/lit/ - Literature

Assholes because I can never remember which is which.

>>19878428
Prior = Before
Post = After

Pretty to remember actually

>>19878416
there is no such thing as a priori. all knowledge comes from experience.

>>19879207
In anatomy posterior comes before.

>>19879214
therefore you are a posteriori

>>19879214
Did you learn this truth through experience or reason?

Anyhow, now that it has been established: what do we make of necessary a posteriori truths?

>>19878416
I use them to annoy people in my essays

>>19879217
No? Posterior is still the back.

>>19878416
A priori based.

>>19878416
lmao y'all really need a chart for this.
You don't know latin?
ngmi

>>19878416
Zero people skills with a sidedish of autism
It really isn't that hard to talk to people in a way that will make them sympathize with what your saying
Unless you're an incel with your panties in a permanent knot

>>19879214
So u read Critique of Pure Reason and just said nuh uh?

>>19879463
This is how I see humans.

Where I live they're standard words.

>>19879321
Necessary a posteriori truths are 'established' through lack of understanding of the concepts of universality, necessity, and a priori cognition.

That they're fucking idiots because nobody who uses it outside of philosophy uses it correctly.

>>19879533
I suggest you take your meds then.

>>19879533
lmao
top quality damage control here

>>19879214
this
>>19879508
exactly

>>19878416
They've never read Prior Analytics

>>19879214
How do you explain the Meno, then?

>>19879214
Kant would agree that all knowledge comes after experience, but not that all knowledge comes from experience. To know something a priori does not mean to know something before any experience, it just means that what is known logically precedes experience.

>>19880140
the slave is taught by experience to actually see the right solution with his eyes in front of him...
he also listens and is given the right solution by word... all he does is recognizing the right solution as it is in fact given to him... if he would remember it he would have had it before it is given to him... but no... all he does is recognizing what is already given to him as being true... there is not one step he does by himself with remembering something...

>>19879214
This guy >>19880229 is right but also you're disregarding primitive reflexes that even infants have. Where did they learn such things? They didn't, or not through experience anyhow

>>19880323
we are talking about knowledge of how the world functions... not about any reflexes that come with birth

>>19880229
but you can not really know it without it being synthetic a priori... therefore time has to be a priori... but time is not a priori... so there is really no reason why what we think logically should be the case in the real world... why it should be knowledge of something... his solution of synthetic judgements a priori results in his transzendental idealism and his transzendental idealism is wrong... there is no thing in itself as Kant describes it...

>>19880365
>but time is not a priori
Sure it is.

>>19880392
so you really think time is not a thing in itself ?
that things are not moving in reality but only in mere appearance for us ?

>>19880448
Assuming that time is a thing in itself results in contradiction and antinomies, therefore it cannot be + time is obviously not given in sensation.

>>19880522
can you explain that in detail ? What contradictions and antinomies result from time being a thing in itself ?

ofcourse time is given in sensation... things are moving in sensation... so time obviously is drawn from experience a posteriori...

>>19880448
>so you really think time is not a thing in itself ?
I'm a transcendental idealist, but I don't subscribe to Kantian idealism. His "thing in itself" is a contradiction in terms.
>that things are not moving in reality but only in mere appearance for us ?
Time has a special status in that it is phenomenologically irreducible, even pure consciousness "happens" in a form of temporality.
The problem is with "appearances". You think that because idealists acknowledge the problem of phenomenological closure (that is to say, that everything empirical we gather is done within a consciousness) they are stuck with saying that objects differs ontologically from the thing, as signs of them if you will. They aren't. An option is to simply accept that consciousness intuitively perceives "things" immediately as objects, conceptually fulfilled.

>>19880584
>ofcourse time is given in sensation... things are moving in sensation...
Time (and space) are the canvas on which all other perceptions and aperceptions are drawn. There is no "feeling" of time (apart from the variations of mood such as being bored or excitement), only the natural correlate to the flux of consciousness and the prehensive and apprehensive extension of the intentional acts which creates a "moment" (the "present" of a cultural fact and the "present" of an emotion are of different sizes, for example).

>>19880584
Time cannot have a beginning that is located in time, because if time began X number of years ago, then there is a "time" before the beginning of time, X+1 number of years ago.

Time cannot be infinite and without beginning because if it were, an infinite amount of time would have already had to pass to arrive at the current moment, but this is impossible, as an infinite amount of time cannot pass.

Therefore, Time cannot have a beginning or not have a beginning. Therefore, Time cannot be real.

>>19880602
The thing-in-itself is not a contradiction in terms, it is just the object considered in abstraction from the conditions of its objectivation. It is an empty concept, yes, but a necessary regulative one meant to it keeps in perspective the receptivity of our mind and the ontic uncreatedness of appearances (just because we objectivate them does not mean we create them, this is to confuse essence and existence).

