/lit/ - Literature

>>21251683
"you can't make judgements about things beyond experience" IS itself a judgement about something beyond experience. it's a paradox. you're saying
"I judge that you cannot judge." That's why the only logical conclusion is that there is nothing beyond experience.

>>21251683
>KANTPOSTERS ACTIVATE!

>>21251683
Kant himself makes judgments beyond experience in critique of practical reason

>>21251719
>IS itself a judgement about something beyond experience.
It's not. That's the point of the Critique. The judgment say something about the limits of human knowledge, not the objects themselves. About the things in themselves the critique of speculative reason simply remains silent, since our limited cognitive faculty prevents us from making any judgment with respect to them.

>>21251683
knowledge (in the prekantian sense) as revelation.

>>21251757
the objects don't exist, because saying they exist is a paradox. therefore, if the whole idea of knowledge being limited is that there are objects we can't make judgements about, then knowledge isn't actually limited because the things you can't make judgements about don't exist in any way.

>>21251719
>>21251749
>>21251766
have you people even read the critique? he says that things outside of the subjective self must exist, because otherwise we wouldn't have a source of content.
he says absolutely NOTHING about the *nature* of things beyond experience. that is literally the whole point of the book.

>>21251792
that they exist is part of their nature. the source of our content is fundamentally mental and therefore not outside experience. experience and noumena are identical. there is no division of worlds.

>>21251803
ok i'm convinced you don't get kant lol. most modern kant scholars don't even interpret him as having advocated for a "division of worlds". he agrees that our content is mental, but needs to be awakened by an outside source. are you an unironic berkeleyan idealist in 2022???

>>21251814
>but needs to be awakened by an outside source
why can't the outside world itself be mental?
>are you an unironic berkeleyan idealist in 2022???
most idealists after Kant would agree with me that nothing is beyond our knowledge

>>21251818
>why can't the outside world itself be mental?
he's saying you can't make claims about things in themselves. maybe they're mental. i'm 100% sure you, 4chan /lit/ kant misinterpreter, are not the one who has solved metaphysics once and for all.
>most idealists after Kant would agree with me that nothing is beyond our knowledge
kant was not an idealist with regards to objects of experience / the spatiotemporal world, quite the opposite actually. he was vehemently opposed to those who held those beliefs. also, the claim that NOTHING is beyond our knowledge is simply retarded.

Does Kant address the problem Hegel expresses when he says that whatever enforce limits, restricts must necessarily lie outside the boundaries imposed?

>>21251792
The point of the book is that you cannot make a priori synthetic judgements without intuitions that are found in experience. The thing is that judgements about practical reason,that is, how thing should be or how we must behave, are not found in experience.

>>21251683
Read Hegel.

>>21251749
Also in the critique of judgement where he talks about teleology.

>>21251838
>he's saying you can't make claims about things in themselves.
how the fuck do you not see that this is a claim about things in themselves? misinterpreting Kant is worse than dogmatically defending him and refusing to read any philosophy after him. your logic circuits seem to have short-circuited if you don't see how "something is unknowable" is a claim about that thing's nature.

>>21251848
>is worse
is not worse*

>>21251766
what the fuck are you even talking about? nothing you said makes the least of sense. an object is something precisely defined by kant as something which is intuited and connected to representative concepts, the limitation to which Kant refers regards concepts to which no object, no intution is connected.

>>21251855
yeah those concepts don't exist and have no affect on reality and you literally contradicted yourself by saying that they are "concepts" to which no object or intuition is connected. they don't exist precisely because you can't say anything about them, therefore the only thing that is outside our knowledge is nothingness. I don't see how this is so hard to understand.

>>21251848
it is NOT a claim about the nature of things in themselves, it's a claim about the limits of reason. the book's title is literally "the critique of pure reason". you are retarded.

>>21251858
and nothingness btw is a contradiction, because the answer to "what is x and not x" is nothing.
>>21251860
stupid nigger, the claim about the limits of reason is literally based on the claim about the ding an sich, that reason is limited in respect to it. the ding an sich is fundamentally involved in the claim.

>>21251803
> the source of our content is fundamentally mental
the source of content are intuitions, sensible perceptions; what is mental are the formal representations of these intuitions.

>>21251865
>intuitions aren't mental
they come from the brain, i don't care about whatever Kant's hairsplitting definition of "mental" is.

>>21251868
the brain is not mental... the brain does not explain qualia... what the fuck are you talking about

>>21251870
what? qualia are mental, they are substances, and all judgements are literally about qualia. if qualia is not mental then it doesn't matter because they can still be brought into the mental sphere and have judgements made about them.

