/lit/ - Literature

Gnosticism

>>19847877
>>19847907
Interesting as jñana and gnos are derived from the same root. Also the word know-ledge does too.

white male buddhism

>>19847877
phenomenology

>>19847912
Finally, some culture! I never knew this. PIE root is *gno

Kys nigger

>>19847877
shankara was already debunked by Guenon

>>19848040
Like this? Is this western jnana yoga?

>>19848598
yes, also husserl and heidegger

>>19848607
At the end do I realize my real self is identical with God after reading them?

>>19847877
The closest the west came to Advaita is probably Berkeley or Schopenhauer, but that's not much since both differ radically from the metaphisical doctrines of Vedanta.

>>19848656
Um, what is German Idealism?

>>19848666
>trips
But nah, German Idealists, outside of Schelling perhaps, went in completely different directions. Fichte subjective idealism take the shape of a social phenomenon of subjects and Hegel's Spirit is a continuous process, rather than an absolute being.

>>19848683
>rolls in grave

>>19848683
>face palms from spirit world

>>19848691
>defender of Fichte has no arguments
History repeats itself

>>19848703
Bc arguments are useless without a common ground between the parties. The key idea of german idealism is that you must first acheive a higher standpoint to even begin the conversation. Kant set the bar with "concepts without content are empty". First you need to develop intellectual intuition for their concepts to mean anything, then you can argue.

>>19848716
>Misunderstanding Kant, German Idealism and the quackery that it "intellectual intuition" so hard
Yeah, no wonder you defend Fichte. Try getting a grasp on Kant first and then you'll realise that "empty concepts without content" is all that Fichte and Hegel ever spewed.

>>19848725
>filtered by Kant, Fichte and Hegel

>>19848739
>filtered by Kant, Fichte and Hegel
You know yourself well

>>19848752
No u
/thread

>>19848763
>threads her own post
Ngmi

>>19847877
The closest western equivalent would seem to be the apophatic theology of figures like Clement of Alexandria, Nicholaus of Cusa, Eirugena, Pseudo-Dionysus, Meister Eckhart etc & the related contemplative/meditative practices that accompany this kind of apophatic theology, including in works like the ‘Cloud of Unknowing’

Some Spanish author has an English translation of his book online “History of Non-Dual Meditation Methods” that starts out with an overview of Advaita, Platonism and Hermeticism and then moves on to a discussion of some of the above theologians and the contemplative paths detailed in their works. Some of the people and passages cited in the book seem to be implicitly speaking about a similar kind of realization to Advaita.

https://www2.uned.es/dpto-hdi/History%20of%20Non-dual%20Meditation%20Methods.pdf

>>19848598
Hegelianism similarly talks about becoming the Absolute or the Absolute coming to know itself but the similarities mostly end there. As others in the thread have already noted in Hegel there is a real development or evolution of the Absolute whereas in Advaita, Brahman is already forever perfect in itself, complete, beyond change, and realizing It is a matter of discerning what’s already present in each moment, although It normally escapes our notice. There is also a strong element of a rationalistic system-building in Hegel, as far as I’m aware fully understanding the system itself on a theoretical level is supposed to guide you to absolute knowing or whatever, whereas in Vedanta understanding the system itself on a purely theoretical level is not sufficient but the system is used as a support for a realization and inner discovery within oneself, under a special context that involves the instruction of a proper teacher, after one has prepared and qualified oneself as ready for it by undertaking certain vows and disciplines.

>>19849105
Best reply. Thanks.

Marshall McLuhan.

>>19849105
Great post.
>Some Spanish author has an English translation of his book online
How did you come across this book? The content looks interesting, but I'm wary of unfamiliar authors.

