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20745445 No.20745445 [Reply] [Original]

>revises the categories of Kant and Hegel using modern logic
>completes the system of German idealism
>devises an architectonic system that can explain everything
Why aren't you familiar with Charles Sanders Peirce (pronounced "PURSE"), perhaps the only system-building philosopher worthy enough to dethrone Aristotle.
>b-b-but he's American
Unfortunate circumstance. But he has more philosophical acumen in one of his thumbs than every other American philosopher put together.
>muh biosemiotics
Fuck off nerd. Peirce wrote about literally everything. Of course he easily revolutionized semiotics, but that's because of the clarity of his tripartite metaphysical thinking.

>> No.20745460

Why post like this? I tune out every thread written in this effeminate zoomer tone. Just post about something Peirce wrote.

>> No.20745577

>>20745460
Fpbp

>> No.20745584

>>20745445
I'm mostly interested in him because I'm interested in studying biosemiotics. However, in light of
>muh biosemiotics
what else do you recommend I read of his?

>> No.20745596
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20745596

>>20745460
>>20745577
>>20745584
His phenomenology, beginning with his categories of being.
>firstness
>secondness
>thirdness
Peirce's writings are all over the place. It's best to dig into JSTOR. Lots of good stuff there. Here's another summary of Peirce's work on ethics:
https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/1060

>> No.20745617

>>20745445
How does Pierce explain consciousness and the self or one’s self, what does he say they are?

>> No.20745626

If you treat Peirce like a forced /lit/ meme on the same level as Guenon, Whitehead, or Ted K, that's all he'll ever be.

>> No.20745649

>>20745617
Matter is effete mind, something that has been ordered until it is stable and no longer in motion. All thinking is done through signs whose meaning is continuously generated through a tripartite phenomenology. Peirce can accurately be defined as a nondualist.

>> No.20745655

>>20745617
I actually just finished reading a great article about Peirce's conception of the self. Here it is for free: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40320043

>> No.20745667

I particularly enjoy how clearly he sensed that Germans were/are/always will be a bullshit people, especially in a time where it was fashionable to treat them as the most advanced

> They [Germans] are an overrated people intellectually; their science & philosophy & literature tell the same story of dullness. Their strength is in a very strong & honest emotional nature: naïve, rather sensuous, entirely single-minded. They are total failures in painting and architecture, indifferent in sculpture and poetry

> I seem to get a further glimmer of what the Germans really are from contrasting them with the French. What strikes me most is their dense stupidity. The French are wonderfully intelligent & the Germans very much the reverse. Slow and dull. [... O]ne is so impressed with the toil the poor Germans have had to achieve something so very inferior, so little real artistic genius have they been able to develop, that one is tempted to ask wether it is worth while for them to strive after a thing they are so manifestly unfitted for. In fact I came away pondering whether it had been well for human culture that the Germans had been so passionately national.

> But I feel convinced that Germany has got to change her courses, give up this large army & have one a good deal smaller than France & change her tone & draw in her horns.

>> No.20745687

>>20745649
>Matter is effete mind, something that has been ordered until it is stable and no longer in motion. All thinking is done through signs whose meaning is continuously generated through a tripartite phenomenology.
Can you give a short Peircian account of how knowledge occurs, how awareness or the subject or consciousness knows itself or something else?
>Peirce can accurately be defined as a nondualist.
Interesting, in what sense? Ontological non-dualism is a more ‘vertical’ kind of non-dualism but epistemic non-dualism is more ‘horizontal’ if you know what I mean.

>> No.20745688

>>20745460
fpbp

>> No.20745689

Is this fella about to become the next big /lit/ meme? If so I'd like to get in early. Currently making a Peirce (pbuh) with laser eyes image and one of him with shades smoking a joint.

>> No.20745702

>>20745655
>here it is for free
>links a copywriter article
>scihub doesnt have it

>> No.20745776
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20745776

>>20745687
>Can you give a short Peircian account of how knowledge occurs, how awareness or the subject or consciousness knows itself or something else?
It's a descriptive account simplified as far as it can be. First quality arises. Then it is forcefully met with reaction between the ego and the outside world before being mediated into an intricate web of meaning, representation, habit, etc. Rinse and repeat. There's a lot going on. Firstness has a "wholeness, potentiality, potential" aspect to it. Secondness has a "analytic, relational, collisionary, ego vs. world" aspect to it. Thirdness has an "evolutionary, stabilizing" quality to it.

Basically, Peirce takes Kant's sensible intuitions, robs Kant of the ability to take those for granted and says that they're acquired abstractions that we've picked up since coming into existence, and eventually acknowledges that the only way we can be said to know anything at all is to have some kind of il lume naturale that connects our minds to the framework of nature. Knowledge is an infinite process, a constant negotiation between ourselves and nature, ourselves and a community of inquirers, etc., as the universe evolves from chance interactions to stable laws. An ever-continuing dance of abduction, deduction, and induction.

As you can tell, everything Peirce writes tends to have an architectonic, reflexive aspect to it. Minds have firstness, secondness, thirdness, etc. The universe operates by firstness, secondness, thirdness, etc. And these categories have a fractal nature to them as well. Secondness can have a degenerate firstness, thirdness can have a degenerate secondness and firstness, etc.

By the way, why the constant mention of triads? Well, Peirce argued that all logical relations can be represented in monads, dyads, and triads. Can't be monads and dyads alone, as that's insufficient to sum up to triads. So Peirce's triadomania holds up. This is how he's able to take Hegel's vision and run with it. Interestingly enough, the Peirce reduction thesis was proved a few decades ago, too. Though, it's worth saying that Quine proved that all logical relations *could* be reduced to dyadic predicates, but that depends on a construction that avoids negation (robbing the Hegelian elements) which Peirce incorporates. It's complex and I have to admit that I'm out of my element when it comes to pure logic, relying instead on SEP here. Still, it's quite fascinating.
>>20745702
It's from a Yale adjunct. And you can read 100 articles free per month from JSTOR.

>> No.20745898

>>20745689
I hope not

>> No.20745957

>>20745898
t. seething G*rmoid

>> No.20745988

>>20745898
me neither, Peirce is like philosophy's best kept secret lol. he solved 99% of the riddle. he cut the Gordion knot of philosophy. hopefully this will just be a phase that blows over...

>> No.20745993

Th only philosophers worth giving shit about is Max Stirner and Ayn Rand. Suck my average-sized dick.

>> No.20746125

>>20745689
please post when finished

>> No.20746325

>>20745445
What’s his opinion on jews

>> No.20746403

>>20746325
doesn't seem to be particularly concerned with (((them))). I don't think there were many Jews around where Peirce lived, especially since most Jews didn't start to come over until the late 19th century. he thought slavery was based though.

>> No.20746411

>>20745445
Not to mention
>Introduced novel and innovative logical operators and concepts into logic, such as material implication, existential graphs, hypostatic abstraction. Easily the greatest logician of the 19th century. Probably top 5 of all time.
>Invented possible worlds semantics or modal logic which became a whole field
>One of the founders of statistics. Introduced terms "confidence" and "likelihood", "repeated measures" and blind, randomized and controlled experiments.
> Anticipated the falsehood of the logicist theory of mathematics decades before it was borne out
> Substantial contributions to probability theory , including a novel "propensity" theory alongside the frequentist and subjectivist schools
> Introduced an entirely new form of inference to the two that had existed for thousands of years abductive inference (alongside inductive and deductive)
>father of semiotics, or at least makes the cofounder and his contemporary Saussure's semiotics look pea-brained in comparison
>Several respectable mathematical contributions in category theory, relation algebra, continua, infinitesimals, and topology
>Made great contributions to the philosophy of science and theory of inquiry
>Revitalized metaphysics with interesting and fresh ideas such as Tychism, objective idealism, etc

>> No.20746518

>>20745445
how should i start with Pierce?

>> No.20746617

>>20746518
His thinking is highly variegated and diffuse, so if you just jump right in somewhere you stand a good chance of not missing some prerequisite reading you'd need to understand wtf he's going on about.

I would start with one of his more digestible essays. The Fixation of Belief is a good one. It's not too abstract and doesn't really draw from his broader lexicon or philosophical system . I don't think it's his best or most insightful work but as an introduction you stand a good chance of understanding it.

http://www.bocc.ubi.pt/pag/peirce-charles-fixation-belief.html

How to Make Our Ideas Clear is also fairly accessible.

https://courses.media.mit.edu/2004spring/mas966/Peirce%201878%20Make%20Ideas%20Clear.pdf

>> No.20746885

Just a quick heads up everybody, Pierce is quite obviously pronounced like 'Fierce'

>> No.20746915

>>20746518
pick a topic, then search what Peirce had to say on it. JSTOR is a great resource. I also found interesting stuff on Google. And if you want to read the original works, then check the citations. Many essays can be found in the published collected works of Peirce, many which are found on libgen

>> No.20746920

>>20746885
Good thing his name is Peirce, not Pierce you fucking irreverent retard

>> No.20747481

>>20745445
he's got drip

>> No.20747916

>>20746920
It's an easy mistake to make, but the word 'pierce' is certainly spelled with the i before the e. Refer to 'Pierce the Veil', etc.

>> No.20747941

>>20745988
>philosophy's best kept secret
>first phil class I took for fun in college as a stem major was about him and william james
Doesn't sound very well kept

>> No.20748326

>>20747941
You're right. It only took a century after his death for him to catch on

>> No.20748640 [DELETED] 

>>20745445
Why post like this?

>> No.20749038

>>20747916
I’m going to snap your twig-like body in half if we ever meet for the sass

>> No.20749817

>>20747941
what did you learn about him anon

>> No.20750646
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20750646

>>20745689
Almost certainly not. I've studied this guy for a while now, and he is genuinely, authentically, legitimately too high IQ for 99.9% of academic scholars.

He is to logic what Carl Jung is to psychoanalysis.

>> No.20750676

>>20745687
>Can you give a short Peircian account of how knowledge occurs, how awareness or the subject or consciousness knows itself or something else?
Not OP but I know more than him, so, his position is that your knowledge of the object is equivalent to the sum of your conceptualizations about the object, plus the sensible perception itself. The object has a true complexity, and you have a subjective apprehension of that complexity which is absolutely approximate in its essential logical structure. You cannot exhaust the true complexity of the object. Which is why he came up with pragmatism as a solution: how much complexity do you need to know, and why? Your answer dictates precisely how far you should bother analyzing material reality.

In short; he considers every quale to have a corresponding "potentiality" for existence prior to its material instantiation, and every material fact is comprised of two antonimical qualities. For example, big cannot exist without small, nor can fast without slow, nor sense without no sensation. You can dig deeper into this idea but I don't really feel like giving a lecture.

>> No.20750692

>>20750646
Holy based. Sounds like he'll filter the midwits and the hylics. I'm sold.

>> No.20750705

>>20750646
>He is to logic what Carl Jung is to psychoanalysi
Self-own of the day

>> No.20750761

>>20750692
He and Jung actually arrived at extremely similar or oftentimes identical conclusions with respect to several phillsophical quandaries.

Jung was a shaman who trained his sights on science, and Peirce was a chemist and logician who set his sights on the domain of subjectivity. They're two wildly different men coming at the same problem, giving an immensely satisfying experience of organic synthesis between their conceptualizations and analytical systems.

>> No.20751191

>>20750761
Does Peirce believe in archetypes or something similar to the collective unconscious?

>> No.20751525

>>20751191
No, not at all. He comes tantalizingly close at a few points, but he is hyper focused on the rational; whereas Jung utilized rational scientific means as a means to an end, that being the elucidation of the phenomenology of the irrational.

Peirce is very much oriented towards the description of the logical laws of objective reality in as far as those can be determined.

>> No.20751528

>>20751525
>the elucidation of the phenomenology of the irrational.
I feel like you don't really know what any of these words mean, you've just been convinced that they should be arranged in this order.

>> No.20751562

>>20751525
In what way is Peirce not concerned about what is irrational? Hell, I think it's worth considering whether "irrationality" lacks a certain logic of its own. In that case, then Peirce's tripartite phaneroscopy, semiotic, etc., can explain "archetypes" (though I doubt that they're limited in number).

>> No.20751660

>>20751528
If you're out of your league then just sit quietly and observe the conversation.

Don't embarass yourself. You're like a fat, outcast loner kid trying to yell insults at the track team because they're panting.

>>20751562
They're certainly capable of allowing for the explanation of archetypal patterns, within the model that is; but that doesn't mean I've come across anything he's ever written that could was equivalent with Jungs theories on the matter.

If I'm mistaken, then please unsarcastically enlighten me. The guy wrote an absolute metric fuckton.

>> No.20751717

>>20751660
>The guy wrote an absolute metric fuckton.
Absolutely true! And I've noticed that most people begin with Peirce's semiotics and his earlier writings, when the architectonic elements of Peirce don't fully begin to shine until the last two decades of his life, when he begins to tackle aesthetics and ethics, investigate Neoplatonism, become more religious, etc.