>>21251838
>he's saying you can't make claims about things in themselves. maybe they're mental
Not him but your lack of Hegel shows itself. If they are in fact mental and mental is all that there is, then it stands to reason that they are in themselves. As such the mind knows the mental in itself.
> i'm 100% sure you, 4chan /lit/ kant misinterpreter, are not the one who has solved metaphysics once and for all.
This is not an argument and contributes nothing at all to the conversation. The fact you felt you had to write this only comes of as insecurity in your position.
>he was vehemently opposed to those who held those beliefs.
This is true, hence: "critique of pure reason". Have you read all three? beacuse he goes into more speculative knowledge in the third critique. So he was not an idealist in the strict sense but a little idealist at least.
>also, the claim that NOTHING is beyond our knowledge is simply retarded.
Also not an argument. Why would anything lie beyond pour possibility of knowledge? Give examples or reasons. LMAO the irony of someone clanking down on "4chan-philosophers" and then proceed to not make arguments for their position...

>>21251848
>you don't see how "something is unknowable" is a claim about that thing's nature.
Kant more or less takes up this issue in the second Preface when he makes a distinction between the conditioned and unconditioned. But I'm eager to read how Hegel will dissolve this distinction.

>>21251865
intuitions are also representations, particular representations

>>21251876
quail are mental. the BRAIN is material.

>>21251877
>So he was not an idealist in the strict sense but a little idealist at least.
Different anon here, but I think that this more idealist take of his in the Third Critique is due to the fact that in Aesthetic Judgement the Subject's activity is kind of more fundamental, as opposed to cognition of the world.

>>21251884
there is no duality between mental and material. matter is made of qualia and mental objects as well.

>>21251883
could we say material representations as opposed to the formal representations of reason and its principles?

>>21251893
bruh
do you have a reason to believe this or are you just shooting from the hip

>>21251903
of course I have reasons to believe that, the idea of the brain is mental, the world itself is mental, therefore the brain itself is mental. everything is in the mind of god.

>>21251892
You are right. But he goes on later in the book about making judgements about nature, teleology and God. A kind of revisit to the first critique if I recall correctly.

>>21251906
what the fuck
whose metaphysical framework do you most closely associate with? malebranche?

>>21251896
The intuition is material because of how our mind works. The matter is a concept that we put in the intuitions to make them inteligible. So it is not that the intuition itself is material, is only material to us. So it is just better to call them particular representations or intuitions and general representation or concepts. Also those things are different from the trancedental intuitions o concepts.

>>21251935
I'm a basic realist + idealist. I wouldn't say I am most aligned to him but if you want to read someone who says something similar to what I have said just in this thread maybe try Josiah Royce or something. I would assume Hegel probably says something similar.

>>21251839
Wittgenstein addresses such things in Tractatus.

>>21251683
I can't think of an example off the top of my head, but you could disprove him if it were possible to make an inference about some object without conforming to his twelve proposed transcendental categories of reason:
>Unity, plurality, and totality for concept of quantity; reality, negation, and limitation, for the concept of quality; inherence and subsistence, cause and effect, and community for the concept of relation; and possibility-impossibility, existence-nonexistence, and necessity and contingency for the concept of modality.

I suspect that either certain areas of advanced mathematics or quantum physics are exceptions to the rules he set forth.

I also suspect that his grounds for concluding these categories are definitive are not themselves founded in experience and it's unclear what sort of introspective capacity would be required to intuitively infer their existence a priori. Kant did not use any of the categories to infer their existence which is a subtle contradiction in his framework.

>>21251683
>I genuinely don't understand how you can even begin to counter the claim that you can't make judgments about things beyond possible experience
You start from a different basis than him. You realize that he himself makes use of it, and we all do, in support of using that different basis. And then you proceed to use the different basis to point out how he was wrong. That's how you do it.
>what is that different basis?
We have the capacity to think general thoughts about "what is" which are not specific thoughts about the things that are, but clearly reach out beyond our knowledge, even possible knowledge, of what is. And it's a starting assumption of idealist types like Kant (and Berkeley, Hume, and post-Kantians) to deny this without argument. Just self-reflect on it.

>>21251928
>But he goes on later in the book about making judgements about nature, teleology and God. A kind of revisit to the first critique if I recall correctly.
Interesting, especially when it comes to nature. I haven't finished the First Critique yet.

