/lit/ - Literature

>>22462992
You can think noumena, but the noumenon is not the absolute. There is a plurality of noumena, they are called other minds. I am a noumenon and when I suppose that you exist I am thinking you as a noumenon. Rocks, trees, stars, etc are all also minds and therefore noumena. There isn’t even a clear boundary between one mind and the other. I only become different from you in a continuous gradation so that there is no exact boundary between me and not-me. That is precisely how I know what is outside myself.

>>22462992
Philosophy is suppose to define evidence, not the other way around

plus, your retarded

>>22463392
>>22463392
Give me one good reason to actually believe the "thing in itself" is any better or worse understood through different observations being pitted against eachother in a dialectic. yes you make a partially good point about evidence being defined ontologically by philosophy but evidence also manifests itself in the various assertions assumed to be true when going through logically deductive argument. again what fucking reason is there to believe that this asshole should know any more about the noumena or how to understand it than any other fucker THAT IS MY PROBLEM WITH THIS COCKSUCKER HOLY SHIT. I have posted for literal MONTHS asking you faggot hegelians to give me any literally ANY good reason to take his arguments regarding the noumena/phenomena distinction, sense certainty, and dialectical materialism seriously at all. his philosophy of history is okay though i disagree with his teleological claims, still as far as his ontological and epistemological claims are concerned he is a RETARD.
>>22463085
honestly this is just going into the retardation of solipsism vs other minds and thus not even worth entertaining

>>22462992
He wrote entire books backing up his claims. He criticizes when people try to do philosophy in one sentence feel good quotes.

>>22463590
Uhh I’m just supposed to accept that there is a subject object distinction without any evidence??

>>22463598
My good friend have you not read the critique of pure reason? Even ignoring that, literally just look at any contemporary neuroscience literature. yes the writers are generally materialists but even they admit that the brain "simulates" your experience for you.

>>22463595
Where? He addresses the noumena/phenomena distinction in the introduction of the phenomenology but then completely ignores it the rest of the book. and don't tell me that crap ass sense certainty chapter counts as evidence. to be fair i have only read the phenomenology so if he does point it out elsewhere please do share.

>>22463605
How is CPR any more evidence than any of Hegels books? Also what does neuroscience have to do with any of this?

>>22463598
the subject object ideal is real and you can reach it anon

>>22463610
It’s in the Science of Logic. He doesn’t treat it in the Phenomenology of Spirit because what you’re talking about isn’t phenomenology

>>22463614
neuroscience is actually showing how the brain works and how the mind experienced is generated by the brain parts but not by direct experience with the objects perceived and experienced themselves. which is essentially what kant is saying, in that we don't actually experience the objects we see and feel in and of themselves but rather as a product of the mind. the body generating the mind shows the distinction between these minds and the objects that are experienced, though still intrinsically tied to the material reality of the brain parts functioning. And the CPR actually makes logically consistent arguments for the separation between the thing experienced and the thing in itself.
>>22463619
yeah but it's directly related to phenomenology, but very well i have been meaning to read the science of logic so i will do that

It’s not that he bridges the gap, he just says that there isn’t one. If you look at Kant’s philosophy from an effective view the noumena really doesn’t add anything at all. Again, in the effective view, we can now just take the noumena and discard it without losing anything from Kant at all. The way he actually proves that the noumena doesn’t exist is more complicated and involves working through the contradictions of Kant’s own philosophy. Essentially, since identity is composed by self-referential difference (absolute difference) we cannot speak of an apple without implicitly speaking of a not pear or a not cherry etc. The web of negations to an identity is what gives it its structure. When we speak of things-in-themselves we are injecting a false dichotomy where things can be in-themselves and for-us. The operation of contradiction works on the level of the for-us and presents a “proof” of the essence of the in-itself by working through consciousness. But, this distinction of in-itself and for-us takes place in consciousness and as such we can say that the thing itself is in-itself-for-us. Thus, the path we take to the Truth in-itself that we thought was exterior to the truth is actually itself predicated on a distinction which takes place in consciousness. We have to posit the thing-itself as the base of transcendental philosophy in order to prove that it exists. Here’s Hegel’s own words on it:
>The content, however, of what presents itself to us does exist for it [for the consciousness]; we comprehend only the formal aspect of that content, or it’s pure origination. For it, what has thus arisen exists only as an object; for us, it appears at the same time as movement and a process of becoming.

>>22463590
>dialectical materialism
well he was an idealist not a materialist.
So yeah, you're getting evidence for sure. But this evidence is for the case that you are missing a chromosome you fucking retard.

How about you actually read the books and stop whining on a shitty message board

>>22462992
>uhhh, the noumena? that's just a word you invented bro, doesn't mean it actually exists
>see? there is no problem

>>22463652
I don't get what you mean by
>in-themselves and for-us
It sounds like you're just repeating the noumena/phenomena distinction respectively, and then doing some handwaving to say that it's constructed by consciousness, even though Kant's whole argument is that there needs to be a synthesis of itself.

Plus this "for-us" thing makes it seem like objects exist... for us. No, they don't. They're indifferent. We react to them, they react to us. Whether we have full disclosure is a different story.

I'm just confused by it all, so I hope you take my slightly abrasive tone as a healthy challenge to prove me wrong.

>>22463669
Ok so you read Kant once and pretend you have an opinion on shit you clearly don't understand.

>hegelian dialatics

>>22463669
things in themselves are appearances. things for us are more complicated because they can be mechanistic, chemical, or teleological.

>>22463669
I’m really not convinced you actually read PoS

>>22463669
I don't mean they are there for us ontologically i just mean they're there and we are observing them.
and there is a synthesis still because the brain needs some information from the stimulus in order to create the conscious phenomenon, according to the contemporary literature in neurology.

>>22463690
>things in themselves are appearances. things for us are more complicated because they can be mechanistic, chemical, or teleological.
It sounds like the noumena-phenomena distinction flipped around. Phenomena are supposed to be the appearances.
>>22463682
I'm not convinced you understand the problem.
>>22463705
Make a good argument to make it seem like a viable solution and I'll read it to see what I'm missing.

>>22463711
appearance-in-itself is nature, according to the prolegomena, iirc

>>22463610
He literally deals with it extensively in both the section on Force and Understanding and in the section on Reason. He even tells you right at the beginning of the Preface that everything he says there is not to be taken at face value, since it will have to be proven later on.
As the other anon told you he also deals with it in the Science of Logic, where he shows that the phenomena/noumena distinction is based on an illogical prejudice.
But desu you don't need Hegel to go beyond the distinction, it is enough to realize that for reason to limit itself it must have already surpassed its self-posited limits. It is no wonder that in Kant the limits of thought are merely presupposed.

>>22463635
Do you realize that for Kant too the brain is just a phenomenon, and as such it has no explanatory power when it comes to the mind? He talks about it in the section on Paralogisms, where he extends this critique to all possible materialist theories of the mind. I think you're mistaking Kant for a neokantism

>>22463733
okay i'll eat some humble pie and check those again.
>>22463737
>>22463737
I understand that, which is partly why i pointed out that many of those neuroscientists are still materialists but both they and kant agree that the mind still constructs the phenomena for kant it does seem to be the mind itself but as far as neuroscience is concerned there still is the necessary relationship between the observable phenomena of the material brain and what occurs in conscious experience of the mind

>>22463669
> Plus this "for-us" thing makes it seem like objects exist... for us.
When I use for-us I am simply making reference to the aspect in which things present themselves to consciousness. I.e. phenomena. I am not imputing any kind of agency on the thing.
>I don’t get what you mean by in-itself and for-us
I don’t mean in-itself-and-for-us, I mean in-itself-for-us. The category of in-itself exists FOR the consciousness.
> It sounds like you're just repeating the noumena/phenomena distinction respectively, and then doing some handwaving to say that it's constructed by consciousness
That’s exactly what I’m doing. Truth is based in the concept which is the mode of thought for consciousness and as such the truth of any statement has to be measured by its place in the concept. Things-in-themselves are entirely foreign to consciousness and therefore cannot be either true or false. All we can know about the things-in-themselves is the form which they take in the thinking consciousness. This form is itself constructed by consciousness beforehand as the inherently a-conscious material. It is un dialectizable, unable to be apprehended. However, this inability to approach the thing-in-itself is itself the purpose of the thing-in-itself. If Noumena could be known then Kant’s whole system falls apart. That is how the in-itself is for-us: the thing-in-itself presents itself as unknowable but the positive action inherent in that is that it necessitates Kant’s whole project. Far from being ostensibly the void which lies outside for Kant, it is the void which axiomatically necessitates transcendental idealism.

>>22462992
Gee, if only he like, had a 900 page book that lays out his goals for a presuppositionless philosophy and then takes you through the system from pure indeterminate being on up.

>>22463590
This post makes me think you don't have even a basic grasp on Hegel. Read Houlgate's introduction to the Logic off LibGen and figure out why he doesn't agree with the noumena. He thinks Kant is guilty of dogmatism for assuming thought is "of objects," as a starting point and then using judgement to just happen to find Aristotle's exact categories. The point is that Kant wasn't critical enough. How he recovers the bridge can't be understood until you understand that.

>>22463793
Exactly. Let’s shut up about Hegel and start actually interpreting the Phenomenology.

>>22463812
I was thinking of the Greater Logic actually.