If you could tell me what you read about Peirce that made you think that he
>comes tantalizingly close at a few points
>to believing in archetypes or something similar to the collective unconscious
then we can have a decent discussion. I think Peirce is more concerned about outlining a "method" of doing inquiry, which includes a structural interpretation of all possible phenomenon. I don't think Peirce would have been too interested in painstakingly cataloging all the common manifestations of our experience, like archetypes, which would be biologically, historically, etc., contingent, theoretically infinite in number, and of inexhaustible complexity (e.g. a substance, a thing-in-itself). So, I think that would make Peirce and Jung's projects fundamentally different, even if you could cross-pollinate ideas between the two thinkers relatively well.

>> No.20751743

>>20751717
I believe we are generally in agreement respecting this particular conceptualization of the two men as regards their differences of method.

The closest I'm aware of that Peirce managed to get with respect to an idea of the archetypes as Jung would describe them is something like the observation that the physical sciences are motivated by the will to power (or as he conceived it as, the instinct of self preservation) and the humanities as being motivated by the Eros principle (or as he conceived it as, the instinct to the general survival of the species). Outside of this, everything I've read of him that was in possession of the qualities typically identified as being contained within Jungs notion of the archetypes relates exclusively to his work with platonic realism.

>> No.20751759

>>20751743
What makes the will to power irrational?

>> No.20751760

>>20751717
Oh, to respond more specifically to your post, I would say that Jung and Peirce compensate for one another; in exactly the way that Jung himself would describe as an ideal in terms of pure method.

Peirce takes an absolutely realist approach whilst Jung is an exceptionally staunch idealist.

>> No.20751794

>>20751760
>Peirce takes an absolutely realist approach whilst Jung is an exceptionally staunch idealist.
It's very difficult to understand what you mean by that because of what I've described here:
>>20745649
>matter is just effete mind

>> No.20751809

>>20750676
Here's another take on Peircian epistemology, what he called the Methodeutic.

Peirce was an objective idealist, or what is today often called a panpsychist. For Peirce the difference between matter and mind was almost like the difference between different phases of matter, like that between liquid and solid. Matter was "congealed" mind, and mental states and ideas and the physical universe were continuous. He called this Synechism, the theory that all things in nature were continuous with everything else. As such, mental states and ideas were "things" as much as a mug on a table. Thoughts are matter in a more fluid, free phase, whereas matter is thought in a more congealed, "habituated" phase.

Peirce was also an evolutionist and proposed that what we call natural laws were not necessary but themselves evolved from initial conditions. And laws and natural regularities are not absolutes but rather habits, states in which physical forces eventually congealed and came to rest through their own dynamic interplay.

Again, because mind and matter are the same substance in different phases, mental habits and lawful natural regularities are the same type of thing, the same pattern expressed differently.

This brings us to the point about epistemology. For Peirce, knowlege is not a state but a process. It is a mental habit or rule by which one consistently draws fruitful results. Knowledge is a mental habit which traces out objective habits. The function of the mind according to Peirce is to acquire and maintain doubt-resistant beliefs. Belief has a tendency to come to rest. To the extent that we think, we doubt our beliefs, we feel that there is some challenge to it which must be staved off. Those mental habits which consistently result in doubt-resistent beliefs are what we call sapience. Sapience, the capacity to know, and knowlege, the product of sapience, are continuous, rather than two different states or elements in typing system in which knowlege products are subordinate to the capacity to know in a sort of hierarchy of types.

In short, knowlege is only as good as the habit of conduct which generates it, because knowlege of isolated facts isn't much knowledge at all. The key to epistemology are those habits of inquiry which consistently yield valid inferences about natural habits which they are, in a way, continuous and the same.

Cognitive knowlege does not really "represent" the object of knowlege, it embodies it.

>> No.20751813

>>20751794
I didn't write that post.

>>20751759
The fact that it deals exclusively with the subjective experience of the individual being as it confronts the irrational reality of pain.

You can be an idealist ... until pain is involved. Pain brings with it a meaning undeniable and unarguable; no employment of reason can assuage it of its self evident truth.

>> No.20751827

>>20751813
>I didn't write that post.
You mean the post I quoted? I know that, because that was my post. I was just bringing attention to it.
>You can be an idealist ... until pain is involved.
How is pain irrational? Also, it's worth noting that this is a classic transition from Firstness to Secondness in Peirce's phaneroscopy.

>> No.20751832

>>20745596
where does theology fit into this?

>> No.20751838

>>20751809
What do you think of the problem of applying Plato's Meno to Peirce's epistemology. i.e. in order to know something, you have to already know something. Also, how would you reconcile Plato's definition of knowledge as being something that doesn't change vs. Peirce's definition of knowledge being process? Both are committed to realism too, which makes the differences intriguing.

>> No.20751853

>>20751827
The value if Peirces work, to me, is as a scaffold for the knowledge available to us thanks to phenomenology.

So, pain is irrational in the same way that any sensation is irrational: you can't argue it away or manipulate it through purely mental means. Certainly you van ignore it, or train yourself to suppress it, but you will feel whatever pain you are feeling and there is nothing you can do to dismiss the truth of its immanent meaning. Compare consciousness to non-consciousness; even the greatest degree of pleasure possible is still objectively painful in comparison to the painlessness of unconsciousness.

>>20751794
Oh, I'm not really sure what you're saying. Isn't that just Berkleys argument that the mind of God is apprehending material reality in its totality? Or does Peirce mean that matter and mind are in some sense on different ends of a polarity?

Either position seems reasonable from him.

>> No.20751884

>>20751832
It's complicated for Peirce, who eventually settles on panentheism. Everything is involved.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/306047760_Panentheism_and_Peirce's_God_Theology_Guided_by_Philosophy_and_Cosmology

>> No.20751890

>>20751853
What makes sensations irrational?

>> No.20751904

>>20751853
>Isn't that just Berkleys argument that the mind of God is apprehending material reality in its totality? Or does Peirce mean that matter and mind are in some sense on different ends of a polarity?
It's both, actually. And there's an "evolutionary" aspect to Peirce's account of cosmology, in that universe tends from chaos, possibility, etc., towards stability and order (from which we can discern the laws of nature). Peirce is well acquainted with the history of philosophy and often compares himself with other philosophers. With Berkeley, Peirce claims that Berkeley does not sufficiently consider the aspect of Secondness enough, leading him to nominalism. You can read more here if you have time:
http://mesosyn.com/peirce-Harvard.html

>> No.20751910

>>20751890
The fact that you cannot employ reason to manipulate their meaning.

Your abstract conception of a lamp is quite different from your apprehension of a real lamp within your senses. In the first case you may employ reason, rationality, and pure thought as a means of mentally changing its color, it's shape, or texture, or position in a room, etc. But when it comes to what's actually in front of you there is no reason by which you can alter your sensation and its perceptions.

In this way, sensation is an irrational function. Of course, as a human being, every component of your consciousness is mired in irrationality; this was indeed Jungs critical observation, and the foundation of his theories. However, it is definitely the case, also, that the material and objective world can have its qualities abstracted into purely rational modes of thought, which is where Peirce shines.

>> No.20751923

>>20751884
are you positive he wasn't just a christian. seems like lots of places are saying he was Episcopalian. I sometimes notice with certain philosophers people really like to make their religious views obscure, when it seems like they just called themselves christians.

>> No.20751937
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20751937

>>20751904
>You can read more here ...
I have read quite a bit of my good freind Mr. Peirce, I can assure you.

But thank you for the recommendation. It's excellent to see people excited about his work, given its potential.

>> No.20751965

>>20751910
>The fact that you cannot employ reason to manipulate their meaning.
Sounds like the most rational thing, desu. But then again, "rationality" is such a meme word these days, as something that's purely about the arrangement of mental constructs and not pursuit of truth. I'll be clear from now on that I'll use rationality not in the general sense but in the Jungian sense.

I'm enjoying this cross pollination. Where do you think intuition plays into Peirce's system of thought? What about the other functions?

>> No.20751968

>>20751923
Nah he wasn't a pantheist, that guy is just misinterpreting his adoption of leibnitz idea that there are monadic "spirits" that comprise the entirety of what it is possible to apprehend within the senses about an object.

Man, people really so have a lot of trouble with Peirce. I don't blame anyone for that, he writes like he was on 5 pounds of cocaine.

>> No.20751973

>>20751923
lol almost every philosopher is a special snowflake religion-ist. Peirce was an atheist for a significant portion of his life before turning to Christianity. he thought that the Trinity made sense because... well... it's a triad!

>> No.20751980

>>20751968
Come on, dude. I never said he was a pantheist. I said he was a panENtheist. EN EN EN. And Peirce himself said that he was a panentheist because he argued that God had to be both involved in the world and beyond the world.

>> No.20751989

>>20751973
> he thought that the Trinity made sense because... well... it's a triad!
that is consistent with what i know about Pierce

>> No.20752003

>>20751965
I'd have to go back into my physical notes from quite a long time ago, back when i was researching him, but I recall making a mental note that Peirce had conflated intuition and with what Jung would call feeling.

Peirce managed to cleanly and consciously differentiate between two functions of the psyche: thinking and sensation; whereas feeling and intuition were to him suffused within one another, however he believed that feeling preceeded intuition and that intuition was in some sense an extention or sublimation of feeling as a function.

I recall this amusing me a great deal, as Peirce was certainly an introverted thinking type and as a consequence would have had the most difficulty in differentiating between the two.

>> No.20752010

>>20751980
Oh, my bad. I'm posting on my phone. Lmao.

Had a long day, my brain is in poor form.

>> No.20752019

>>20751973
>He thoufht that the Trinity made sense because... well... it's a triad!
Unassailable logic desu

>> No.20752031

>>20752003
Interesting. I would have relegated feeling to Firstness and intuition toward Thirdness, which of course then informs Firstness again. Please let return if you have the time to check your notes.

>> No.20752052

>>20752031
You got a discord or something?

>> No.20752068

>>20752052
no unfortunately

>> No.20752098

>>20752068
What sort of turbo nerd doesn't have a discord, 555-cmon-now.

So how old are you? How the hell did you learn about peirce and his work?

>> No.20752182

>>20752098
I'm 25. Wikipedia, actually. I used to have a Discord, but I quit because I'm enlisting. I ship out in a month.

How did I come across Peirce? I was studying Plato's Parmenides dialogue as part of a general meditation on being, non-being, and becoming. Then I was reminded of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel's categories of being. I'm autistic enough to think that it's essential to have some account of the categories of being, and I thought their arrangements were rather arbitrary, but I had not a snowball's chance in hell in tackling them. Then, lo and behold, the Wikipedia article mentioned Peirce's system among the other thinkers who tried to hack at the question of categories, and he was concerned with the question for the exact same reasons I was. I traveled down the rabbit hole, threw every objection I could think of at it but failed, and then became convinced that I was dealing with a once in a millennia genius and, strangely, a kindred spirit, a mentor even. I also felt like phaneroscopy has the potential of making one's own "practical thinking" clearer, so I've been playing around with it for the past month while delving into every area that Peirce tackled, from aesthetics to logic. I even read some secondary literature applying Peircian semiotics to vipassana meditation and thought it was brilliant. I am genuinely thankful that such a man lived, was able to write so much, and have his works preserved for me to read at my convenience today.

>> No.20752216

>>20752182
Well I'm not much older than you, best of luck on your training. What possessed you to pursue a military career? You seem extremely sharp for your age.

>> No.20752260

>>20752098
>you don't have a facebook gramps, like um oh my god what do you eveeen do all day, you are like toootally uncool. Even my bffs sister Becky has an fb and shes like 5.
That's what you sound like, a teenage girl.

>> No.20752289

>>20752260
Would you be against telling me about yourself?

I've always wondered what types of people make these sorts of posts.

>> No.20752298

>>20752216
Thank you anon. I'm pretty excited for it, honestly.

I graduated from a top-tier university, whose people I absolutely hated because I felt that they were unserious and inadequate despite being trained to become the next generation of leaders. I wanted to pick a career that was as far away from that crowd as possible. I know for a fact that the military will keep me disciplined and force me away from the theoretical and towards the practical, which is something I desperately need in order to congeal all that I've been contemplating into a coherent worldview. Plus, I like the military life and what it represents. As broken as this country is, I still have to find some way to contribute to it if I ever want to be in a position to re-right the ship. And for me, the most bearable way of doing that is military service, perhaps followed by a re-entry into academia later.

I could go on and on about how every aspect of the military somehow suits my current needs. But it ultimately boils down to this. I want to become the kind of leader I'd want to listen to. Somebody I would have looked up to about 10 years ago when I became conscious enough about society's deep contradictions yet had nowhere to look. It would have saved me a ton of hassle.

>> No.20752322

>>20752298
I hope you get out if it what you need. When I was young I also wanted to join the military for that very reason. Then I got married and, contrary to my assumptions, discovered that the necessities concomitant with a romantic relationship to a woman were sufficient to cure me of most of my self deception and stupidity. Personally I spent a year at an awful college and left because they weren't teaching anything I didn't already know. So long as you have the internet, you're as educated as you choose to be.

If I have any advice for you, it would be to seek who it is that you are; become who you are, not who you think you should be. Say yes to what is possible, not what is desired.

Are you familiar with Jungs work? I'd highly recommend delving deeper into it, with great caution.