>>21252006
>Kant did not use any of the categories to infer their existence which is a subtle contradiction in his framework.
Well there are 12 concepts, so that involves the concept of plurality as quantity. They exist according to his premises, which involves the quality of reality. They are inherent (to the mind) as a concept of relation. They are necessary (for reason) and therefore possible, for the concept of modality.
But I do see a problem with the positive introspection of these categories through the categories. There is a certain circularity to it that threatens inconsistency. The categories are supposed to order the framework of experience and the judgements which apply to it. Yet the categories themselves are not contained in the manifold of experience, after all, they are transcendental. They cannot therefore be inferred from experience, as they lie outside of it. How then is knowledge of them obtained? How does it arise? The categories are just magically there. They do not arise out of some causal process, because, they are the source of the concept of cause and effect. They define the concept of quantity, yet there are 12 of them preexisting. They must be accepted as axioms without further comment even though how Kant arrived at knowledge of them is questionable even from within his own premises.

You can though.

See? I just did it.

>>21251940
Ah yes, indeed. The distinction between particular and general representations works, I just thought we could affirm the distinction between formal and material because it was a distinction Kant himself employed, but it seems he only hint at it once in the Transcendental Aesthetic.

>>21251964
Nice! Thank you.

>>21251683
If the human mind is not able to reason because it perceived the world through fallible sense, how can it be trusted to determine consciousness based on the same senses?

>>21251766
Maybe your issue is thinking that an object of perception and an object in itself are mutually exclusive. This is not what Kant claims. Immagine a cylinder as representative of the object in itself while a circle is the object of perception. In this analogy you can see that the circle is not an illusion that is substituted for the object in itself. The circle is simply a two dimensional slice of the three dimensional object of a cylinder. Similarly, we can view the self as three deminsional representation of a four dimensional object where time is the dimension that we only have one slice of( the present). The me that is perceived in this moment is not illusory(like Hume or Berkley think) it is simply limited since the self we know( that self of perception) is forever boundedby time but that doesn't mean there isn't any part of us which exists outside of time( and therefore out of perception). Kant's main evidence for this idea is that causality can't be explained from within the chain of casual relations we perceive in everyday life. For more info on Kant, consider reading the critiques lol.

>>21251683
>How can you refute it?
You can't.
> Did he simply win philosophy?
Yes, he did.

>>21252097
It is not that the senses are fallible is that they do not allow us to access the noumenal realm, you can't have knowledge of things that we do not experience nor have a corresponding object to (i.e. God, The Absolute, etc).

Basically all German Idealists seem to try surpass the boundaries placed by Kant, trying to resurrect the cosmological proof.
>>21251683
The only person who really carried on his legacy was Schopenhauer who identified the thing-in-itself, or at least the manifestation of it as will to life.

>>21251792
>he says that things outside of the subjective self must exist, because otherwise we wouldn't have a source of content
Nonsense because qualia exist like beauty. The whole argument here is based on equivocating mental phenomena with his concept of appearance.

>>21251683
Hmm, let's see:
>Transcendental aesthetic refuted by science
>Entire system relies on transcendental aesthetic
>Therefore etc.

Also, makes arguments for claims that transcend experience to prove such arguments are inadmissible (e.g. noumena affect sense organs).

Also, bases categories off of shitty Aristotelian logic that has since been completely revamped and updated.

Also, derives transcendental necessities from random prejudices about what constitutes actual experience (e.g. spatio-temporality, Euclidean geometry, Newtonian physics, the I).

>>21251683
>How can you refute it?
By ignoring it

>>21251860
DOES THE CLAIM "you can't make claims about things in themselves" PREDICATE ANYTHING TO THINGS IN THEMSELVES?
OBVIOUSLY RETARD, THAT THEY CAN'T BE THOUGHT.
HENCE WE MADE A CLAIM ABOUT THINGS IN THEMSELVES

Christ, a retard reads a few philosophy books and thinks he knows anything about anything

>>21251964
Wittgenstein "addresses" that Hegel is right and that his book is a contradictory mess, see his final proposition.

>>21252752
Nigger you're a fucking retard, Wittgenstein's philosophy is literally a retelling of Schopenhauer's. Hegel attempts to use reason to go through the boundaries Kant pointed out, and came up with a very abstract Spinozist system so that knowledge of God was knowable and that there was meaning intrinsic to life.
>The significance of German philosophy (Hegel): to devise a pantheism through which evil, error, and suffering are not felt as arguments against divinity. This grandiose initiative has been misused by the existing powers (state, etc.), as if it sanctioned the rationality of whoever happened to be ruling

>>21251877
Not him but:

Assume proposition P is true.
Assume no one knows P is true.
This entails that the proposition P2, "P is an unknown truth" is also true.
It is not possible to know P2, as to know this is true entails knowing P is true, but this in turn means that P2 is no longer known, so its truth cannot be know.

Get wrecked. Circular, falliblist epistemology is the only thing that works. My boy Hegel knew this, and that Kant had created all sorts of trouble with the noumenal/phenomenal distinction.