>>19848598
phenomenology is a technique, not a book

>>19848651
yes, the whole point is that the absolute spirit, history and the subject are the same thing

>>19848666
buddhism is more similar to german idealism than vedanta
pratikiasamutpada already propouse the mind and his activity of conceptualisation as the main fundament of existence, and the dinamic of the five skandas are is the same one as the gestalts of the phenomenology
and the dhamma and geist have the same function

>>19848666
>>19848683
>>19849105

this, hegel already debunked vedanta on the preface of the phenomenology
to him a doctrine that can't incorporate becoming into his system and ends up relying on a unchanging metaphysical being is already trapped in conceptual dogmatism

>>19851431
>this, hegel already debunked vedanta on the preface of the phenomenology
Hegel never read Shankara, it wasn't translated then and at most he read some 3rd-rate vague summary of Indian thought produced by an orientalist. Hegel was in all actuality BTFO by the Advaitin Krishnaswamy Iyer (pbuh) in his book 'Vedanta, or the Science of Reality' , wherein he also takes apart and exposes Hegel's critique of Hinduism as an inaccurate strawman. The Hegel chapter was posted in this thread before.

>>/lit/thread/S13208492

>From the One issues the many or the many ones. For the self-relation of the one is relation. By a negative relation is meant a relation to another, e.e., a relation of the being which negates its other. For the self-relatedness of the one exists only by virtue of that it has its other in it. Being has only become Being for Self by absorbing its other. Its self-relation is therefore relation to another. That other is internal to it, yet because it is another it is also external to it. For to be another means to be external, or in other words, that the one is self-related means that the one is related to the one. This involves a distinction between the one which is related and the one to which it is related. The one distinguishes itself from itself. Thus the one suffers diremption into a multiplicity of one, the many.” (Art: 208, Philosophy of Hegel).

>The first thing to draw our attention is the expression self-relation. Now, if Hegel began with a real one and deduced the many from it, he must have scrupulously avoided every implication of a second. But a relation implies two terms, and to speak of self-relation is already to have conceived the one to be split up, and the many is seen to be flourishing before it is born with such travails ! Indeed, the scheme of his deduction, thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, starts with an assumption of multiplicity and relation, and the derivation of the Universe from Being, is not the derivation of the man from the one, but of the many from the many, assumed for convenience to be one to start with. Thus his deductions are shorn of all interest beyond their ingenuity

>>19851512

>Stace represents Hegel as criticizing Hinduism in these terms ;“In Hinduism the conception of substance is more explicitly developed There is only substance ... It is formless. God is the formless One, Brahman—abstract unity. As against this One all other existence is unreal, merely accidental. Nothing has any right of independent existence in itself. It arises out of the One and again vanishes in the One. Though the One may frequently be spoken of in terms which seem to imply personality, yet it is not spirit that is the real content, but only substance. Such phrases merely imply superlicial personification. The One is essentially neuter.”

>Well, I am irresistibly reminded of the proverb, “ those who live in glass houses should not throw stones." Hegel, who audaciously erects mere universality into a God, which is not a Person, but only a personality, and manufactures concreteness by imagining one universality to contain infinite others, who has never shown how an individual thing can arise by piling up any amount of universals, reproaches Hinduism alleging that its God is substance, and not spirit, that its unity is empty, that the One is essentially neuter and that no other thing has any right of independent existence. In the first place, we are not told how Hegel was able to form these views. Is it the Vedas, the Upanishads, or the Puranas, the Epics, or the Smritis that led to his conclusions? Has he been able to separate the rational—Vedantic—element from the poetic, the traditional and the ritual elements ? A whole life devoted to the study of the immense mass of Hindu Scriptures with their disciplines, will not suffice to accomplish the task. Yet critics with glib tongues will be blatant over the defects and the inconsistencies of the Hindu religion and philosophy.

>Many of these detractors cannot claim to possess even a passable acquaintance with Sanskrit. Do they study their Plato and Aristotle in the same fashion, I ask ? But to answer his charges. The Hindu God is not Substance but Spirit, not mere spirituality, but a personal Being. Siva is the cosmic consciousness, the central all-pervading Light at which every other torch of individual consciousness has been lighted. Vishnu is the inmost essence of man, of all Existence, the being immanent in all hearts, while Brahman in the neuter gender is the witness of the three states, neither male nor female, but the Principle of Unity that holds the world together. But what is more than all, what the greatest thinkers fail to recognize is that the Hindu God is never an external entity, can never be regarded as object, except to help the human understanding, except to offer worship. The very aim of Vedanta in declaring Brahman to be void of attributes is to caution the enquirer against conceiving it as substance.

