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They are things in itself because our whole perception of the world (ie. phenomena) can not exist without the existence of time and space. An object must exist through space the same way as an event must occur through time, thus those are the two necessary conditions for anything to be perceived at all by us, the subject.
Time and space therefore transcend the mind’s categories as they are what the categories are based off of: you cannot perceive something unless it exists; for that something to exist and be perceived there must exist time and space.

>>19860621
Bro just read the transcendental aesthetic or secondary lit on transcendental aesthetic.

>>19861196
I did several times... you think I am assuming something wrong... tell me what it is !

>>19860960
Kant says it several times during the critique, that space and time are NOT things in itself but rather a priori and just our way of perceiving things... it is the reason why he divides everything in phenomena and noumena... it is the basis for him to get synthetic judgements a priori...

>>19861269
Ask yourself this: if you can obtain no universal and necessary knowledge from experience, and Geometry applies universally and necessarilly to all objects of experience, how is this possible if geometrical propositions were derived from experience?

>>19862036
geometry fails as a universal and necessary science... simple

>>19860621
Time is constructed and space is made of intuitions. It means that objects would look like particles without a brain or being.

>>19862124
Except it is a universal and necessary science. Are you really going to deny that in every space the shortest distance between two points is a straight line?

>>19860621
Is space a literal thing, or is it just a container in which things are placed? Newton held this view, while Leibniz said that space was the relative place of objects, and would be nonexistent without any objects to measure it.

Kant, closely following this problem, essentially said that space (and time) is a necessary prerequisite for the possibility of cognition of objects, and thus exist in the mind, by necessity, as an a priori form of perception. He solved the problem between Newton and Leibniz by showing that space is real, in that all perceived objects are spatial, and ideal, in the sense that we have no idea whether or not objects have spatial properties independent of our perception.

This is a very basic and broad overview of one aspect of transcendental idealism, and does not at all fully represent it, but it sort of shows what it is all about.

>>19861269
Dud envíale a Ale

>>19862264
Wtf even this means

>>19862178
in a curved space the line is curved not straight

>>19862342
Begone noneuclidean

>>19860960
They absolutely aren't things or even a sum of relations between things, they're forms of sensibility
>>19862342
You can even apply that by refining and just adding "in an euclidian space"

However Kants argument is that Geometry as a universal and necessary science fails if space is a thing in itself because then it wouldn't be a priori true... he implies that a space as a thing in itself could have properties different from what we know or there could occur other spaces in experience that differ from the current one... so his argument is basically only that geometry would be no universal and necessary science... so I say geometry fails but space remains a thing in itself... this is much more comfortable than to say space is mere appearance but geometry remains universal and necessary... so even if euclideans geometry would be the only possible... Kant would have had to say that the sentence : "the shortest distance between two points is a straight line" wouldn't be universal and necessary true if space is a thing in itself

>>19862178
Kant himself would have had to say that in fact you have to deny this sentence if space is a thing in itself... now as It is obviously true that space is in fact a thing in itself and not mere appearance... you have to deny that sentence or come up with a solution that makes it universal and necessary while space remains also a thing in itself

>isn't this idea written about 200 years ago really obvious?

>>19860621
Disregard Kant, read Husserl.
> "Husserl conceives the constitution of space as the monosubjective intentional transformation of manifold of so-called sensuous fields that we make during our corporal-moving activity (objective space is the correlate of the monosubjective transformation). On the other side he conceives it as intersubjective, intentional transformation of structures of subjective perceived spaces that we make (together with so-called ‘transcendental empathy’) within our community of transcendental subjects that communicate each other (hence, the objective space is the correlate of the intersubjective transformation)...

> The ‘physical space’, in Husserl’s opinion, is only an intersubjective construct. Summarizing we can say that Husserlian conception is realistic (at least at the starting point) and moderate deterministic (to the moment of writing Ideas I and II, wherein Husserl starts reformulating his theory of space into the transcendental idealism)."

>>19863153
>now as It is obviously true that space is in fact a thing in itself and not mere appearance
You keep doing this bro. That's why you don't get anywhere with Kant. You just assume that which is to be proved. That fact no one had been able to prove the reality of an external world was one of the reasons that led to the critique. It's NOT obvious space/time are things in themselves. Are you trolling?

>>19863590
How is that not just regressing back to Leibniz?

>>19864050
Just admit you got filtered.

>>19860621
Kant: "Man is blind, because he has eyes."

>>19864050
Because Husserl doesn't deny the "physical reality" of space, (see Philosophy as Rigorous Science) however it isn't his job to define it (he does think there is a difference between between geometric space and perceptual space), given the limitations he puts on himself. His job his to describe its constitution within eidetic or transcendantal consciousness.
The term "intersubjective construct" is rather misleading, as "construction" is an empirical term according to Husserl. There is no "historical" process of construction à la Sapir Whorf, but rather an essential feature of perception which is to always lead toward a greater whole.

>>19860621
Read Nagarjuna instead

>>19864585
Why?

>>19860621
i think he's just saying that the ability to perceive objects and being distinct and the sequentiality of events is something innate to us. space and time as concepts may be outside of perception, but the ability to distinguish objects from one another, or to events are sequenced and not simultaneous are a priori. I forget if he lumps in space and time with his other a priori concepts of understanding (eg. causality) but that's how I understand it. So, he's not really insane to assume this, because a mind that is not born with the ability to distinguish individual objects (eg. that your computer is not your wall) or sequentiality (concepts of before, after, now), there'd be no making sense of the world and you'd be fucked.

>>19863689
I in fact think that Kant is trolling us a little bit