That's why all true Gs are analytical Hegelians. Only through the progression of autism does the Absolute come into being dawg.

Absolute Knowing is just stage I. Absolute Analytical Autism comes next.

>>21251683
If even the PHD's that study this fucker can't come to a consensus about what the fuck he really meant, then I can just ignore him.

>>21252878
There isn't THAT much disagreement about what Kant meant. It could be much worse. He's downright cogent compared with Hegel or Whitehead.

>>21252858
What an extremely autistic way of coping with Kant.
It's like saying to a person who has woke up with no recollection where they are in an isolated cell where he cannot look outside and thus he says: "I cannot look outside these walls and I can not know what transcends them."
"But you know that you cannot know what transcends them therefore you can, the first proposition you said is circular!!!!!!!!! or something."
It makes absolutely no sense to think that " I can not know things outside of my sense perception" and then try refute it with the fact that you know that you cannot look past your experience as a proof that you can know things in themselves.
>>21252914
Even Hegel claimed that no one had understood him, probably because he suffered from Schizophrenia or something.

>>21252914
Doubt that. You can't name a single secondary literature that coherently explain his philosophy in understandable language.

>>21252915
>But you know that you cannot know what transcends them therefore you can, the first proposition you said is circular!!!!!!!!

Circularity is not the problem in >>21252858

Fitch's Unknowability Paradox is just showing that not all true propositions can be known, since knowledge of them would make them no longer true.

Second, how DARE you imply Heg Dawg was cray. Look at all he has inspired.

>>21252954
Hegel seems incredibly bizarre, his Dialectic is the only interesting thing about him.
I mean the guy said on his deathbed how only one man understood him and even he didn't. I'm on the Kant/Schopenhauer team most German Idealists after Kant really just wanted knowledge of things that transcend our knowledge i.e. God.

>>21252914
>>21252915
>>21252917
lol, Kant is great but I remember reading that someone who received his work, I can't remember if it was Knutzen, said that he appreciated but if he feared that if he read more of it he would become schizophrenic.

>>21253017
In Subahibi one of the characters who references Kant becomes a schizo. I can't imagine the brain rot someone gets from Hegel

>>21253021
I think Kleist, who shot his lover and then killed himself (ok it was a suicide pact), was deeply affected by Kant, I heard Kleist's On the Theater of Marionettes is an essay more or less about the epistemological implications of Kant's First Critique.

>>21253060
Interesting, imo the entire revolt against Kant was that setting boundaries to reason and that now believing in God, free-will etc is now not rational but faith based, despite Kant being an optimistic Christian. If you were a devout christian who suddenly read Kant it would be way to blackpilling.

I believe that the rationalism/empiricism debate is a false dichotomy. The decision between representation (subjective rationalism) and presentation (objective empiricism) is false , as is the division between mind and matter . Neutral monism dissolves these false dichotomies and with it Kant's purported solution to a nonexistent problem.

It all hinges on what is meant by "experience". Kant followed Hume, who viewed experience as atomic sensations without overarching structure. Hume had is in retrospect a primitive associationist theory as to how these experiential atoms combined. It's an essentially a form of statistical inference. The mind has no prebuilt structures that order experience. Rather, overlapping, recurring, or coincident sensations over time become the basis of inferences after repeated observation. Eventually the mind infers conditional parings from the redundancy of events and attributes causality to events which immediately precede antecedent events reliably.

This theory leads Hume to doubt causality because causality itself is not experienced. There is no "causality" existing independently of the spatiotemporal relations of objects. Causality itself is never experienced, it is inferred from the associated connections of streams of events.

This is where Kant comes in. Wanting to preserve the idea of causality and disprove Hume, he argued that causality is a precondition for reasoning itself. Causality is not learned, it is built into the logic of thought itself.

Both Hume and Kant can be criticized however in that experience is not just "raw data" Reason and experience are the same thing. If experience is not just raw data, but has its own structure, then there is no need for reason to order it. Enter James' radical empiricism:

>(1) a postulate: “The only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience”; (2) a factual statement: “The relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves,” which serves to distinguish radical empiricism from the empiricism of the Scottish philosopher David Hume; and (3) a generalized conclusion: “The parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous transempirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure.” The result of this theory of knowledge is a metaphysics that refutes the rationalist belief in a being that transcends experience, which gives unity to the world.

1/2

>>21253130
Since the mind does not stand in opposition to the world, but is continuous with it, experience is a direct interface to the world. The structure of experience is dependent on the structure of the world. After all, why should the so-called transcendental categories be pragmatically effective? The logic of these categories cannot be arbitrary, or else reason would fail. Given that reason is successful, these categories must contain the imprint of experience, which itself contains the imprint of the world.