>>19851518

>As to “ nothing else having an independent existence in itself ”, this is ungracious, mischievous. Hegel’s own system is equally guilty of the doctrine. To him also, things have no reality, no independence, as they depend on the Universals which alone are real, but do not exist. That they all arise out of the One and vanish into the One, is not speculative fantasy. It is our undeniable experience through the three states. But it was not given to Hegel to descry the only source of real knowledge. Brahman as the Great Being is neither an abstract nor a concrete One. The terms cannot apply to it. For it is beyond the reach of intellectual distinctions.

>Hegel’s ignorance of Vedantic method is responsible for the next statement. “It (the One) does not genuinely produce them out of itself, and then again restore its own unity by taking them back into itself. . , . Although it is asserted that they have proceeded out of the One, and are therefore dependent beings, yet since the One is abstract and has not itself produced them, they are for that reason in reality independent beings ... a chaos of disconnected forms. . . . Because it does not retain them within its grasp, they are therefore outside it, independent of it, and riot in this independence.”

>The fault of Hinduism was, according to Hegel’s first statement, that it allowed nothing the right of independent existence in itself, and now he has so soon forgotten himself and veers round saying that since the One does not genuinely produce things out of itself, they are independent beings—a chaos of disconnected forms, rioting in their independence. Can unfairness go farther? How is Hinduism to save itself? Things proceed from the One and depend on it. No, says, Hegel, your One is abstract and cannot produce. Things must be independent of the One—but they are unreal, accidental. In that case, you will not allow them right of independent existence. Hence, to concede or deny independent existence to things is equally culpable, and Hinduism in any case must go to the wall.

>>19851512
What do you think of Guenons metaphysics

>>19851565
>What do you think of Guenons metaphysics
I like them, I agree with Advaita and think Guenon does a fine job of presenting it. Some of the only things that I think could be improved are that Guenon sometimes seems to cause confusion in people by using certain terms that also have a specific context in scholasticism or Aristotle and it can appear that he is using it in these contexts, despite Guenon using the word more as a sort of approximation to what is being talked about in Advaita and not always in the specific western sense.

I also think Guenon often implies that many different traditions and even multiple sects/subschools of them lead to the equivalent of moksha, but when you closely study Advaita and then compare it to the texts/practices of those schools, it seems that this isn't actually the norm and in many cases some other traditions or the majority of that tradition's esoteric practices (aside from certain notable exceptions) may be leading to the highest state possible that is just short of moksha, which according to Advaita then lets you reach moksha quickly and easily in the state that happens immediately after such a person's physical body dies, i.e. ascending to the Brahmaloka and then reaching moksha there. I don't know whether Guenon agreed with me in his reading and downplayed that because he wanted to emphasize unity or because he disagreed with me in his reading. He does talk about the edenic state and so on as a lesser step but he seems to imply a lot of different kinds of approaches lead to moksha while still embodied on earth.

Hesychasm

>>19851697
Are "the One" and Guenon's "infinite" the same concept then?

>>19851538
>Hegel, your One is abstract and cannot produce.
he's right tho, an unchanging thing can "produce" things since that would be pretty much change(becoming) and thus a contradiction in terms
a world outside of causation can't create or be responsible of anything, since it would need to be the part of causation
this guy did absolutely nothing to refute hegel, his main point is that hegel didn't read the whole hindu canon, which isn't necessary once you're familiar with his metaphysics

>>19851538
>the Universals which alone are real
lol this is false, the universals aren't real, the unversals are part of a process, they change and have multiple forms, conditione dunversal, unconditioned unversal, sense certainty also exist and is by deffiniiton the opposite of anuniversal
it's funny because this guy accused hegel of criticising vedanta withour reading it, while he clearly has a super shallow understanding of hegel's doctrine

>>19851730
>lol this is false, the universals aren't real,
>sense certainty also exist and is by deffiniiton the opposite of anuniversal
It seems you don't know your Hegel despite posing as otherwise, I'm not surprised when you can barely spell words correctly. Universals for Hegel ARE real, and individuals have their being as members of their universal. Hegel uses universal in a lower and higher sense, in the former lower sense denoting the common notion of the thought that is abstracted from the particular, and then in the higher latter sense as denoting the universal that is immanent in the object and forming the very being of it. In this latter type of universal empirical sense matters would have their very being constituted by the higher universals immanent in them.