On the surface Hegel’s charge that Kant simply assumes that understanding is judgment appears to be too hasty. But closer examination of Kant’s position in the Critique of Pure Reason proves Hegel to be right. Indeed, one of Kant’s strongest advocates, Reinhard Brandt, confirms Hegel’s view. In the First Critique, Brandt writes, “it is assumed as obvious that the understanding is a faculty of knowledge through concepts, [and] that concepts can be used to obtain knowledge only through judgments.”8 Hegel is also right to claim that Kant simply takes over the various kinds of judgment with which he is familiar from formal logic and does not derive them from the nature of understanding itself. Indeed, Kant states explicitly that such a derivation is impossible to provide:

...for the peculiarity of our understanding, that it is able to bring about the unity of apperception a priori only by means of the categories and only through precisely this kind and number of them, a further ground may be offered just as little as one can be offered for why we have precisely these and no other functions for judgment or for why space and time are the sole forms of our possible intuition. (CPR 254/159 [B145–6])

All Kant can say, therefore, is that “if we abstract from all content of a judgment . . . , we find (finden) that the function of thinking in that can be brought under four titles” (CPR 206/110 , my emphasis)…

So far I have suggested that what motivates Hegel in the Logic is the desire for necessity. Like Fichte, Hegel wants to find out how basic categories have to be understood, not just how they have in fact been understood. This can only be discovered, he believes, if we demonstrate which categories are inherent in thought as such, and we can only do this if we allow pure thought to determine itself—and so to generate its own determinations—“before our very eyes” (to use Fichte’s expression).

Fichte maintains that Kant himself “does not derive the presumed laws of the intellect from the very nature of the intellect,” but abstracts these laws from our empirical experience of objects, albeit via a “detour through logic” (which itself abstracts its laws from our experience of objects).16 In Fichte’s view, therefore, Kant may assert that the categories and laws of thought have their source in the spontaneity of the intellect, but—because of the way he proceeds—“he has no way to confirm that the laws of thought he postulates actually are laws of thought and that they are really nothing else but the immanent laws of the intellect.” The only way to confirm this, Fichte tells us, would be to start from the simple premise that the intellect acts—that the intellect is “a kind of doing and absolutely nothing more”—and to show how the laws of thought can be derived from this premise alone

In §24 of the Encyclopedia Logic [Hegel] claims that “logic coincides with metaphysics, with the science of things grasped in thoughts” (EL 56/81), and in the introduction to the Logic he maintains that “the objective logic . . . takes the place . . . of former metaphysics which was intended to be the scientific construction of the world in terms of thoughts alone” (SL 63/1: 61). Hegel also emphasizes the metaphysical character of the Logic by asserting that its subject matter is the logos, “the reason of that which is”: “it is least of all the logos which should be left outside the science of logic” (SL 39/1: 30)…

Hegel does not claim that ontological structures are known in the Logic precisely as they occur in nature. The Logic conceives such structures in abstraction from space, time, and matter first of all, and the Philosophy of Nature then examines how such structures manifest themselves in space and time. Hegel’s claim that conceptual and syllogistic form is to be found in nature (or in “all things”) should not therefore be taken to blur the distinction between the Logic and the Philosophy of Nature. What that claim does make clear, however, is that for Hegel “concept” and “syllogism” are forms inhering in what there is and are not just forms in terms of which we think; they are ontological and not merely logical structures.

>>22463590
So to clear up your confusion, consider that:

Hegel’s arguments in support of the claim that thought understands not just the objects of our experience but being itself can be regarded as forming his own Transcendental Deduction....

There are two intimately related arguments at the heart of Hegel’s Transcendental Deduction. After Kant’s critical turn, Hegel maintains, the logician is no longer justified in taking for granted any rules, laws, or concepts of thought (SL 43/1: 35). Indeed, the logician cannot take for granted anything at all about thought except thought’s own simple being. In the science of logic, therefore, we may begin from nothing more determinate than the sheer being of thought itself—thought as sheer being.

...The principal difference between Descartes and Hegel, of course, is that for Hegel the process of suspending all that thought has previously taken for granted about itself leaves us not with the recognition that I am but with the indeterminate thought of thought itself as sheer being.

Hegel’s second argument is equally simple but starts from the idea of “being” rather than from thought. If we are to be thoroughly self-critical, we cannot initially assume that being is anything beyond the being of which thought is minimally aware. We may not assume that being stands over against thought or eludes thought but must take being to be the sheer immediacy of which thought is minimally aware—because that is all that the self-critical suspension of our presuppositions about being and thought leaves us with. A thoroughly selfcritical philosopher has no choice, therefore, but to equate being with what is thought and understood. Any other conception of being—in particular, one that regards being as possibly or necessarily transcending thought—is simply not warranted by the bare idea of being as the “sheer-immediacy-of-which-thoughtis-minimally-aware” from which we must begin.

First, we are aware of being for no other reason than that we think; thought is thus the “condition” of our awareness of being. This is Hegel’s quasi-Kantian principle. Second, thought is minimally the awareness or intuition of being itself. This is Hegel’s quasiSpinozan principle. These two principles dovetail in the single principle that the structure of being is the structure of the thought of being and cause Hegel to collapse ontology and logic into the new science of ontological logic. 31

Hegel acknowledges that there is a difference between thought and being: being is what it is in its own right and is not there only for conscious thought. Moreover, as we learn in the course of the Logic, being does, after all, turn out to constitute a realm of objects (“over there” and all around us). Hegel insists, however, that we may not begin by assuming that being is quite separate from thought.

Hegelians should just dilate in silence. Their sophistry is subversive and unwanted.

>>22463842
Wonderful post anon, ty for this very clear formulation

>>22463848
Could you please explain, in very general terms, how the passage from Logic to Nature is accomplished? How do we end up knowing that the syllogism and the concept are forming that inhere in what there is in the natural realm?

>>22463757
>That’s exactly what I’m doing.
What if the distinction is not constructed by consciousness? What if these problems are inherent in the fabric of reality? What if consciousness is meant to mediate between the two, but only does so imperfectly, and Kant merely discovered this problem and devised the appropriate labels to map the problem with precision?

>>22463892
See: >>22463854

The natural consciousness takes "experience" to belong to subjective rationality, and the "object" to be what is independently actual. The truth of absolute cognition is rather that "experience" is actual and objective, while the unchangeable absolute object is the concept of subjective rationality; and since it is absolute and unchangeable this truth of absolute cognition enforces itself in the obstinately inverted concept that natural consciousness has of its cognition, by continually driving it to despair, and so to the experience of self-inversion. Only when the identity of the actual and the rational is fully grasped--only when we finally see that "experience" is objective and the "object" is our subjective concept--only then will the concept of truth as experience, and experience as truth, finally comprehend itself.


Thus the seemingly insoluble difficulty created by the fact that consciousness cannot "get behind the object as it is for consciousness" and test its knowledge of the object by the standard of "how the object is in itself" is a pseudo-problem created by our looking at things the wrong way round.

>>22463948
Earlier quotes from Houlgate's introduction to the Logic, the latter from Harris's Hegel's Ladder on section 184 of the Phenomenology.

I know there is a more direct, if deflationary explanation in Pinkhard's Hegel's Naturalism, but I don't have it bookmarked.

>>22463854
Thank you anon for the series of effortposts. Especially with these two quotes:
>There are two intimately related arguments at the heart of Hegel’s Transcendental Deduction. After Kant’s critical turn, Hegel maintains, the logician is no longer justified in taking for granted any rules, laws, or concepts of thought (SL 43/1: 35). Indeed, the logician cannot take for granted anything at all about thought except thought’s own simple being. In the science of logic, therefore, we may begin from nothing more determinate than the sheer being of thought itself—thought as sheer being.
>First, we are aware of being for no other reason than that we think; thought is thus the “condition” of our awareness of being. This is Hegel’s quasi-Kantian principle. Second, thought is minimally the awareness or intuition of being itself. This is Hegel’s quasiSpinozan principle. These two principles dovetail in the single principle that the structure of being is the structure of the thought of being and cause Hegel to collapse ontology and logic into the new science of ontological logic.
I can see where Hegel starts to bridge the phenomena-noumena gap. But this seems to only work at a fundamental, basic level. Is there a "ladder" that thought can climb so that the whole is grasped?

>>22463947
Is your counterargument really 3 what if statements? What if the moon was made of cheese?

>>22463968
They're three serious hypotheticals that could undermine any anti-Kantian project, yes. Judging from your flippant attitude, I'm presuming you have no ability to answer them.

>>22463980
You are literally just saying “what if you’re wrong.” Yeah, I’d be wrong. You got me. You aren’t even trying to attack my argument, just undermine it

>>22463085
Do you have one good piece of evidence to support that? Any neuroscience studies that show that's how the human brain processes distinctions between itself and things outside itself? Or are you just talking out of your ass?

>>22463987
Hegel's response to Kant is basically "what if you're wrong?" so it's about as good of a counterargument as Hegel deserves without making a positive claim as to why Hegel's system overcomes Kant's problematization of metaphysics.

>>22464032
Lmfao, you have no clue what you’re talking about

>>22464042
Prove it then instead of posturing. The hypotheticals are still there, waiting for an adequate rebuttal.
>this kills the Hegelian

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AjrcWffUr_w
>praise the meta
>nouma nouma yay
>nouma nouma yay

>>22464049
As a kantian you should be able to refute this: what if a priori judgements don’t exist?

>>22464058
Then it would be impossible to understand reality whatsoever.

>>22464058
they easily could, but you would just need negation to determine why the result wasn't the prediction. and then i guess infinite judgements make them impossible to know

>>22464063
A child can perceive reality independent of a priori judgements. What if apriori judgements are merely a posterori judgements that we’ve systematized

>>22464078
A child is making a priori judgments all the time.
>What if apriori judgements are merely a posterori judgements that we’ve systematized
There would need to be a first judgment or else no systematization could be possible.