>> No.20752347

>>20752322
>Say yes to what is possible, not what is desired.
Well, I like to go with both. Everything seems to be lining up for this to be the best decision. And everybody I know who cares about me, even if they were surprised, came around to it being a great idea. So, there's that.
>Are you familiar with Jungs work? I'd highly recommend delving deeper into it, with great caution.
Hardly at all, except for a basic understanding of the functions. I always liked taking MBTI tests, but with the caveat of trying to track the "development" of my functions without getting attached to my particular type. I know that's a huge divergence from Jung. What would you recommend?

>> No.20752420

>>20752347
I would recommend starting with Man and His Symbols. Although only the first chapter was written by Jung, it is nevertheless the best introductory book on his work and his ideas. After this, consider perusing his absolutely monumental body of work and picking out what seems interesting to you.

I would personally recommend starting with Psychological Types or Archetypes of The Collective Unconscious.

I believe you will find great kinship with Jung, as he was also a stern and severe man of discipline who dedicated himself entirely to his work. The amount of references he makes in a typical book would be sufficient to best most academics in respect to the amount of books read in their entire careers. His collected works total over 70 thousand pages.

Absolutely no one else will let you see into the human mind like he will, if you are willingly to walk that path.

>> No.20752439

>>20752420
>Man and His Thirdness
I kid, I kid. Thank you anon, I will look into it. Perhaps my mom has some Jung lying around here...

>> No.20752450

>>20752439
Do you have a kindle e reader? They're very inexpensive and will allow you to go to bo-k.org and get his collected works, and any other book in existence, for free.

>> No.20752483

>>20751525
There is nothing irrational about these concepts of Jung. If not he doesn't share these concepts, then be so kind as to tell us in what way Peirce agrees with Jung. I am a reader of Jung and I find this claim of yours to be very strange.

>> No.20752519

>>20752420
How do you feel about Freud?

>> No.20752589

>>20752519
He's Jewish, and was dealing with Jewish psychology. He himself admitted much of his work was incommensurate with the white Aryan mind.

However, each of us, as an incarnation of our race, carries within a great likeness to one another; and whatever can be learned about the Jews can be applied to oneself

>>20752483
Consider that you're looking at the word cat written down on a page.

Thinking is a rational faculty in that you can manipulate the word by attributing to it all manner of particular or general concepts, such as a tabby, a kitten, a siamese, the talking cat from Sabrina The Teenage Witch, etc. You can even assign those conceptualizations to a different symbol, say the German word for cat. This is how you would learn another language.

Feeling is also a rational faculty in that you may pick out, that is "abstract", from your feelings about cats one in particular - say, how cute and adorable kittens are and how lovely that makes you feel. Whereas you might also choose to focus in on feelings of paranoia and fear, if you happened to be a superstitious person.

Sensation is irrational in that there is absolutely nothing that you as a consciousness can do to affect the way that you perceive the word cat on the page. It will be the color you see it as, and have the features you apprehend within the senses, and that's that. There's no arguing with your eyes or brain that they're seeing a certain color.

Intuition is also irrational, but I'll let you do some reading and figure out for yourself why that's the case.

>> No.20752618

>>20752589
>He's Jewish, and was dealing with Jewish psychology.
He derived his insights from dealing with his patients, who were from the German and Austrian elite, anon.

>> No.20752621
File: 31 KB, 500x500, il_fullxfull.1296855583_wbyg.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
20752621

>>20752618
Who were Jewish.

>> No.20752626

>>20752621
not all of them were Jewish lmao

>> No.20752630

oh sweet a schizo thread

>> No.20752631

>>20752626
The vast majority were. There are correspondence letters between Freud and Jewish elites discussing how the goyim cannot comprehend his work, or his patients.

>> No.20752637

>>20752631
>The vast majority were.
bullshit

>> No.20752649

>>20752637
Elite Germans and Austrians were jews, my man.

I know this may come as a shock to you, but jews weren't political and economical dullards at the time.

>> No.20752682

>>20752649
this sounds like goy cope

>> No.20752710

>>20752682
We call that jungian analysis now

>> No.20753049

>>20751838
Funny you should ask that. Meno's paradox is only a problem if answers are the only source of knowlege. But questions, as Socrates repeatedly demonstrates to braindead Meno in the dialogue itself, can be sources of knowlege. That's because questions make you think. Answers do the thinking for you. In fact a question is more useful than an answer because it forces you to think. And the value of an answer is if it can lead to deeper more penetrating questions. For Peirce, it's the journey (a constantly iterating, self-improving investigation process) that is more important than the destination (answers). The answers just refine the method.

>. Also, how would you reconcile Plato's definition of knowledge as being something that doesn't change vs. Peirce's definition of knowledge being process?
Peirce would disagree with Plato because he is quite adamant that everything changes . He's a fallibilist and denies absolute knowlege. Peirce believes all knowlege is probabilistic and contains a degree of uncertainty. Good knowlege is revisable.

Both Peirce and Plato believe in universals. Plato would say there is absolute knowlege, which is knowlege of the Eternal Form which is reflected in everything it represents. This Eternal Form is mind-independent, and knowlege of it constitutes knowlege of a universal. Peirce is a "moderate realist" in that he says universals exist, but they are mental entities, something the mind creates. They are therefore not absolute but more fragile because like everything else it can change.

A key point however is that he says universals are real, in the same way Plato says the forms are real. He believed in the reality of abstractions. What is the universal concept made up of? It consists of a sort of layering of various levels of all the particulars it corresponds to. This has to do with his theory of categories, firstness, secondness, thirdness, etc. The universal consists of all the "-ness" which overlap and are shared between objects of the same class. "It's perfectly true that all white things have whiteness in them, for that is only saying...that all white things are white; but it since it is true that real things possess whiteness, whiteness is real."

Similarly, triangularity , the geometric universal , is a three cornered and three sided sided entity which overlaps with "threeness" "sidedness" "cornerdness" "isoscelesness" , "equilateralness", or "scaleneness" and so on.

>> No.20753994

>>20745460
Fpbp

>> No.20754001

Threads like these make me proud of the next generation

>> No.20754399

pbuh

>> No.20755003

>>20745445
Where should I begin? Should I start with "The Essential Peirce. Selected Philosophical Writings" or with "Writings of Charles S. Peirce. A Chronological Edition"?

>> No.20755019

>>20755003
Honestly? I recommend first trying to understand Peirce's categories and his cosmology. Then, once you have a general gist of that abstract framework, move on to see what he has to say on any topic you're curious about. For example, it was fascinating to watch Peirce connect Schiller's play drive to abductive reasoning in the context of phaneroscopy once he finally applied his system to aesthetics. Peirce's core philosophy remains largely the same, but he never wrote a magnum opus like the Critique of Pure Reason. Rather, he consistently churned out work over the course of his life. So collected writings are going to be like drinking from a firehose. Plus views changed over the course of his life, becoming more mature and refined until Peirce's philosophy began to reach its final stage, more or less, by the 1890s onward. So, pick a topic, find some writings and secondary literature, and see what he has to say.

>> No.20755126

>>20755003

I got you senpai.

Definitely start here: principles of philosophy by Charles Peirce.

Punch that into bo-k

>> No.20755287

>>20753049
>He's a fallibilist
Into the trash it goes

>> No.20755307

>>20753049
>That's because questions make you think.
Thinking isn't knowledge. And Socrates's questions lead to aporia, where nobody knows nothing, and everybody is left off more confused than they were prior.
>For Peirce, it's the journey (a constantly iterating, self-improving investigation process) that is more important than the destination (answers).
I think you dodged the question. How can you even tell that you're on the right track with the inquiry process if you don't even begin with the slightest bit of knowledge that can confirm that what you have acquired is true? That epistemic problem is the whole reason why Plato developed his account of the immortal soul and recollection theory. If you already have the "imprinting" in some way, then you have the possibility for knowledge.
>Peirce would disagree with Plato because he is quite adamant that everything changes .
Even Peirce recognizes that there's an evolutionary tendency in the universe to grow towards order, where things won't change. Isn't that the point of knowledge, to get something that won't change no matter what?

>> No.20755585

>>20755307
Not him but you're discounting instincts and sensible apprehensions. The ground of reality is pain, everything builds off that. So, we have absolute certain knowledge but only of one specific quality.

>> No.20755586

>>20755307
>>20755307
>Thinking isn't knowledge. And Socrates's questions lead to aporia, where nobody knows nothing, and everybody is left off more confused than they were prior.
Thinking can result in a priori knowlege. The real question is to what extent is pure reason able to derive knowlege? Enter Kant. In any case, thinking results in theory generation, and we then ask questions on the basis of the theory, seeking to confirm the theory on the basis of answers. We never actually question the object of the unknown itself. That's the problem of induction. We simply need to be aware that it exists. We can question anything we are aware of.
>I think you dodged the question. How can you even tell that you're on the right track with the inquiry process if you don't even begin with the slightest bit of knowledge that can confirm that what you have acquired is true?
I can address this problem in more detail than you can possibly know.
The doctrine of anamnesis is flawed because it begs the question. Where did that latent knowlege come from? Where did the immortal soul get it? Socrates basically says something like well he learned it in a past life. How did the past life learn it without falling prey to the paradox? It also implies that everything learnable is already known, only latent. Which would imply that the subject is "latently omniscient" and contains infinite potential knowlege (because there is an infinite number of knowables. There is for example the possibility of knowing each prime number even though there is an infinity of them.) Infinite latent knowlege is impossible for a finite being.
There is no acquired knowlege, there is only theoretical confirmation. Look at how science operates. Scientists seek to answer their own questions and then test it to see if it aligns with external evidence.
>Even Peirce recognizes that there's an evolutionary tendency in the universe to grow towards order, where things won't change. Isn't that the point of knowledge, to get something that won't change no matter what?
Perhaps the universe does become more knowable over time, in the sense that it progressively reaches a more regular and therefore predictable habitual state. However, we can never know if it has finally reached that state of maximum order, because we don't know what it would look like. Would it be the state of thermodynamic equilibrium? At which point we would no longer exist because all matter and energy would be dispersed equally throughout the universe which implies the destruction of our bodies.

>> No.20755593

>>20755586
>Thinking can result in a priori knowlege.
Precisely, although virtually nobody realizes this. Ideas are in essence theoretical arrangements of properties and qualities and tendencies (rules) by which consequences can be traced.

So, we can infer with certainty a great deal at specific levels of resolution.

>> No.20755600

>>20755307
Also Socrates claims that Aporia is a epistemically constructive state of mind, not a terrible confusion. It means that false assumptions or unexamined prior opinion has been disrupted, opening up the possibility for inquiry and discovery which was blocked by self-satisfied opinion. This also aligns with Perice's understanding of the epistemic value of doubt.

>> No.20755604

>>20755593
And there is evidence that a priori knowlege can be quite extensive. Einstein basically developed his whole theory of gravity just using pen and paper. Only later was it confirmed by experiment and evidence. Same for quantum theory.

>> No.20755632

>>20755586
>Thinking can result in a priori knowlege.
And what grounds thinking?
>We simply need to be aware that it exists.
No, being simply aware of something doesn't mean the problem goes away.
>We can question anything we are aware of.
Can you question something that you already know until you doubt yourself?
>How did the past life learn it without falling prey to the paradox?
Try thinking about it ad infinitum. Then think about the cosmological and religious implications.
>It also implies that everything learnable is already known, only latent. Which would imply that the subject is "latently omniscient" and contains infinite potential knowlege (because there is an infinite number of knowables. There is for example the possibility of knowing each prime number even though there is an infinity of them.)
Exactly. Welcome to the theory of the forms.
>Infinite latent knowlege is impossible for a finite being.
In what sense?
>There is no acquired knowlege, there is only theoretical confirmation. Look at how science operates.
Poorly.
>Would it be the state of thermodynamic equilibrium? At which point we would no longer exist because all matter and energy would be dispersed equally throughout the universe which implies the destruction of our bodies.
You're not thinking on a grand enough scale. What happens after that?
>>20755600
Socrates claims that. He also claims that he knows nothing despite a lifetime of inquiry. That is not reconcilable with Peirce's epistemic optimism.
>>20755604
Was it a priori knowledge just because he formulated a theory with pen and paper? Was Einstein truly operating outside of any empirically-informed intuition?

>> No.20755639

>>20755632
Not him, but you missed my post where I said pain grounds everything conscious.

>> No.20755668

>>20755639
How do you explain masochists and utility monsters, then? e.g. somebody with trauma who has learned to relive their trauma through everyday life experience

>> No.20755688

>>20755668
Retards? I mean, you can suppress your physical expression of pain or even meld it into a pleasurable experience, but once you go over a certain threshold the human body has mechanisms to react.

That being said, it still doesn't dismiss the subjective experience of the meaning of pain. You can argue that beauty is in some sense intangible, or abstract, or debatable, but you cannot do so with pain.

If I set you on fire then you're going to feel like you're on fire. Even if you can suppress the urge to move or scream.

>> No.20755727

>>20755632
>And what grounds thinking?
The innate capacity for reason. Kant has a better answer for this than I do, although I'm not saying he necessarily has the right explanation with his transcendental categories.

