/lit/ - Literature

>>20284985
Nothing.
They are.

>>20284985
Holy shit, aesthetics is synthesis of sensuous intuitions and the concepts of pure reason, you’re fucking illiterate. No philosopher in history has ever defended subjective idealism and it’s not even remotely implied in Kantianism. The correct criticism isn’t that it risks collapse but in the contrary that it already has collapsed into hypostasis of pure universality, which is never absolutely divorced from its particular moments but rather constantly rearticulates them as free individuals through the dialectic of actions.

>>20284985
Never read Kant but it's because he can't definitively rule out things-in-themselves either. It's a position so skeptical that it can't even fall into solipsism which would at least have confirmatory evidence that all Sensation and Understanding don't come from Objects.

>>20284985
Oh great, another shitty Kant thread...

>Does Kant give arguments to support things-in-themselves
Yes, he does give one. And it isn't even hard to find. Do your fucking homework alone!

>>20284985
Because deep down all idealism comes down to either God existing or some metaphysical historical entity existing that keeps all things intact.

Marx also abuses this methodology of idealism in his materialism so it keeps consistency.

>>20285034
Condescending answers like this are the reason why Kant threads are so shitty. None of you fuckers could give me a clear answer why concepts were different to objects: if Kant is so hard for even you self-professed experts to read, why the fuck would I waste my time on an enterprise to learn nothing.
Meanwhile if you provided educational and simplified answers, it could stoke other anons to go: "huh, Maybe I'll read more into that" and actually be able to contribute.
Good going jackass.

>>20284985
>Does Kant give arguments to support things-in-themselves
You would know if you bothered to read even the bare minimum of wikipedia.

>>20284985
Start here bro:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/#TraDed

>>20285089
Kek
>Who is John Galt, said the bum.

Quantum mechanics disproves most of the old arguments for materialism

>>20285360
>t. Deepak Chopra

>>20285088
>dude, you can't just like, directly interact with another individual, you have to interact with some arbitrarily defined matter between you two so that it reaches him
>no I will not explain how this rationally or practically benefits anyone
The Demiurge (not neo Platonic) has more stable and consistent ideas than you, that's it.

>>20285366
>idealism is when things are ideal

>>20285366
>pic
is supposedly true, my University physics professor literally started one of his lectures with that statement. Maybe it's because I'm not American but I rarely got the post modernist indoctrination in university people on 4chan claim happens.

>>20285394
>>20285380
>is supposedly true,
It ain't. 99% of anything that mentions the word 'quantum' is bullshit. Unless they are actually describing the probabilities of quantum particles like quarks and what not then it's bullshit.
Even 'Quantum Computing' isn't quantum.
Kantianism might be incompatible with later scientific discoveries, but anyone who says a vague statement like "Quantum Mechanics disproves it" has no idea what they're talking about and might as well be saying "The Riemann Hypothesis/Reynold's Number/Thicc PAWGs disproves it" or similar non-argumentative nonsense.

>>20285409
>"Quantum Mechanics disproves it"
Is correct because materialism put all their eggs in the basket of scientific determinism that was becoming really popular before the discovery of quantum mechanics, fundamentally disproving the ideas the ideas that relied on a purely newtonian reality.

>>20285418
Name one proposition of Kant's that's incompatible with one specific finding of Quantum Mechanics because we all know you're talking through your ass.

>>20285422
>>20285360
I can't because that wasn't even what I was talking about. I was just arguing against my presumption of OPs implication based on how these idealism vs materialism threads go.

>>20284985
Very bright minds criticized Kant heavily even while he was alive about this, and Kant's response was "They misunderstand me" instead of clarifying how exactly he was right and they were wrong. To this day Kantians think he's just right and claim they can prove it but it's not particularly convincing. The need to talk about things in themselves seems quite unargued for, the capacity to talk about them seems quite impossible given his claims that categories and concepts can only apply to empirical objects, and his own account of the truth of sentences seems so thoroughly ideal that the supposed objectivity of the thing in itself quite becomes a dangler in the whole account of Kantian truth. Of course Kantians will resist this but the truth is that it's Kant's fault for not properly proving to the world that his critics misunderstood him as he claimed.

>>20284985
Hegel squares this circle epistemologically: Ding An Sich is a product of consciousness to universalize the object of perceptions.

