/lit/ - Literature

>>20194421
"Qualia" is just a grifter word for "Sensation". I doubt Dennett says sensation doesn't exist, only that Qualia is a bullshit term.

>>20194421
You just summerized "consciousness explained away" by David Chalmers

Qualia is the most inexplicable shit to me. How is it not materialists trying to own Plato by appealing to an unverifiable Platonic ideal?

>>20194743
Qualia is shorthand for qualitative. It's not that surprising that a materialist who is committed to an empirical epistemology and thinks anything that can't be measured or quantified is unreal would also commit themselves to denying that there is a qualitative dimension to reality that lies outside the purview of empirical science.

Basically if Dennett admits that qualitative aspects of reality exist like the first hand experience of things then his entire project falls to pieces. The main issue being that anyone who actually experienced reality (that is to say, everyone), knows for absolute fact that there exists a qualitative dimension and that is how they experience the world. It's the quantitative aspect that is abstracted from the realness of the qualitative, phenomenal aspect.

>>20194797
Go jack off to furry porn, Bernardo

>>20194797
>Qualia is shorthand for qualitative.
Why do we need a shorthand, we already have 'qualitative' at home, why do we need another word for it? My working hypothesis which I am open to being corrected on is: it's a grift.
> commit themselves to denying that there is a qualitative dimension to reality that lies outside the purview of empirical science.
I'm probably way out of my depth here, but I was under the impression that Dennett believed all that stuff could indeed be explained by empirical science if you break it down enough. He's not denying the qualities of softness, loudness, and blueness - he's saying that the mechanisms by which we recognize them are explainable through the physical composition of the human form, and more specifically understanding how the different components interact.
Therefore, and again, this is mostly just poking around in these threads: the word 'qualia' is a spook. It's a useless piece of argot that obscures rather than specifies.

>>20194421
Most definitely not. Everything your read about Dennett's views on this website should go straight into the trash. It's nothing but the screeching of filtered brainlets (perhaps even repeated second- or third- hand). Look up "quining qualia" and work your way through it to get at his actual views.

>>20194815
Is it really him? Lord Kastrup?

>>20194743
It's not a grift dude. In ordinary language, language Dennett accepts, we have to use propostional attitudes like "perceive that" and then (with the addition of a subject "I") bind those to sentences consisting in subjects, supposedly extrasensory like "the apple," and connect these to sensory quality predicates like "is red." Nobody will deny that "I perceive that the apple is red" makes perfect sense. And everybody in the literature, even Dennett, accepts that as intelligible and proper. Of course they understand "red" as a physical property like reflecting a certain wavelength of light. But PERCEIVING THAT is an attitude like loving, hating, etc, and is supposed to be consistent with error. Meaning: "I perceive that the apple is red" is consistent with the apple being green, but i perceive (i.e. see) it to be red, which is illusion. Likewise there might not even be an apple, which is hallucination. And again, these are granted in the literature Dennett engages by most people even materialists. The issue then is making sense of cases of error. If I perceive that an apple is red when it's actually green, what's going on? The old philosophers thought this showed that there was a separation between a more direct object of perception than the apple, the "sense datum" or "impression," which was qualitatively red, or green, or whatever, and about which you couldn't make a mistake. The alternative to this is to say the quality is baked into the perception itself, which is adverbialism: we "red-see" or "green-see," etc. But there's still somewhat of an asymmetry there, if we "red-see" something that doesn't exist, like a non-existent apple. This bothers many materialists. In any case many materialists propose disjunctivism about perception. This is the claim that when you hallucinate, when there's no wavelength of light and no apple, and experience e.g. color perceptions which you think are indistinguishable from non-hallucinations, you're just wrong. But this is one place where using an immanent qualitative sameness makes more philosophical sense: it's less cumbersome, explains why we insist the two experience are indistinguishable. Materialist rejection of qualia quickly starts looking ridiculous. It's much better to just accept qualia and pretend there's some materialist way to reduce it, than claim it doesn't exist as Dennett does. Which is in fact what most materialists in philosophy do. Dennett's view is seen as fringe by other materialists who don't deny qualia.