/lit/ - Literature

Can we solve the problem of change if we recognize that Being has multiple predicates?

As I understand it, the problem of change comes from the fact that Eleatics hold that everything that is, is, and that everything that is not, is not. Furthermore, they also hold that something cannot transform into nothing and vice versa. Therefore, nothing can be created or destroyed, so nothing can become, only "be."

Well, what if we recognize that Being has multiple predicates? It has at least possibility (in the Meinong's jungle sense) and actuality (arrangements of matter that have manifested in space and time). After all, Being itself both is possible and is actual. Everything "is" in the sense that infinite things are possible, and they have been that way eternally, but only some things are in the "actual" realm, and not always at the same time.

When things in the sensible realm are created or destroyed, all we are doing to these things is giving them the predicate "actual." However, since they always continue to "be" in some way, they are never destroyed. With this multi-faceted understanding of Being, we now have a framework where things can be and also become. By performing the correct "predicate accounting" for the substances involved, Parmenides's challenge is met, and we can now comfortably say he has been overcome.

>>22404211 (doubles)
The concept of being is not synthetic a priori. "Being is" is simply analytic.

>>22404207
Great now you can define what it means that something “can” be something without reference to non-being. Or can you?

>>22404207
I apologize for not addressing your points sooner. I was interrupted.
>You are dodging or not understanding the question, I asked you to define possibility because my position is that it is impossible to define possibility without a notion of non-being.
According to Parmenides himself, he takes possibility for granted (with the use of its negation, impossibility). At the very least, I would hazard that what is intelligible is possible, and what is possible is intelligible.
>You said that a possible is what can be actual. I pointed out you just substituted words and didn’t really explain what it is, so I’m am now asking you what it means for that something can be something.
I would hazard that for something to be actual, it takes on a concrete form, which is highlighted more than other possible forms. It is now more "determined", "more predicated", than it was prior. When it ceases to be actual, this concrete form recedes back into the domain of possibility, and that something sinks back into a sea of possibility.
>It doesn’t make sense to say that “can” is invetween possible and actual when you literally used can in your definition of actual (though in the form of “could” because you for some reason defined impossible instead of possible)
When we talk about capability in a practical sense, we are referring to whether a certain possibility of a being can be expressed within certain limits, such as a time frame. We are imposing those limits and thus "rigging" the conversation in a certain way. If we don't impose those limits, then in a sense everything is possible. This is why in a colloquial sense capability is between possibility and actuality.

>>22404215
Being "is" is analytic but indeterminate. Something can "be" in multiple ways because Being "is" in multiple ways, hence the multiple predication hypothesis. Being is possible, actual, and necessary, or else it wouldn't be Being. A consequence of this is that "is" is always a predicate.

Building on this, simply positing a subject, like God, for example, without "is", leaves the thing in the realm of the most preliminary, primordial, and precursory state, a superposition of being or non-being. It is completely indeterminate. Add "is", and now we have a determination. Add "is not", and we also have a determination, except it is now negative. "God is" is still quite vague, since it can "be" in many ways, and we haven't begun to predicate other qualities (e.g. omnipotent, omniscient, etc.) too. But since it is a determination in some direction, it must be a predicate. "God is actual"'/"God exists" now even adds more determination to the subject, that it "is" in a certain way. And so on and so far.

Circling back to the statement "Being is", it is worth noting that it *could* be a synthetic statement if it weren't for the following reduction ad absurdum. The problem is that Being can only "be", so saying "Being is not" leads to gibberish. "Being is" must always be analytic, as if you know what possibility, actuality, and necessity are, then you must know Being to be that in all possible judgments of Being.

>>22404220
Parmenides can't, as I've stated in my last post. I don't see why you are providing me with a challenge that Parmenides himself does not tackle and probably would not see as intelligible.

>>22404232
Parmenides only uses impossibility when referencing what is not, because what is not is impossible. But this is a contradiction in him in the sense that it is a absurd to say “what is not” if what is not is not, but he has to because some people think it is.