>This theory of the Organic Universal as the Totalität containing and determining all the interrelated and true Individuals, which latter have genuine being only as members of the organized body of their Universal, has been shown in the text to be a necessary result of the Hegelian metaphysics of Self-consciousness.

>The real world is the world of the Absolute Self. His truth is organic, is allumfassend, is a Totalität, and is, in logical formulation, the universal Idee. Now the Idee is not an "abstract universal," nor a general idea that is merely exemplified by the individual objects of the world. On the contrary, they are in it; for in it they live and move and have their being; and it, on the other hand, is in them only in so far forth as they are first in it. No finite individual, in its isolation, embodies the Idee, or corresponds to this true Universal. Only the organic totality of the finite embodies the Universal. And in this sense the Genus is real. Hegel's theory, expressed in his own words, is: -

>"Alles Wirkliche, in sofern es ein Wahres ist, ist die Idee, und hat seine Wahrheit allein durch und kraft der Idee. Das einzelne Seyn ist irgend eine Seite der Idee; für dieses bedarf es daher noch anderer Wirklichkeiten, die gleichfalls als besonders für sich bestehende erscheinen; in ihnen zusammen und in ihrer Beziehung ist allein der Begriff realisirt. Das Einzelne für sich entspricht seinem Begriffe nicht; diese Beschränktheit seines Daseyns macht seine Endlichkeit und seinen Untergang aus."1

>To the illustration of this theory it is worth while, however, to devote some further space. With his customary manysidedness of treatment, Hegel, of course, endeavors to show how previous theories of the universal have a relative and historical justification as stages on the way to the true insight, and as embodiments of lower and partly untrue forms of the universal forms, which are presented to us in the phenomenal appearances of the finite world.

>>19851730

>Aristotle himself, to be sure, in his metaphysical theory, really transcended the limitations of his logical theory, and implied the existence of a deeper and truer sort of universality in the nature of things. But he did this haltingly. His metaphysical instinct is truer than his logic. He uses the higher universal, but has a logical theory only of the lower. And as for this lower, it appears to the understanding as objectively existent only in each individual, as constituting the essence or wesentliche Bestimmtheit thereof. Subjectively it is represented by the Gedanke, which is the thought of some abstractly defined class-essence. And such class-essences appear to the understanding to have no Existenz as such, apart from the individuals in which they are exemplified. This is why we are accustomed to say, from the point of view of ordinary thought, that general ideas do not represent concrete realities, and that only the individual is real.

>Principal Caird, in his "Philosophy of Religion," after describing the foregoing lower sort of universality, and pointing out its inadequacy to the expression of the truth of the real world, proceeds, in a confessedly Hegelian spirit, to set forth the nature of the Vernunft-Allgemeinheit, and its application to the comprehension of the relations of God and the world, as follows: -

>"But thought is capable of another and deeper movement. It can rise to a universality which is not foreign to, but the very inward nature of things in themselves, not the universal of an abstraction from the particular and different, but the unity which is immanent in them and finds in them its own necessary expression; not an arbitrary invention of the observing and classifying mind, . . . but an idea which expresses the inner dialectic, the movement or process towards unity, which exists in and constitutes the being of the objects themselves. This deeper and truer universality is that which may be designated ideal or organic universality.

http://dbanach.com/archive/mickelsen/royce@20-@20hegel@20apend@20c.html

>>19851717
>Are "the One" and Guenon's "infinite" the same concept then?
If by "the One" you mean Brahman, in comparison to Guenon's "metaphysical infinite" then yes I think so. Guenon writes in one of his books that the finite doesn't really exist as a 'part' of the infinite, the infinite isn't constituted by parts, and he says that the finite is really only an illusionary appearance that is contingent upon the metaphysical infinite, neither identical with it nor truly existing in its own right; the fact of the infinite providing for the appearance of the finite as such. This relation between Guenon's infinite and the finite is very similar to what Advaita says about Brahman vs maya.