>No, being simply aware of something doesn't mean the problem goes away.
No, but it means you can start questioning and theorizing about it.
>Can you question something that you already know until you doubt yourself?
You can doubt that you really know it by challenging your beliefs in the way Socrates does.
>Try thinking about it ad infinitum. Then think about the cosmological and religious implications.
Not sure what you're getting at here. Deus ex Machina is not a valid argument.
>Exactly. Welcome to the theory of the forms.
You seem to be saying that only the knowlege of the Form is latent, a kind of compressed structure. But most people don't know what the nth prime number is off the top of their heads, even if they know the concept of a prime number.
There's also the problem of enumerating how many Forms there are. Are there an infinity of them? If it is a countable set, how many? And what are they? Is there a Form for Forms? Etc.
>In what sense?
Presumably knowlege has to do with the brain, and the brain has finite constraints on memory and processing.
>Poorly.
You're typing on a computer that exists because of science. Science is imperfect but it is as good a model of inquiry as any.
>Socrates claims that. He also claims that he knows nothing despite a lifetime of inquiry. That is not reconcilable with Peirce's epistemic optimism.
Well sure, they aren't the same thinker. The oracle considers Socrates the wisest of men because he "knows nothing" (a sly contradiction btw) . Really what he's saying is that he understands that what he thinks constitutes knowlege is fallible and you have to remain open minded.
>Was it a priori knowledge just because he formulated a theory with pen and paper? Was Einstein truly operating outside of any empirically-informed intuition?
He was, but he was also working off of Newton, who also was a theoretical physicist. Einstein wasn't an experimentalist. Evidence played a confirmatory role in his theory, not a determinative role.

>> No.20755747

>>20755688
I'm still confused. Are you trying to say that pain somehow grounds people in reality? How does pleasure not perform the same function? That's why I mentioned utility monsters.

>> No.20755753

>>20755747
Because consciousness, any degree of it, is more painful than the painlessness of unconsciousness.

Pain and pleasure are also dyadic in structure, one cannot exist without the other. However, an absence of pain necessitates an absence of pleasure and therein we find our comprehension of the phenomenology of death a priori.

>> No.20755768

>>20755727
>The innate capacity for reason. Kant has a better answer for this than I do, although I'm not saying he necessarily has the right explanation with his transcendental categories.
And Peirce debunks Kant by pointing out that space and time are acquired abstractions themselves. You can repeat this process of intuitional skepticism ad infinitum.
>You can doubt that you really know it by challenging your beliefs in the way Socrates does.
Can you doubt something you know?
>Deus ex Machina is not a valid argument.
Why not?
>You seem to be saying that only the knowlege of the Form is latent, a kind of compressed structure.
Yes. That's what intuition is. It's a receptive form of knowledge. The passive intellect.
>There's also the problem of enumerating how many Forms there are. Are there an infinity of them? If it is a countable set, how many? And what are they? Is there a Form for Forms? Etc.
Why does that matter?
>Presumably knowlege has to do with the brain, and the brain has finite constraints on memory and processing.
Knowledge is more than data storage. It's about making efficient connections.
>You're typing on a computer that exists because of science. Science is imperfect but it is as good a model of inquiry as any.
More like engineering. And the jury is out on whether our technological society is a net gain for humanity in the long run.
>The oracle considers Socrates the wisest of men because he "knows nothing" (a sly contradiction btw)
Bingo. It's a contradiction. But you don't realize that it can go either way. Either he knows everything, or at least everything about one aspect of his understanding of everything, or he knows nothing. This is why the later members of the academy devolved into Pyrrhonic skepticism. Because somebody went out on a limb, took the latter path, and said: "I do not even know if I know nothing." Either you know something, or you don't.
>Really what he's saying is that he understands that what he thinks constitutes knowlege is fallible and you have to remain open minded.
He critiqued the supposed knowledge of his peers and revealed that they had none. True knowledge isn't fallible. Because you simply know. Only the appearance of knowledge is fallible. Because, well, you don't know! The Meno paradox is far more serious than you're making it out to be.
>He was, but he was also working off of Newton, who also was a theoretical physicist.
Lol, Newton had the complete opposite intuition of Einstein when it came to the nature of space-time. If anything, Einstein was working in the shadow of Leibniz, that space and time are relative frameworks (and of course Poincare, Lorenz, and all the other scientists of his day).

>> No.20755776

>>20755753
>However, an absence of pain necessitates an absence of pleasure
Idk, it seems like bliss. How are we supposed to enjoy heaven then?

>> No.20755863

>>20755776
Dunno, bud. Maybe life is a little more complicated and brutal than our archaic conceptualizations of eternal life?

>> No.20755877

>>20755863
Sounds like a copout to me. It's okay to admit that you don't know something or need more time to think about it. Or even at least give a preliminary account for shits and giggles.

>> No.20755931

>>20755768
>And Peirce debunks Kant by pointing out that space and time are acquired abstractions themselves
I'm not saying Peirce is right about everything. It makes more sense to me that space and time are preconditions of reason.
>Can you doubt something you know?
Try. You can doubt that you know it. That's what doubt is. What can't you doubt? I think therefore I am?
>Yes. That's what intuition is. It's a receptive form of knowledge. The passive intellect.
Maybe. But that is a conclusion that is doubtable because it is merely asserted.
>Why does that matter?
Because it violates the axiomatic completeness of the Form theory. If there is a set of fundamental Forms but no Form for Forms, it falls to Russel's paradox of set theory. Perice btw denies the existence of Universal Forms as metaphysical, rather than purely conceptual entities.
>Knowledge is more than data storage. It's about making efficient connections.
But if knowlege is latent there must be adequate storage space for all possible knowlege. Which is infinite
>More like engineering. And the jury is out on whether our technological society is a net gain for humanity in the long run.
And engineering is informed by science.
> Either you know something, or you don't.
And claiming that you know nothing is probably closer to the truth than claiming you know everything. The number of things you know is closer to zero than it is infinity or the maximum of what is knowable.
> The Meno paradox is far more serious than you're making it out to be.
I know it's serious. But there is a solution to it. (I'm actually writing a whole paper on it, I don't want to give away the plot here.) I just don't believe in absolute a posteriori knowlege and I think the grounds for arguing it exists is quite flimsy. The only absolute knowlege is deductive a priori, e.g. math proofs etc.
>Lol, Newton had the complete opposite intuition of Einstein when it came to the nature of space-time.
Yes. Einstein used Newton as a counterpoint. Without Newton's theory to disprove and advance beyond, there would be no theory of gravity. It's like a dialectic.

Anyway, much like Meno's dialogue itself, we are having one. In which questions are being asked and candidate hypotheses and answers are being suggested. I think the way forward is to stop holding onto this idea that the goal of inquiry is some ideal Hegelian state of perfected knowlege. The process itself is informative and awakens new thoughts and possibilities for investigation . Socrates thinks we are better for becoming more aware of our ignorance. Questions bring our awareness to our attention and therefore allow us to go beyond it. Awareness of what we are ignorant of is more productive than chasing the elusive ghost of perfect knowlege.

>> No.20755972

>>20755931
>It makes more sense to me that space and time are preconditions of reason.
Why?
>I think therefore I am
You can doubt the "I." And you can at least attempt to doubt existence, though that's less clear.
>Perice btw denies the existence of Universal Forms as metaphysical, rather than purely conceptual entities.
Peirce denies the "problem of universals" caricature of Plato's theory of the forms, which Plato also denies as well in several dialogues such as Parmenides. But one thing Plato doesn't seem to doubt is the form of the good. You know what Peirce also doesn't doubt, once he concedes on the gambit of "how do we know that we know anything?" Something he picks from Galileo, il lume naturale. See the connection?
>But if knowlege is latent there must be adequate storage space for all possible knowlege. Which is infinite
I think it's wrong to think of knowledge as an infinite series of facts. True knowledge is one thing, since every fact is predicated on a web of interrelated facts. Which gels well with Peirce's conception of thirdness, but I digress.
>And engineering is informed by science.
In some cases, yes. In other cases. no.
>And claiming that you know nothing is probably closer to the truth than claiming you know everything.
In order to claim that you know nothing, you have to be absolutely sure that you know nothing. Which means you have to have some kind of position on everything. Knowledge is one thing.
>I think the way forward is to stop holding onto this idea that the goal of inquiry is some ideal Hegelian state of perfected knowlege.
If we abandon the ideals then we inevitably settle for mediocrity, ending back in a situation where we are no better than the Sophists. Awareness itself is predicated on... knowledge!

By the way, why isn't deus ex machina a valid argument? You can argue for that via abductive reasoning.

>> No.20756288

>>20755972
>Why?
Cuz you can't reason about anything without presupposing them? They are the conditions of possibility for any percept
>You can doubt the "I." And you can at least attempt to doubt existence, though that's less clear.
So you can doubt anything.
>See the connection?
No. What are you driving at?
>I think it's wrong to think of knowledge as an infinite series of facts. True knowledge is one thing, since every fact is predicated on a web of interrelated facts. Which gels well with Peirce's conception of thirdness, but I digress.
There are knowlege of categories and generalizations which can derive knowlege of specific facts. But that does not mean you know each specific fact. Knowlege of a rule is not the same as knowlege of the result of its application.
> In order to claim that you know nothing, you have to be absolutely sure that you know nothing.
I believe in approximate or probabilistic truths and therefore approximate knowlege. If the universe is indeterministic, which it seems like it is at least at the quantum level, then this is true.
>If we abandon the ideals then we inevitably settle for mediocrity, ending back in a situation where we are no better than the Sophists. Awareness itself is predicated on... knowledge!
Not if the ideal is to have an indefinitely improvable method of inquiry.
>By the way, why isn't deus ex machina a valid argument? You can argue for that via abductive reasoning.
Because it's a copout. It's the "god of the gaps" fallacy. Whenever someone can't provide a mechanistic or rational answer they default to God. But God is simply assumed. And God is unanalyzable, a mystery, about which one can attribute anything because it is beyond understanding. (Or doesn't exist) Leibniz did it with his metaphysical optimism, Descartes did it with his hyperbolic doubt theory . It's just a way to say: Why is it that way? It's just so. Because Jesus told me so.

>> No.20756343

>>20756288
>Cuz you can't reason about anything without presupposing them?
And yet where did they come from? Were your intuitions of space and time always as fleshed out as they are now?
>No. What are you driving at?
Peirce has to eventually "cut" the infinite continuities of knowledge and state that we have to have a starting point. Which makes his account of knowledge dovetail with Plato in an interesting way.
>I believe in approximate or probabilistic truths and therefore approximate knowlege.
Peirce famously debunked Bayesian reasoning because you never truly have a rational reason for conditioning any kind of prior. Again, the problem of the unknown unknown, the "principle of insufficient reason", the ability to have access to an alternate universe, etc.
>Not if the ideal is to have an indefinitely improvable method of inquiry.
The ideal is to be clear about what we're talking about, at the very least.
>Because it's a copout. It's the "god of the gaps" fallacy.
You know what also is a copout? Simply positing that everything we know has always existed that way in a chain that goes back infinitely in accordance to laws that we've only begun to discover today. In fact, I'd argue that infinite regression is more of a copout than positing that the universe has a definite beginning. There's a reason why people default to God, and it has nothing to do with the lack of a scientific explanation. No feasible, purely scientific explanation about creation can exist without making enormous presuppositions, such as the eternal stability of physical laws.

>> No.20756448

>>20746411
>One of the founders of statistics. Introduced terms "confidence" and "likelihood", "repeated measures" and blind, randomized and controlled experiments.
These have been an unparalleled disaster for the human race.

>> No.20756459

>>20756448
Why?

>> No.20756533

>>20756448
Humans being generally retarded isn't his fault.

>> No.20756651

>>20755877
I'm not sure why you're snarky little reddit comment was written, I wasn't trying to insult you.

I was being very literal. I sometimes forget I'm not talking to academics.

>> No.20756669

>>20756651
Sorry anon, I was just disappointed. I was hoping that maybe you'd think about it more if I provoked you.

>> No.20756672

>>20756533
This. It's not his fault people who misused his ideas are dumber than him. Statistics by itself never hurt nobody.

>> No.20756678

>>20756672
Peirce was careful to debunk the misapplication of statistics anyway in his critique of Bayesian reasoning. e.g. there's no rational reason to condition on any given prior

>> No.20756694

>>20756343
>And yet where did they come from? Were your intuitions of space and time always as fleshed out as they are now?
Well, they're transcendental. To explain where they come from, we'd have to step outside the field of epistemology and ask where minds come from.
>Peirce has to eventually "cut" the infinite continuities of knowledge and state that we have to have a starting point. Which makes his account of knowledge dovetail with Plato in an interesting way.
Interesting. I didn't know that.
>Peirce famously debunked Bayesian reasoning because you never truly have a rational reason for conditioning any kind of prior.
Yet he was an indeterminist and believed what he called Tychism, the idea that objective chance existed. Hence why he was also a fallibilist. Knowlege always aimed for a moving target. Which meant that knowlege always had to keep moving.
>The ideal is to be clear about what we're talking about, at the very least.
Sure, add that to the bag.
>You know what also is a copout? Simply positing that everything we know has always existed that way in a chain that goes back infinitely in accordance to laws that we've only begun to discover today.
Where did you get this idea? I didn't say that. I was arguing against Plato's recollection theory and explained why it is unsound.