>>20285252
tldr

>>20285089
If you're too lazy to even read the wikipedia or sep articles about Kant and instead expect other people to spend the time to to "provide[...] educational and simplified answers", I have two words for you: fuck yourself!

>>20285418
you have absolutely no idea how quantum physics works. Just because we don't currently understand something doesn't mean it's random. Just because the world doesn't work as a Newtonian machine doesn't disprove materialism at all. Schrodinger's cat was originally created to show how stupid certain quantum physicists were, and anyone who believes that the cat is in some sort of magical state of both dead and alive is absolutely retarded

>>20285418
> materialism put all their eggs in the basket of scientific determinism
Materialism doesn’t require or presuppose any given model of causality. Read Althusser.

>>20284985
The deeply intersubjective character of consciousness and knowledge.
Also, read Husserl.

>>20285089
Sounds like cope to me retard. Just google it, read it or quit shitting up the board.

>>20288184
>>20289415
I did read SEP and tried to find some essays on sci-hub, and then in my confusion asked for clarity. And didn't get it because of morons like you who don't have answers either.
See, all this time instead of actually discussing Kant, you've only tried to insult some stranger on the internet over something you wrongly assumed they didn't do. Is that a productive use of your time?

>>20285089
Plus, Schopenhauer was better

>>20284985
>skepticism about the external world and solipsism?
He doesn't deny the existence of some external objective "something" he just says we kant know what it is in its true essence "in itself."

>>20289583
Anywhere to start with him? He certainly seems easier to grasp without losing content.

>>20284985
>Does Kant give arguments to support things-in-themselves, or are they just wishful thinking?
He says sensory experience must have a cause, and that cause must be something external. Hence the external world. Where he departs from empiricism is the contention that what the senses produce is a re-production of the external world. Perception is cognition-laden and interspersed with various categories of reasoning that are sprinkled in by the mind, making for conditions in which the mind's contribution and the external stimuli's contribution cannot be evenly and cleanly separated.

>>20289595
I understand, but if we can't know the thing-in-itself, how do we know it is out there in the first place? Why shouldn't we identify appearances or sensations with things-in-themselves?

>>20289840
>He says sensory experience must have a cause, and that cause must be something external
I thought one of the main points of the CPR was that things such as "cause" cannot be applied to metaphysical statements outside the world of concepts that our minds imposes onto us, e.g. principle of sufficient reason for the existence of God. In other words, we can't say that "something external" has or is a cause. Is that accurate?

>>20289601
Not that anon but I started with his essays and aphorisms

>>20285418
Quantum physics work 100% on deterministic principles, you are just retarded

>>20289868
>I understand, but if we can't know the thing-in-itself, how do we know it is out there in the first place? Why shouldn't we identify appearances or sensations with things-in-themselves?
Not that anon but I don't buy that line of argument: Forensic Investigators are quite adept at telling if someone was murdered without, ya know, identifying the murderer or having sensations of the murderer. I don't need to know the source of a leak, but when I sense the wetness of a puddle on my kitchen floor - I know that somewhere in the kitchen there is something leaking that shouldn't - I don't need direct sensory data of the source of that leak, only the result of it.
Worse still it implies that the more reasonable assertion is that there is nothing out there, (because the question is not: what is the nature of things-in-themselves but are there things-in-themselves at all?) and I know all too well that as much as I have tried to 'change my reality' there does seem to be some exogenous force on my senses that is not generated internally of my locus of control or in my "subject", so there must be something else... the things-in-themselves, whatever form they take.

>>20286085
desu i couldnt go more than 30 minuets of The Metaphysics of Morals it got boring and the grimorium verum was more interesting

>>20288768
>reality is either random or deterministic
>we cant prove either
>but its totally one of those
Its neither

>>20290390
I don't think you understand how scientific claims work, if it was deterministic scientists would say that. But we don't have proof, so saying it is is anti-science. And until we do, we cannot say it is true.

>>20288768
>Schrodinger's cat was originally created to show how stupid certain quantum physicists were
And now, MWT which is a more absurd version of that is taken seriously by some scientists.