>>19851720
>he's right tho, an unchanging thing can(t) "produce" things since that would be pretty much change(becoming) and thus a contradiction in terms
Obviously we are not talking about the material production of one object from another kiddo! Brahman is the aspatial, atemporal, acausal principle ensuring the possibility of space, time and causation, Brahman doesn't do so in a spatial, temporal or causal way, to try to derive some contrived contradiction in asking how Brahman can produce space in a spatial and temporal manner from within causality is to totally miss the point and to not understand the difference between something ensuring the possibility of something and that very thing ensured. Brahman doesn't have to produce time, space and causation, It simply has to be what has the nature to provide for the false appearance of time, space and causation as such, when time, space and causation aren't ultimately real then there is no logical requirement that what ensures their appearance as such does so within the limits of terms which are themselves negated in the final analysis, to say otherwise is foolish, it's seeking to make absolute and infallible the way that the human mind structures and arranges the universe around it, which is an act of faith without much justification.
>this guy did absolutely nothing to refute hegel
He shows how a lot of Hegel is goofy and that Hegel takes fallacious steps, such as claiming to derive the many from the one but in a way that subtly presumes the many already

>>19851933
>Hegel ARE real
i never said the aren't real, i said they're not the only real
>It seems you don't know your Hegel
i think you're the one who doesn't know hegel al to well, how do you explain the existence of sense certainty if only the unversals are real?

>>19852127
>It simply has to be what has the nature to provide for the false appearance of time, space and causation as such
that's just a very contrived way to say he's the "cause" for space and time

>>19852127
>such as claiming to derive the many from the one but in a way that subtly presumes the many already
hegel never said you derive the many form hte one, in fact he poitns out this contraditcion, how you can both presume the many form the one and the one from the many, it' sall in the second chapter of the phenomenology
he said the one and the many are both derived from the articulation of concepts(force and understanding)
this guy just doesn't know hegel at all

>>19851933
>>This theory of the Organic Universal as the Totalität containing and determining all the interrelated and true Individuals
this is actually just platonism, a system hegel debunked with his notion of an "inverted (ideas) world"
hegel is in fact proposing the complete opposite system, flux and becoming is what makes the universals happen, again see force and understanding and the first chapter of self conciouness
when the conciousness goes beyond the veil of the archetypical wolrd

>>19851704
shhhh, he sleep

>>19852127
>acausal principle ensuring the possibility of space
this is a contradicitonin termsn, if he's ensuring it, then he's by deffinition the cause

>>19852138
>i never said the aren't real
That's literally what you wrote and what I quoted in my reply, you can go reread your post and see, you typed verbatim "lol this is false, the universals aren't real,". Most of the time your spelling and punctuation is way off, but you made sure to spell "aren't" correctly with the right punctuation.
> how do you explain the existence of sense certainty if only the unversals are real?
Already answered in the post you just replied to, its because according to Hegel all particulars are the universals in the higher sense expressing themselves through constituting the being of the particulars: "It can rise to a universality which is not foreign to, but the very inward nature of things in themselves, not the universal of an abstraction from the particular and different, but the unity which is immanent in them and finds in them its own necessary expression; not an arbitrary invention of the observing and classifying mind, . . . but an idea which expresses the inner dialectic, the movement or process towards unity, which exists in and constitutes the being of the objects themselves"
>>19852151
>that's just a very contrived way to say he's the "cause" for space and time
No, because "cause" is understood to have an implied meaning that is different from the regular type of empirical causation. It's closer to say that Brahman is considered as the substratum or adisthana, the substratum of an illusion doesn't participate in a causal relationship with something that doesn't actually exist. At the same time the illusion is entirely contingent on it's substratum and would vanish without it.
>>19852221
>this is a contradicitonin termsn, if he's ensuring it, then he's by deffinition the cause
That's faulty logic you're using, as we see examples of it being wrong, e.g. space ensures the possibility of movement by providing extension, without which there could not be movement, but the empty expanse of space itself doesn't participate in a causal relation with various moving things as the cause which initiates their movement.

>>19852210
>>>This theory of the Organic Universal as the Totalität containing and determining all the interrelated and true Individuals
>this is actually just platonism
Wrong, you are still confused about what Hegel meant. In Platonism the forms are above the particulars, which derive their characteristics as particulars from the forms, in contrast to this, when Hegel is talking about forms in the higher idiosyncratic sense he inverts this to mean the universal being immanent in the individual particular as its being, not as a separate thing above it.