How does your definition fulfill any of your goals? It seems like you’re trying to say “the possible” is merely what has less predicates than the actual. Though you still took a roundabout method and did not define possible, but instead actual, saying that the actual is more predicated and determined while leaving me to guess that the possible must be what has less predicates relative to the actual. But suppose I say “unicorn.” A unicorn is possible to be actual. But it only possesses one less predicate than the actual unicorn, namely that the actual unicorn is really experienced while the unicorn is only an idea. But the possible univorn still has to have all the same predicates horned, horse, wings, whatever, or else it isn’t a possible unicorn at all, but just something that is vague “possibility” without any determination as to what it is that is possible. So this definition doesnt work for the way we typically say something is possible. But it also doesn’t work to refute Parmenides, because I can now simply say that since the possible lacks all predicates and determinations it does not exist because it has nothing in it to be thought, and therefore if there is any multitude of predicates they must ALL be actual already, which again refutes the notion of change, since for something to change implies there was something not actual for it to change into.

>>22404266
Are you the original OP or what? The other guy was saying we have to overcome Parmenides in his framework of what is not is not. Obviously you can define possibility and potentiality if you can get a conception of something that does not exist. I don’t know what these judgements being analytic or synthetic has to do with anything I’ve been arguing.

>>22404286
>How does your definition fulfill any of your goals?
We'll go step by step.
>It seems like you’re trying to say “the possible” is merely what has less predicates than the actual.
Correct. Though, I'd like to evolve beyond "predicate accounting", but it's a good start to understand what is happening when we posit change.
>Though you still took a roundabout method and did not define possible, but instead actual, saying that the actual is more predicated and determined while leaving me to guess that the possible must be what has less predicates relative to the actual. But suppose I say “unicorn.” A unicorn is possible to be actual. But it only possesses one less predicate than the actual unicorn, namely that the actual unicorn is really experienced while the unicorn is only an idea. But the possible univorn still has to have all the same predicates horned, horse, wings, whatever, or else it isn’t a possible unicorn at all, but just something that is vague “possibility” without any determination as to what it is that is possible.
Correct.
>So this definition doesnt work for the way we typically say something is possible.
How so? Do you mean our little sidebar about "capability" being between possibility and actuality? Sure, it doesn't work, because that would be a discussion of possibility by the "way of mortals." Mortals set limits because they themselves are limited. But these limits are illusory when we take a god-like perspective.
>because I can now simply say that since the possible lacks all predicates and determinations
This is where the train derails and I've lost you, especially since we were on the same page. How would you go about doing that? If anything, possibility includes all the predicates, even those that contradict each other on a qualitative basis, because there's no need to privilege one predicate over another. They're floating into a sea of indetermination. When a possible thing becomes actual, some predicates emerge to the forefront and determine that thing, while the other predicates slink away to the periphery, still present but otherwise "inactive." They've never disappeared, however.

>>22404297
I am the same OP, yes. But I was responding to that other guy who brought in the analytic-synthetic distinction and I decided to give my two cents on how I felt about it applying here. Feel free to jump in if you want, but if you don't want to, that's fine too.

>>22404312
> How so?
Bruh what I explained it. The possible unicorn has all the same predicates as the actual unicorn. Both have horns, wings, and are horses. It’s clearly something else that makes it possible. It doesn’t have any less predicates except one, it lacks the predicate “actual.” The possible unicorn is not indeterminate, I know exactly what it is, it is fully determined by being horned and winged and a horse.
> possibility includes all the predicates
You literally said the actual was more predicated than the possible, now you are saying it is the possible which has all predicates?

>>22404319
The problem here is two-fold. One, you're not recognizing that "being" is on a "spectrum" of determination. Being itself is almost completely indeterminate outside of its self-referential predicates (possibility, actuality, etc.). Why? Because it encompasses everything that only the most vaguest and fundamental predicates can be determined of it. Being is happy. But Being is also sad. Being has all of these predicates, yet, it is defined by none of them, so it cannot be determined by any of them. If you were to say that Being is happy, and make it a determination, then it would rule out the sadness that Being has. Once you understand the relationship between predication and determination, you'll understand how possibility and actuality works together.

Moving on, the problem with possible objects is that it is never given a concrete determination. It is true that a possible unicorn and an actual unicorn possess all the same predicates. But a possible unicorn can only exist in a "general" way. You could imagine a specific possible unicorn, honing in a few predicates, but there is nothing determined by it. You would be imagining just another possibility among an infinite possible combinations that would fall under the label unicorn. In contrast, an actual unicorn would be a concrete determination that fulfills the general "plan" of the possible unicorn. It may even be similar to a very specific envisioning of a unicorn. But unlike your vivid unicorn dreams, it is an extant particular individual which is wholly determined by a certain subset of its predicates, forcing the other predicates into the periphery. It is like a conceptual "floor" in the hierarchy of being.