I don't say that I know how things began of if there is a beginning. But the god of the gaps is fallacious. It's argumentum ad ignorantiam, the appeal to ignorance. "Oh, well we don't know what the ultimate truth or source of reality is, so it must be God!" Well we don't know what God is either, or whether it exists. So that claim explains nothing.

>> No.20756705

>>20756694
>Oh, well we don't know what the ultimate truth or source of reality is
More precisely, we don't have a naturalistic explanation for the principle of the universe , so the explanation must be supernatural. Well, have we exhausted every possible naturalistic explanation? Nope.

>> No.20756726

>>20756694
>Yet he was an indeterminist and believed what he called Tychism, the idea that objective chance existed. Hence why he was also a fallibilist. Knowlege always aimed for a moving target. Which meant that knowlege always had to keep moving.
>Where did you get this idea? I didn't say that.
I thought we were talking about the problem of positing a first cause, i.e. God. If you don't posit a first cause, then we have to say that the universe has always existed, which is at least as problematic as saying that God exists.
>But the god of the gaps is fallacious.
Fallacious in what way? It's not a formal logic fallacy, so you must be saying that it's an informal fallacy.
>It's argumentum ad ignorantiam, the appeal to ignorance.
It's not, especially in the right context. If we're trying to talk about the cause of the universe in a context that exceeds the boundaries of science, then it is worth considering the possibility of God. Furthermore, if God is responsible for creating the universe and its laws, then it's correct to cite him as the cause of scientific phenomena, al-Ghazali style. The only problem, and this is where it becomes fallacious, is that deus ex machina is often not a sufficiently high resolution explanation for our purposes if we're looking to do something with those laws, e.g., study the interactions or come up with practical solutions to our problems.

>> No.20756731

>>20756705
You cannot come up with a naturalistic explanation to the universe. There's no way to scientifically prove that. It's simply something you have to take as a given. This is another one of Kant's antinomies: whether the universe was created or if it always existed.

>> No.20756758

>>20756731
Kant's antinomies were sophistical though so it doesn't really matter.

>> No.20756773

>>20756669
You didn't provoke me, you disgusted me.

My answer is a result of innumerable hours of study and contemplation. If you disagree with me, then I'll give you the same challenge I give every other student: Put a knife through your hand and rationally dismiss the pain.

>> No.20756783

>>20756726
>If you don't posit a first cause, then we have to say that the universe has always existed,
Not necessarily. Depending how you define your judgement criteria, an infinite, eternal universe is not necessarily physically impossible until proven otherwise. The law of energy conservation at least leaves the door open. And there is some work being done entertaining the hypothesis that the big bang was not the beginning. Relying on God just Means a commitment to abandoning all rational explanation. Now, maybe rational explanation is limited. I admit it is conceivable that God is the first cause, but that does not mean it is possible or even plausible. Perhaps our understanding of time or causality is simply false and this makes the concept of a first cause naive.
>Fallacious in what way? It's not a formal logic fallacy, so you must be saying that it's an informal fallacy.
Have I not explained ? You can't assume there is not a rational, atheistic explanation for the universe with the jury still out and with our physical understanding of the universe is still incomplete. And simply saying that it's God just shuts down any attempt to discover if there is another explanation. There is no other argument for saying God did it other than that we are ignorant of another explanation .

By extension, it is equally valid to say that the true cause of the universe is simply unknowable. That is perfectly consistent with the claim that there is no natural explanation. So deferring to God is not a necessary implication of the inability to find a physical theory of everything.
>If we're trying to talk about the cause of the universe in a context that exceeds the boundaries of science
And you know it exceeds the boundaries of science how exactly? Before relying on god, see if you can find another explanation which is consistent and continuous with the naturalistic understanding of everything else. Why should this one fact alone evade naturalistic explication?
>>20756731
>You cannot come up with a naturalistic explanation to the universe. There's no way to scientifically prove that.
Have you tried? Do you know all of science and all possible science? You can only assert this to be the case if you know every physical fact and every natural law perfectly and see that indeed it does not result in a complete self-contained physical explanation for everything.

You can't presume you know the limits of knowlege unless you know you know everything that is knowable.

>> No.20756840

>>20756773
I can rationally dismiss the pain if I think there's greater meaning to it. I may even begin to enjoy it. Pain is just the universe reacting to us. But we determine how to interpret the reaction, perhaps even to our own delusional peril.

>> No.20756847

>>20756840
You can't rationally dismiss the apprehension of pain within the senses any more than you can dismiss the color of an apple.

>This apple isn't really green, it's actually a completely different color ... stop it eyes, and cut it out brain!
Yeah no.

>> No.20756865

>>20756758
No they weren't.
>>20756783
>Not necessarily. Perhaps our understanding of time or causality is simply false and this makes the concept of a first cause naive.
How do you plan on scientifically studying the origins of the universe without causality?
>You can't assume there is not a rational, atheistic explanation for the universe with the jury still out and with our physical understanding of the universe is still incomplete.
Because our physical understanding of the past would require us to assume that the laws which exist today existed all the way to the beginning of the universe. That's a huge assumption.
>And simply saying that it's God just shuts down any attempt to discover if there is another explanation.
Not really. You can always go deeper.
>You can't presume you know the limits of knowlege unless you know you know everything that is knowable.
You don't understand. I'm not blaspheming science here. I'm just saying that, to understand the creation of the universe, we would be required to go outside what we consider the epistemic bounds of science into speculative territory. Whatever you value about the certainty or the practicality of science would cease to exist. We would then enter the realm of philosophy.

>> No.20756873

>>20756847
It's just a signal. That's what you don't get.

>> No.20756981

>>20756873
Then stab yourself in the hand and timestamp the picture.

Oh wait, you won't because either 1) you're wrong and pain is irrational or 2) you're not intelligent enough to rationally dismiss the pain.

So either I'm right or you're dumb. Perhaps both?

>> No.20757029

>>20756865
>How do you plan on scientifically studying the origins of the universe without causality?
By figuring out what the right idea for causality is. For example, perhaps by unifying relativity with quantum mechanics. QM is a good prop to use here, because it challenges our intuitive logical concepts and assumptions about space, time causality, identity, determinacy, etc.
>Because our physical understanding of the past would require us to assume that the laws which exist today existed all the way to the beginning of the universe. That's a huge assumption.
Not necessarily. Check out this recent paper on the "autodidactic universe" which, strikingly, is a line of thought Peirce's nomological evolutionism anticipated . Natural laws as we see today might point to something deeper.
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2104.03902.pdf
And if we view natural laws not as metaphysical absolutes, but descriptive generalizations of observable phenomena, we aren't limited by them in the way you suggest.
>Not really. You can always go deeper.
How? How can I know any facts about God? Nothing rational can be attributed to God. Spinoza tried and I'm unconvinced. At this point you must rely solely on irrationalism, on truth by revelation.
>We would then enter the realm of philosophy.
Sure. But your claims about the limits of science are indirectly claims about the limits of rationality. Philosophy as usual will have to light the way. But you can't claim to know the limits of science . If we accept the premise that theoretical physics is valid science, science does not have to begin with an experiment or observation. It can begin with a theory that is a purely intellectual construct which has sustained all attempts at evidentiary disproof.

>> No.20757059

>>20756981
I don't know what you mean by rational or irrational.
>Then stab yourself in the hand and timestamp the picture.
What would that prove? If I were a schizophrenic masochist, maybe I'd do it and tell you in grisly detail how much I loved it. The way you describe pain can be applied to virtually any qualia.

>> No.20757066

>>20757029
>that theoretical physics is valid science
why would it be valid science? what if we're left with theories that cannot be experimentally tested?

>> No.20757166

>>20757059
>What would that prove?
That your retarded ramblings were coherent?

Either you're a troll attempting to keep the thread going or you're seriously deluded as to your intellectual abilities.

>> No.20757206

>>20757166
>That your retarded ramblings were coherent?
I already know that they're coherent. What I want to know is how you think your Sam Harris tier observation reveals anything substantial about pain that isn't necessarily different from other qualia.

>> No.20757252

>>20757206
All qualia is grounded in pain, retard.

>> No.20757260

>>20757252
Proof?
>stab yourself with le fork!!!
Why not say all qualia is grounded in pleasure? The proof? Shoot up some heroin and timestamp it for me. That's how stupid you sound.

>> No.20757280

>>20757260
Because pain and pleasure are dyadic in their essential logical structure, which means unconsciousness precludes pain or pleasure.

This means they're the same thing, structurally, but are distinct only in their degree of intensity or quality. We're talking about logical structure, my freind. So, maybe brush up on your hermetic principles and prepositional calculus?

This is why I don't talk to non-degree holders. It's like talking to a fucking turtle.

>> No.20757359

>>20757280
>This means they're the same thing, structurally, but are distinct only in their degree of intensity or quality.
Okay, so why focus on pain? Why not pleasure? And what exactly is the point of your argument? Pleasure and pain are mere signals. They don't keep your consciousness grounded in reality or whatever it is that you're trying to argue.
>This is why I don't talk to non-degree holders. It's like talking to a fucking turtle.
I'm willing to bet $1000 that my degree mogs your degree. Want to stake? kek

>> No.20757370

>>20755585
who hurt you

>> No.20757427

>>20757359
You're having a conversation about the logical structures of qualitative properties and you don't understand what a dyadic relation is.

Whatever your degree in its definitely not physics, mathematics, chemistry, engineering, or biology. That's for sure.

>> No.20757560

>>20757066
>cannot be
That we don't know how to test as of yet. We can't a priori declare that a theory is untestable. We have to leave open the possibility that what we can conceive of as experimentally testable is limited by the current science. As science advances, the scope of testability expands.

For example, the scope of testability is constrained by current technological limitation. A new technology may extend the reach of experimentation. Not everything is testable barehanded.

All I'm saying is that you're calling it prematurely. Never say never.

>> No.20757572
File: 8 KB, 269x187, images (10).jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
20757572

Nice bread fellas . A true gem. And the smartest one on /lit/ in a long while. Not that the bar is that high.

>> No.20757650

>>20757427
I know what a dyadic relation is. You just keep presuming that firstness and secondness is all there is to consciousness when you have thirdness, i.e. triadic relations, to account for as well. Why are you even in a Peirce thread, spouting your Harris-tier autism, is beyond my comprehension.

>> No.20757669

>>20757560
>Never say never.
Let's call this "science of the gaps." Maybe we can make science NOT obey the laws of causality, yet everything will be smoothed out and rational still. And then we can bend the past to reflect the future, and then the future to reflect the past, and...

>> No.20757751

>>20757669
I'm not sure what science ever did to you or why you're so hostile to it. Science differs from other methods of inquiry in that its assumptions can be challenged by its results.

Again, quantum mechanics shows up to bust everybody's ass. The same object can be in two places at the same time!? What now? A future event can retroactively influence a past event? Say what now? An object can be in two places at the same time? Really? The superposition means possibility is objectively real? Ok stop... etc.
What I mean is causality is an assumption among assumption. Nature stands ever ready to BTFO us.
Is quantum mechanics God or is a rational explanation of it impossible and the reason we haven't figured it out is that we're too stupid? Yes or no.

>> No.20757762

>>20757650
So, you as a subject are experiencing an object (consciousness) comprised of two constituent elements that are themselves subjects of the object (pain and pleasure).

You're basically arguing that you're right by exposing yourself as having no comprehension whatsoever of the topic. You are a moron, and should go study more.

>> No.20757765

>>20757751
I'm not hostile to science. I just think there's a time and place for science, and that science requires certain criteria to operate the way that we want it to operate.
>The same object can be in two places at the same time!?
I mean, can it? IIRC, indeterminacy is a problem of measurement, since measurement and movement is capped by the speed of light. But, I'm not going to pretend I have anything more than a pop science understanding of that.
>Science differs from other methods of inquiry in that its assumptions can be challenged by its results.
The point is that science requires unchanging principles to make sense of the world. You couldn't have a science if the laws of nature were one thing one day and something else the other day. How would you even be able to replicate your findings?

>> No.20757772

>>20757762
Triads, anon. Triads. Idk, maybe you only see the world in terms of pain and pleasure. Sad!

>> No.20757790

>>20757772
The universe witnessed your retardation and will never forget it.

>> No.20757797

>>20757790
Don't worry, I'm comfortable with the universe thinking that I believe there's more to consciousness than pain and pleasure.

>> No.20757818

>>20757797
The universe will also remember that you don't know what sublimation is.

>> No.20757823

>>20757818
It's... le thirdness!

>> No.20758162

>>20752483
>>20752589
is intuition similar to synechism or thirdness?

>> No.20758310

>>20758162
No.

A lot of people seem to misunderstanding what Peirce is referring to when he talks of thirdness. What he says he means is one thing, but what he's referring to is what we might call tendenciousness: the fact that things tend to play out in a particular way and according to rules.

If I drop a book it tends to fall towards the earth, but there's no way to a priori determine with absolute certainty that this is what it will do every single time.

>> No.20759731

>>20758310
What's the closest analogy to intuition then, in Peirce's vocabulary?

>> No.20759789

I haven't read him since college but I remember that thing he wrote about chasing the squirrel around the tree. Too into history books right now, maybe in a few months.