Radical empiricism disarms Hume at the root, and therefore defeats Kant because it shows how he's chasing after a pseudo-problem.

nuke this thread

>finds the noumena and completes Kant's system

>>21253073
Yeah, when I was into neoplatonism, christian theology and apophatic theology in general, I felt an indisposition toward him, would look to possible refutations of him in Husserl. But now that I'm inclined against rationalism I see his metaphysics and epistemology with sympathy.

>>21253227
I guess I was a gnostic for a while so I somewhat understand. Schopenhauer was right about most philosophers of his time having theological intent, intending to find proof for God rather then finding truth which is why he called them charlatans and went into a passionate fit of rage whenever they tried to use reason pass its boundaries.

>>21252858
Might just be a brainlet, but I don't think the argument you made checks out. The truth of P can be pragmatically assumed or weakly inferred while also asserting that the actual truth-value of P is indeterminate. P2 would then be something like: either P or not P is true. P2 would then be consistent with our lack of certainty regarding P.

>>21253135
But then this structure implies a specific organization, a form in which it finds itself as what it is. How does this differ from those ancient ontological inquiries, chain of being, etc. of the world and nature?

>>21251842
Imagine taking Hegel seriously, fucking pseud

lol he fucked up the deduction three times but yeah trust him im sure the fourth one was right

>>21251683
It's simple, if you're not a gullible fool you realize there is nothing Kant said which necessarily prevents the possibility of making judgements beyond "possible experience." Namely because "possible experience" is an entirely arbitrary idea which Kant made up, which he even admits himself at one point.

>>21253152
Did his dog awaken from a slumber after taking a bite out of that book?

>>21253822
I thought Kant had defined countless times what experience entails. But where does he admit it is all arbitrary?

>>21253849
When he writes about intellectual intuition, he admits outright that the only reason he considers it "not a possible experience" is because he has never experienced it (actually, he even admits that intellectual intuition is "theoretically possible"). He tries to gloss this over by making appeals to common sense and so on, but for anyone with eyes to see, it's very clear what Kant is doing. He is just an enlightenment figurehead trying to further curtail the influence of possibilities transcending the all-too-human.
>I thought Kant had defined countless times what experience entails.
This is not quite correct, Kant explains countless times what human experience commonly consists of, not experience per se. He is never able to deductively demonstrate why experience must take a certain form, namely the form human beings commonly experience. Consequently he is also not able to explain why reason is necessarily linked to this form of experience, when there could be others he is simply not aware of.

>>21252718
>Transcendental aesthetic refuted by science
How?

>>21253834
kek

>>21251683
Has the same epistemic problems as Nominalism.

>>21251719
Fpbp

>>21253888
Good job anon. Are you a kant phd?

>>21254557
I'm just an autodidact who got tired of being told what to think, so I went straight to the source.

>>21254570
What do you think about this?:

>... as in this philosophical and critical age empiricism can scarcely be taken seriously, and it is probably put forward only as an intellectual exercise and for the purpose of putting in a clearer light, by contrast, the necessity of rational a priori principles, we can only be grateful to those who employ themselves in this otherwise uninstructive labour.

>only as an intellectual exercise and for the purpose of putting in a clearer light, by contrast, the necessity of rational a priori principles

It was in this same way that Kant put forward the critique of speculative reason and its exclusion of intellectual intuition from the faculties of the human being. It was to awaken us to the unpalatable consequences of this negation of intellectual intuition, and by this means present us with an apagoge that reveals to each and every true understander of the critique of pure speculative reason his own power of intellectual intuition.

>Freedom, however, is the only one of all the ideas of the speculative reason of which we know the possibility a priori

An Idea? Known? How could this be? Are not all Ideas concepts without objects and therefore unknowable? No. There is one Idea, at least, which obtains an object and through this means obtains objective validity: Freedom. But what is freedom if not the exercise of WILLPOWER.

>there now appears an unexpected and very satisfactory proof of the consistency of the speculative critical philosophy. For whereas it insisted that the objects of experience as such, including our own subject, have only the value of phenomena, while at the same time things in themselves must be supposed as their basis, so that not everything supersensible was to be regarded as a fiction and its concept as empty; so now practical reason itself, without any concert with the speculative, assures reality to a supersensible object of the category of causality, viz., freedom, although (as becomes a practical concept) only for practical use; and this establishes on the evidence of a fact that which in the former case could only be conceived.

>assures reality to a supersensible object

And what is the supersensible if not the intelligible?

And thus this intellegible object which corresponds to our Idea, or concept of pure reason as opposed to the understanding, gives that Idea the objective validity which makes that Idea knowable. But since concepts without intuitions are empty, it is therefore an intuition which has supplied the material with which to synthesize a manifold into a concept and present an object giving that concept objective validity.

