/lit/ - Literature

>>19390841
Guess. Then click spoiler.

>>19390903

>>19390841
power to asert urself idk i guess

He means it in the most literal and wide-ranging possible sense. But apart from that, "power for what" doesn't make sense. "Power over what", here is an illustrative answer:
>Philosophers habitually speak of the will as if it was the best-known thing in the world. Indeed, Schopenhauer let it be known that the will is the only thing really known to us, totally known, understood without anything taken away or added. But still, again and again it seems to me that Schopenhauer, too, in this case has only done what philosophers just do habitually - he's taken over and exaggerated a popular opinion. Willing seems to me, above all, something complicated, something which is unified only in the word - and popular opinion simply inheres in this one word, which has overmastered the always inadequate caution of philosophers. So if we are, for once, more careful, if we are "un-philosophical," then let's say, firstly, that in every act of willing there is, first of all, a multiplicity of feelings, namely, the feeling of the condition away from which, a feeling of the condition towards which, the feeling of this "away" and "towards" themselves, then again, an accompanying muscular feeling which comes into play through some kind of habit, without our putting our "arms and legs" into motion, as soon as we "will." Secondly, just as we acknowledge feelings, indeed many different feelings, as ingredients of willing, so we should also acknowledge thinking. In every act of will there is a commanding thought,- and people should not believe that this thought can be separated from the "will," as if then the will would still be left over! Thirdly, the will is not only a complex of feeling and thinking but, above all, an affect , and, indeed, an affect of the commander. What is called "freedom of the will" is essentially the feeling of superiority with respect to the one who has to obey: "I am free; 'he' must obey"- this awareness inheres in every will, just as much as that tense attentiveness inheres, that direct gaze fixed exclusively on one thing, that unconditional value judgment "Do this now - nothing else needs to be done," that inner certainty about the fact that obedience will take place, and everything else that accompanies the condition of the one issuing commands. A man who wills - gives orders to something in himself which obeys or which he thinks obeys. cont

>>19391754
>But now observe what is the strangest thing about willing - about this multifaceted thing for which the people have only a single word: insofar as we are in a given case the one ordering and the one obeying both at the same time and as the one obeying we know the feelings of compulsion, of pushing and pressing, resistance and movement, which habitually start right after the act of will, and insofar as we, by contrast, have the habit of disregarding this duality and deceiving ourselves, thanks to the synthetic idea of "I," a whole series of mistaken conclusions and, consequently, false evaluations of the will have attached themselves to the act of willing, in such a way that the person doing the willing believes in good faith that willing is sufficient for action. Because in the vast majority of cases a person only wills something where he may expect his command to take effect in obedience and thus in action, what is apparent has translated itself into a feeling, as if there might be some necessary effect. In short, the one who is doing the willing believes, with a reasonable degree of certainty, that will and action are somehow one thing - he ascribes his success, the carrying out of the will, to the will itself and, in the process, enjoys an increase in that feeling of power which all success brings with it. "Freedom of the will"- that's the word for that multifaceted condition of enjoyment in the person willing, who commands and at the same identifies himself with what is carrying out the order. As such, he enjoys the triumph over things which resist him, but in himself is of the opinion that it is his will by itself which really overcomes this resistance. The person doing the willing thus acquires the joyful feelings of the successful implements carrying out the order, the serviceable "under-wills" or under-souls - our body is, in fact, merely a social construct of many souls - in addition to his joyful feeling as the one who commands. L'effet c'est moi [the effect is I] . What happens here is what happens in every well-constructed and happy commonality - the ruling class identifies itself with the successes of the community. All willing is simply a matter of giving orders and obeying, on the basis, as mentioned, of a social construct of many "souls": for this reason a philosopher should arrogate to himself the right to include willing as such within the field of morality: morality, that is, understood as a doctrine of the power relationships under which the phenomenon "living" arises.

>>19390903
I guessed ownership.

>>19390841
Something like the poet's condition, as one who intentionally shapes reality to enjoyable effect. And while the comparison is always a little embarrassing to philosophers, anatomizing what the difference consists of is certainly better than denying it altogether.

>>19390841
imo it was the will to kinda like become what something """really""" is so to speak

>>19391754
That's a lot of words to say "desire".