>> No.20759852

>>20759731
Feeling, which to him meant sensation.

>> No.20760020

>>20759852
abduction?

>> No.20760139

>>20760020
Kinda, yeah.

Peirce was really not even slightly close to Jung when it comes to description of and differentiation between the psychological functions. In order to properly understand Peirce you need Jung, and in order to properly comprehend Jung you need Peirce. Now, no one does this because they're not 200 IQ like me.

>> No.20760183

/lit/ has been parched for high iq threads. This has been a good one. I'm not expecting any correspondences, but I wonder if Peirce would agree with any of this:

>If non-X is in X, it replaces it, but if non-X is not in X, or if both are not “in” some third medium in which they can be brought together, no contact, and hence no contrast between them, is possible. This interchangeability of diverse but equally omnipresent qualia is what Zhili calls “creation in terms of principle” (lizao ), pertaining to the three thousand [coherences] as each omnipresent and unconditioned. Each “creates” the others in the sense that it is equally readable as any of the others, inherently entails the others. The transition from “entailment” to “identity” is a transition from part to whole, from predicate to subject: “X is inalienably a part of Y” or “X is an inalienable property of Y” is here seen to mean additionally: “Y is inalienably a part of X;Y is an inalienable property of X; X is another name for Y in its entirety.” Because this applies both ways, it means that part and whole are reversible, subject and predicate are reversible: this quale is a part of all other qualia, and at the same time all other qualia are a part of this quale. This quale is a property of all other qualia, and all other qualia are properties of this qualia. This reversibility is what is the most crucial criterion for full “identity” in the Tiantai sense

>> No.20760238

>>20760183
>If non-x is in x, it replaces it
What do you mean by "in"?

>> No.20760364

>>20757762
>experiencing an object (consciousness) comprised of two constituent elements that are themselves subjects of the object (pain and pleasure).
Huh? How can insentient qualities inhering in the witnessed object be considered a "subject"?

>> No.20760386

>>20760364
if you switch subject with object in his sentence, then it makes more sense

>> No.20760392

>>20760364
>>20760386
Male and female are two subjects of the object we call human. Large and small are subjects to the abstract object well call size, etc.

>> No.20760395

>>20760386
On a superficial level possibly; but to say the subject is comprised of two qualities that are themselves observed by the subject at the same time he is comprised by them is also illogical

>> No.20760402

>>20760392
It sounds like by "substance" what you actually meant is "mode"; is English not your first language?

>> No.20760405

>>20760402
*by "subject" you mean

>> No.20760453

>>20760402
You're in a Peirce thread and I'm using Peircean language. English is my first language, and I'm quite adept with it.

An object can be comprised of two subjects so long as those constituent aspects are in a dyadic relation.

>> No.20760463

>>20760453
>Peircian
>only focuses on dyads
>never focuses on triads
You never knew Peirce.

>> No.20760471

>>20760453
I understand that's apparently part of how Peirce understand the relations between an object and its constitutive properties but wouldn't it be naive or a logical leap to assume that talking about objects and their constituents in this way automatically transposes to talking about subject vs object in terms of epistemology where the terms have a different meaning or context?

>> No.20760502

daily reminder that Peirce become a Platonist late in his life
https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/o%27hara/csp-plato.htm

>> No.20760513

>>20760502
So did Gottlob Frege, the greatest philosopher of mathematics.
Only lowbrow minds can remain a nominalist.

>> No.20760543

>>20760513
>studies logic
>becomes Platonist
many such cases!

>> No.20760579

>>20760471
If you aren't familiar with triadic relations then yes, but Peirce was and so held that a subject apprehended facts which were objects comprised of two subjects.

People like this >>20760463 have great difficulty in comprehending what Peirce meant by third Ness and so contaminate any coherent understanding of the subject object relation.

Read his work, he explains it in painstakingly autistic detail. I'm only telling you how Peirce himself actually described these things.

>> No.20760589

>>20760579
>tenuous grasp on basic philosophical terms
okay dude, keep harping on muh pain

>> No.20760633

>>20760589
So what's your degree in? Mog me, boy.

I also love how I keep using your posts as examples of poor comprehension, yet ts complete coincidence to me that it's always you.

lol
lmao, even

>> No.20760655

>>20760633
>be pretentious schizo
>have one half-baked philosophical insight
>MUH PAAAAAIN
>can't even use subject and object correctly
>attach myself to Peirce, but keep neglecting the concept of degenerate relations or even the basic framework of thirdness
>get mad whenever somebody points it out
>thinks having a STEM degree makes himself better capable of talking about philosophy
>thinks Peirce was a nominalist and anti-Platonic when virtually the opposite is true
You're a laughing stock and a caricature, anon.

>> No.20760665

>>20760579
>If you aren't familiar with triadic relations then yes, but Peirce was and so held that a subject apprehended facts which were objects comprised of two subjects.
That's seemingly using two different meanings of the word "subject" in the same statement without acknowledging that one is doing so, which as far as I can tell is possibly creating the ground for potential confusion. In the first subject; the subject who "apprehends" is spoken about as the knower, and this is the context that the subject is typically spoken about in epistemology ie the subject is the knower of the object. However, in the second part of the statement the word 'subject' is used in the sense of data, of unintelligent known content that itself is insentient and knows nothing. Since these two subjects are different from each other, why use the same word for both, and why go beyond that even by applying the attached metaphysical connotations of the word in both applications equally even when they are talking about 2 different things?

>> No.20760715

>>20760665
Well, because all objects are themselves comprised of dyadic relations between two subjects.

I can understand the confusion, and don't at all disparage you for it. However, consider that you as a percipient of material reality are comprised an innumerable number of antonimical subjects; consciousness and unconsciousness, for example.

You are an object, at least in so far as can be determined from the perspective of a purely objective frame of reference. And this is the way in which Peirce wishes for you to conceive of yourself.

>> No.20760730

>>20760715
your mother is an object. I used her like an object

>> No.20760797

>>20760730
Guess how I can tell you're a regular over on lgbt

>> No.20760824

>>20760730
Nothing to say, tranny?

>> No.20760840

>>20760797
because you frequent lgbt and have an uncanny ability to find like-minded individuals?

>> No.20760851

>>20760824
relax chud, I've got a life.

>> No.20760855

>>20760840
Because, as a true philosopher, I have read thousands upon thousands of hours of thought and contemplations from great and terrible minds.

And I say you're a fag.

>> No.20760865

>>20760851
Cutting your balls off and pretending you aren't a man isn't a life, tranny. How does it feel to know that people can tell you're a tranny just from reading your posts? That must be disphoric. Nevermind the freakish flipper feet and gorilla hands, or the Neanderthal ass skull.

>> No.20760903

Now we just have to wait for the trannys narcissism to counteract his self consciousness, and he'll come crawling back with a very frail, sickly set of insults designed to insinuate that I'm somehow obsessed with him. A variant of the classic "you're just mad bro."

Nevermind, he shall, that what I and all able men feel is disgust. Not anger.

>> No.20760924

>>20760715
>However, consider that you as a percipient of material reality are comprised an innumerable number of antonimical subjects; consciousness and unconsciousness, for example
Why should I consider the unconscious as being a part of the perceiver when it's never perceived? Because I don't see why I should. As far as mundane interactions in the world are concerned people identify themselves with their body but if you want to investigate the real truth of things and not popular assumptions that are assumed for worldly convenience; then as far as I can see all the evidence points to us (sentience) being different from the body; we always find our awareness to be observing the body and not vice versa etc. Saying the unconsciousness is part of the observer seems to be arbitrarily saying that B is a part of A just because they are (apparently) regularly associated with one another; which itself provides no info or confirmation about whether one actually partially comprises the other or not. Similarly if one analyzes the 'perceiver' one finds that one's is unable to find any parts or complexity in the awareness which knows thoughts; complexity is only found in the content being presented to the witnessing awareness but it has no way to split itself into observer and observed and thereby and see parts or internal complexity in itself

>> No.20760933

>>20760924
Well, Peirce is philosophically opposed to idealism. So, I suppose you and him metaphisically disagree on this issue.

>> No.20760957

Where'd you go, tranny?

Let's talk.

>> No.20760971

>>20760933
>Well, Peirce is philosophically opposed to idealism
Well, does he have any sort of logical explanation for why this sort of perspective or understanding about consciousness might be considered wrong aside from his general disagreement with idealism (which is one but not the only valid interpretation of my post; eg an idealist and and a non-idealist could both fully accept it as valid)

>> No.20760979
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20760979

>>20760971
I mean, if you read his work he'll spend about a thousand pages telling you.

>> No.20760996

>>20760865
I'm not a tranny though kek. You're an insane chud.

>> No.20761002

>>20760933
>>20760971
>Well, Peirce is philosophically opposed to idealism.
Anon, he coined a school of thought called objective idealism. That's what he called it.

>> No.20761009

>>20761002
Objective idealism is kantian idealism made not retarded with the addition of platonic realism.

The word objective is in the name, dude.

>> No.20761026

>>20761009
Peirce is extremely Platonic, though.

>> No.20761031

>>20761026
And you're a tranny? Fuck off back to LGBT, monkey pox dick suckered. Lmao.

>> No.20761038

>>20760979
I wanted to know if anyone here understand his thought well enough to formulate a reply to my specific queries based on how his thought would position itself in relation to it. I kinda doubt he directly engaged with what I just said head-on anywhere or it would have made more sense for someone to just briefly state his exact response or to direct me to that passage instead of a general encourage to read him

>> No.20761047

>>20761031
Platonism refutes transgenderism, anon.

>> No.20761310

>>20761038
He has literally dedicated a thousand pages to it.

>> No.20762600
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20762600

Could one of you Peirce stans help me figure out the fractal nature of Peirce's categories? I don't understand what's going on here.

First, is thirdness supposed to inform the next firstness, like a cycle? Second, there are "degenerate" categories like first of secondness, first and second of thirdness. Does that mean that there's 3 categories and 3 degenerate categories per each "iteration"? Third, what the hell is going on in pic-related? For example, why does firstness keep getting repeated ad infinitum with each successive iteration? Is that how thirdness redefines past moments of firstness?

Would greatly appreciate any help. If you could spare some hassle to annotate pic-related or provide a better example, that would be even better. I've seen a few different ways to represent Peirce's categories, from pic-related, to an ever-expanding triangle, to even a Penrose-like triangle that progressively triangulates closer to its center. I'm not sure what's more accurate, or if they're all capturing something essential about Peirce's categories. e.g. the way it gets closer to knowledge, the way symbols inform each other in a web of knowledge, etc.

>> No.20762608

>>20762600
Also, I've seen Sierpinski triangles used to represent Hegel's categories but never to represent Peirce's categories. Why is that?

>> No.20762615
File: 46 KB, 480x416, Hegel-Christianity.gif [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
20762615

>>20762608
forgot pic-rel

>> No.20762689

>>20762600
What makes Peirce so utterly resistant to psueds is that his model is only partially finished from the linguistic perspective.

The three categories flow from one into another. Firstness preceedes everything else, secondness comes as a consequence of two instances of firstness materially instantiating, and thirdness is a resultant of a third instance of secondness.

I'd love to go into more detail but unfortunately this is something I'm presently working on as an essay, and I don't want anyone to steal my insights.

>> No.20762701

>>20762689
bruh moment

well, uhhh I hope you publish your essay soon anon. I'm dying to learn. also, I don't think it's just about linguistics but rather about everything.

>> No.20762721

>>20762701
When it's finished I'll be posting it here to dab on pseuds, though, don't even worry about it. I highly recommend a collection of papers by Peirce titled "principles of philosophy". Reading it will answer all of your questions.

Just be warned: Peirce is savagely autistic. Dude will straight up write "I've proven this somewhere else, so I don't feel the need to do so again here".

>> No.20762752

>>20762721
why do you want to dab on pseuds so badly?

>> No.20762761

>>20761310
In which work? And what chapter or section specifically deals with what I mention?

>> No.20762766

>>20761031
https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/o%27hara/csp-plato.htm

>> No.20762799

>>20746617
See on one hand I'm interested but on the other hand you recommend a pdf file.

>> No.20762801

>>20762761
Principles of philosophy

>> No.20762803

>>20762799
well wtf do you want anon?

>> No.20762852

>>20762752
I don't want it at all, but my very existence dabs on them.

>> No.20762856
File: 123 KB, 2734x361, 1651847698955.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
20762856

>>20762803
I want you to recommend a book that you've actually read yourself. None of that poorly ocr'd pdf trash from the 90s. HTMLs are fine. The one you linked even comes with pre-highlights. Just look at the comparison and try to understand why pdfs are terrible and should not be shared.

>> No.20762868

>>20762856
nigger, do you understand that Peirce didn't write books? he wrote essays. thousands of them.

>> No.20762877

>>20762868
Are you seriously stuck on my using the word book here? You provided the right example, rather than the left. That's the main issue here. I hope you understand.

>> No.20762915

>>20762877
you can just google the essay title and find whatever version you like. why do you need people to spoonfeed you here?

>> No.20762922

>>20762915
See on one hand you recommend a trash file and on the other hand you still think you're not the problem.

>> No.20762948

>>20762877
Buddy everyone can tell you've never read Peirce or any other philosopher for that matter.