>>20290453
Whoops, looks like you confused reasoning about the phenomenal world with pure reason’s postulate of a noumenal world.
>>20289868
> I understand, but if we can't know the thing-in-itself, how do we know it is out there in the first place? Why shouldn't we identify appearances or sensations with things-in-themselves?
We don’t - that’s the point - its noumenal. We can rationally postulate it as the universal remainder of our reasoning’s analytic action over sensuous intuitions, but about the noumenon we can’t know anything, not even that it’s “out there,” because if we take this postulate in its extremity we find that we too must have a noumenal aspect that recedes and draws away from our empirical moments of experience. But therein we are free, because we have put forward an aspect of ourselves free from causal determination in the phenomenal realm.

>>20284995
>No philosopher in history has ever defended subjective idealism

>>20289595
Kant doesn't even seem bold enough to assert its existence though. Feel free to contradict me if you have a direct quote where he states clearly otherwise. I understand that Kant asserts that existence is not a predicate, even though reality (existence) is one of his categories, however surely predicating reality of the thing in itself would be doing too much, because categories cannot apply to it. It can't be either negated, posited, nor unlimited, because that would be categorizing it according to the understanding. But if existence is not a predicate, ie not a category, then surely the thing in itself might be allowed to be given existence?
>>20290453
>I know that somewhere in the kitchen there is something leaking that shouldn't
You don't actually know that, you just assume it because it is common. Your idea of "wet floor" is either strongly associated with or contained within the idea of a "leak", not necessarily but just empirically due to common experience of the two coinciding. It could also be caused by magma deep under your house evaporating the ground water, which then bubbles up through the soil and pushes up through the floor somehow, entering your house from below, just to give an absurdly unlikely example.

>>20290797
>looks like you confused reasoning about the phenomenal world with pure reason’s postulate of a noumenal world.
Where?
>>20290872
>It could also be
You lost when you phrased it like that... because true to form it's a straw clutchingly improbable suggestion which doesn't present a strong enough argument to look for this being the cause.
Likewise in a either or: do things-in-themselves exist even if their exact nature is unknown, or is it solipsism. I'm gonna vote for the latter. Also why is it that whenever someone starts a counterpoint with a "what if..." or "maybe it's" or "it could also be..." invariably it's suggestion they pulled out of their ass? Note I'm not accusing you - I realize it's a rhetorical example to show the impossibility of certainty, but... god why can't people be more persuasive and stop wasting my time!?

>>20291293
>. I'm gonna vote for the latter.
*former
Fuck. I've had a lot to drink

>>20291293
> Where
The entire analogy betrays misapprehension of what the word “noumenal” refers to. The leak is noumenal with respect to the phenomenal drip. It’s just something we haven’t empirically encountered yet. The noumenon is an abstract postulate of pure reason.

>>20291415
The leak ISNT**

>>20291415
Well you clearly didn't read my entire post. Go back and read the stuff about not being able to 'change my reality'.
But more to the point which do you personally think is more likley?
>there is nothing external of the subject (you)
>there is something external of the subject (you)
You can only pick one, and can't qualify it. Answer it. to rephrase the question: Do you personally err more towards things-in-themselves existing in some form or another, or not at all?

>>20291426
You just have no idea what you’re talking about.
Kant is NOT saying that the phenomenal world is like a veil of appearance cast over an invisible landscape.
He’s saying that superadded to our conceptual apprehension of sensuous objects is the supposition, provided by pure reason, of their universality, which is the noumenal thing-in-itself.
This is not phil 101 where you try to answer “why is there something instead of nothing,” “is the world real or an illusion,” etc.
That said - I am not a subjective idealist, to answer your question. Neither is Kant.

>>20291426
>> there is nothing external of the subject (you)
I’ll add moreover that this is actually correct but needs to be understood in Hegel’s sense in order to be correct: there IS “nothing” outside the subject - outside the subject, Nothing is, Nothing is there. But not the Nothing which is simple non-existence or non-being, rather the simple negation of every Something, everything given sensuously to intuition.

>>20284985
Notice how no kantians have answered, but merely replied smugly and condescendingly. Is there a bigger hint that they themselves don't know?

>>20291426
> things-in-themselves existing
Contradiction in terms - things IN themselves do not EX-sist. That’s why they are IN themselves.