>>19852210
>Organic Universal as the Totalität containing and determining all the interrelated and true Individuals
How's this not just nonsensical blabbery?

>>19852424
>Hegel all particulars
again taht's wrong, sense certainty isn't a particular, the object of perception is a particular
ypur whole critic of hegel jusct crumbles after this fundamental mistake

>>19852424
>but the empty expanse of space itself
you don't know if space as an empty extension could actually exist, sinc eyou can't see emprtyness devoided of things,
>because "cause" is understood to have an implied meaning that is different from the regular type of empirical causation
not really, you can make that asumption, but that just be you making a petitito principii fallacy, since you're trying to dissociate causation form his empirical meaning, there's only empirical causation
>>19852461
>>19852461
>which derive their characteristics
no
>e universal being immanent in the individual particular as its being,
this is platonis, the ideas give being to the particulars, he said it in the republic, just as the light shows the ibjects to the eyes but also give them life, the idea not only show the qualities of the ibject but it give them their being
hegel inverts that and show how what give being to an object is not an idea or universal, but the conceptual power of articulation(knowledge(desire after the inevrted world) that then creates the universals from sense certanity
you need t ostop reading americans tryin to understand hegela nd actually read the phenomenology
you clearly don't know what you're talking about

>>19852424
>e.g. space ensures the possibility of movemen
you're trying to use an empirical example while at the same time, negating the possibility of empirical phenomena being conected to rational speculation here
>No, because "cause" is understood to have an implied meaning that is different from the regular type of empirical causation
if empirical causation isn't the same as causation on itself, then you can use empirical phenomena to justify a rational speculation of the relationship between causation and non-causation
at the same time most physicist believe space is atcually formed by things, so space doesn't present empirically a ssomething that just permit things to exist, space is on itself a thing
also your example is pretty crappy, it's like saying that ferttile earth is not the cause for a tree to grow, since it just there and is just the tree the one who's contingent on the fertile earth

>>19852756
>again taht's wrong, sense certainty isn't a particular
So, if it isn't a particular or a universal, then what is it? Remember, you said here >>19851730 that sense certainty is the opposite of a universal, and now you're saying it's not a particular, it seems like you are contradicting yourself because the normal scheme is to say there are either particulars or universals, you are trying to have your cake and eat it too.
>but the empty expanse of space itself
>you don't know if space as an empty extension could actually exist, sinc eyou can't see emprtyness devoided of things,
The point remains true either way even if we speak about non-empty space that contains air, sunlight and tiny dust particles that is present all around earth, in just the same way, the fact of space being there is a prerequisite of movement taking place, but without the space that is present there being the causal factor that induces movement in moving objects.

Your argument is basically to argue that all prerequisites of something else are the cause of that, which is silly and nonsensical. It's refuted by the fact of (empty or non-empty) space ensuring the possibility of movement but without causing movement in a casual relation or interacting with movement. The farmer tending to crops has as its prerequisite that farmer's grandmother having children but that farmer's long-dead grandmother doesn't participate in a causal relation with the farm that she never saw before dying, there are instead a series of causal relations between her and other things which indirectly allows for the farm to happen on the basis of other causal relations.

>because "cause" is understood to have an implied meaning that is different from the regular type of empirical causation
>not really, you can make that asumption, but that just be you making a petitito principii fallacy, since you're trying to dissociate causation form his empirical meaning, there's only empirical causation
No I'm not, I'm saying "cause" is used in a figurative sense to refer to an acausal process, the description of Brahman as cause is negated and the description of substratum is given as well. Brahman is the necessary substratum of causality that itself doesn't participate in casual relations.