>>22464091
> There would need to be a first judgment or else no systematization could be possible.
Sure, an a posterori judgement

>>22464124
And how would it be recognized? The exterior magically impinges on the interior and, boom, the capacity for judgment is made? There's judgment before the capacity for judgment happens?

>>22464132
No dude, a priori judgements are a posterori judgements.

>>22464009
The evidence is contained in your own post. A neuroscience study standard of truth is just something you ironically presumed to avoid the truth for a funny contradiction.

>>22464149
Now you're just not making any sense. How can the first judgment be a posteriori if there's nothing to make a judgment in the first place?

I suspect this is a big distraction get away from the fact that you can't explain: >>22463947

I've already humored you enough. I'm not going to entertain any more posts unless you do your part.

>>22463947
The closest philosopher to move in this direction is Julius Bahnsen, but unfortunately, he was never translated into English.

“Julius Bahnsen's more persistent claim is that the nature of actual existence is bipolar, that objects and events conflict with one another and (since they possess opposed properties) also with themselves and that existence therefore eludes being grasped by formal logic.”

>>22462992
Tranny philosopher that hides his gooey innards of pearl clutching sentimentality behind a charade of mysticism and world salads. Hegel is not particularly bright and appeals to mediocrities that are desperate to seem eccentric. Hence why trannies love him. Behind all the edgy "do crime" memes, peacocking with obscurantist literature and ironic disaffection is a sub 115 IQ crossdresser that wants to give blacks more free stuff and to make people stop calling him and his ilk mean names. This describes the magacommunism troons especially

>>22464167
Now do you see why it’s stupid as fuck to try to argue like that? I can’t make an argument against a position that a priori rules mine out. Yes, if anything you said in the OP is true then Hegel is wrong. Congrats. You have to realize that truth is correspondance to the concept and that the concept is the form of thought. This guy here >>22463854 does a wonderful job of explaining how truth stemming from the concept leads to the recognition of things-in-themselves stemming from the concept as well.

>>22464199
>Now do you see why it’s stupid as fuck to try to argue like that?
Not really, no. I answered your claims in good faith, and then we took it to its logical conclusion. Then you tried to posit something impossible, and I told you that it didn't make any sense. Not even remotely the same.
>This guy here >>22463854 does a wonderful job of explaining how truth stemming from the concept leads to the recognition of things-in-themselves stemming from the concept as well.
Yeah, I agree he had a great explanation, which I recognized here: >>22463963. I still have a follow-up question.

>>22464364
You still can’t grasp that he’s not thinking of it as a gap at all. He’s not “bridging the gap” the gap doesn’t exist. Things-in-themselves don’t inherently exist. If Truth is in the concept and the concept is outside of things-in-themselves then the content of things-in-themselves is neither true or false, it’s an illusion.

>>22464009
using neuroscience in this context is like trying to analyze processors to explain network protocols.

>>22464399
>He’s not “bridging the gap” the gap doesn’t exist.
see >>22463661
>If Truth is in the concept and the concept is outside of things-in-themselves then the content of things-in-themselves is neither true or false, it’s an illusion.'
And, again, heading back to the hypotheticals I posited earlier, what if truth is mediated and therefore partial?

>>22464409
You know what they say, you can lead a horse to water…

>>22464197
Personally I could never take Hegel seriously after taking Schopenhauer's rants about him seriously. Academic philosophy has the pos.

>>22464411
I drank and realized that the water wasn't as clean and refreshing as people said it was. And then I got berated for saying the truth.

>>22464417

>>22464009
>how the human brain processe

The radio has nothing to do with the signal's production or broadcast, it's a receiver.

>>22464421
why would you have a pepe labeled "UWU"? are you some special kind of faggot or something?

>>22464414
>taking Schopenhauer's rants about him seriously.
ngmi

>>22463590
Is that you Schoppy

bump

>>22463854
>>22463963
Waiting for an answer to the last question which will decide whether or not I will either read Hegel or write him off as >>22463661.

>>22462992
Hegel never left Germany

>>22465650
boomp

>>22465650
>>22466752
boomp boomp

bumpy wumpy

>>22465650
>>22466752
>>22467337
>>22467684
absolute bump

>>22465653
giwtwm

>>22463652
An anon who actually understands Hegel. As a fellow Hegelmaxxer is was going to start typing paragraphs quoting Perception, Force and Understanding, etc. but you did the hard work for me.

>>22463669
>noumena/phenomena distinction respectively, and then doing some handwaving to say that it's constructed by consciousness
That’s exactly what Hegel argues but it’s not handwaving. The argument is that the experience of particulars leads us to synthesize them into having an objective inner essence, but because we never escape our own experience (if you need an argument for this, just think about the meaning of the terms “own experience”), the idea of “inner essence” must logically follow from our own experience, meaning we have not simply stumbled upon an immutable objective “law” of the concept of in-itself, rather we have actively imagined the idea of an in-itself as an abstract negation of all of the differences of an object in flux. We use general laws to explain particular instances but there is no point at which the particulars create a final objective picture of a general law, nor does the law actually explain how they are distinct from one another. The idea of the in-itself is always dependent on particular experience and thus can come from nowhere but particular experience itself which is in consciousness of course.

>>22467796
So what grounds experience then, if the thing-in-itself doesn't exist? Is Hegel a naive realist then?

I'm just confused, and my main questions also are here: >>22463947 >>22463963

>>22464009
I am only a small section of my brain. Most of my brain is outside myself and I obviously lapse into cognition of these things on the edge of me and not me.

Here's my problem with Hegel (and others):
As explained by >>22463854, the beginning of Hegel's system is thought as pure being. From my own observations, though, thought is separated from pure being by a sort of leap of faith; what I would call pure being is not thought itself but the 'container' for thought, which is the simple awareness of phenomena that precedes all other things (from a phenomenological point of view). To me there is no way to prove that the experience of thinking is the same thing as actually actively thinking for yourself with your own will and mind; you could be thinking about something or you could be essentially involuntarily watching a sort of movie which encompasses not just all the senses but also the whole scope of phenomena at large, including the experience of thinking a thought. The only thing you are capable of being aware of without doubting that it's a random phenomena flung at you from the beyond is the awareness of your own awareness, or the ability to experience your awareness becoming aware of phenomena, which reflexively dumps you into a loop of awareness of being aware of being aware of being aware... into infinity without touching the phenomena filling your awareness. Unless there's a way to bridge the gap between simply being a passive awareness that experiences things, like a cup being filled with water without any action on its part, and the capacity to actively think, you can't start a project like Hegel's, or Kant's, or really anyone's.
I'm a brainlet so if this criticism seems retarded it probably is.

>>22468061
>constructs an argument to prove how he’s not actually thinking

>>22468188
Well, yes. From my perspective I can't tell if I'm actually constructing an argument or if there just so happens to be a mass of phenomena in which an argument is constructed and posted on 4chan which I ended up experiencing for some reason, and it would seem that proving such a thing one way or the other is impossible.
And there doesn't seem to be a way out of the situation if one relies purely on reason and what is immediately obvious to the awareness; obviously one has to believe that one is actually thinking or even capable of believing or that there is something which calls itself "I" which thinks or believes or that anything is intelligible at all in order to function in life, but if one aims to construct a system of thought with full rigor then I believe one would have to overcome this gap somehow in order to begin such a thing, unless one simply begins by accepting thought as what it seems to be, axiomatically, and proceeds from there.

>>22462992
Hegel is a philosophical maze for morons

>>22468315
You say this because you have great familiarity with his system and not because you only know him through memes... right?

>>22468363
Hegel and Kant are #1

>>22467842
By saying the thing-in-itself doesn’t exist, Hegel isn’t saying we can immediately intuit reality as it is (that is the whole point of the dialectic of the Phenomenology; we have to pass through many stages of consciousness), nor is he claiming external reality doesn’t exist. He is merely saying that the thing-in-itself can’t be considered as some objective concept delivered to us on a silver platter by something outside ourselves. The concept of the thing-in-itself, like every other concept, is generated by consciousness based on the experience of the flux of reality. It is just as dependent on what appears as what appears is supposedly dependent on the thing-in-itself; and in realizing this, we realize the thing-in-itself is an empty abstraction created by consciousness in order to explain the flux of reality. Our experience of the world is not a fixed set of encounters which edge toward an unknowable limit because in establishing this limit (thing-in-itself), we are already within the bounds of consciousness and this fixed limit itself is a product of consciousness. When objects of experience don’t live up to the “ideal” of the thing-in-itself, we would have to have immediate self-justifying encounters with objective reality in order to say that these objects of experience don’t live up to “reality.” Instead, all we can say is these objects of experience don’t live up to a notion of ideal objective existence which consciousness has ALREADY established a priori. It is through this a priori development of the notion of objectivity and being that we find genuine progression of knowledge, but what’s important is that this notion of objectivity has no further criterion to be judged by and only progresses through dialectic. Our notions constantly are found to be contradictory and then cancel themselves out before being incorporated into a more nuanced, coherent notion. Thus knowledge progresses but not because it edges closer to a preconceived limit, but because we establish a limit and then the limit changes but we can only identify this after realizing the contradictions in it and positing a new limit. The information which informs the imposition of a new limit is what is already contained in experience, not some new external criteria.

>>22468580
>have problem
>pretend it doesn't exist
>no longer have problem
problem?

>>22468061
Ok Kirkegaard.

>>22465650
Hegel avoids the problem of noumena being "over there," through refusing to assume that thought is necessarily "of objects." On this dogmatic assumption rests the entire problem of the noumena and Kant's subjective dualism.