Things would remain in themselves forever if consciousness didn’t come along to draw them out of their inwardness into outward phenomenality. Kantianism is about the insistence that there is a necessary, knowable connection between this inner repose and phenomenal appearances, he’s not saying that we’re somehow mistaken or mislead by appearances. Actually, what misleads us is our attempts to rationalize appearances. This things-in-themselves don’t properly exist until observed, but “existence” shouldn’t be taken to mean “reality” - it’s not subjective idealism whereby the subject somehow unfolds the entire world out of itself - to exist is rather to be the synthesis of being-for-self with being-for-another.

All Kant is saying is that the noumenon is neither time nor space, as they form a synthetic unit.
Schopenhauer on the other hand says that the thing-in-itself is the will.

>>20289555
First of all: you're talking to two different persons (which should tell you it's not just the personal opinion of a single guy)
Second: even a five minute research in the SEP would have given you the following passage
> Kant’s argument, very briefly, is that the existence of objects in space outside me (“empirically external” objects) is a condition on the possibility of my being conscious of the determinate temporal relations of my inner states. Consequently, it is impossible to be a self-conscious subject without there existing objects in space outside of me, and in being conscious of the temporal relations of my inner states I am immediately conscious of the existence of these objects.
If you want to look up the whole argument in the KpR, go for the "Refutation of Idealism" (B276-288) which would not have been exactly hard to find, if you had just looked for it, too.

Next time, at least put the minimum amount of effort into it before you expect others to do your homework.

>>20291447
>This is not phil 101 where you try to answer “why is there something instead of nothing,” “is the world real or an illusion,” etc.
Why are you turning it into that then? I don't remember asking that question. I said that I can't control the things I see, therefore there's something else. You seem to agree with that, You claim Kant agrees with that too. I didn't attempt to get into an epistemological argument over what and how those things are. Only that pedantically spouting "what ifs" about the improbability of total solipsism is a fucking waste of energy.
I never claimed Kant was asking about that either, I was simply trying to tell that other I don't buy the argument that you need to directly have sensation of something to know there was something.
Really I should have just said "ALGEBRA!"

>>20291501
You didn't actually read my post and you have the gall to tell me to do my homework? Let's look back at the post in question >>20285089
>None of you fuckers could give me a clear answer why concepts were different to objects
Instead of answering it, you've invented a question I didn't ask and then decided I'm lazy for not researching this irrelevant question of your own invention instead of answering mine. A simple one of mere definition.
What is a object, what is a concept? Why are they different?
If a concept is a 'mediate representation of an object' then what is an object, and don't say the 'immediate representation of a concept' or something tautological. Explain it in the kind of pure English that can only come from a true masterly grasp of the material, not the kind of argot ridden rote-learning that shows that you don't understand it either:
What is a concept?
What is a object?
Why are they different? How are they different?
Do I need to ask it again just so you know that I'm not asking about the conditionality of temporal relations of a subject's inner states but asking:
>>>>>>>What distinguishes objects from concepts in Kantian terminology...

>>20291532
No, you simply think you are not asking about those things because you don’t know whereof you speak. You believe there is a “simple” answer that doesn’t include reference to temporality because you have a notion in your head of what these things should be, which we are failing to satisfy because they aren’t that. They aren’t simple. They aren’t isolated. They are complex and involved.

>>20291501
>>20291532
At the risk of beating you over the head with it: I didn't ask that... I asked:
>When discussing Kant there are two words "concept" and "object" what do each refer to and how does the meaning between the two words differ with respect to discussing Kant?

>>20291541
What is a concept and how does it differ from a object?

>>20291532
You asked >>20284985 and I gave you the answer to it. Now, you bring up a new question and think, it's the same which it isn't.
I don't even know what you mean with concept and object. Do you mean "thing in itself" (object) and "object of our experience"?

>>20291501
>Consequently, it is impossible to be a self-conscious subject without there existing objects in space outside of me, and in being conscious of the temporal relations of my inner states I am immediately conscious of the existence of these objects.
Not him but this seems dumb and blatantly unnecessary

>>20291579
I'm not OP! But looks like you've given me a break though, thank you:
>I don't even know what you mean with concept and object. Do you mean "thing in itself" (object) and "object of our experience"?
Well no one has ever made that distinction, are they different?
Obviously I can't answer your question because: this is news to me.
I don't even know if the 'object' is equivocal with the 'thing-in-itself' because every damn essay seems to use different terminology.