>>19852781
see >>19852899

>>19852842
>>e.g. space ensures the possibility of movemen
>you're trying to use an empirical example while at the same time, negating the possibility of empirical phenomena being conected to rational speculation here
No I'm not, there is no teaching or implication in Advaita that says maya cannot provides clues that guide us to higher reality in the from of logic, contradiction etc, that there is a supernaturally revealed scripture in the form of the Upanishads indicates that this is indeed possible. Maya not being fully real doesn't mean it cannot point us in the direction of truth.
>>No, because "cause" is understood to have an implied meaning that is different from the regular type of empirical causation
>if empirical causation isn't the same as causation on itself, then you can use empirical phenomena to justify a rational speculation of the relationship between causation and non-causation
I already have, the fact of extension is an empirical phenomena we perceive it in the form of shapes that don't all occupy a single position, things moving from one position to another position in that extension or distance requires that extension preexist, or there would be nowhere to move to. That distance doesn't cause the object to move, so it's an empirical example of something being a pre-condition for something without causing it.
>at the same time most physicist believe space is atcually formed by things, so space doesn't present empirically a ssomething that just permit things to exist, space is on itself a thing
This view is ultimately non-sensical as it relies on an a prior idea of extension which is unintelligible without any reference to extension itself being a thing. Also, you say that space is formed by discrete things like little tiny atomistic units of distance all lined up against each other than you fall prey to the contradictions that Zeno's paradoxes show in such a view of space as formed of discrete units. Many modern scientists also have other retarded beliefs as well such as that you can add the finite to itself and eventually arrive at the infinite, or that there are infinite's of different sizes or quantities.
>also your example is pretty crappy, it's like saying that ferttile earth is not the cause for a tree to grow, since it just there and is just the tree the one who's contingent on the fertile earth
Wrong, because in your example the minerals in the fertile earth are directly taken up into the material of the tree, i.e. a direct causal interaction, while on the other hand distance/extension provides for the possibility of movement without a direct causal interaction with the moving object.

>>19852899
>then what is it?
read the phenomenology
>the normal scheme is to say there are either particulars or universals
that's why hegel is such a revolutionary philosopher, he created a new system outside the classical scheme
first youave sense certainty, then you have the particular, then the universal, and then the inversion of universality, so that huge text you posted is just plain wrong and don't understand basi chegelian phenomenology
>>19852899
>The point remains true either way
not is not, if space has substance then it affects the thing, gravity is aperfect example, space "reacts"(that is has a causal relationship) with mass thus creating a gravitaitonal force, that pretty much deifnes all reality, and if we add black matter then space has even mor esubtsanciability, is even more of a thing
>grandmother doesn't participate in a causal relation with the farm that she never saw before dying
wtf are you talking aout? of cours she does!, if she woulnd't exist then the farm would never existed either, she's primary cause for the farm
>the description of Brahman as cause is negated and the description of substratum is given as well. Brahman is the necessary substratum of causality that itself doesn't participate in casual relations.
this also birngs another problem, if this crappy metaphysics is true, then brahma is a completly different substance thancausality(our world) thus this creates this logical problem
if acausality exist as a susbtance, why another substance is needed? and if causality exist, why we need acausality?
this is the problem with two substances, if there's two substances(causality and causality) then something must conect them, but that thing that conects them mut sneed conectr itself, and those conectors by that sam emechanism would need some conector too, makins an inifnite set of bridges between substances
and if they dont need ocnectors, then those two substances are not related in anyshape or form making the whole concept of two substances useless
why to entertaing the idea of another subtance or world or trasecent reality, if we're not conected to it in any shape or form, monism seems like a better option

>>19852967
>that there is a supernaturally revealed scripture in the form of the Upanishads indicates that this is indeed possible
that's an argument from autyhority, you're no longer doing logic atthis point just theological dogmatism
>I already have,
exactly and thus you contradict yourself, since you said before you can't apply empirical causation to logical causation, you can't have your cake and eat it too
>you say that space is formed by discrete things
i'm not saying that, im saying space have substanciality, that affects matter and is affected by matter´
>Wrong, because in your example the minerals in the fertile earth are directly taken up into the material of the tree, i.e. a direct causal interaction, while on the other hand distance/extension provides for the possibility of movement without a direct causal interaction with the moving object.
the fact that you can move thru space is affected by gravitational fields, in the same way minerals affect a tree, that's why time and space are compressed closer to a blackhole
space affect how you move and you move differently i places with more gravity, the fact that you can't see it doesn't make it less real, it's like saying the earth is flat just because i see it that way

>>19847877
opium