>> No.20762951

>>20762922
I'm not even the guy who linked you the file originally kek, I'm a different guy. you could have spent all this time reading one of the greatest minds to have ever lived, but instead you're screaming into the void. well, maybe it's for the best. you'd probably get filtered anyway

>> No.20762958

>>20762948
>>20762951
As long as you understand that recommending files you haven't read yourself is retarded

>> No.20762967

>>20762958
I'm too lazy to find a wojak so imagine the gayest, softest, most histrionic, ugly, unkempt, insipid wojak you can think of. that's you right now.

>> No.20762982

>>20762967
Haha. Sick burn,

>> No.20763189

>>20762982
Not him but you've been a faggot this entire thread. So much so a guy literally figured out you were a tranny. You suck.

>> No.20763202

>>20763189
You're getting confused. I'm the guy who got called a tranny for (rightfully) pointing out Peirce's admiration of Plato. Yet I've been mocking this entitled retard too.
>>20762803
>>20762868
>>20762915
>>20762951
>>20762967

>> No.20763326

>>20763202
Bro I know which posts are yours because they're from a faggot. Again, you suck and this entire thread stands as a monument to how fucking gay you are.

The good conversations have come and gone, now you're like a little crumb of shit that refuses to snap off from the asshole of this thread.

>> No.20763338

>>20763326
want me to prove it with (Yous)?

>> No.20763412

>>20763338
We all want you to fuck off back to LGBT. Go be a gay faggot somewhere else.

>> No.20763419

based

>> No.20763585

>>20763412
You think everybody is the same person. You're insane.

>> No.20763939

>>20762600
>>20762608
>>20762615
bump

>> No.20764422

>>20752630
Fuck off.

It’s good to see a 200+ reply Peirce thread. I discovered his significance a few years back and I’m glad others are starting to recognize his significant contribution to philosophy.

If I can, one of his most useful contribution is a break of lineage. Philosophy was always intimately Western European/ Mediterranean. Although not my first choice as a southerner, th New England native was a break in the European bloodline but like a mutt, it’s immune system was only made stronger from his lack of purity. Moreover, it serves as a role model of why we should dishonor/break from our ancestors in order to honor them and make them stronger. That is, make us stronger and honor our ancestors by interacting directly with reality without dogma. Everything else takes care of itself because the universe works like that.

>> No.20764802

>>20745667
>I seem to get a further glimmer of what the Germans really are from contrasting them with the French
dropped, what a fucking midwit

>> No.20765010

>>20763189
I'm a faggot for pointing out that pdfs you yourself don't read are a terrible thing to provide. I simply made this point and had to explain it to your for seemingly 4 times now because you are so well-versed in reading your comprehension of it is immaculate. What's with this childish sentiment? You can't even deny my argument because you know it's true.

>> No.20765038

>>20765010
What sort of peasant doesn't have a boox lumi max? Are you some sort of uneducated monkey man?

>> No.20765095

You can keep trying to read into my post things I've never indulged in. You can keep moving the goal posts. But at the end of the day. I've provided you with ample explanation and even provided an example.
This illogical mindset that is unseeming to accepting seems to stem from bad parenting. You never told your parents you weren't happy with your gift. So now you think people must accept your input willy nilly. Just stop presenting pdfs you've never read yourself. That's all. I'm not going to bother with yet another one of your segue-ways.

>> No.20765243

>>20765095
I’m not following along but are you the one asking for recommendations? Any anthology will do. The fact is that a lot of Peirce is intuitive and follows from Hegel, Kant, Spinoza. You can see his influence in James, Dewey, Rorty, Habermas. Honestly, if you don’t appreciate Peirce for how obvious his genius is and intuitive his ideas are, you’re a pseud or not very well read.

>> No.20765266

>>20765010
>>20763189
both of you guys think the other person is me lol. Christ you two are stupid beyond belief.

>> No.20765667

>>20765243
Why do respond to the wrong post? You can forego any wrong identities by simply responding to the post in question that is asking for the reccs. Does this not strike you as odd behavior? Was there a reason to include my post with this other post? The fact that you insist I'm this other poster just to call me names. What's

>>20765266
Anything I posted that is addressing a person is directly to the post number I addressed it to. Anything else is generalities not meant to be addressed towards a single person to begin with.

>> No.20765681

>>20765667
yeah and you thought that the guy you've been calling out over 4 times was that that guy. no, it was me. you have no idea who you're addressing kek

>> No.20765698

>seemingly

>> No.20765716

>>20757765
Bit late here. Shame I couldn't continue our interesting discussion all day.
> and that science requires certain criteria to operate the way that we want it to operate.
Those criteria, testability, observational evidence, falsifiability, reproducibility, etc, are more flexible than you give them credit.
>I mean, can it? IIRC, indeterminacy is a problem of measurement, since measurement and movement is capped by the speed of light.
I've discussed the topic with a physics expert with an advanced degree and yes, it's not simply a matter of measurement. In the state of pre-collapsed superposition it makes sense to say the particle is everywhere and nowhere at once.
>You couldn't have a science if the laws of nature were one thing one day and something else the other day.
To return to Peircian nomological evolutonism and synechism, Natural laws themselves evolve or are selected. They are not metaphysical absolutes but rather, descriptions of observational regularities. Those regularities are emergent as a consequence of the dynamic interplay of the interaction of all convergent physical forces. Science is not dependent on natural law as an priori necessary prior, but natural law depends on empirical observation and inductive generalization.
Science does not require unchanging principles. If it so happens that an exception to natural law as previously understood emerges, then the theory associated with that natural law must be revised.

>> No.20765745

>>20765716
>Science does not require unchanging principles. If it so happens that an exception to natural law as previously understood emerges, then the theory associated with that natural law must be revised.
Again the only way you could mistakenly believe this is if you incorrectly interpret science to be a body of facts, a proof mechanism, a procedure for generating hard, static truths. Rather than an self-improving, self-correcting revisable, fallibilist method of investigation. A process rather than a collection of finished final results.

>> No.20765850

>>20765716
>>20765745
So, we keep going in circles, where I keep trying to convince you that my skepticism of science has nothing to do with a doubt that it can't know all the answers. I personally think that science will come to the point where it knows everything it can know, and probably within the next two hundred years of things go well. Rather, it has to do with the fact that I believe some answers are ontologically inaccessible or irrelevant to scientific inquiry.

You want science to be able to explain everything, yet that would require us to have access to realities we simply do not have, like alternative universes. For example, there's a reason why we do control groups. Why? Because we don't have that alternate universes available to us, so we have to rely on the hopes that we are uncovering unchanging laws of nature. This is why Peirce, who was influenced by a lifetime of precise laboratory work, clings strongly to chance as a defining feature of firstness as a necessary part of his phaneroscopy. It HAS to be accounted for.

When we start talking about the origins of the universe itself, well, now we have nothing to build upon except assumptions upon assumptions about the unchanging laws about the universe, since we cannot recreate our own universe that we currently live in.

Recall that, according to Peirce, the scientific inquiry process is about hypothesis generation, i.e. abductive reasoning. Abductive reasoning builds upon previous knowledge (laws) and new observations (effects) to posit a "best guess" (cause), much like Newton standing on top of the shoulders of Galileo to offer a unifying system of gravity. If the laws of nature kept changing, then the abductive reasoning process would be bunk, because there would be no shoulders to stand on. As soon as you grasped onto something real, it would dissolve into sand and slipped between your fingertips, and you'd be stuck hopelessly trying to observe the world with zero frame of reference.

There is no higher understanding of causality to achieve. Metaphysically speaking, causality needs to happen for us to have knowledge of anything. Otherwise everything is chance and therefore incomprehensible. But a little bit of chance... somehow keeps things fresh, too. To hammer this home, what does a science of humans do, if it were as "complete" as you would want a science of the universe to be? You'd reduce humans to automatons. If this then that. It's over. No more chance, no more new causes or self-generated causes. Humans are just deductive and inductive machines. This is also why Peirce brilliantly starts to associate abductive reasoning with Schiller's play drive and creativity towards the end of his life. You want the human spirit? Get used to the fact that some things can't be proven by science, and rightfully so in every sense of the word.

>> No.20765910

>>20765716
>>20765745
>>20765716
>>20765745
Also, it's worth noting that Peirce himself, in a Platonic fashion, places science below mathematics and philosophy. See pic-rel.
>A process rather than a collection of finished final results.
Then what makes science different from mathematics or philosophy? What stops science from, I don't know, overcoming the prior two? What questions are philosophical and what questions are scientific? Can that be proven a priori?

>> No.20765958
File: 45 KB, 640x640, Peirces-architectonic-division-of-the-sciences-as-in-Liszka-1996-and-De-Waal-2001_Q640.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
20765958

>>20765910
forgot pic rel lol

>> No.20766125

>>20765850
>I personally think that science will come to the point where it knows everything it can know, and probably within the next two hundred years of things go well
And I keep trying to point out that you can't possibly know that without knowing what science can't discover. Whatever science can't discover is obviously, undiscovered, so you can't know it.
>You want science to be able to explain everything, yet that would require us to have access to realities we simply do not have, like alternative universes.
There is such a thing as indirect evidence.
>if it were as "complete" as you would want a science of the universe to be
The whole point of science and what drives it is ignorance, the understanding that knowlege is incomplete. This is what pushes it to explore further.
> Abductive reasoning builds upon previous knowledge (laws) and new observations (effects) to posit a "best guess"
Even if science is just glorified guesswork, it provides better guesses than "God did it, end of story." Because that is not the hypothesis from the best guess. It's a bad guess. It stands on nothing but the argument from ignorance, namely, "we have no rational explanation for x, therefore x has no rational explanation" ignoring the possibility that the only reason we don't have a rational explanation for it YET is because our rational understanding is incomplete.
> If the laws of nature kept changing, then the abductive reasoning process would be bunk, because there would be no shoulders to stand on.

No. The theory the abduction is based on would be revised to accomodate the new finding.
>There is no higher understanding of causality to achieve.
And you know this how? Do you have perfect understanding of causality? The difference between how you're arguing and how I'm arguing, no offense, is the difference between Meno and Socrates. You stop at what is unknown and claim it is the end of inquiry. I view it as something to drive me to further questioning. Even if all my answers to my questions are just guesses, out of all possible guesses there is one that is correct, OR what I'm trying to know is unknowable. I can't assume it is unknowable without paradoxically knowing it is, an impossibility. Hence I at least see it as worth a try.

>> No.20766228

>>20766125
Sorry man, but we're just going to have to agree to disagree. You want science to explain everything in such a way that it would cease to be "science" but rather something like philosophy, without understanding that once it becomes philosophy, it ceases to be science. Again, this has nothing to do with pessimism about science but rather understanding of what science is, what it seeks to discover, and what it cannot discover without ontological support from something else. This is an emotional blindspot that you have.
>No. The theory the abduction is based on would be revised to accomodate the new finding.
Abduction IS the new theory.
>namely, "we have no rational explanation for x, therefore x has no rational explanation" ignoring the possibility that the only reason we don't have a rational explanation for it YET is because our rational understanding is incomplete.
Why do you think God can't be a rational explanation? It absolutely can be. It's just that eternal recurrence can also be a rational explanation. I'm referencing Kant's antinomies for a second time now.
>And you know this how? Do you have perfect understanding of causality?
A priori knowledge. What the hell do you think causality even is? Causality isn't some changing material object. Causality is the relation of "if this then that." When we leave the domain of causality, science enters a territory where it lacks the tools to understand phenomena as it occurs.
>The difference between how you're arguing and how I'm arguing, no offense, is the difference between Meno and Socrates. You stop at what is unknown and claim it is the end of inquiry.
It's more like the difference between Glaucon and Socrates, with you being Glaucon courageously yet foolishly pressing the limits of inquiry, only to realize you're unable to understand the difference between being and becoming, knowledge and opinion, the mathematical nature of reality, etc. Science is an attempt to transform the world of becoming into the world of being. But that can only happen through the lens of things that are necessarily "being", i.e. eternal, unchanging, etc. If things are necessarily becoming, i.e. constantly changing and not even in a predictable way (defying causality), then they cannot be being and thus only opinions can be formed about them.

>> No.20766367

>>20766228
Well, you're wrong, so there's that. QED.
Just kidding.
>You want science to explain everything
No no no. I'm simply saying we don't know what science can and cannot explain without knowing that science is complete.
>A priori knowledge. What the hell do you think causality even is?
Causality is the spatiotemporal congruence between events. (Enter Hume to BTFO causality.) However, again, QM shows that our a priori understanding of causality is flawed. Therefore whatever we base on a priori causality is cannot be a sufficient basis for understanding the universe. Advanced mathematics applied to QM may allow us to still understand the universe though despite our disrupted intuitions.
> If things are necessarily becoming, i.e. constantly changing and not even in a predictable way (defying causality), then they cannot be being and thus only opinions can be formed about them.
Nah. If things are constantly changing and becoming, knowlege must simply keep up with it. I'm in line with Peirce in that I have fallibilist sympathies. Certain knowlege is wishful thinking. Scientific understanding is derived by inferences from statistical aggregations of what is invariant among data. When inconsistent data is introduced, when in other words, something unexpected happens or changes, then the inferential process is tweaked and updated. Scientific knowlege is a form of adaptation. If the universe somehow mutates, then that simply means the current scientific theory needs to be modified to accomodate a new discovery. Science is not a Hegelian dialectic leading to some perfected ideal state. It is an ongoing, unending process that does not assume its conclusions. Science is always becoming. The whole point of science is its revisablity !