>>20284985
>What stops transcendental idealism from falling into skepticism about the external world and solipsism?
Some kind of Buddhist like practice, rather than theory I'd wager.

>>20291601
>Well no one has ever made that distinction,
*made that distinction TO ME

>>20291580
What would you be conscious of without objects?

>>20291579
Also it's not a 'new question' I asked it almost a month ago.
>>20246161

>>20284995
Fichte?

>>20291611
I don't see a practical reason as to why a subject can't be aware of itself without acting upon anything. I would posit that the fundamental person that develops and attains knowledge is always aware of this, even if focused elsewhere. Unless you view man as an atomic (not physical, but in terms of division) particle that only exists to interact with its environment and not introspect would it make sense, wherein the individual does not exist as anything more than a condition as opposed to an undivided (but not "singular" as opposed to plural) nature that can, through poor action, indulge in it's environment in confusing ways but is simultaneously the potential of the ultimate nature of it's environment and that which is interacting with the environment not out of necessity but for it's own either confused or meaningful reason.

>>20291580
Godfuckingdammit. Why do you little pieces of shit really think, it's a good idea to criticise one of the greatest thinkers in the history of mankind without even properly reading him?
>Hurr durr, I just read two crumbs of a really dense overview of a 10 page argument. Due to all my non-existent background knowledge, I, the smartest person who ever set foot on this planet, hereby decide this very argument shall henceforth and for all time be known to mankind as "dumb and blatantly unnecessary".

>>20291670
Not him but I'm this >>20285089 anon and I reiterate:
>Meanwhile if you provided educational and simplified answers, it could stoke other anons to go: "huh, Maybe I'll read more into that" and actually be able to contribute.

>>20291601
>Well no one has ever made that distinction, are they different?
I really hope you're trying to troll.

>>20291644
How would you distinguish consciousness of self if self weren’t situated in an objective environment?

>>20291644

To add my 2 pence:
Subject-object nature is divided between that which is placed as different and fundamentally distinct, if we were to never consider subject object nature we would not notice anything in our environment besides that which would cause interest in us (possibly leading to reforming of the subject object nature), which can be self-resounding; but we can also ponder our own mind inward and outward without any of those things we may or may not care for, thus ending the need for external reality until it is needed again. While you are actively dividing the world in such a way that focuses on the external, you are forcing yourself into that position, remove the activity and the distinction ends. When you think of a clock, you do not have an idea of a clock, and another idea of a hypothetical real clock, a single thought is enough, or another thought observing the first idea. The question then isn't whether or not you would be capable of having thoughts independent of external stimuli but rather why do you even need it, and the answer from my perspective would be "searching for something which your nature does not posses or contain at the moment", seemingly seeking externally out of failure to find any idea (sensory or thought) internally, explaining the "passively active consciousness" that makes you alive and here.

>>20291698
>distinguish
Why would I need to distinguish? If there is a consciousness, it is inherently aware of its information that is truly itself without distinguishment, otherwise it would not be able to perform any action off of any information it possess. What you are suggesting sounds like reducing the consciousness to an engine that acts dependently entirely on what it sees, and has no other purpose other than to serve as a processing unit for information that it is gazing at. Perhaps it is better to say I believe that all action is aware of self, just not necessarily in the best of understanding to know how to act upon it. All action on objects is an attempt to attain more for the supposed undivided self-consciousness, that may be of temporary or if possible permanent; serving as a boonto help action that you should have done independently in the first place.

>>20291731
What is consciousness aware of when it is only aware of itself?

>>20291679
>if you provided educational and simplified answers, it could stoke other anons to go: "huh, Maybe I'll read more into that" and actually be able to contribute.
An educational and simplified answer to
>Not him but this seems dumb and blatantly unnecessary
Are you fucking kidding me. This board is a loony bin.
Good luck, guys.