In the end, Hegel's system is more objective about the external world, less guilty of the label of "subjective idealism," then Kant's, but he refuses to start from that supposition.

Partly, Hegel is saying that it's meaningless to posit metaphysical entities who, by definition, can never make a difference to us. Their existing or not existing is coidentical for all possible observers.

For Hegel, the problem is partly psychological, a problem in how we have defined truth.

But you can't really get at it in a soundbite. That's why I recommended Houlgate's opening to the Logic.


In between these two events (forming the main content of Hegel's "Science of Experience") there is the slow maturation of the concept of truth as human experience, masked from the consciousness in which it happens by the assumption that cognition is a dialectic between experience and the "in-itself" that is "out there" (as the being of what is, in the order of Nature), rather than a dialectic between experience and the "in-itself" that is "in here" (our concept of "truth" as the thought of "what is," or the "in-itself" of consciousness itself). The natural consciousness takes "experience" to belong to subjective rationality, and the "object" to be what is independently actual.The truth of absolute cognition is rather that "experience" is actual and objective, while the unchangeable absolute object is the concept of subjective rationality; and since it is absolute and unchangeable this truth of absolute cognition enforces itself in the obstinately inverted concept that natural consciousness has of its cognition, by continually driving it to despair, and so to the experience of self-inversion. Only when the identity of the actual and the rational is fully grasped--only when we finally see that "experience" is objective and the "object" is our subjective concept--only then will the concept of truth as experience, and experience as truth, finally comprehend itself.

People get uncomfortable with Hegel's circular, falliblist epistemology though. This is "the fear of error that is really the fear of truth."

Part of the bridge is the fact that our idea of a thing IS part of that thing. For Hegel, there is no hard objective/subjective distinction. Such a thing doesn't make sense. So our conception of a thing is part of its identity, because the truth is the whole. The flower does not refute the bud nor the oak tree the acorn. The mistake is to assume our view of a thing is a somehow cut off aspect of reality, dogmatically separated as the "in here," that is not "over there." But Hegel's whole point is that we are natural creatures and subjectivity is part of reality, emerging from nature. How now then do we justify an artificial dichotomy?

>>22467842
Hegel is not a naive realist.

>>22463669 #
>noumena/phenomena distinction respectively, and then doing some handwaving to say that it's constructed by consciousness

The noumena phenomena distinction is constructed by consciousness in Kant too. The idea of "objective," is incoherent without the context of subjectivity. "Truth" is incoherent without the possibility of falsity. If there is no subjective frame than all things are "true and objective," the terms apply equally to all that exists, and are thus totally contentless.

Truth is an emergent concept.

But if the distinction is somewhat natural it is because nature creates consciousnesses.

>>22469159
>>22469175
I just don't get it. People keep telling me that the subjective-objective, phenomena-noumena distinction is constructed, fake, etc., but it seems natural for us to have a problem of subjectivity, considering that our minds are but a miniscule net traveling through a sliver of spacetime. God wouldn't have to worry about phenomena-noumena because of the nature of his existence, but we do. So why are talking about it like we just made up the concept? It's meant to point to a problem that almost has to exist, both as a confirmation of our prison, but also as a confirmation of a possible salvation out of our prison. That we both are doomed to err, but that in being doomed to err, the fact that anything is intelligible at all means that salvation is still possible.

>>22468950
How do you know the thing-in-itself must exist as an objective concept? Where did that idea of yours come from? Would you care to elaborate?

>>22469385
Like the other anon said, the problem rests on the assumption of a world of objects. If you don’t want to have to do much reading, the first 30 pages of the Phenomenology—Sense Certainty and Perception—already establish the highly problematic nature of our experience with so-called “objects.” How do they contain a multitude of qualities, all distinct from themselves, while still cohering into a unified whole? What is the most concrete experience of these? What mediates this experience? These questions all become problematic when one thinks of the world in objective terms. Further along the line, we come to problematize the very nature of distinction itself. Force is the process by which things we posit as objects are found to have distinct internal differences but also a unity, and a complex dialectic of codependence arises between Force “Expressed” (differences arising) and Force “Proper” (unity emerging).

>>22469415
Because if there weren't a thing-in-itself then there would be nothing out there. Our situation would be completely hopeless. It's the grounding for intelligibility.
>>22469433
Are you the same anon from >>22463842?

>>22469557
>>22469557
Why are you so sure there are ontologically real “things”? The thing-in-itself reflects a very narrow view of discrete objects with atomic being. Like I said, Hegel doesn’t negate the idea of external reality, merely the Kantian notion of a thing-in-itself which somehow causes appearance but is not itself subject to causality or to the senses. And no, I am not the other anon. I haven’t read the greater Logic and he could probably explain it better than I have. But I think the Phenomenology of Spirit is relevant for the kind of epistemological questions you have.

The question you raise about intelligibility is very important because Hegel believes intelligibility is the ground of experience, and that this ground is exhaustive of an object, but only after traveling through the stages of consciousness. All consciousness or object-cognition involves making distinctions (perception of internal differences in an object) about an object; and in doing so, Understanding (which is not a singular understanding that Kant talks about, but universal Understanding) realizes these distinctions must come from both the object and the subject, and in thus laying out this contradiction, Hegel finds resolution in the fact that because “objects” are centers of dialectical opposition and unity (they have distinct parts that are also united), the opposition between subject and object itself must also be a simultaneous distinction and unity. Since this resolution of opposition and unity in consciousness of things is the way reason functions, simultaneous distinction and unity is the only manner in which the general subject-object dichotomy can exist at all, or else we’d have to throw out the baby with the bath water and deny the very possibility of distinct properties inherent in objects.

>>22469980
>The thing-in-itself reflects a very narrow view of discrete objects with atomic being
I'm getting the sense that the thing-in-itself is too loaded of a term to serve its purpose of communicating ideas. So what is intelligibility, then? What grounds intelligibility?
>Why are you so sure there are ontologically real “things”?
Excuse me for my bluntness, but... what? I don't get where you're going with this. To me, positing such questions is akin to trying to flip the table we're playing chess on, and then pretend you can still play chess afterwards. I don't know what baggage you're associating "ontological realness" with. I'll try to communicate what I think is the issue here in a rough visual analogy. To me, I see "the joints of nature" as consisting of concentric circles, with Being encompassing Intelligibility encompassing Phenomena, and to the extent that these circles overlap (perhaps perfectly, perhaps not) and to the extent that we can traverse the full diameter, circumference, and everything in-between these circles, is what Kant problematized in the Critique of Pure Reason.

ASS

>>22470045
The first part of your reply connects directly to the second part. What I mean by objects not being ontologically real, is not that there is not “stuff” out there which is not us, neither Kant nor Hegel would deny that. But that the thing-hood of stuff can’t be determined independently of the nature of consciousness, and to such an extent that we realize the contradictory nature of this thing-hood itself and how it must be resolved by a unity with consciousness. This is the whole backing behind Hegel’s analysis of the internal dialectic of the unity-in-difference objects have and how this must be resolved by recourse to consciousness itself. I understand exactly where you’re coming from with the idea of concentric circles, and I believe the traditional Jacobian or Hegelian critique of that system of conceptions is that they are causally alienated if phenomena are separate from their being (the classic argument is how can a non-sensible, non-causal, unintelligible object “cause” itself to appear). In rough terms, Hegel believes that appearance is being and being is appearance, and that these two separate ideas (the “for-us” and “in-itself”) are moments of a higher unity. The justification is contained in all my previous comments, especially the last one. At this point I’ve said all I know how to say, and as I am only a young Hegel scholar learning more every day, I would recommend you just go ahead and just engage with even small piecemeal parts of his philosophy. The introduction to the phenomenology is only 10 pages and sketches his epistemology fairly clearly. Force and Understanding is a way more difficult chapter but it really digs at the problem of an object’s apparent inner being which Hegel uses dialectic to understand.

>>22470180
>that the thing-hood of stuff can’t be determined independently
What do you mean by determination? Why is it important?

>>22470902
The process of creating distinctions. The Forces of Difference and Unity working hand in hand.

>>22462992
On Divine and Human Law

>>22471234
I always associated determination with predication. So in that way, it does require a subject. But the distinction itself had to have existed beforehand and have some way of being communicated that is independent from the mind itself, no?

>>22467996
Sounds like the made up bullshit you hear college professors say to impress girls in their classes.

>>22471311
NTA anon, but sure. Hegel is rejecting inaccessible things hiding in their own unobservable world, not external objects.

Hegel isn't a Berklian subjective idealist. He is in many ways a naturalist. Object are "outside."

But he also things the world is rational. If the world isn't rational, we might as well give up and embrace rational skepticism because it means that one thing doesn't follow from another. Throw your pasta into boiling water? Better hope it doesn't turn into rocks. Drop your kid off at school? Better hope they haven't aged 20 years over the last 8 hours.

But we don't fear those sorts of things because our world evolves in a logical fashion. We don't worry that it and all our memories were just spit into existence a second ago and will wink out the next.

So once we've gotten past radical skepticism and accept a structured world (a prerequisite for the scientific project), now we can build a bridge between the objects and our experience.

What would be the problem here?

>"Actually all the external objects that generate experience actually act irrationally and all patterns are projected by the mind."

This is radical skeptic tier. You might as well posit Decartes demon fine tuning your thoughts. If things can happen that by definition make no difference to anyone, why bother positing them as metaphysical entities.

The rational is the actual and the actual is the rational.

But Hegel starts from pure sense certainty because he wants to begin presuppositionlessly to avoid the pitfalls that Kant's dogmatism gets him into. Thus, he ends up writing off Kant's noumena altogether.