Ideas are not empirical however, and transcend anything empirical. And yet the Ideal object is intuited. How? Another kind of intuition, a kind of intuition which, before it becomes actual, is merely intelligible, an intuition which prior to a consciousness of its existence is only an apparition of the Mind- a ghost, perhaps a spirit, if you will.

We thus realize that this (from a lower standpoint) merely intelligible, or intellectual, intuition is actually (from a higher standpoint) spiritual intuition.

Somesay Kant never reached Swedenborg. Perhaps it was Swedenborg who reached Kant

>>21254570

Also this:

What irony that the greatest thinker who ever lived denied the faculty of intellectual intuition to human beings! The Critique of Pure Reason is overflowing with intellectual intuition expressed in precise, disciplined Prussian German.

The Critique is written from the standpoint of someone who lacks intellectual intuition, or in other words, someone who fails to recognize his own thinking as intuition, i.e, direct cognition of his thoughts. Yet, the Critique itself, as a product of thinking, is a product of intellectual intuition, in fact, presupposes it. Kant, with his impeccable intelligence, could not have failed to recognize this. Thus what makes the Critique so great is its profound irony, without doubt intended deliberately by the great Architect.

The truth is Kant himself possessed intellectual intuition, but chose to write from the standpoint of one without this faculty, so that his intended audience, empiricist and rationalist philosophers could bridge the gap between themselves through the recognition that belief or not in the faculty of intellectual intuition is what lied at the boundary between them. And further those who did not believe in this faculty would come to recognize their own intellectual intuition by means of the great contradiction of the Critique, its great irony: its grandiose display of intellectual intuition to deny that selfsame intuition. A contradiction that can only be resolved, an irony that can only be understood, when the reader finally recognizes their own thinking as this mysterious intellectual intuition.

This predicate which Kant admits only to the concept of a divine understanding, shows itself to be found in the understanding of man- and thus man's understanding reveals itself to be divine understanding; the Mind of God is Mind of Man.

>If, by the term noumenon, we understand a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensuous intuition, thus making abstraction of our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the word. But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensuous intuition, we in this case assume a peculiar mode of intuition, an intellectual intuition, to wit, which does not, however, belong to us, of the very possibility of which we have no notion—and this is a noumenon in the positive sense.

>Now, the possibility of a thing can never be proved from the fact that the conception of it is not self-contradictory, but only by means of an intuition corresponding to the conception. If, therefore, we wish to apply the categories to objects which cannot be regarded as phenomena, we must have an intuition different from the sensuous, and in this case the objects would be a noumena in the positive sense of the word. Now, as such an intuition, that is, an intellectual intuition, is no part of our faculty of cognition, it is absolutely impossible for the categories to possess any application beyond the limits of experience. It may be true that there are intelligible existences to which our faculty of sensuous intuition has no relation, and cannot be applied, but our conceptions of the understanding, as mere forms of thought for our sensuous intuition, do not extend to these. What, therefore, we call noumenon must be understood by us as such in a negative sense.

>the intelligible requires an altogether peculiar intuition, which we do not possess, and in the absence of which it is for us nothing;

He meant all this merely as a thought experiment to demonstrate the logical consequences of the normie metaphysic (denial of intellectual intuition). The Critique is ultimately a reductio ad absurdum: "Look at what you get when you deny intellectual intuition, complete nonsense. Therefore intellectual intuition exists."

He does therefore believe in noumena in a postive sense: thoughts as objects of understanding, all the while tongue in cheek denying such a faculty for humans in the natural healthy state. It is by the process of progressing through transcendental critique that the human eventually grows out of this natural state and achieves the standpoint of philosophy which is the recognition of the true nature of thought, a state which transforms the human into something more than human: An Übermensch.

>>21254576
Sorry anon, but I buy penguin editions of CPR just to make bonfires out of them.

>>21253888
>he explains what human experience consists of, not experience per se
Anon, how can “possible experience” be anything but what is possible for us? What does experience in itself even mean? Experience entails the subjective part.

As for his attempt to curtail the influence of possibilities transcending the all-too-human, you are absolutely right. He himself says that despite the critique not being in the reach of the common people, what he tries to do is to level reason to the reach of the common people in its practical side.

>>21254576
What does this intellectual intuition implies? Is it anything more than the intuition of unity of apperception?

>>21252858
this is what analytics does to a mother fucker. You need to get out of your anglo box bro.
You created a paradox isolated from anything real. You are not a Hegelian.