>>22404207
The other thread was likely deleted because you are a troll who partakes in definition readjusting and baseless conjecture and when people tell you that you are trying to make compatible two completely contradictory schools of thought by readjusting the meaning of words you just ignore it.

>>22404380
You’re not being precise at alp, it sounds like you’re trying to formulate hylomorphism without using aristotelian terminology. Sounds like you’re trying to say that the predicates are not actual because they are not predicated of a primary substance yet. So what exactly is the thing that possesses the predicates of a unicorn in the case of a possible unicorn? Perhaps you’re trying to say that there is an independent substance called possibility onto which these things are thought. So your previous statement that all actuals are also possible simply means that all predicates are predicated of both substances. But this contradicts your previous claim that this dualism avoids a “bifurcation of worlds” since these substances. It must be either predicated of one or the other, there’s nothing inbetween, which contradicts parmenides’s statement that what is is in contact with what is.

>>22404415
I'll try to do my best.
>You’re not being precise at alp, it sounds like you’re trying to formulate hylomorphism without using aristotelian terminology.
I borrow from hylomorphism but I stray away from it because Aristotle never organized his categories nor developed a robust understanding of predicate logic.
>Sounds like you’re trying to say that the predicates are not actual because they are not predicated of a primary substance yet. So what exactly is the thing that possesses the predicates of a unicorn in the case of a possible unicorn?
A unicorn already is a primary substance, and it has all of these predicates you associate with a unicorn, but due to the virtue of it being possible, none of these predicates shine over the rest. It is indeterminate.
>Perhaps you’re trying to say that there is an independent substance called possibility onto which these things are thought. So your previous statement that all actuals are also possible simply means that all predicates are predicated of both substances. But this contradicts your previous claim that this dualism avoids a “bifurcation of worlds” since these substances. It must be either predicated of one or the other, there’s nothing inbetween, which contradicts parmenides’s statement that what is is in contact with what is.
I'm not following where you're going with this. I think a better way to provide clarity is to provide an example of an argument why change is impossible, and show you how I would resolve it.
>check pic-related
I would simply argue that the highlighted premise, 2a, was true and is simply now in the proverbial "spotlight."

>>22404266
"Being is" is an analytic a priori judgement, because it strictly follows from the principle of non-contradiction of "being". It can't be synthetic a priori, else you'd have to answer the question: "What is?".

>>22404663
That’s basically what I said without expanding out my reasoning. I wanted to explore what it would mean to hold it as synthetic a priori for the sake of argument.

>>22405011
Pardon me for not wanting to play pretend.

>>22405073
I don't get what you mean.

bomp

>>22404207
I remember an argument by Simplicius, which iirc was attributed to Zeno. It went something like this (I'll paraphrase heavily)
1) Hypothesis: A and B are different entities
2) If A and B are different entities, they must differ in something
3) If they both are, they are not different with regards to their Being
4) If 3), then they must only differ with regards to their non-Being
5) Non-Being is not (and therefore it cannot be the basis for a positive distinction between two entities)
6) There is no ground for a distinction between A and B
7) A and B are the same entity, and the hypothesis is refuted
This of course could be applied to any concievable distinction (including conceptual ones).
How would you respond to it?

>>22405444
>3. If they both are
the argument already fails here due to the multi-faceted predication of being. One could be possible, the other could be actual. We've opened the flood doors to differentiation, and the whole Parmenidean dam comes crashing down.

>>22405444
>and therefore it cannot be the basis for a positive distinction between two entities)

No

>>22405450
I have prefaced it with an "if", and made it clear that 1) is just an hypothesis, whis is reduced to absurdity in 7). Moreover, the same argument can be applied to modalities too (such as "actual", "possible", "necessary" and so on)

>>22405458
What's wrong with it? The basis for a positive distinction is already a determinate being (qua basis for a positive distinction).

>>22405462
The whole argument works through linguistic sleight of hand by forcing the question of Being into a false dichotomy. By abusing "is", "being", etc., and treating "is" as determinate in ways that it is not, you're able to make the simple predicate of being both vague and all-encompassing. I'm lifting up the curtain to see the man behind it.
>Moreover, the same argument can be applied to modalities too (such as "actual", "possible", "necessary" and so on)
I don't see how you would do it.
>3) If they both are possible, then they are not different with regards to their possibility.
>4) If 3), then they must only differ with regards to their actuality.
>5) Wait, so they're actually different? The changes we notice in the sensible realm mean something? FUCK FUCK FUCK ELEATIC BROS THIS WASN'T SUPPOSED TO HAPPEN