>>22469385
Phenomenal vs Noumenal =/= Objective vs Subjective.

Hegel acknowledges the separation between the subjective and objective, it's a major focus of the phenomenology. That's not the same thing as the noumena though.

>>22469385
If you want to get into space-time and the like, there are some good arguments against coherent "objects" existing at all. The reason we find very large and very small scales, relativity and the quantum scale, so confusing is because we evolved to deal with medium sized objects.

But our perceptual system isn't designed to represent truth, it's designed to represent fitness. Our world is perhaps more akin to a computer desktop with its many icons. There aren't really emails in "folders" that can be moved into a "recycle bin," right, there are just tiny logic gates on a hard drive. But our world is like that too. Our conception of 3D spacetime itself is simply a user interface.

That is at least the argument cognitive scientist Donald Hoffman makes in his "The Case Against Reality." He ultimately argues that the search for "things as they are themselves," is a blind alley, and has a fairly Hegelian conclusion.

The Very Short Introduction on Objectivity is also pretty good here too. It is a short primer on the concept and gets into the common mistake of thinking that more objective = more true, or that complete objectivity approaches truth at the limit. This idea is often incoherent. Is the true way a tree looks the way it is seen without eyes?

You even have text books on mechanics that tried to do away with all diagrams of things in motion, instead using only equations because this was "more objective." But are a bunch of equations a more "true" view of what our world is like?

I'd say not. We have experiences. We are part of the world. Part of the negative legacy of Kant is this sort of strange striving to strip the world of ourselves in the mistaken delusion that somehow once we are gone, only truth remains. But once we are gone, once subjectivity is gone, truth and falsity simply become contentless terms.

>>22471634
if want to get into why this person said "question from a stemfag", please do

>>22471602
>Phenomenal vs Noumenal =/= Objective vs Subjective.
What's the difference? I genuinely thought that these terms were synonyms for each other.

>>22471689
not one of these, i take this name and make it mine and the other is i add an address

>>22463590

Thank you for contributing to the absolute's becoming.

>>22462992
So there is the concept of the a priori, this is something you need to understand well before reading Hegel. Understand it maybe in Kant and maybe attend to how its discussed by the likes of Carnap if you're interested in the role of empiricism here.

>>22471311
In a way, yes. But this pre-distinction can’t be established purely in the object when arguing from consciousness. The point of Hegel explaining the dialectic of Force in creating distinctions is to show that there is a mutual coreliance of subject and object for these distinctions to be made, and in turn showing this contradictory reliance which must be sublated.

>>22472046
that's Bottom's Dream, which I have not read, and there is zero point to posting here

bumpy

>>22462992
evidence for what? zerg and cloudsong?

>>22468061
>>22468198
Anyone else mind taking a stab at answering my questions here?

>>22471689
bumping for clarification

"Basedsourcers" are debased from their own source, akin to how "likefarmers" lack their own spirit to farm.

>>22474839
that is cool, who did that?

Bump

>>22463085
addition to this, there is no actual refutation of philosophical systems

>>22469159
These posts make me actually want to read Hegel. Where should I start?

>>22475856
If you're familiar with Kant's critiques then feel free to jump right in. If you need a commentary look to Houlgate or Harris.

>>22475973
isnt houlgate a warwick midwit that isnt taken seriously by other scholars

>>22475989
Nope, Houlgate is a very respected Hegelian scholar.

>>22475856
Start with the Science of Logic, or any of his Lectures. Avoid the Phenomenology until you've seriously familiarised yourself with Hegel's terminology and mode of thinking.

>>22463085
>There isn’t even a clear boundary between one mind and the other. I only become different from you in a continuous gradation so that there is no exact boundary between me and not-me. That is precisely how I know what is outside myself.
I'm a retard, can you explain this?
Wouldn't an example of this boundary be my effect on other's minds? Like, if I hurt someone, I can't feel it, but they do. Isn't that a clear limit on what is outside of myself?

>>22471602
>Phenomenal vs Noumenal =/= Objective vs Subjective.
What's the difference? I genuinely thought that these terms were roughly synonyms for each other.

>>22476513
they're equivalent to each other. idk what the other posters are on about

>>22470902
>>22471234
>>22471311
Isn't determination = being and indetermination = non-being?

>>22475856
>Where should I start?

>>22476459
How do you know that you're hurting someone? It's not some unmediated, objective, empirical truth, it's also a boundary between outside and inside that is constructed within your mind. Hegel is still very Kantian in that sense.

uhhh, so about this
>Phenomenal vs Noumenal =/= Objective vs Subjective.
and
>Isn't determination = being and indetermination = non-being?
stuff... any help Hegelanons?

>>22477617
>>Phenomenal vs Noumenal =/= Objective vs Subjective.
If you can’t grasp this then you haven’t read Kant and if you don’t understand Kant then you can’t grasp Hegel. If noumenal was a synonym for objective and knowledge of the noumena is impossible then so is objective knowledge which Kant clearly says is possible. You have had the question in your OP answered several times already ITT

>>22477647
>If you can’t grasp this then you haven’t read Kant and if you don’t understand Kant then you can’t grasp Hegel. If noumenal was a synonym for objective and knowledge of the noumena is impossible then so is objective knowledge which Kant clearly says is possible
NTA but it's very easy to read Kant as equivocating on these issues, especially given the subject-heavy nature of the transcendental deduction. Much of Kant's contemporaries misread him as a Berkeleyan for sensible reasons. Shaming him does little good for understanding, and it would be a better exercise to explain why he is wrong to think that they're mere synonyms, even if they are related in some way.

>>22477664
I’m not trying to shame him, just saying that he doesn’t have the requisite knowledge to even be able to understand why Hegel can overcome Kant. It would be like trying to explain calculus to a sixth grader. Of course you can simplify the knowledge leading up to calculus for the sixth grader but he won’t understand it’s necessity which is exactly the problem OP is having.

>>22477744
You could try. His misunderstanding is not as gross as you make it seem. Maybe he can ask a few followup questions and get himself straightened out. Maybe there are other anons with a similar yet more complete understanding who will finally have that "a-ha" moment thanks to your explanation. Maybe that will lead to a cascading event that raises the philosophical literacy of the board by an order of magnitude.

And if you think no such thing is possible... simply search for any key philosophical term in the archives and notice that the quality of discussion has only increased since records began. This is a much smarter board than it used to be when I first arrived here, and it's a reason why I can't bring myself to quit it.

>>22477806
I have already tried just that several times ITT. It’s either a bait thread or he has a serious misunderstanding of Kant. it seems to be the latter to me

>>22477818
He seems like a new guy to me. And the thread was doing a great job of introducing people to Hegel and clarifying themes in German idealism for anons. Why not just try? Maybe you'll figure out a new knack for explaining things that you'll feel proud of.

>>22477823
>Why not just try?
nta but after while you get tired of explaining the same basic shit over and over again seeing people get filtered by the same problems over and over again, and after repeated attempts to explain the other interlocutor just goes full ad hominem at me or the philosopher I'm explaining then bails.

>>22477846
Idk man, I enjoy answering questions. I see it as a test of my own knowledge.
>and after repeated attempts to explain the other interlocutor just goes full ad hominem at me or the philosopher I'm explaining then bails.
That anon hasn't attacked you at all though. You're catastrophizing about a future that hasn't happened and probably won't happen.

>>22477877
You are too pure for this place

>>22477877
>Idk man, I enjoy answering questions. I see it as a test of my own knowledge.
feel free to answer that anons questions then

>That anon hasn't attacked you at all though. You're catastrophizing about a future that hasn't happened and probably won't happen.
Inductive reasoning may not be right, but it keeps you from getting burnt twice.

>feel free to answer that anons questions then
I would but it's too late in the day. I can't answer anything related to German idealism without a lot of coffee in my system. I would butcher the distinctions. I think Kant had right idea.
>Inductive reasoning may not be right, but it keeps you from getting burnt twice.
My guy, it's 4chan. It's an anonymous board known for its edginess. Prolifically hostile, yet completely inconsequential. If you can't handle it here, but you willingly post here, then I have serious qualms about your day-to-day judgment.

>>22478080
kys

>>22471689
>>22474284
>Noumenal
The noumenal refers to the realm of things as they are in themselves, independent of human perception or experience. Kant thought that the noumena causes our phenomenal experiences and cause is for him, the bridge that allows us to say the noumenal exists (but essentially nothing else about it). Arguably, this results in a sort of subjective dualism where only phenomena is real and the noumena is largely superfluous. Both critics of Kant and supporters have taken him to be a subjective idealist, but views on this vary a great deal, even today.

Kant argued that humans can only know the "phenomenal" world, which is the world as it appears to our senses, and we cannot directly perceive or know the noumenal world.

E.g., if you see a red apple, the noumenal aspect would be the true nature of the apple that exists independently of your perception.

>Objective

Something is objective when it is based on facts and exists independently of individual opinions, biases, or subjective experiences.

Objectivity implies that there is a single, shared reality that can be observed and described by multiple people in a consistent manner, even if no one observer can be free of all biases. Objectivity is something that is achieved within the context of subjective beings, while the noumena exist, by definition, outside the context of any phenomena/experience.


E.g., the statement "Water boils at 100 degrees Celsius at sea level" is objective because it is based on empirical observations and can be verified by anyone under the same conditions.

In summary, "noumenal" is a philosophical concept related to the idea that there may be a reality beyond our sensory perceptions, while "objective" refers to the idea that something is based on verifiable facts and is not influenced by personal opinions or perspectives. The two terms are related in the sense that the noumenal realm, if it exists, would be assumed to be objective, but they are not interchangeable.