But cheers to you absolute analytical autism, it was funny :)

>>21254884
>Anon, how can “possible experience” be anything but what is possible for us?
By being possible for something which is not us. Very simple, it just requires basic critical thinking skills.
>What does experience in itself even mean?
I never said anything about experience in itself.
>Experience entails the subjective part.
Perhaps if you define it as entailing the subjective part. This is not really what my point was though, and I don't see it as necessary to argue otherwise. My point was that experience does not necessarily entail the human ("transcendental aesthetic") part, which is what Kant tries to assert.
>As for his attempt to curtail the influence of possibilities transcending the all-too-human, you are absolutely right.
Naturally, for I was quoting him almost verbatim throughout that entire post, except where I added my own comments.

>>21252745
>>21251863
good posts, Kant's entire project or at least the grounds for the worst excesses of Kant weeabooism is demolished by this

>>21255052
>by being possible for something which is not us
Jesus christ.

>I never said anything about experience in itself
> Kant explains countless times what human experience commonly consists of, not experience per se
>experience per se
>per se

>If you define it as entailing the subjective part
What is experience with no subjective part?

> My point was that experience does not necessarily entail the human ("transcendental aesthetic") part, which is what Kant tries to assert.
Well, I think you should read look up for the Kritik der Eselsvernunft, then.

>>21251719
quite this.

>>21251757
>It's not. That's the point of the Critique. The judgment say something about the limits of human knowledge,
No, it's a fallacious thing; where your own conclusion of that XYZ is impossible relies upon you having already done XYZ - it's a personal experience argument 'he' is making and arguing against it. Hypocrisy, in a word.

By the same logic we humans who have ever visited the sun can say nothing of how it operates and our observations must be discounted, or like: because we've never seen Pluto make a full 400 yr orbit of the sun we can say nothing of it. Nonsense. We predict most of our knowledge, if it works then it's correct, it is doesn't work then it was in error and we don't use it anymore.

>>21255121
>> Kant explains countless times what human experience commonly consists of, not experience per se
There is no assertion that experience in itself is a real thing by me, the assertion is that Kant has no right to imply that there is such a thing by limiting experience arbitrarily to human experience, and calling it "[all] possible experience." Reading comprehension.
>What is experience with no subjective part?
As I said, it's not necessary to argue this point, but this would theoretically be subject-object identification, which would be the true criterion for knowledge vis-a-vis intellectual intuition.
>Well, I think you should read look up for the Kritik der Eselsvernunft, then.
I don't know what that is, you will have to sell me on why I should.

mind if I chime in?

>>21255152
>There is no assertion that experience in itself is a real thing by me, the assertion is that Kant has no right to imply that there is such a thing
This is still the same problem I just made, here: >>21255125 plus, overall, whoever is declaring "all things we know" to be dismissed almost as a first-glance opinion "unique to you/me/him, not translatable to anybody else," (as people tend to take this line of thought) then they're simply not aware of evidenced-based proofs about things. The material world and all working knowledge is derived from this, for instance, and not from anything else,

> the true criterion for knowledge vis-a-vis intellectual intuition.

>>21255152
Then why is it relevant to bring experience per se into the discussion? All we can have is human experience, hence this is all it is possible. Kant expected his audience to consist of human beings, not donkeys, birds, weasels.

>subject-object identification
This is an abstraction of experience. Experience implies the material of sensations which implies external stimulus.

>>21251683
>Did he simply
I'll relay,

Kant do simple problem-solving.
Kant hold a job.
Kant figure out a train timetable.

As he grew up being told to do things like this by the persons around him in a trick of phonemes making it seem like every instruction was a cruel put-down against his abilities, Emmanuel Kant slowly went mad.

>>21255219
>Then why is it relevant to bring experience per se into the discussion?
To show that Kant is making a mistake by implying that there is such a thing, and especially by implying that this thing is basically all-too-human.
>All we can have is human experience, hence this is all it is possible.
You do not know this. I am not referring to subhuman experiences either (which are likely the same as the common human experience Kant wrote about anyway), which should be quite obvious, it is the possibilities which are transcendent with respect to the human state (but which do not necessarily preclude "a human" from attaining them, given that "humanity" is a false abstraction, anyway). There is simply no reason why the "common experience" of men and animals is the experience everyone is bound by, it is just a dogmatic assertion you are making.
>This is an abstraction of experience.
No, it is a possible reality.
>Experience implies the material of sensations
You are making this up to support your point, the same dogmatism Kant uses. You are assuming that material sensations are necessary for experience because you've been ingratiated with them your entire life.

>>21255259
Where does Kant say anything about experience per se? He only talks about what is in the reach of human beings, what are you talking about?

> There is simply no reason why the "common experience" of men and animals is the experience everyone is bound by, it is just a dogmatic assertion you are making
Lmao, Guenon reader, everyone.