>> No.20766378

>>20766228
Also, yes.
>Why do you think God can't be a rational explanation?
Yes. Because "God" is an empty signifier. Anything can be attributed to it. It cannot be connected to our understanding of everything else, other than it created it somehow by magic. Theology is magical thinking. How did God create the world if not by magic? How does God exist if not by magic? Is magic rational? No.

>> No.20766385

>>20766378
>Yes. Because "God" is an empty signifier. Anything can be attributed to it.
Why anything?
>It cannot be connected to our understanding of everything else,
Why not?
>Theology is magical thinking.
You'd be surprised that Peirce even thought that his method of inquiry could be applied to theology, which he did late in his life to come to his panentheist views.

>> No.20766515

>>20756865
>No they weren't.
Refuted by schopenhauer.

>> No.20766524

>>20766515
Schopenhauer didn't really get Kant.

>> No.20766558

>>20766524
You didn't really get Schopenhauer or Kant.

>> No.20766562

>>20766558
I get everything.

>> No.20767516

>>20766562
You don’t get any pussy

>> No.20767521

>>20745667
this paragraph alone is enough for me to dismiss Peirce

>> No.20767683

>>20745993
>le epic plebbit philosophers
you have to go back

>> No.20768244

>>20762600
>>20762608
>>20762615
bump. gigabrain Peirce autists pls help

>> No.20768809

bump
>>20745689
still waiting on that Peirce meme you lil' bitch

>> No.20768818

>>20745626
Well, you spun a whole bullshit thread out of this meme. Now what?

>> No.20768858

>>20768818
there's some gold nuggets in here. Peirce is a top-tier thinker. he'll eventually catch on.

>> No.20769320

bump

>> No.20770413

Bump

>> No.20770463

if methexis is firstness, and mimesis is thirdness, then what is secondness?

>> No.20770496

>>20768858
He won't, I guarantee you. His system is only half finished. You need to be familiar with modern phenomenology and psychoanalysis to fill in the gaps.

He's probably going to be revived in another century.

>> No.20770508
File: 275 KB, 700x753, peirce-eyes.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
20770508

>>20770496
I'm coming back anon, whether you like it or not

>> No.20770576

>>20770508
Lmao.

I hope, anon.

Unfortunately, the typical philosophy professor is about 30 IQ points too low to understand even shit like hypostatic abstraction.

>> No.20771361

bump

>> No.20771470

>>20745460
fpbp

>> No.20771821

>>20745667
He’s right, anything but a conquering German is a castrated German.
Diversity, religion, and lastly, without success btw, war were all 3 used by Rome to try and destroy them

>> No.20771832

>>20745445
Just look how /lit/ freaked out over Grothendieck. They are not ready yet for Peirce

>> No.20772152

If pain is a fundamental truth to consciousness >>20755753 then what does it say about reality >>20751809

I’m going to start a new cult and consciousness will be its Satan

>> No.20772277

>>20771832
>Just look how /lit/ freaked out over Grothendieck.
You mean Foucault. I know, it's easy to get the two bald French men mixed up. I wonder if they've ever been photographed in one room together? I'm sure there was a demand for it.

>> No.20772921

Bump

>> No.20773787

bump

>> No.20774865

>>20745460
Fpbp

>> No.20775705

bump

>> No.20776262

Peirce sisters... not like this...

>> No.20777194

bump

>> No.20778851

>>20772277
should ask DALL-E that

>> No.20779944

>>20745445
I've been doing a lot of thinking about Peirce and his triadic philosophy lately, especially applying it to my own life. I think what it effectively does is allow Peirce to metaphysically hedge his bets, if that makes sense. But it is a hopeless affair for the scale that Peirce wants. I think Peirce's pharenoscopy is brilliant in the sense that, at any give moment, it can be used to cover your bases and consider everything, even the possibility that of things we have no awareness of. But when you hedge your bets through an infinite triangulation process, you're still left with... nothing. Low risk, low reward.

This is not to say that Peirce's HUD system of firstness, secondness, and thirdness isn't brilliant. Yes, Peirce can account for chance, fact, and generalities. Yes, Peirce can account for how mind comes into conflict with other minds or with matter itself, creating new habitual tendencies in the long-term (I'm reminded of how Newton, Leibniz, etc. thought that God's will was the force driving the motion of brute matter). Yes, Peirce, successfully distinguished between abduction, deduction, and induction as types of reasoning, and he even had the genius to connect abduction as a form of creativity. Yes, Peirce can account for quality, resistance, and habit/meaning/rules as part of our -everevolving phenomenology. Yes, he has a system which, on paper, allows one to best defend themselves against the Kantian razor and hope for evolutionary knowledge. Yes, Peirce can account for how phenomenology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, etc., are all connected to one another in a beautiful constellation of a system. But Peirce's epistemology, while it may be more "straightened out" and all-encompassing than Kant's or Hegel's, is still a system with a potentially bad infinity.

(1/2)

>> No.20779981

>>20779944
I think the problem is lies in how anti-necessitarian Peirce is in his attempt to explain the world through the lens that everything is continuous and connected. By trying to account for chance, free will, and the (potentially indeterminate) laws of nature, Peirce's own system can destroy the "meaning" (thirdness) of all explanations at any given moment. Hopefully, that means giving a better account, at least when it comes to science. But when it comes to history, or any other event that relies on the mysteries of human action, Peirce is at a loss. Go read secondary sources on what Peirce has to say about the philosophy of history. Peirce describes history as "a vast dialogue of significations and reflections, continually shedding contingencies and growing hyperbolically in the direction of concrete reasonableness." So, you would need to include so many symbolic dialogues that there would be no hope of capturing the spirit. And every pattern of dialogue, e.g. thirdness, has the possibility of merely being a habit that can be broken at any given time.

Imagine being a politician consulting Peirce for a philosopher of history, trying to make sense of one's own era. And you ask him to give an account of history and what will happen next, Hegel-style, only for Peirce to essentially reply
>Well, the ball is in your court
Which is true. There are so many currents of meaning running to the present date, such a robust inventory of knowledge at our disposal, etc., yet it could all be resolved or shattered in a moment's notice, being only checked by the limits of our material reality and the choices made by free human beings. Not a satisfying account whatsoever. But maybe what we are looking for is impossible.

In summary, the lack of stable foundation in Peirce's epistemology shows that he was largely unable to overcome Kant, though it seems he may have been the most competent logician to even attempt to bridge the gap. This seems to be a largely inescapable fact of the human condition. We simply lack the ability to know what we do not know, even if we have the ability to contemplate on what is absent, what is nothing. Even Peirce himself recognizes the problem when he humorously criticizes Bayesian reasoning for failing to give a rational account of one's priors (since we can't know what we don't know)
>if only [possible] universes were as plentiful as blackberries!
That's true. Unfortunately, we only live in this timeline. I hope we have the will to take good care of it.

(2/2)

>> No.20780044

You cannot claim to understand Peirce until you fully and thoughtfully understand his semiotic model. Good luck with that.

>> No.20780071

>>20779944
>>20779981
I have to admit. Peircian thinking easily leads to aporia once you climb to the top of thirdness and comprehend just how insufficient it all is. Your knowledge is a finite stack of rules, acquired through musement with and struggle against the world. But knowledge requires infinite such layers of meaning. Imagine being a philosopher, and telling people what you "know", only for it to be a lesser collection of habits and corresponding facts, relations, etc., that make those habits plausible. Your magic trick is successful, and your interlocutor walks away happy that he just found a new connection to make sense of a meaningless and chaotic world. But you, the philosopher, are standing on top of a far greater stack of habits that your interlocutor couldn't hope to possibly comprehend. But even you know that all your efforts are insufficient, with the knowledge of the possibility of contradiction leaving you in little more than a state of mitigated, stoic agnosticism.

I suppose once can return to a common pragmatic maxim, that you only need to know enough for you to get on with what you're dealing with in life. Peirce also began placing a lot of value on Platonism, Neoplatonism, and "il lume naturale", a Galilean reference meant to describe some innate ability for the human mind to understand the natural world. But again, you can never know what you truly need, and we are often tantalized by the sheer possibilities that lay just outside of our reach. I can see why Peirce eventually turned to religion later in life. Like so many contemplative and humble philosophers before him, there's no philosophical challenge that can be resolved by humans alone.

>>20780044
I don't think Peirce fully understood his semiotic model. He was constantly devising and revising his phenomenological system throughout his life, and his semiotics was derived from that.

>> No.20780081
File: 52 KB, 500x365, r.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
20780081

>>20779944
>>20779981
>>20780071
a wasp in a bottle indeed

>> No.20780177

>>20779944
>>20779981
>>20780071
Before I respond to you I'd like to ask, precisely how much of Peirce have you read?

It sounds as if you're discounting him as an atheist, when he was not.

>> No.20780262

>>20780177
>It sounds as if you're discounting him as an atheist, when he was not.
What makes you think that? I hardly even talked about Peirce's religious views from what I can tell.

>precisely how much of Peirce have you read?
Tons. I've read his early papers on categories, a guess at the riddle, man's glassy essence, a ton of his Harvard lectures, some of his letters to Lady Welby, his neglected argument for God, and a metric fuckton of secondary sources dealing with Peirce's thoughts on topics including probability, aesthetics, ethics, history, logic, phenomenology, the categories, etc. I also read a biography of Peirce, too. I think I have a decent grasp of what he's about, albeit the more complex mathematical and logical work eludes my understanding.

By the way, you make it seem that Peirce's religious views were black and white, when that was not the case. Peirce WAS an atheist earlier in his life, especially when he was a cocky know-it-all contrarian who managed to piss everyone off wherever he went (so much for the community of inquirers). But he then became a devout Christian towards the end of his life, a panentheist to be sure. After grappling with his philosophical viewpoint for the longest time, I can fully understand why. We start with "il lume naturale", the potential for understanding, but despite our best efforts, only a God can save us when it comes to knowing.

>> No.20780418

>>20780262
I ask because it feels as though you're identifying much of what would today be considered a hard limit on knowledge attained through his model with his own personal frustrations at not being able to surmount them.

>> No.20781107

>>20780418
What system does the best to counter the limitations of Peirce's system?

>> No.20781199

>>20781107
I'd tell you but you may steal my PhD subject.

>> No.20781302

>>20781199
>>20780177
Care to at least share some of your thoughts?

>> No.20781360

>>20781302
I can give you a hint, sure: firstness, secondness, thirdness, and many other ideas promulgated by Peirce have within their definitions and descriptions concepts which do not truly belong to those with which they've been assimilated. Disintengling the intersections between these concepts us vital to tracing their true origins and ultimately proper homes.

>> No.20781401

>>20781360
What’s the most glaring inconsistency for you?

>> No.20781515

>>20781401
Not so much inconsistencies as they are being conflated with one another.

In example, Peirce attributes intuition to sublimated feeling, and by feeling he means sensible perception. So, you have this issue where Peirce is making lucid comments on the faculty of intuition but is deligating the function feeling, or sensation; he has a very hard time differentiating between psychological functions. But, once one is sufficiently educated on psychoanalytic matters, these shortcomings are easily compensated for.

Only a psychoanalyst could ever understand Peirce, and no psychoanalysis would ever submit themselves to him. Thus we have his obscurity.

>> No.20782222
File: 102 KB, 700x754, 281706.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
20782222

>>20781515
>Not so much inconsistencies as they are being conflated with one another.
From what I understand, I don't think firstness, secondness, and thirdness can ever truly be separated from one another given the self-similar nature of Peircian triads. This is why Peircian triads have degenerate (subsidiary) degrees of categories at the levels of secondness and thirdness. They all occur at once, and they are dependent on each other to operate meaningfully, yet they still have distinct properties from one another. I think pic-related here >20762600 illustrates this well enough. This interactive process continues on forever through thirdness, which is more of a middle term between firstness and secondness, guiding what firstness and secondness achieves.

To explain the dynamics of Peirce's triads, take, for example, abductive, deductive, and inductive reasoning, which I've arranged in their respective categorical order. Abductive reasoning is related to perception and how we determine the best-fitting causes, cases, or hypothesis to explain the effects that affect us. It is a purely mental abstraction. However, the explanations that fits best will be mediated by the previous observation of previous rules, patterns, habits, etc., which we know of as inductive reasoning. And inductive reasoning will be buttressed by hypothesis testing, which we can think of as deductive reasoning. The consequences of hypothesis testing, regardless of the predictions, create new rules, patterns, and habits to hold through a dyadic reaction with the world. And hypothesis testing will be spurred by a previous round of hypothesis generation, abductive reasoning, hence the cyclical nature of Peirce's pharenoscopy. It's a delicate waltz.

>> No.20782228

>>20782222
I meant >>20762600

>> No.20783334

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>> No.20783489
File: 533 KB, 585x691, 1657879451313.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
20783489

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