>>22475989
Houlgate is perhaps the foremost Hegel scholar around these days actually. Maybe Pippen might have that claim.

>>22478096
Re Kant and subjective dualism:

Hamann argued that Kant’s entire project labored under a mistaken abstraction, a vain attempt to liberate reason from history, experience, and language. Kant postulated a self-sufficient noumenal realm set apart from everything belonging to the phenomenal realm; one concept generated another, creating arbitrary dualisms: “Receptivity of language and spontaneity of concepts! From this double source of ambiguity, pure reason draws all the elements of its doctrinairism, doubt, and connoisseurship.” Hamann was sarcastic, but also penetrating. He protested that when Kant was finished abstracting, he was actually proud to have nothing but a purely formal transcendental subject, which Hamann called “a windy sough, a magic shadow play, at most.” Hamann countered that Kant’s object, a special faculty called reason, does not exist. What exists are rational ways of thinking and acting in specific languages and cultural contexts. Kant’s Platonism, however, stood in the way of dealing with anything real. This critique was not published until 1800, after Hamann had died; he was sensitive about offending Kant in public. But it had a significant subterranean influence, as Jacobi and Herder mined it for insights.

And hence we have the rest of German idealism seeing itself as a way to "clean up" Kant's dualism problem here. My view would be that Kant absolutely did not want to fall into subjective idealism, and seems aware of his problems in his revisions.

>>22478113
Kant and dualism continued:

But to explain the reality of the external world, one has to establish some kind of dualism between subject and object; otherwise objects are not really independent of our subjectivity. Kant’s rich, twisting, turgid, and conflicted wrestling with this problem yielded what Beiser aptly calls “a synthesis of subjectivism and objectivism in transcendental idealism” and a wide array of competing interpretations of what he said, yielding similar readings about the post-Kantian alternatives that succeeded him…

In both editions Kant described the noumenon as the idea of a thing-in-itself that is not an object of the senses and is not positive in any way. Essentially it signified the thought of something in general, in which one abstracts from everything belonging to sensible intuition. A noumenon is a thing so far as it is not an object of sensible intuition. But what kind of thing is that? How can it signify a true object by Kant’s principles? In the first edition, Kant reasoned that for a noumenon to signify a true object distinct from all phenomena, it is not enough to free one’s thought of all conditions of sensible intuition: “I must likewise have ground for assuming another kind of intuition, different from the sensible, in which such an object may be given. For otherwise my thought, while indeed without contradictions, is none the less empty.” Kant admitted that he could not prove that sensible intuition is the only possible kind of intuition. On the other hand, he also could not prove that another kind of intuition is possible: “Consequently, although our thought can abstract from all sensibility, it is still an open question whether the notion of a noumenon be not a mere form of a concept, and whether, when this separation has been made, any object whatsoever is left.”68

>>22478116
In the second edition he wrested more control over his most elusive concept by eliminating the transcendental object, at least in the most relevant sections. Any suggestion that the noumenon has a positive content or sense must be eliminated, he urged. To apply the categories to objects that are not appearances is to assume that some type of intellectual intuition exists. But sensible intuition is the only type that we know, and the Transcendental Analytic made no sense if the categories extended beyond objects of experience. Kant allowed that perhaps there are intelligible entities to which human sensible intuition has no relation. But since the concepts of understanding are forms corresponding to our sensible intuition, it is pointless to speculate on the subject; there is no knowledge. Kant realized that his critics would say the same thing about the thing-in-itself, but he needed the idea of the noumenon to account for the given manifold and the ground of moral freedom. The idea of a thing-in-itself that is not a thing of the senses is not contradictory, he assured. It is crucially important, wholly negative, and a thing of pure understanding.69

This idea cast a long, ironic shadow over modern theology. Kant conceived his unknowable Ding an sich as a brake on metaphysical speculation in philosophy and theology, which it did for Kantians. Yet his dualism of known and unknown worlds also sparked an explosion of high-flying metaphysical systems claiming that the world exists as the externalization of consciousness.

>>22478096
Thank you for the extensive writeup. Regarding objectivity and subjectivity, can intersubjectivity approach objectivity, in the sense that we have a totally-encompassing description of the thing-in-itself, perhaps by a map of all possible phenomena? Is intersubjectivity all that we can strive for?

IIRC, I think there's a German idealist who strives for this. Fichte, I think?

>>22478096
Re objectivity:


If we conceive of conceptual structuring as a universal feature of the mind, then there is no threat to objectivity, because questions of objectivity simply cannot arise. Sense organs and the brain do not just register the world. Our minds structure our experience and our thought in fundamental ways. To think that this in itself could compromise objectivity is to imagine that we could think without brains, see without eyes. To the extent to which this is Kant’s point about our perceiving the world only as phenomenal (as it is structured by our minds) and not as it is in itself (as it is in its unstructured form), then this is just to say that we cannot think without minds any more than we can see without eyes. Unmediated perception (and thought) is not objective perception: it is not perception at all...

So that we are not misled into simply associating objectivity and truth, it is worth highlighting one very important difference between them. Whereas truth is absolute and does not come in degrees, objectivity only comes in degrees. The idea of absolute objectivity is a misconception, encouraged by thinking of it as a view from nowhere. If there is no view from nowhere, there is no limiting case where, having progressively become more and more objective, a theory can finally attain absolute objectivity. Objectivity does not become like truth in the limiting case. Indeed, some of the deepest and most persistent problems for understanding objectivity arise when one tries to make it absolute, or at least inadvertently thinks of it in absolutist terms.

What we are seeking to do in imposing standards of objectivity in our judgements in modern science is to identify and separate the informative and the uninformative, with a view to producing reliable results. Objectivity is more mundane than ‘the search for truth’, and it is in its very mundaneness, by contrast with the ‘search for truth’, that its value lies.

>>22478128
Intersubjectivity can approach objectivity, sure. Can it ever become completely objective? I don't know if that makes sense.

A complete description of a thing in itself would seem to require experiencing the thing as every observer experiences it. But we can trade aspects of experience, we can't live as other people. So this doesn't seem possible.

My personal opinion though, following Hegel, is that the noumenal doesn't make sense and simply shouldn't be posited. I come to it from slightly different reasons, although I think the Logic is mostly right on these grounds.

As a naturalist, the separation between our experience of nature, and nature, seems artificial, an abstraction. If we are natural then we grow from the ground we seek to study.

Can any one agent know exactly how they interact with nature? No. To see why, consider what would happen if we had an extra organ, a metaeye that examined everything our eye and visual cortex does in the process of seeing. Now we have an analysis of goings on producing sight. But, we will invariably be blind to parts of the process of our coming to experience the meta eye unless we also have a meta-meta eye that observers the metaeye and relays that to sensation, and so on.

But the world isn't just viewed by individual agents. It is viewed by Spirit, emergent agents. E.g., some biologists argue it makes more sense to view ant hives as the organism than individual ants, while it is sometimes easier to think of lymphocytes as independent of the bodies they are cells of. Being coming to know itself as self occurs on many levels, in patterns of fractal self-similarity. Thus, a fundemental mistake is to assume that knowing the world objectivity = one person being able to read about it, or something to that effect. But, in organizations, we are often the accidents, not the substance. The idea of group minds in cognitive science is interesting here. I think Hegel would have loved complexity studies, group minds, and fractal geometry.

>>22463948

tl;dr it is impossible for a thing to know itself. A spoon doesn't know it's a spoon. A human being doesn't know it's a __________. We can only describe ourselves using imprecise, approximate, tautologic, and analogic language. Philosophy is like the mind of a spoon trying to know that it is a spoon. It's time to recognize this and give up.

>>22478809
>using a spoon as an analogy for human consciousness
ngmi

All you are is a present Will and Manifestation of Will. That's it. You are aware of the world, which includes "your" body, but what you actually are, independently and internally, is your present intention. What you "are" in the world is the manifestation of that intent through a sphere of influence that starts with "your" body and extends outward like ripples. Externally, you are as much the falling of the domino as you are the finger that pushed it. Internally, you are the intent behind the action that pushes the domino.

"Matter" is formless potential that is shaped by many manifestations of separate Wills. It appears as "physical spacetime" as our mind's representation of the manifestations of many Wills.

God is real and created life and formless potential for life to shape.

>>22478815

Alright, stay on the hamster wheel then. All language is tautology. You will never get to the truth through language. You're just described the same thing in different ways.

Massive hubris of humans to think that we can somehow transcend ourselves.

>>22473561
This is essentially what neville goddard describes as God. Awareness of being, when Moses asks God his name he says "I Am is my name forever and ever". Another way to phrase it is "I can forget who I am, what I am, where I am, but I cannot forget that I am." Hope this provides some assurance that what you're saying isn't nuts. I would agree that being proceeds thought and that the concept of being is necessary for thought to arise.

>>22473561

You are pure being/will. We can never know true reality. We just know that we have some presentation of a shared external reality. In that presentation, our will is most closely linked to our body, and our being is linked to the thoughts and feelings of that body's mind. That's really all we can say about that.

But our mere existence is enough to infer that God created and sustains our existence. Therefore we can trust that living in this presented world is good and that we really have no need to question it or try to escape it, not that we could escape anyways. For whatever reason our being is linked to the presentation of the body of "you" in the shared world. The shared world seems to be a place for us to experience experience and grow in goodness.

>>22462992
What is there even to know?
Thats the best part. Not only we cannot know that something but also we dont know if there is something to know. Its just a guess that propetulates philosophy for hundreds of years. Lets just take assumption that there is something to know "A ONE TRUE REALLITY BEHINDE THIS ILLUSION".
But all this time if someone asked what an applle is they answered banana, and when they asked what banana is they answered orange.

