot contend with the illusionary doctrine.
>>22681506
The Schopenhauerian idealist feeds off of obscurity. Don’t expect a clarification.

>>22677683
I just read Kant and it left a shit taste in my mouth. It wasn't complex, it was just deconstructionist and dry as fuck. Convince me this is worth giving a try to.

>>22684833
everything's illusion to schoop
he's basically a buddhist/advaitin

qrd on his refutation of Spinoza?

>>22685237
You just had a taste of your own mouth for the first time buddy.

>>22686308
Terrible. Spinoza understood the implications of the PSR very well. Schopenhauer seethed at him over his version of the Ontological Argument, I think raising the same critique Kant raised over it (might be more to it, this is just off memory).

>>22686285
the will is an illusion then

>>22681496
>more obscurantism
How is Schopenhauer different from Hegel again? It's all the same Germoid schlock.

>>22678395
And which of these options is most like children?

>>22689508
The latter undoubtedly

>>22677683
>Does the homunculus argument apply to representationalism?
I feel like this confuses spatial recursion with temporal representations. Schopenhauer was writing more about temporal representations, re-presentations, memories..the homunculus argument is more spatially oriented, a thought experiment that reminds me of Zeno's paradoxes in that they illustrate the problems with mixing reason with half-baked empirical and phenomenal ideas. You end up with fantastical obviously wrong theories that seem like episodes of Black Mirror or Twilight Zone. The buck obviously stops at the material world, it is us, we are made up of it. It is watching itself fragmentally and in a strikingly limited dream-like way through us. As far as I can ascertain, there is no infinite regression of increasingly tiny men watching through the parent body via a screen in the eyes or anything analogous to that.
> e.g. If we observe the world and form a representation in our minds, and then we observe our observations to form a representation of a representation, etc., does this have the potential to go on to infinity?
Those would be temporal representations and they go on for as long as you have memories. Perhaps the universe is infinite, if that's true I guess, theoretically, representations could be infinite but because we are, I assume, discussing people as we now define them, the answer would be 'no' since eventually the human body is destroyed along with it's representations.
> Or does it end somewhere?
The representations would end, I assume, with the individual in questions death.

>>22690216
>I feel like this confuses spatial recursion with temporal representations.
Well, I was wondering if the general "gist" of the homunculus argument, the infinite recursion of observation, would apply. I would abstract out the spatial elements as the vehicle of the metaphor. The question is whether pic-related serves as an adequate description of representation.
>Those would be temporal representations and they go on for as long as you have memories.
I don't think the question would involve memories, at least not in a direct moment, because we are looking at thinking in general and/or thinking at a particular snapshot.

>>22690576
> The question is whether pic-related serves as an adequate description of representation.
Usually we don't "see" representations unless we are talking about visual tricks (pic related), typically representations are of physical feelings, concepts, multi-dimensional abstractions and things like that. For example, when you look at a bleeding hand or some other bodily disaster, you might have an empathetic projection, maybe a quick feeling in your hand, or when you see some tactile fluffy material like a coat you might have a sense of what it feels like. In day to day action your mind puts together flash representations to create a sense of space and time. Like the drawing, these are usually merged into combined ideas, like legos of different type and shape connected together. It's not one dimensional because it involves multiple senses, multiple memories, abstract ideas, all of it gelling together in random ways to allow us to accomplish tasks and achieve goals. We aren't just sitting down, powerless, as representations flash before us like watching a movie. We are actively navigating a multi-dimensional imagination space of feelings, sound relations, internal vocabulary/monologue, as well as differently formed concepts. I guess, symbolically, the diagram can describe one potentiality of how representations happen.

>>22690761
> Usually we don't "see" representations
Actually, I said this incorrectly, I said this wrong, I meant that we don't see false representations, like we often don't usually visually "see" our memories like in your picture, it's more like a sort of flash concept of a visualization with the packed ideas developed and sensations we acquire as children feeling around spaces and learning about space as we touch objects and learn to crawl and walk. We are seeing representations constantly, just of the spatial world around us. So, I meant we aren't typically visually "seeing" our memories in the same way we see things with our eyes. I guess that's what I meant.

>>22690781
(continued)
but you aren't really talking about that, I think you are asking whether ideas get packed together into recursive associations, the answer is yes. You see a tree and aspects of that sight have the ability to be stored in memory and, if stored, you can access whatever aspect was stored (I guess that's the bubble) and recall that fragment of the experience and that can be associated with another experience. This can go on sort of recursively. It really depends on what we are talking about, different types of representations gel together in different ways, they don't all form in the same way. My ideas about China aren't formed in the same as my ideas about navigating space or about language or how time passes or riding a bike or how to deal with my girlfriend or writing or drawing or shaving. They don't all form in exactly the same way. I'm reluctant to say "generally, yes" because a hair splitter could enter the conversation and point out all the ways this or that series of representations doesn't work this way exactly and there are many other things involved and they would be right. Asking whether memory operates like in this picture is almost like asking whether dogs operate by putting food into their mouth and pooping. I guess the answer is "yeah" but there's way more shit going on, cells, reproduction, development, barking, brain functions, diseases, etc.

>>22690839
>I think you are asking whether ideas get packed together into recursive associations, the answer is yes.
So, would we be capable of infinite recursion in consciousness? i.e. reflecting upon reflecting upon reflecting, etc. Or would we hit some kind of barrier after a certain limit, i.e. Aristotle's thought thinking itself?

>>22687120
i'm only on sec24-30

If causality is a form of intuition or quality of the object as object, what does it mean for cause and effect as a relational category?

i get it, woof