>>22405510
Regarding the first bit, maybe, but atm you're just making assertions, and I cannot agree until you will say something more substantial.
Regarding the second point, the substitution you've proposed seems wrong. Rather you would have to substitute it in 1), with regards to A and B. This could be done in multiple ways (since the argument always remain the same). Here's a few examples:
1) Hypothesis: possibility and actuality are different
1) Hypothesis: A insofar as it is considered as actual and A insofar as it is considered as possible are different
1) Hypothesis: actual A and possible A are different
1) Hypothesis: modality A and modality B are different
I'll let you pick either one of these, or formulate your own, since as I have said the formulation is irrelevant to the argument

Ill also anticipate a possible objection by pointing out that here I am using "entity" not as a synonym for "substance", but in a much larger sense, as in, "anything that involves being". As such, if one claims that modality makes a difference with regards to the determination of a being (for example), I will regard that modality as an entity, as in, as something that involves being (because if it didn't it would simply be a nothing).
If you prefer, you can reformulate 1) as "Hypothesis: A and B are different", and gloss entirely over that "entities", since (as I am noticing now), it's not really crucial to the argument. If you choose to do so, of course you can also gloss all the other mentions of "entities" in 2) to 7), since the presence of that term is not crucial to those either.

Le Bump

>>22405543
>1) Hypothesis: possibility and actuality are different
It wouldn’t work because the question isn’t rigged to work based on two entities existing (which are not truly entities but rather hypostatic abstractions of predicates describing the ways one can be). There’s no false dichotomy later on that leads us to an absurd conclusion. I’ll explain more later.

based thread

>>22405543
>>22406747
>>22406747
Actually, I'll explain more if it's absolutely needed. I don't have as much to say. I felt like I made my point. If Being has multi-faceted predication, then we have no problem, and the Being-Non-Being gambit fails.

>>22406747
Check the second bit of the post you are responding to. I had already predicted this objection, and I have already rephrased it in a way that refutes said objection. And if you bite the bullet and say that there is no difference between different modalities your entire argument crumbles.
>>22407106
I think it doesn't fail, and you actually have to explain yourself. I think that with this objection I have touched the crucial issues of your theory, which are 1) the foundation of difference starting from pure Being (you simply assert this foundation, without realizing that the being/non-being distinction refutes it), and 2) the passage from indeterminacy of being to the determinacy of its predicates (which, again, is simply asserted, without realizing that the being/non-being distinction makes it impossible to ground any determinacy, insofar as it makes it impossible to ground any distinction).

>>22407185
Do you disagree that Being is possible, is actual, etc.?

>>22407975
Possible does not equate being. “Possibilities are more actual than realities”- last thread should’ve ended at this moronic argument

>>22407982
Nobody said any of those things. I'm going to continue to ignore you now (because you're a namefag brainlet).

>>22407993
Go to the archive. He said something like that worded slightly differently.

>>22407975
I am the guy you are responding to, dunno who >>22407982 is
Anyway, if I am to follow Zeno I would say that I disagree, insofar as you are positing a distinction between Being and modality, as my previous arguments clearly show.

>>22407995
I am that person, and I never said that, nor did I ever mean that. I think you just have poor reading comprehension.
>>22408004
All we're doing is dissecting Being into its composite parts for the sake of argument. Obviously, a modality of Being is still Being.

>>22408034
>all we're doing is dissecting Being into its composite parts for the sake of argument.
To dissect it you would have to posit a distinction between being as a whole and its composite parts.
Moreover, if A) Being is Being only as a whole, then it is made of parts that are non-Being, since the parts are not the whole, and only the whole would be Being.
On the other hands if B) the parts are Being, you would have then to point out what's the common property that assign Being to every individual part, which means that every other property apart from that would not be Being. Therefore you would end up once again with pure indeterminacy (since two parts would have in common only Being, and each other determination would be non-Being: but if that's the case you end up with strict identity, meaning that you don't really have two parts).
>Obviously, a modality of Being is still Being
That's not obvious at all. If there is a strict identity between Pure Being and a modality of Being, then you're using two names to describe the same things, and as such there would be no predication. Saying "actual Being" would literally mean "Being Being", and saying "Being is actual" would mean "Being is Being". In these repetitions and tautologies modality loses all its determinacy, which means that it is not a modality proper, but only an arbitrary alternative name for Pure Being (and an arbitrary name is not enough to designate a real internal difference).
On the other hand if you're not positing a strict identity then you're left with the issue of distinguishing them, which would have to be done on the basis of non-Being (therefore you would fall once again in the argument made by Simplicius).

