/lit/ - Literature

>>20164925
Somebody please post the pasta of Husserl talking shit about Kant.

>>20164925
>Is Psychologism just another word for ... Transcendental Idealism
Yes, kind of. The difference is that psychologism says the conditions of mathematics, logic, modality, and truth are physical/biological and contingent on evolution or the way the world turns out, whereas the transcendental idealist doesn't do that, the transcendental conditions are not dependent on those things, and Kant speaks as if they are necessary, and yet he also elsewhere speaks as if they could have been otherwise, or at least as if their necessity is not properly alethic. The rest of your post sounds like weird bait about funny words.

>>20164925
In a very broad sense, yes, however Husserl's attack on psychologism is much more directed.

> Having dismissed these two older forms of antipsychologism, Husserl moves on to present his own arguments. One main train of thought centers on the three empiricist consequences of psychologism. They can be reconstructed as follows:

> First Consequence: If logical rules were based upon psychological laws, then all logical rules would have to be as vague as the underlying psychological laws.

> Refutation: Not all logical rules are vague. And therefore not all logical rules are based upon psychological laws. (§21).

> Second Consequence: If laws of logic were psychological laws, then they could not be known a priori. They would be more or less probable rather than Valid, and justified only by reference to experience.

> Refutation: Laws of logic are a priori, they are justified by apodictic self-evidence, and valid rather than probable. And therefore laws of logic are not psychological (§21).

> Third Consequence: If logical laws were psychological laws, they would refer to psychological entities.

> Refutation: Logical laws do not refer to psychological entities. And therefore logical laws are not psychological laws (§23).

> Husserl also claims that psychologism fails to do justice to the idea that truths are eternal. It is precisely because truths are eternal that logical laws cannot be laws about states of affairs (be they mental or physical). Husserl attempts to prove this claim by showing that the opposite assumption leads to paradoxes.

>>20164925
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, C (AA) Reason, part B blew Husserl the fuck out before he was even born. Fuck Husserl. And you know what else? Fuck that Husserl scholar who posts miserably on 4chan. I’m glad he’s obscure.

>>20165957
Husserl poster is cool, unlike you, who couldn't explain Hegel "refutation" for us.

>>20166078
It’s simple - anyone trying to set up abstract psychological or transcendental laws cannot account for the free action of the individual except by means of a lifeless schematism which falls apart in each case - either the individual isn’t really free, or the law isn’t really a law. transcendental psychologism is no better than the caput mortuum of phrenology, the only difference is you can actually touch poor Yorick’s skull.

>logic is psychological
The type of things the great "philosophers" of the 20th century discuss.

>>20166078
>>20166099
Nice digits. Husserlfag btfo

>check last husserl thread
>french anon who recommended berger thinks i was saying BERGER (or his recommendation of berger) of berger was "vexed"
I was saying the ISSUE of Husserl's early period has historically been vexed (controversial), that's all! Don't be mad at me Bergerfriend, I just haven't gotten around to reading the Berger rec yet so I couldn't comment on it directly

>>20166384
I'll allow it.

>>20166104
Are you a platonist?

Has anyone ever given a straight forward account of what phenomenology is supposed to be

>>20167199
Study of consciousness or phenomenal experience. In a certain way, you can portray it as the study of reality itself.

>>20166099
>the free action of the individual
Ah, so you fell for the meme. Hegelianism is truly brain rot

>>20167199
It's a type of transcendental idealism, as far as I understand it, that tries to decribe experience in first person, as opposed to third person as we usually do. That is, while thinking of an object they "bracket" the objective world, they progressively remove all relative determinations of the object until you are left with the pure first person account of your intentioal counsciousness towards that object - or a "pure object".

>>20167568
marxism on the other hand...

>>20167161
NTA but what is the relationship?

>>20168092
If you're a platonist, you believe in abstract objects independent of your mind. Hence, Frege was a platonist, though it is debatable whether he became a logicist because of his Platonist conviction or vice versa. That's why he was a platonist about fuckton, even facts and propositions.

>>20164925
I tried to get into Husserl, just seemed like a load of spaghetti-long world salads that went nowhere. I would like to try realist phenomenology, maybe that would work better. I have books by Gabriel Marcel, Jacques Maritain and Dietrich Von Hildebrand that might work, as they are personalists.

>>20166099
>It’s simple - anyone trying to set up abstract psychological or transcendental laws cannot account for the free action of the individual except by means of a lifeless schematism which falls apart in each case - either the individual isn’t really free, or the law isn’t really a law.
Why the fuck would certain specific psychological laws, especially logical ones, need to account for the free action of the individual? Your argument has no substance.

>>20168753
What does this have to do with whether logic is psychological?

>>20165941
Thanks! Helpful fren.