>>19880737
The emphasis was on "his", I don't disagree with anything you say, but that is not Kant's.

>>19880584
You sense sensation changing, but you do not sense time. Change happens in time, it is not time itself.

>>19880747
I think it is, if you read carefully. He specifically notes that the thing-in-itself is merely an ens rationalis, an empty concept, the object thought in abstraction from its conditions of objectivation. Kant is not a two-worlder.

>>19880757
>Kant is not a two-worlder.
That is seemingly what he wanted to avoid being, but not what he avoided ending up being. The "thing-in-itself" is *only* the necessary object of further categorial qualifications, having it correspond to the vanishing point of the undifferentiated manifold necessarily relegates the theory to a metaphysical one, regardless of the author's efforts to the contrary.
> And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.
> Prolegomena, § 32

>>19880726
>then there is a "time" before the beginning of time, X+1 number of years ago.
No there wouldn't be, by your own admission. You just said time started X years ago.
>an infinite amount of time cannot pass
Why?

>>19880749
On the contrary, without change there would be no flow of time, but this flow of time is necessary for measuring time.

>>19879612
Why?

>>19880229
The person who you are responding to said all knowledge comes from experience, not after experience. How would you disprove him?

>>19880323
How are primite reflexes a type of knowledge?

>>19880365
>but you can not really know it without it being synthetic a priori...
Why?
>>19880602
>His "thing in itself" is a contradiction in terms.
What is the contradiction?

>>19881626
Because the definition of infinity is that it can never be reached by the addition of finite magnitudes.

>>19881671
Show how 2+2=4 requires justification from experience.

>>19881639
It makes no sense to say that time starts at a moment in time is what I'm saying, you're already presupposing a time series in which the moment that it starts is situated. You can ask unintelligible questions like "why didn't time start five minutes earlier than it did?".

>>19880323
Reflexes clearly aren't knowledge, knowledge is knowing-that.

>>19879214
t. Hume

>>19881712
> "The transcendent is that which transcends our consciousness. It is the plenum which, being other than consciousness, never gives itself up to consciousness; an inexhaustible otherness and fullness which consciousness apprehends now this way, now that; is what always manages to escape consciousness, to overflow it, to be too much for it at any one time. Transcendencies are mundane, empirical realities which give themselves to subjectivity in a complex of presence and absence, of partly filled and partly empty intentions. Meanwhile, the transcendental does not belong to the world at all. It is not mundane [...] or empirical, but instead ‘transcends’ the world; does not transcend the world in a manner of metaphysics, in the sense of belonging to a second, totally other, nonempirical world; is “prior” to the
world, providing the ultimate subjectivity before which the world rises up as a phenomenon; it is in the face of which all objectivity takes shape; is not anything in the world, not anything above the world, but the
condition of possibility prior to the world which lets the world be; the center around which the world groups itself, the subject for which the world is object."
The contradiction is that objects are transcendent or transcendental in many different ways, and the (material) transcendencies of "sense-objects" has nothing to do with the objective categorial "thing", except as a necessary "logical" presupposition.

>>19879214
Lol so you learned all possible things and therefor you know from experience you needed to experience them?

>>19881752
Yes, summing finite magnitudes produces a finite magnitude. But that assumes we are summing finite magnitudes and not an infinite magnitude with a finite magnitude. You are assuming a beginning in your very argument, since that's what your summing two finite magnitudes together idea would require.

>>19881671
Knowledge of causality provides an example of knowledge that does not come from experience.
You see a red billiard ball hitting a black billiard ball, then the black ball starts moving. You don't experience a causal relationship between the balls, yet you know that the red ball caused the black ball to move. The causal connection is made in the mind, and it could not have come from the experience, because your experience consists only in seeing two objects change places over time.

>>19881757
Let us say i couldn't. How would that prove your point? Just because I can't perform some proof doesn't show the proof cannot exist.

>>19881775
>It makes no sense to say that time starts at a moment in time is what I'm saying, you're already presupposing a time series in which the moment that it starts is situated.
No you aren't, since it is the first such moment.

>>19882054
>The contradiction is that objects are transcendent or transcendental in many different ways, and the (material) transcendencies of "sense-objects" has nothing to do with the objective categorial "thing", except as a necessary "logical" presupposition.
I'm afraid i don't know what you're trying to say here, and the quotation marks around logical and thing are certainly not helping

>>19882168
it is from Husserl, so I guess you should start by playing Pharaoh (1999)

>>19878416
You can teach a blind girl everything there is no know about vision. She can be as educated as a professor about the physics and physiology of vision and electro-magnetic waves. But she will never see, and she will never truly know what it means or what its like to see.