>>22478924
If you say we cant know what true reallity is that means you have some idea of what true reallity is that does not match our cognition of it. Meaning, your statement is self refuting. It requires you to know difference between true reallity and one which humans cognize.

>>22478924
Willing and intention are posterior to awareness. Receptive/passive awareness has no will or intentions as those things belong to the phenomena which fill it. The fact that phenomena exist and fill the awareness, and the simple fact of the existence of the awareness for that matter, could be construed as a roundabout proof of God but that's beside the point here.
I don't disagree with the second part of your post, per se, but my little project here is to see what can be "reasoned" from the absolute base of experience, with zero presuppositions whatsoever. In order to get from where I'm at to where you're at there must either be a leap of faith or some form of logic which I've yet to grasp - logic in any form seems impossible from the perspective of a purely passive awareness but I don't think I've thought through all the implications of my initial argument yet.

>>22479268
>Lets just take assumption that there is something to know "A ONE TRUE REALLITY BEHINDE THIS ILLUSION".

>>22479268
>"A ONE TRUE REALLITY BEHINDE THIS ILLUSION".

>>22479277

Our language always falls short and ends up being tautology. The best we can say is reality is "being." But what is being? Being existing. What is existing? It is being. That's the end of the line. We cannot say any more than that.

>>22479598
>Being existing.
>can't distinguish between being and existence
ngmi

>>22478096>>22478128

>>Kant argued that humans can only know the "phenomenal" world, which is the world as it appears to our senses, and we cannot directly perceive or know the noumenal world.
of course it is only his personal opinion. And his noumenal world is also is personal fantasy.

>>22479569

Okay I don't disagree with you, except that I'm not certain we can say that will is posterior to anything. I'm not sure. It all might coexist at once, inseparable. I haven't thought that out yet. I'm also not sure of the implications of that. I suppose the main implication is that if will precedes experience then that would support will existing above the mind. But if Will can only come from experience, then perhaps will is from the mind too. But if that is the case, how can we control our will? How can we be aware of something (mind -> will) and yet be in control of it (as opposed to influencing it)? It seems that will must be fundamentally coexistant with awareness because otherwise awareness has no means by which to interact with mind.

I do agree that awareness (being) is fundamental. I guess the only question is whether will is coexistant with it.

I think that ultimately it is a pointless endeavor. See my post here >>22479598

>>22479605
>only his personal opinion
you were unredeemably filtered

>>22479602

Tautology. It's the same thing viewed in different ways. Word salad to try and make sense of a tautology. A snake eating its own tail.

>>22479612
>It's the same thing viewed in different ways.
the irony. it's right under your nose and you look right past it.

>>22479268
>Its just a guess that propetulates philosophy for hundreds of years.

Herr Hegel:
>Even common sense in everyday matters is above the absurdity of setting a universal beside the particulars. Would any one, who wished for fruit, reject cherries, pears, and grapes, on the ground that they were cherries, pears, or grapes, and not fruit? But when philosophy is in question, the excuse of many is that philosophies are so different, and none of them is the philosophy — that each is only a philosophy. Such a plea is assumed to justify any amount of contempt for philosophy. And yet cherries too are fruit. Often, too, a system, of which the principle is the universal, is put on a level with another of which the principle is a particular, and with theories which deny the existence of philosophy altogether. Such systems are said to be only different views of philosophy. With equal justice, light and darkness might be styled different kinds of light.

>>22479607
As you can recognize thoughts as distinct objects of the mind, you can be aware of them separately from yourself. The same goes for desires, intents, wills, etc. You can "watch" yourself thinking about a topic and reaching a conclusion, like watching clouds drifting through the sky. In the same manner "you" can see your own personality, your identity, everything that is "you" beyond simple awareness, from an exterior perspective of sorts (though whether this perspective is easily accessible simply by thinking about it or if it has to be reached through some special technique or meditation or whatever I can't really say). Essentially, everything about consciousness can be "seen" by the awareness, including itself, but aside from the awareness itself all over features are in some way clouds rather than the sky itself.
Put another way, there's no way to tell whether something like the will exists at all; if, say, some magician had the power to create phenomena and cast them on an awareness, or a scientist could stimulate a mind through technology, in order to make it experience the sensation of willing and thinking, then said mind would have no way of knowing whether it was thinking for itself or just having the experience of thought cast on it. There is no way to prove whether one is happening or the other. Quite the conundrum.

The place where my reasoning struggles is at the point of self-awareness; not only can one be passively aware of the phenomena, but one is also aware of being aware, aware of being aware of being aware, and so on to infinity, which raises the question: is the experience of being aware of being aware to be considered part of the phenomena or does it belong entirely to the awareness? Without any other phenomena the awareness is empty, a state we identify with death or unconsciousness, so it would seem impossible to test whether an awareness can be aware of itself without outside phenomena to act as a sort of backing material for the mirror of self-awareness. Yet we also (in my argument) separate awareness from the phenomena, as it is a container or vessel independent of what it is aware of, as I observe in my own mind and which others can observe through meditation techniques or some sort of derealization/depersonalization disorder. If we aim to make no presuppositions or leaps, then it seems we are stuck; awareness can't will or think as it seems to be purely passive, yet it is capable of seeing itself when it is filled with phenomena. At the same time, from the "other side" of the gap, the will and thought require awareness to operate, and this awareness must in some way identify with them in order for this to take place, despite the fact that awareness shouldn't be capable of such a thing. This brings me to an impasse, which I hope to resolve through dialectic.

As said before, I'm a bit of a brainlet so if something here doesn't make sense let me know so I can try to explain better.

>>22479622

Explain

>>22479693

I like the way you think. We should do a joint effort.

I would say that will coexists with awareness being that awareness requires coexistant direction. In other words, the awareness is not aimless. You can (and must) direct your awareness. So there seems to be an inherent will that is separate from the wills of the mind. But because this will is "you" in the same way that "you" are the awareness, you can never actually approach it.

In regards to your second point about awareness being an empty vessel by itself, that really directs me to hylomorphism. It's as if the awareness is the form, but it cannot exist separately from the totality of the "human" as a thing. It is all coexistant by necessity in order to "exist." So when you die your awareness doesn't cease to exist but goes into the eternal void because it has no container. In the Christian view, God then resurrects us and reunites us with our bodies so that we can live again. This makes sense if exist I means the necessary pairing of awareness and body (subject object).

I would also say that will and thought do not require awareness to operate - see animals. Awareness, rather, sits on top of the animal (human).

Right now I would say that I lean towards some sort of idealist hylomorphism to explain reality. Essentially, God imagines our existence, and as such we cannot separate our being (awareness) from existence (body).

>>22479729

>I would say that will coexists with awareness because* awareness requires coexistant direction

Revised for clarity

>>22479627
Meta--cognition is not cognition Herr Hegel.
Grapes, cherries and pears are indeed fruit. But a hamer is not.

>>22479730
Indeed anon, consciousness allways is about something. But if we asume it is an active will rather then passivity, we fall in problem of answering the question: How am i able to actively seek something if i dont even know what i am seeking?
Which again, only solution to it is to assume it is a passive element of a subkect rather then activity pushed by will.

>>22480167

Mhm. Time is an interesting element too. Like, is there time between the rise of a will and the awareness of it? Or the ruse of a thought and the awareness of it? Or are they truly coexistant? I wonder...

If it's all immaterial realm then there could be no time at all. But then how does a no-time realm interact with spacetime? I think the answer is there is no time problem because it all happens at once. The material spacetime realm is material presentation, or correlation, to the immaterial realm, so there is no "space" between them.

Maybe time is the key to unlocking all of this. Just thinking out loud.

Do any philosophers account for the fact that life is created from other life? Consciousness and being doesn't just pop out of the blue. It comes from a male female relationship and develops. Does anyone even address this???

Bump

has anyone... has anyone actually read the third part of the encyclopedia? i fail to approach it

this is basically part 2... actually mastering all these syllogisms

>>22480383
>It comes from a male female relationship and develops
what is asexual reproduction?

>>22480383
yeah, i guess some philosophers do account for this. the subjective concept can unite to a machine, a chemical process, or an end. the idea it creates is life. for example the subjective concept of existence applied to a machine might give rise to digestion. idk who would say something so crazy,

>>22479729
>I would say that will coexists with awareness being that awareness requires coexistant direction. In other words, the awareness is not aimless. You can (and must) direct your awareness. So there seems to be an inherent will that is separate from the wills of the mind. But because this will is "you" in the same way that "you" are the awareness, you can never actually approach it.
Is there? Are you sure you're directing your awareness or are you just experiencing phenomena which portray the sensations of directing your experience? How can you tell the difference? How can you tell the difference without relying on the content of phenomena, or only relying on the reflexive self-awareness which seems to be the only point at which phenomena and awareness meet? (On a side, note it almost seems at that point that phenomena and awareness are identical. I'm still thinking through the implications of this).
Re: separation of awareness and body or being and existence, there is as of yet no reason to believe that the loss of phenomena would mean that the awareness is destroyed or damaged - on the contrary, as we observe every morning on waking, the awareness remains in a state indistinguishable from nonexistence when emptied but, crucially, it does indeed still exist. For this reason, if we are only taking what is immediately at hand from the perspective of such an awareness as useful to the argument, it can be reasoned that the awareness cannot be destroyed, and if death brings a loss of phenomena similar to sleep then it stands to reason that death would not have any effect on the awareness save to empty it - an argument which agrees with the Christian view, I suppose, but it also rules out the necessity of the pairing of phenomena and awareness, much as a cup does not require water to exist.
I'm about to go to bed but I'll try thinking through more implications of the points raised today and if the thread's still up I'll reply again.