>>22404211
>We need to say that shit like "Hitler winning World War 2 exists but just isn't "actual,"' instead of just pointing out that possibility is talking about the future.

>We can fix the problem of change by having being posses predicates that... change.

Why not just realize Parmenides is wrong? Aristotle shits on the paradox of the arrow perfectly. It's a fallacy of composition. Of course the arrow isn't flying in any one frozen moment, velocity has to do with movement over time and time is the dimension over which change occurs.

All possible universes involve change. Even the simplist 1D toy universe of just a line has change. Where? Points on a line vary from one another across one dimension. If they didn't vary then you don't have a line you have a point. If only a point exists, with no context, then your toy universe is contentless. You need difference to have information (see Claude Shannon's Mathematical Theory of Information or the concept of Kolmogorov Complexity). This is not unlike Hegel's finding in the logic that pure undifferentiated being turns out to be nothing.

So change is undeniable, essential.

Parmenides can be let of the hook for having a naive conception of mathematics and being because of when he lived. It's easy to imagine a 3D world where nothing moves and say "hey, there is no change here." Well, no, there is all sorts of change across the three dimensions you have, just not a fourth. And indeed, actual being demonstrates fractal dimensionality.

A toy universe with zero variance? Can't make it. See Floridi, The Philosophy of Information Ch. 14 for a proof.

Chicken Parm ain't got shit here. He's starting loaded up on presuppositions. We need to drop all presuppositions like Bauer in the Laws of Form. I'm talking Greater Logic level dawg. Straight up, Heg Dawg is who we should look up to here.

The Logos is without beginning or end.

The being of things begins and ends, in accordance with the Logos.

Being is subject to cause and effect, before and after.

Does this mean that cause and effect are old? By no means. Logos is the ground from which before and after arise, it is above and below them.

All being springs forth from the Unground, the Darkness Above the Light, Ein Soph. It springs forth according to the Logos.

Being as it can be known is tripartite. There is always:
>The object that is known, the ground, the Father
>The sign by which the object is known; the Word, the Son
>That which knows, the Interpretant, Atman, the Holy Spirit

Likewise we can see the triad as:
>Possibility, Firstness, quality
>Actuality, reaction, Secondness
>Mediation, law, Thirdness

>Though this Logos is true evermore, yet men are as unable to understand it when they hear it for the first time as before they have heard it at all. For, though all things come to pass in accordance with this Logos, men seem as if they had no experience of them, when they make trial of words and deeds such as I set forth, dividing each thing according to its kind and showing how it truly is. But other men know not what they are doing when awake, even as they forget what they do in sleep.”

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν. πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἕν. ὃ γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων· καὶ τὸ φῶς ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ φαίνει, καὶ ἡ σκοτία αὐτὸ οὐ κατέλαβεν.

In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was God. The same was in the beginning with God

>our task is to serve the logos out of the depths of our new kairos, a kairos that is now emerging in the crises and catastrophes of our day. Hence, the more deeply we understand fate — our own personal fate and that of our society — the more our intellectual work will have power and truth.

>>22408093
>To dissect it you would have to posit a distinction between being as a whole and its composite parts.
There is no distinction. All you're doing is highlighting one aspect of Being and acknowledging that Being has it.

>>22408471
Call it a modality, call it an aspect, you're still positing differences that are obviously not strict identities.
Im not sure wether you're willing to be convinced here, since you've already went so deep into defending your own position. My only advice for you is to save these comments of mine, take them seriously, and reflect on them in the future. Eventually you will realize that they are in fact correct, and that you're not dealing with one of the major issues in metaphysics (which has been called in many ways, for example "the jump from the infinite to the finite", or "the jump from indeterminacy to determinacy").

There are actual solutions to this issue, which mostly involve dialectical thinking (basically, Hegel). I have not mentioned them because i dont think you're ready yet.

>>22408522
>Im not sure wether you're willing to be convinced here, since you've already went so deep into defending your own position.
I am willing to be convinced, I'm just not sure that this isn't linguistic obfuscation. Which, it really looked like it was, and you were cornered until you brought out another one of the Eleatic positions, this time dealing with mereology. After all, why would I adopt the Eleatic position if it appears to be incredibly silly regarding every single intuition we have?