>>19882080
You could analyze an experience and gain knowledge of equivalent experiences. This goes for experiences of knowledge as well. This allows for general knowledge through empirical means. From this point, you could argue that such knowledge is a priori, but showing it as such would require a readjustment of what a prosteriori knowledge is to maintain their "contrariness" (hopefully you know what i mean by this, i cant think of a better word to describe what im thinking).

>>19882131
>You see a red billiard ball hitting a black billiard ball, then the black ball starts moving. You don't experience a causal relationship between the balls, yet you know that the red ball caused the black ball to move.
No i dont know that. I just believe that. How do i know i wasn't watching a tv screen just then, and was drugged? How do i know i wasn't part of a simulation just then, being programmed? My belief of the causal connection was "made" in the mind (and even this is a maybe), not the causal connection itself.

>>19882207
Educated in that she can repeat the dogma. She will never have a first person experience of vision. It will all just be word patterns to her.

get off the crack before posting about philosophy on the internets

>>19878416
Concepts which arent modelled by experience are just meaningless words with no reference and thus are not knowledge. Formal, mathematical/logical systems have to be modelled by reality in order to be more than word games and actually constitute knowledge.

>>19882251
Are you following the thread here? The question was about whether all knowledge comes from experience or after experience. Neither of the positions afford skepticism about the authority of experience. There is a Descartes thread on the catalog right now, maybe you should go there.

>>19882313
For those who didn't understand the underlying meaning of what i just said, a priori knowledge doesn't exist.

Let's apply my general proof to common replies, such as 1+1=2 being a priori knowledge. Insofar as 1+1=2 is at all about experience, we have to show it is about experience by demonstrating a model of it in experience. But demonstrating such an experiential model is an empirical affair, and there is always the possibility that reality can somehow reconfigure itself so that there can't be such a modelling. This is the model-theoretic formulation of the problem of induction, fyi.

>>19882330
Knowledge implies truth. I demonstrated in my last post that you don't know if our intuitions on what caused what is true.

>>19882168
By refusing to extend categorical intuition to the level of perception, Kant creates a cleavage in the extension of objecthood, which has for effect to force him to deny it to logical objects. This put him in the paradoxical position to both qualify the thing-in-itself as purely unknowable, but also be the object of knowledge (albeit a negative one).

>>19882313
>Concepts which arent modelled by experience are just meaningless words with no reference and thus are not knowledge
right, as "thoughts without content are empty"
>Formal, mathematical/logical systems have to be modelled by reality in order to be more than word games and actually constitute knowledge.
nay, you've got in in the reverse, as "intuitions without concepts are blind"
Experience itself does not give us models, that is why we make our own models. Then we test our models against reality in order to check their validity. Those who pass, we employ them in order to make sense of our experience.

>>19882344
>This is the model-theoretic formulation of the problem of induction
But you could make a model of all models and a priori all (sufficiently advanced) consciousnesses should be able to grasp the validity of this metamodel.
Cunt.

>>19879214
A posterior is talking!

>>19879508
Do you really think the first critique is all about a priori knowledge?

>>19882344
>Insofar as 1+1=2 is at all about experience, we have to show it is about experience by demonstrating a model of it in experience.
> He thinks tomorrow 1+1 could stop = 2.
This is why we need mereology classes from the first grade onward.

>>19882212
I understand what you're getting at but the Greeks had a whole thing about this.
There are no black Swans is the common example, in Europe it was experientially true for years. But it wasn't true.
The best you could say is all the knowledge I personally have is a posteriori.
Hard to show how this general category can also include things like math

>>19882490
It's not lack of actual reasoning ability.
This is the autism forced materialism drive.
Wittgenstein, Chomsky etc all do this too

>>19882476
Not "all about", but a huge portion of it (at least half) is a direct attempt to "solve the problem" of the possibility a priori knowledge. Hence Kant's conclusion of the first half that causality is the only synthetic a priori truth available to us.

>>19882490
The point is the mereology of the universe could completely change.

>>19882370
>I demonstrated in my last post that you don't know if our intuitions on what caused what is true.
1) You did not do that, you have just provided some imaginary situations where all sensorial/experiential knowledge would be null

2) The movement of the balls accord with universal laws of motion, therefore my assessment of the causal connection is true

>>19880229
logic/tautology/rationality isnt necessitated on reality and therefore in order to reach logical conclusions, you have to experience and make sure that you are in fact in a logical world first
>>19881757
above

>>19882521
>is the only synthetic a priori truth available to us.
That is not based in the form of pure intuition*

>>19882416
>Experience itself does not give us models, that is why we make our own models.
I dont think you understand what i mean by "modelling". Modelling is when we can map a language to reality and define all the symbols. Showing such a mapping exists is an empirical affair.