>>20291736
That which it has attained, temporarily or permanently that constitutes it. It doesn't need to see it because it already knows it in a sort of perfect efficiency, as it is the same thing just divided in this conversation for the sake of understanding (just as subject-object thinking is) but can if it needs to for it's other senses, were it able to of it's own accord (an issue I mentioned before). As for other individuals, I do not place the nature of interaction in the material world as the highest standard, rather I place it as an interaction between individuals done by a third party/proxy which the individuals attached to due to seeing said third part as a temporarily attained benefit they wanted (how it transformed to the current moment is up for discussion); primarily to avoid the need for unconscious matter. How did the the third party and the individual meet? I can't guarantee, it's something that should be obvious to everyone as a memory yet needs to be learned, but I would say, just as there is no distinction in the environment when we remove the subject-object distinction until we find that which interests us, so do we find that which interests us in this primordial reality entirely within the bounds of our, possibly spacial, possibly spaceless outcry for answers externally, in what we inherently know is not us. And when we do, if someone hears us, however that works, we get to interact, and we do so as long as we both "care" about each other, not limited by any amount of information, only by our mutual "consent".

>>20291740
You could have just ignored his comment, but you chose to engage it because you're sour.
You catch more flies with honey than with vinegar.

>>20291797
I’ll be honest, I find you very hard to understand. But at a minimum you’re positing an abstract I=I which necessarily involves differentiation and objectification

>>20291872
>an abstract I=I which necessarily involves differentiation and objectification
Not sure what precisely you are referring to.

>>20291601
>I don't even know if the 'object' is equivocal with the 'thing-in-itself' because every damn essay seems to use different terminology.
Kant's original text makes a careful separation between many names, like "Gegenstand" (object of appearace), "Objekt" (object of knowledge), "Ding" (I don't really understand this one), and "Ding an sich" (thing-in-itself), which is synonym to "Gegenstand an sich" and "Objekt an sich". Kant translations usually obliterate those differences. I'm a Kant noob so I don't know how to enter in more details. Try checking out the object entry in Caygill's Kant Dictionary.

>>20292229
Adding to that, "Whatever an sich" is identified with noumena, while (I think) Objekt and Gegenstand are identified with phenomena

>>20291640
If you're talking about philosophers defending subjective idealism, can we add Berkeley to that?

>>20292229
What is it "before the observation" and is there a name for the process of attaining those named things?

>>20292270
I can be totally wrong, and probably using imprecise terms, but as far as I understand it, the "named things" are concepts (actually they don't need necessarily to be named, they are just universals in general). I don't know the name of the process, but I think we're entering the realm of reason/cognition/whatever. In the case of mathematical concepts, Kant has this special term "construction". This process is "parallel to" sensory intuition, that you can only interpret through those concepts.

My fist in your eye socket will prove both you and I exist

>>20292375
>idealism is when life is ideal

>>20285089
based

fuck kant threads

>>20290390
>quantum physics work 100% on deterministic principles
What is chaos theory?

What is true randomness?

>>20292342
Did a bit of a research to find the name of the process(es):

reason - The faculty for inference and unconditional generalization, which yields ideas (a type of concept) and ideals.

understanding - The faculty of concepts; pure understanding is the source of the categories (pure concepts of the understanding).

synthesis - The combination of any representations (of which concepts are a type of) into a more complex representation.

So apparently basic concepts come from reason and understanding, and through synthesis we can build complex concepts

>>20292390
>chaos theory
You're mixing up map and territory. Chaos theory describes certain processes but it's not the process itself. What gets "chaotic" here isn't the process itself but the predictions the theory makes about it, and they become chaotic due to a lack of information.

>>20292440
>Being this fucking wrong.
Never post here again, fucking brainlet.

>>20292440
Chaos: When the present determines the future, but the approximate present does not approximately determine the future.

>>20292229
"Gegenstand" und "Ding" are pretty synonymous. They simply mean "thing", nothing more nothing less. The only little difference is: a "Gegenstand" is always an object like in "Gegenstand der Erkenntnis"/"Erkenntnisgegenstand" (Object of perception), while "Ding" is a little bit more neutral, but that barely matters at all. And I consider the difference between an object and a subject to be given.
If Kant speaks of the "thing in itself" he always uses "Ding an sich". I doubt he ever uses "Gegenstand an sich" and he doesn't use "Objekt an sich" for sure. It would also be really strange since the "thing in itself" does not have the role of an object. When you think of the "thing in itself", think of it as the stage on which our perception plays or the canvas on which it paints it's objects.
If Kant makes distinctions he is always pretty clear and explicit about them - at least as long as he's aware of them himself.