>>22408535
Because intuitions are not philosophically relevant, don't ever let analytic philosophers convince you that they are

>>22408620
It wasn't an analytic philosopher who ever convinced me of that.

>>22404211
"Recognizing multiple predicates" won't give you the sort of change you want. Ultimately it's all just cope; what you want is rearrangement, the destruction/creation of arrangements. Melissus explicitly shut that down, it's over.

If you make arrangements significant (which you do because you want to use them to smuggle in your "change"), then the arrangements must comply with the nature of Being. Your account of arrangements and change fails to achieve this, hence it's all nonsense.

99% of metaphysics is sheer cope and idiocy. Parmenides broke you all and you still can't handle it.

>>22408638
Still, it's a dumb way to proceed. It becomes clearer when you call intuitions by their real name: prejudices

>>22408180
I would give you a serious answer but I'm still laughing at how fucking clueless you are about Zeno's paradox. First, Aristotle failed hilariously at providing an answer to the Eleatics; just look how he seethes and cries over Melissus, pure impotent rage. Second, good job "solving" the paradox via velocity: ie, giving the Eleatic exactly what he wants by positing the chronology as a complete whole so you can measure something within it. You fool, you midwit, you utter peripatetic.

>>22408681
I don't get it. Explain what you mean by that.
>>22408717
I think this is more linguistic sleight of hand meant to disguise the fact that we intuitively know that change is real. Even if senses are illusory, changing illusions are a sign of change itself. There's *something* changing. And if that something is identical with everything else, then everything is changing, and we're back to Heraclitus.

>>22408721
>You're wrong! No, I can't give any reason why because ur just too dumb and I am le smart.
>Time must be a whole for moments to be ordered. No way finistism is huge in physics!
>Reeeeee! My 2,000 year old shitty word games can't be defeated because I say so!!!

Clitus already fucked up Chicken Parm millennia ago.

>>22408522
>There are actual solutions to this issue, which mostly involve dialectical thinking (basically, Hegel). I have not mentioned them because i dont think you're ready yet.
>not mentioning Peirce (pbuh)
pseud

>>22408736
>I don't get it. Explain what you mean by that.

I think it's clear. How about you state your account of change in clear and simple language. From what I recall of your post, it seemed your model involves creating and destroying new arrangements, and the arrangements represent the "actual"/the "now". You apparently think it's not genuinely creation/destruction because things still exist in some other way, like in potential.

However, a potential is not an actual, the arrangements themselves are significant. If you give more detail we can list out what exactly is being created and destroyed. Which results in the total failure of your account, because you have not responded to the fundamental problem of creation and destruction. If it can be shown to be present in your account, then its over. Total Eleatic Victory.

>>22408784
You clearly have this model of arrangement or rearrangements that you're working with that I'm not familiar with. You're going to have to recapitulate your headcanon for me.

>>22408784
>it's not an actual so it's not real
>by the way, the actual moving from one arrangement to another is an illusion
Eleaticniggers are so dishonest it makes me want to actualize the change of slicing them in half with a 1000-folded katana

>>22408869
But the potentiality exists wherein the entity just has to "imagine" that it is not the case he is being sliced in half and so the eleatic wins again whereby he can imagine such a potentiality ocurring.

>>22408881
An Eleatic can never be bested in dialectic. But a Heraclitean can never be defeated in combat. Which one do you pick?

>>22408736
>I think this is more linguistic sleight of hand meant to disguise the fact that we intuitively know that change is real
This is the whole point of philosophy: to mediate knowledge through the act of thinking. In this sense even if an intuition is true, it is philosophically irrelevant as long as you cannot conceptually explain it. As I have mentioned I do not deny change, I just think that you're at the moment incapable of rationally and conceptually argue for it, which is why passing through Zeno and Parmenides is so useful (mainly, because it shows a current limit in your thinking). To just say "but I know change exists" is akin to surrendering and abandoning the real task of philosophy. If intuitions are accepted as a valid criterion, philosophy (and thinking in general) becomes mere pub talk, a collection of rethorical tricks used to persuade other people into believing in those beliefs of yours which are based on prejudice (what you call intuitions, which basically boil down to items of knowledge you cannot really explain nor justify)

>>22408884
The eleatic because no matter the outcome, he would manage to reword it into a win.

>>22408863
Why would I repeat my "headcanon" of a position that you only half gave? Put forward your position in a clear fashion. You are the one who is apparently "solving theproblem of change" via "multiple predicates".

>>22408869
Cope & Seething.