>>22481959

Good points, I'll think on them as well.

>mfw realizing I'm the Unhappy Consciousness

>>22480325
I would say awareness pre-exists the will. We will what we are aware off. As i noted, we cannot will something we do not know even exists. I see will as a motion towards what is beinf experianced or known an as such product of awarenes and consciousness.
As i said, to be aware of something it must firstly exist. We cannot be aware of nothing since conaciousness is allways about something. So the same applys to thought and awareness of it. When you become aware of your thought (the one you had moment ago) you are basically bringing a memory of that thought and then reflect upon it. You think about thoughts. I hold that it is wrong to see this as if both awareness and thought coexist in the same time.

We should be carefull about treating time as an existing entity since it is a conception. Treating it as an entity would bring us into fallacy of reification.

>>22482090
Next step is Madness, but if you survive it its all gonna be OK,

>>22482769

I agree that a subject needs an object, but if awareness and thought are immaterial then there is no time relationship. Which means that we can't say that awareness precedes or pre-exists will. They exist in timeless fashion. This is what I think leads to our conundrum, because we think in terms of pre- and post-, in terms of cause and effect.

This is what leads to my hylomorphic view.

Soul:body
Form:substance
Awareness:instantiation

All coexistant, timeless, therefore "one" entity - a human.

I am fleshing this out as I type so it could probably use refinement.

bumpy bump

>>22483917
what part should I study next anon?

>>22462992
if the noumenon as such has no knowable content then positing it is enough to know what it is: a gap in your knowledge.

>>22463590
the point - and if you weren't such an illiterate dysgenic RETARD experience would have revealed this to you trivially, but alas, i doubt you have ever endeavored to know something - the point is that there is "nothing to know" about the noumenon besides that it is noumenal.

>>22463605
>contemporary neuroscience literature
YOU CAN'T BE SERIOUS!! OH MY GOD HAHAHAHAHAHA

>>22463669
>objects exist... for us. No, they don't. They're indifferent. We react to them, they react to us.
OH MY GOD he's trying to read German philosophy and he doesn't even know the difference between das Dinge, Gegenstande, and Objekt. holy shit you are RETARDED

>>22464032
you're fucking illiterate. KILL YOURSELF.

>>22468061
this is precisely why you are supposed to read the Phenomenology and really grok absolute knowing first. Hegel takes a Phenomenological approach to EXPERIENCE first because it is EXPERIENCES that lead us to faulty metaphysics unless we philosophically apprehend the categories we bring to them, starting, like Science of Logic, with Being, the stupidest, emptiest - some others in this thread have said "sheerest" - category of all.

your panicked thought experiement - "these ideas are just happening to me man!!" - are literally covered in the Inverted World. you're just mad with the power of Understanding right now, you think you can dissolve any identity - even your own - into differences. you're not wrong. but there is a use and an abuse of this power, and consequences following therefrom.

if anyone wants to make a critique of Hegel that's where it needs to start: his overriding, dominant sense of the PROPER use of faculties. but beware - you may end up in an asylum or worse.

>>22485017
I suspected as much. I will confess (as you've guessed) that I haven't fully worked my way through the Phenomenology yet and mostly just wanted to find anons to poke holes in my arguments by posting in threads along similar veins.
The confirmation that Hegel addresses my argument head-on is exciting and I look forward to seeing how he treats the "gap" I've identified between experience and thought.

>>22484986
>>22485002
>hurr durr nerd noises
I am 100% certain I could twist your body into a pretzel if I ever came across you IRL. Lower your tone of voice when you speak to me.

>>22485099
yes - Hegel addresses head-on the problem of taking yourself for the object of your own cogitations, as a subject posed before such an object posited for yourself, etc. etc.

>>22485105
you're an illiterate dysgenic retard! kill yourself!!

>>22485114
>>22485105
If you're gonna engage in cheap slapfights like this then fuck off to /wwoym/ or /b/.

>>22485114
You wouldn't say that to my face IRL. You'd be lowering yourself to your weak femboy knees to suck my cock and appease me.

>>22485120
literally kill yourself faggot. your eyes will never be blue.

>>22485121
>your eyes will never be blue.
Wrong.

>>22485159
O-oh! Heil Fauci! Heil Fauci!!

>>22485017

I know I know Hegel addresses a lot of stuff...but look... I'm just not gonna read it. Sorry! I have better things to do with my time. If it's true then it should be able to be explained simply. If you can't explain it quickly and simply then it isn't worthwhile.

>>22485573
You're being dishonest if you represent anon's quite clear and to-the-point post as overcomplicated or hard to understand, and by judging the rest of the Phenomenology by that standard you're only doing yourself a disservice.

>>22485573
>If it's true then it should be able to be explained simply. If you can't explain it quickly and simply then it isn't worthwhile.
ngmi

>all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare

>>22485573

He didn't say anything.

>>22485651

Spinoza was way off

>>22486663

For >>22485645

>>22485573
>If it's true then it should be able to be explained simply. If you can't explain it quickly and simply then it isn't worthwhile.
There is no worthwhile philosophy, no scientific theory, no religious doctrine and no artistic work that can be explained in such a way. People often attribute this quote to Einstein and Feynman, without realizing that none of their theories can be explained in such a manner to a neophite. My advice is to abandon this very naive motto, and to understand that everything that is worth learning will take some intellectual effort from your part.

>>22486676

I'm not talking about their theory of everything quote. I'm saying that if you need to twist and torture language to say something then there is likely a problem with what you're saying. Language is the limit of human thought. If you can't find a way to describe something then maybe that's just the answer.

>>22486738
Firstly, what you call "twisting language" is still language. Secondly, what you seem to be saying is that everything should be explainable with day-to-day speech, but none of the things I've mentioned are explainable in such a way either.

>>22486824

No, I'm saying that philosophy has run up against the hard wall of experience. Words are not sufficient to accurately talk about subjective experience. It cannot be done. It is an unbridgeable gap. We simply cannot understand the true nature of our existence, unless you turn to God (and even then you only know what God permits us to know). "Being" is a mystery and will remain a mystery.

All we can say is that we exist as something, and other somethings also exist. Everything else is a model built consciously or unconsciously by the mind.

It's really all a waste of time. It's all circular and tautological. A complete dead end unless you humbly admit that we ultimately cannot know and turn to God.

>>22482936
I think i understand what you are pointing at. Do you have a non-negative definition of immaterial substance?

Smug liberalism is naturally repulsive but it is many times less intolerable than than smug conservatism

>>22486978
Because liberalism is inclined to be smug but conservatism is supposed to resist false impressions and is always unnaturally smug

>>22486988
This decides the important question of whether hegel was liberal or conservative. Since hegel could only be either a smug liberal or a smug conservative, he would be necessarily smug if he was a conservative.

>>22486975

No, and it is impossible to give one. i think immaterial is equivalent to non-substantial, meaning that we cannot speak to the substance of it.

I was reading Schopenhauer, particularly chapter 5 of McGee's book, and I think Schopenhauer is on track. But I think Schopenhauer falls short because he doesn't explain how Will came to be, nor does he sufficiently account for separate things. His speculation that different beings are just different aspects of Will striving to know itself is unsupported, in my view. Pure speculation.

I see truth in Schopenhauer's view but instead of Will I see Existence. And the ultimate question then of how are there different experiencers of Existence and how do they know each other is really the ultimate question that I think can only be answered with God.

I want to read more into Schopenhauer though and give it some more thought. My goal is to marry Aquinas's hylomorphism with Schopenhauer-ish idealism.

Good chapter here: https://academic.oup.com/book/32819/chapter-abstract/275011403?redirectedFrom=fulltext

>>22484971
i will literally canonize this, problem?

>>22487056

Some more thoughts

Matter is potentiality waiting to be formed. Time is just different arrangements of matter, meaning that time is simply a concept of potentiality - what was and what could be. Humans are unique because we are actual but we can perceive the future, present, and past. We can observe and order ourselves to the future (potentiality), meaning we can transcend actuality. We can sacrifice actuality for potentiality. The ultimate, infinite potentiality is heaven. That's where we can order ourselves towards if we choose. Because we can choose actuality, we help create actuality rather than merely participating in actuality.

>>22462992
>>22463085
>noumena
Is the unknown.

>>22487056
>>22489173
>>22489372
God is the essential origin of the causality, not the causality itself.

>>22489173
This is retarded. Read Heidegger.

>>22489446

Explain why

>>22489173
>Matter is potentiality waiting to be formed.
this is like mostly the transition of appearance to actuality

Time is just different arrangements of matter, meaning that time is simply a concept of potentiality - what was and what could be.

there is THE RELATIONSHIP, the relationship of substantiality, and the relationship of necessity

Humans are unique because we are actual but we can perceive the future, present, and past. We can observe and order ourselves to the future (potentiality), meaning we can transcend actuality. We can sacrifice actuality for potentiality. The ultimate, infinite potentiality is heaven. That's where we can order ourselves towards if we choose. Because we can choose actuality, we help create actuality rather than merely participating in actuality.

in more modern philosophy actuality is the highest level possible world. read Hacking

matter is the LIMNITUDE of the POTENTIALITY asymptotically reaching ACTUALITY in the meeting of the becoming of GEIST and the being of ESSENCE.

>>22490591
gibberish post

>>22490631
Gibberish thread. Hegel was a crackpot and a charlatan and his book of phenomenobabble is best used as toilet paper.

>>22491911
so basically religion? totally not science