There are certain English translations that look a little bit strange when you know Kant in German, most notably the omnipresence of the word "noumena" in the discussion of Kant which he himself barely uses after his pre-critical phase. He himself talks about the "thing in itself" instead of the "noumenal world" in 99 out of 100 cases.

Does Kant question if you can interact with an object without it being able to interact with you, choose how it lets you see it or not get affected by you seeing it?

>>20292553
>I doubt he ever uses "Gegenstand an sich" and he doesn't use "Objekt an sich" for sure.
In PGM, "Gegenstand an sich" are mentioned in §9, §28 and §34. "Objekte an sich" are mentioned in §36 and §39.

>the stage on which our perception plays or the canvas on which it paints it's objects
Isn't that (the faculty of) intuition?

>>20292553
Just to add to this, Gegenstand most literally translates as "that-which-stands-against", or "that-which-stands-over", and when you got that, it is easy to see that you are very right about a Gegenstand an sich being a misnomer, since Gegenstand is in essence a relational term.

>>20292595
>In PGM, "Gegenstand an sich" are mentioned in §9, §28 and §34. "Objekte an sich" are mentioned in §36 and §39.
Thanks, wasn't aware of that. Sometimes he seems to be a bit sloppy, but who am I to judge.

>Isn't that (the faculty of) intuition?
I understand your objection. We might seperate between the inner and outer canvas or a material and ideal one... or we might simply agree, I just made up a shitty metaphor.

>>20292445
>local mathematician forgets his work only exists on a chalkboard
Many such cases. Sad!

>>20292575
As far as I know, he doesn't. It's also not clear what you mean with "object" - I'm pretty sure you mean the thing in itself not the object of perception. And it's also not clear what you mean with "see it": do you mean said object wants to influence the sensual perception you have of it or do you mean it wants to influence your opinion of him ("the way you see it") - the latter meaning isn't touched by Kant, and it's also a completely different topic.

Kant's dictum is: everything you perceive from an object (of perception) you've put into this object yourself. Therefore, the object of perception can't actively alter your perception of it, it's your creation. On the other hand, beyond the necessity of its existance, we can't say anything about the thing in itself.

>>20292608
Just looked it up: "Gegenstand" is used in philosophical debates as the German equivalent to "object".

Even Wikipedia states:
>Seit dem 18. Jahrhundert wird es – statt zuvor „Gegenwurf“ oder „Widerschein“ fachsprachlich in philosophischen Kontexten als Entsprechung zu lateinisch obiectum (das Entgegengeworfene) gebraucht.
>Since the 18th century it (Gegenstand) is used [...] as an equivalent to the Latin obiectum [...]

>>20291689
Not trolling just easily confused: I clarified no one has made that distinction TO ME... and then this morning I looked through my notes and found this clipping from an essay (Immanuel Kant’s Theory of Objects and Its Inherent Link to Natural Science - Rudolf meer):
>it is necessary to differentiate Kant’s concepts of objects into intelligible object (2.1), sensible object (2.2), and object of experience (2.3). Based on this distinction, it is possible to highlight the specific status of the concept of objects of experience(2.4), in which Kant combines in a specific way the first two classes of objects
I was wrong, but I wasn't trying to lie.
But also crucially in the footnotes:
> in the translation of the Critique of Pure Reason by Guyer and Wood the German term Gegenstand is always translated as objet. For this reason, the differentiation between the German Objekt and Gegenstand disappears in the English translation.
>>20292229
>>20292229
Thank you, this helps immeasurably.
>>20292342
In my notes it says a concept is
>"Predicates of possible judgements"..."the unity of the act through which different representations are ordered under a common one."
I don't get it either... I get there are 4 judgements, I get that concepts are 'mediate representations of objects' but what does that mean?
>>20292553
It really sounds like the translations are the problem. For example in the Meer essay is the object of experience the same as Erkenntnisgegenstand?

>>20293704
>I get there are 4 judgements
Wait, what?
>what does that mean?
I guess the best analogy to judgments are propositions, but in a more ethereal, non-verbal form. This definition might make things clear: "A judgment is a representation of a state of affairs through a *combination of concepts* ultimately referring to one or more intuitions"

So this 4chan thread is a concept to me, and "this 4chan thread is garbage" is a judgment. This judgment contains some concepts (e.g. this 4chan thread, garbage). The intuition is colors in the screen, in which I recognize those concepts. These concepts are not *in* the intuition, rather I created them through understanding, reason, and synthesis.