> You are making this up to support your point, the same dogmatism Kant uses
Definitions may be dogmatic (as Kant recognizes science to be) but not dogmatism. Dogmatism is subscribing to supposed superhuman faculties without due critique of them.

>>21252917
The silence is deafening. Kantbros are all pseuds.

>>21255296
>Where does Kant say anything about experience per se?
Nowhere, I was explaining why it was implied by his statement which I criticized earlier (again, reading comprehension). Go back and read it, and you'll see how.
>Dogmatism is subscribing to supposed superhuman faculties without due critique of them.
Universal Possibility encompasses everything, including the sub- and superhuman. There is no need to subscribe to anything except the reality of total possibility and all of its extensions, either virtual or actual.
>Definitions may be dogmatic
We are not just talking about definitions, Kant's attachment of possible experience to one particular type of experience is actually an incorrect and dogmatic judgement, rather than a definition. And either way, I still have yet to see any meaningful response from you which is able to support Kant's views as given in my first post. If you are just here to argue in favor of Kant because you agree with his opinions rather than actually show where I've made a mistake, then let's cut this short and stop here.

>>21251683
I haven't read his book, what new concepts can I possibly learn from it if I've already studies Bayes before?

>>21255348
So Kant is wrong because he talks about possible experience, which implies experience per se, which doesn’t exist? Why are you so confusing? You don’t make any of your points with clarity.

>Universal possibility
Here we go with another speculative abstraction. Alright, this kind of possibility is restricted to reason, not experience for experience is determined to certain conditions. Now the possibility of this universal possibility of reason is what Kant criticizes. Have you read the Critique of Pure Reason? This is an honest question.

How do you subscribe to the reality of total possibility? What is it? How do you gain knowledge of it?

>one particular tupe of experience
Again, Kant’s definition of experience is very clear. Are you implying that reasoning’s especulation and boundless journeys can considered as experience as well? Again, this is what Kant addresses in the book.

>I still have yet to see any meaningful response from you which is able to support Kant's views as given in my first post. If you are just here to argue in favor of Kant because you agree with his opinions rather than actually show where I've made a mistake
But I tried. I tried to show you what Kant means by experience, what it necessarily entails. You just refuses to acknowledge, call it dogmatic and proceed to spout sentimental mysticism.

>>21255401
What I've said so far is all quite clear, from what I can tell, judging by the fact that you repeatedly misread words such as "implies" as "says", I am assuming you have poor reading comprehension or maybe dyslexia. There is not much more I can do to help you in this case, except recommend that you read slowly to parse singular words more accurately.
> Alright, this kind of possibility is restricted to reason
No.
>Now the possibility of this universal possibility of reason is what Kant criticizes.
"Attempts to criticize", you mean. Regardless, "universal possibility of reason" is an oxymoron because "reason" (namely the concrete application of logical rules) is already a determination itself. Kant criticizes the human faculty of reason as it is generally used on a daily basis, which he calls understanding, and the edge case which he calls "reason." They are both really one and the same thing, which he notes correctly, but he believes without sufficient justification (for the reasons I have already given in this thread) that reason is unjustified in some of its conclusions.
>Have you read the Critique of Pure Reason?
Of course, although I do not generally spend more time with it than necessary because I do not consider it profound or interesting.
>How do you subscribe to the reality of total possibility?
By simply acknowledging it, and not allowing odd beliefs to cloud your vision, like the ones you're currently putting forth. This question is going very far from what my original post was about, it's actually extraneous to the point I was making about Kant, and I can tell you are hostile to the idea so there is little point in pursuing it further.
> what it necessarily entails
You haven't shown the necessity of anything yet. You have just said things and then stated that they are necessary. I am on the contrary not in the position of stating that anything is absolutely necessary.

>>21255452
It is useless to keep going. You don’t seem to have read the Critique for otherwise I wouldn’t have to explain repeatedly what experience is and how it is constituted (answering you here about necessity, which is really implies in a thing’s constitution, you are barely in touch with analytical statements).

> I can tell you are hostile to the idea so there is little point in pursuing it further.
Dude:
>>How do you subscribe to the reality of total possibility?
>By simply acknowledging it
Look at your answer. How do you expect someone not to be hostile to this kind of answer? You are not honest about your own beliefs.

Yes, Kant is not profound, the movement of German Idealism is uninteresting and irrelevant. You should keep yourself with your readings of Guenon, Shankara, Allan Watts.

>>21255481
>Look at your answer.
My answer was as stupid as the question was, it's kind of you to notice.
>You don’t seem to have read the Critique
This is what it always comes down to with Kantians.