>>19882522
>The point is the mereology of the universe could completely change.
No it could not.

>>19882436
This is not a refutation, this just shows the limitations of my knowledge. Indeed, reality could change so I could be wrong, and my language which i have conveniently mapped to reality no longer coheres with it. You are exactly right.

>>19882529
No, all sensorial experience would not be wrong, not by a long shot. For instance, the balls would still have a shape and colour that is correctly describable.

Universal, scientific laws of motion are also based on induction, which is a faulty methodology.

>>19882535 isn't by me but it is funnily enough an application of this general proof here >>19882344 to the specific case of logical principles.

>>19882562
Why?

>>19882561
>Modelling is when we can map a language to reality and define all the symbols
wat

>>19882629
It's model theory, a mathematical theory talking about how formal languages are interpreted.

>>19882575
No, its a limit inherent with materialist/empiricist theories that replaces objects, things and ideas with appearances, signs and models, and believe that this somewhat solves the problem of abstraction. You cannot accept that knowledge is the coincidence of the empirical and the formal in a higher act of consciousness. Whatever transformation the universe will incur in the future will never affect the validity of mathematical truths, because these truths have been obtained through the emptying of (most if not) all empirical content from its object.

>>19882653
>Whatever transformation the universe will incur in the future will never affect the validity of mathematical truths, because these truths have been obtained through the emptying of (most if not) all empirical content from its object.
Commitments to platonic objects are no longer needed after mathematical formalism, and there are many problems with positing platonic objects.

>>19882535
>logic/tautology/rationality isnt necessitated on reality
Surely not for things in themselves, but it is the way by which my understanding operates.

>in order to reach logical conclusions, you have to experience and make sure that you are in fact in a logical world first
My experience will always be structured in a logical way because of what i just wrote.

>>19882713
>but it is the way by which my understanding operates
But you dont know if it necessarily operates this way.

>>19882608
>Why?
Mereology is the science that describe the eidetic relation of whole and parts.
Say tomorrow the Universe changes, as you say. Put yourself into the shoes of an outside observer that remains, Let's examine a few scenarios.
> 1) Empty.
> "There is nothing to qualify as parts of a whole".
Mereology is still valid.
> 2) Chaotic mess
> "The parts of this whole are indistinguishable to me through experience."
Mereology is still valid.
> 3) Monad
> "This whole has no parts."
Mereology is still valid.
And if mereology is still valid, the mathematical extension of objecthood is still valid, and therefore quantities are still possible objects.

>>19882745
You are assuming those cases are exhaustive.

>>19882756
Go ahead, offer any other.

>>19880229
many will fall for this bait. good job.

>>19882743
well, according to Herr Kant I don't even know if necessity has any meaning beyond the form of my experience

>>19882771
My inability to offer any other doesn't prove there isn't any other. In order to even show exhaustivity would require logical possibility and thus an implicit assumption in thinking binary logic is necessary, in which case i could just say "but what if the world changes so formal binary logic is not modelled?"

>>19882790
But what if your understanding changed in such a way that it did have such a meaning?

>>19882695
>mathematical formalism
> If I arbitrarily decide, against all intuition to the contrary, that mathematics no longer have anything to do with reality, then it becomes reasonable to thing that reality could rewrite itself and somehow change mathematics.

>>19882810
But what if my penis changed in such a way that it was bigger then itself?
I guess that would be self-contradictory.

>>19882858
Right now, what youre saying has no clear cut empirical model, so it is nonsensical. But nothing is stopping the world from potentially changing to make this proposition modellable.

>>19882811
Mathematics has to do with reality, when reality models a mathematical formal system. You have to admit it does conveniently answer a bunch of questions.

Here is a problem with mathematical formalism, since i have been mostly playing devils advocate for a bit of a soulless position (not that modal realism is much more soulful). What, exactly, is the difference of believing following a set of grammatical rules consistently produces the same formal system, and believing following a set of assumptions consistently produces the same theory? .

>>19882923
>What, exactly, is the difference of believing following a set of grammatical rules consistently produces the same formal system, and believing following a set of assumptions consistently produces the same theory? .
One could hope that this grammar is consistent with transcendental logic and eventually verify its content eidetically. The difference is in possibility to found one's such belief to provide access to further knowledge.

>>19878416
Gay and wrong. These terms concern the justification, not the origin of knowledge.

>>19879207
lmao and yet you couldn't remember to add the word easy. fucking imbecile.

>>19878416
The pic you posted is some stupid shit, the expressions dont inherently represent/advocate for some epistemological position they are just part the vocabulary of epistemelogy

Just weird everyone in this thread is like 'I'm with this one'

>>19880726
that shit is laughable... that should be the reason time is not a thing in itself ? The reason time is not real ?