>the unity of the act through which different representations are ordered under a common one.
This sounds like it is describing synthesis of empirical concepts. Pure concepts (categories) are not united from different representations, they are like primitives if you know programming.

>is the object of experience the same as Erkenntnisgegenstand?
I don't know, but Erkenntnis is pretty much always translated 1:1 to cognition, and according to Caygill, "there are two sorts of cognition, namely intuitions and concepts". So an object of intuition is Gegenstand, and an object of concepts is Objekt (I don't know what's the difference between a concept and its Objekt). So, since Erkenntnis can refer to knowledge or intuition than I guess "Erkenntnisgegenstand" could possibly be interpreted as:
* synonym to Gegenstand, since he chose to put "gegenstand" in the middle of the word, or
* the general union of Gegenstand and Objekt (which is consistent with the use of Erkenntnis), because otherwise he could have just used Gegenstand.

Again, I'm a total noob, so a lot here can be wrong or imprecise.

>>20292608
Fair enough, but Gegenstand is a literal calque from obiectum. "Ob" also means "against" https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/ob-#Latin

>>20294151
Me again, I take back the "but". What this means is that everything >>20292608
said about Gegenstand can be said about Objekt. It also means it is really hard to translate Objekt and Gegenstand to different words.

>>20294132
>Wait, what?
Well four TYPE of judgements: Quality, Quantity, Relation or Modality. I misspoke.
>This definition might make things clear: "A judgment is a representation of a state of affairs through a *combination of concepts* ultimately referring to one or more intuitions"
Sadly as clear as mud because what is a a concept... it is a 'mediated representation of a object' according to my notes. Okay but there's several types of objects, is it only a mediation of a specific type or more. So is a "sensible object" a thing-in-itself?
And a object of experience a... wait, what is the difference between a "Gegenstand" (object of appearance), "Objekt" (object of knowledge),
>Pure concepts (categories) are not united from different representations, they are like primitives if you know programming.
Well that confuses me even more. So categories are concepts... uhhh... okay? But surely "Unity" isn't a mediated representation of some object... is it? It doesn't correlate to an intuition, because there is no sense data of unity?
Perhaps it would be easier if I say this is what I understand/assume which is obviously wrong:
>>The Noumea is the totality of Things-In-Themselves, they somehow transmit Intuition (colors, sounds touch etc.) to the Sensation, which is one faculty of Cognition, the Sensation then moves on its out put to the Understanding which makes Judgements. It is also here that the Intuition is actually 'recognized' (my word) - for example, that moving figure of changing light and dark is finally recognized as a person running. That recognition is a 'concept'. The 'object' is the thing-in-itself which through the interplay of light (whether the thing-in-itself is the person the light is reflecting off or not is kind of unimportant) produces the sensation that is grasped by the Intuition through the Understanding becomes a 'concept'.
>>there is not a 1:1 connection between a concept and an object. Similar to Piercian ideas of Firstness and Secondness, or the more general semiotic idea of sign and signified.
Now you're a noob like me so I don't expect you to know which parts I've got wrong, but hopefully someone who isn't a condescending fuck can say "ahhh, no this part is right but that part is wrong" and it'll all click.

>>20294151
Many of the German idealists use Gegenstand and Objekt as separate technical terms even if they are colloquially synonymous

>>20294191
>So is a "sensible object" a thing-in-itself?
I'm almost sure a "sensible object" is Gegenstand. You can't sense things-in-themselves.
>what is the difference between a "Gegenstand" (object of appearance), "Objekt" (object of knowledge)
Caygill: "When objects [Gegenstände] of experience are made into objects for knowledge, they become Objekte". My guess is: Objekte are active, you come up with them, and they are universals. Gegenstände are passive, you sense them, and they are particulars. It's like you come up with these "patterns" for objects (Objekt) and when you recognize them in intuition (Gegenstand), you "match" them.
>sensation that is grasped by the Intuition through the Understanding becomes a 'concept'
I think this part is not strictly right, the sensation is identified with a concept, it does not become a concept. The understanding creates concepts. There's probably another faculty that I don't know of (Urteilskraft maybe?) that makes that association.