/lit/ - Literature

>>19227396
I think some philosophers would say yes and some (the ones sympathetic to him) would say no.

>>19227402
Er, other way around. His fans would say you're mischaracterizing him.

>>19227396
I'm not sure if that's a fair characterization, as I'm not familiar with Dennett's work, but this reminded me of something from Hume I read today"

>'Twill not be surprizing after this, if I deliver a maxim, which is condemn'd by several metaphysicians, and is esteem'd contrary to the most certain principles of human reason. This maxim is *that an object may exist, and yet be nowhere*: and I assert, that this is not only possible, but that the greatest part of beings do and must exist after this manner. An object may be said to be no where, when its parts are not so situated with respect to each other, as to form any figure or quantity; now the whole with respect to other bodies so as to answer to our notions of contiguity or distance. Now this is evidently the case with all our perceptions and objects, except those of the sight and feeling. A moral reflection cannot be plac'd on the roght or on the left hand of a passion, nor can a smell or sound be either of a circular or square figure. These objects and perceptions, so far from requiring any particular place, are absolutely incompatible with it, and even the imagination cannot attribute it to them.

From this I surmise that our identity is a lot like the ship of Theseus. We as subjects elude simple identification, and similarly so with consciousness.

>>19227475
Which is skirting around the buddhist model of consciousness and the debates surrounding the nature of anatman/impermanance/emptiness or lack of essence. I think Dennet is following that line of thought there. Chalmers might disagree and make claims about not just there being a concrete consciousness but also claims about qualia and those having concrete essence. Which is the stance that Hindus and Christians follow.

>>19227524
Yes, I thought of the Buddhist model as well while reading this section, and I think Hume's metaphysics are probably reconcilable with Buddhist perspective on identity. Another interesting tidbit I heard recently (Buddha noob, FYI): Anatman does not translate to "the self does not exist" but rather "the not-self exists," which is a subtle but critical distinction. Hume goes on shortly after this to criticize Spinoza's pantheism, which I always found to be compatible with the Hindu notion of Atman, or Atman (self) as Brahman (universal).

>>19227396
According to Dennett, conscious experience definitely exists, he's on record about this, verbatim. Now if you have some notion of consciousness as being a rich, full, unified and uninterrupted stream, he would object to that. So depends what you mean by "consciousness". When he says that "qualia don't exist", he means that the term, as it's usually defined, is ill-conceived. Not that you don't see red. Nobody claims that.

>>19227569
>According to Dennett, conscious experience definitely exists, he's on record about this, verbatim.
I'd love to know where he says this. It would help to clear up a lot of misunderstandings I have about him. He seemed too insightful in other areas to be a zombie behaviorist type regarding consciousness.

>>19227524
>Chalmers might disagree and make claims about not just there being a concrete consciousness but also claims about qualia and those having concrete essence. Which is the stance that Hindus and Christians follow.
In Theravada Buddhism (the "oldest" branch of Buddhism) nobody has any problem saying that qualia exist concretely. They just don't manifest any type of personal identity (sabbe dhammā anattā), and they are always temporary products of causality (sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā). The Buddha isn't some sort of PoMoist who thinks they aren't real though.

>>19227659
Theravada and Yogacara has some psuedo svabhava/essence/singularity/discreetness stances. Madhyamaka Buddhists go against this idea hard. The whole of emptiness is a direct attack against the discreet dharmas/qualia that early buddhist schools had. It doesn't work well with 3 marks of existence.

>>19227396
dennett? more like faggot
KWAFMBN (kek what a faggot motherfucking bitch nigger)

>>19227677
>The whole of emptiness is a direct attack against the discreet dharmas/qualia that early buddhist schools had. It doesn't work well with 3 marks of existence.
Precisely why I don't have much interest in later forms of Buddhism. Too bad they're the only kind that most westerners are familiar with.
>The truth... is that there is no truth...
wow so fucking profound that will definitely help me end the cycle of birth and death

>>19227564
>Spinoza's pantheism, which I always found to be compatible with the Hindu notion of Atman, or Atman (self) as Brahman (universal).
Spinoza’s Substance for him is what constitutes everything including material objects. The Hindu schools Advaita Vedanta which says that Atman = Brahman rejects the notion that the material world is itself Brahman as being philosophically incoherent for various reasons, because for example that which is truly eternal doesn’t change while the world changes, and our consciousness is invisible, formless, soundless etc and so it conflicts with our experience to say that things which are the opposite of that (detectable material objects like rocks) are somehow the same thing, even though we never experience them as being conscious or as having the behavior of conscious things. Other Hindu schools like certain kinds of Vaishnavism and Shaivism disagree with this and try to posit some degree of Atman = Brahman while also having the material world itself be that same Brahman.

>>19227635
>http://cogprints.org/254/1/quinqual.htm
>Which idea of qualia am I trying to extirpate? Everything real has properties, and since I don't deny the reality of conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties.
You might read that as him talking about some "third person" notion of experience, but the first paragraph should disambiguate this. Now if you want to understand how on earth can you be a physicalist and still argue your way out of the special ontological status of conscious first-person experience, you'll need to do quite a bit of reading. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JKTWSVS_YBo will help you with this article. I recommend Sweet Dreams next.

>>19227396
Anyone who denies that consciousness exists is a P-zombie.

>>19227722
wow, thanks anon. this was exactly the info I was looking for.
Also, checked.

>>19227697
Its unfortunate because problems of discreteness was a problem that kept coming up due to our tendencies to adhere to singularities/atman. Grounding of dhammas was problematic and I dont think many make a strong claim to that inlight of globally available texts.

>>19227396
Marvin Minsky and Brian Tomasik also deny the existence of consciousness

https://longtermrisk.org/the-eliminativist-approach-to-consciousness/#Denying_consciousness_altogether

>>19227564
>the not-self exists
This is the essential. The moment you start thinking of yourself as a fixed thing, you start clinging to it. But when you don't cling, you are, and when you just are, you experience spontaneous bliss
This is the whole point of hitting you with a stick when you start verbalizing. Language is a trap

>>19227773

Both Dennett & Chalmers are deformed autist freaks

>>19227780
>when you just are, you experience spontaneous bliss
this actually repudiates the Buddhist claim that consciousness is inherently suffering, unsatisfactory, painful etc

>>19227787
would love to meet retards like this in real life. can only spout their catchphrases. don't read anything.

>>19227659
>In Theravada Buddhism (the "oldest" branch of Buddhism) nobody has any problem saying that qualia exist concretely. They just don't manifest any type of personal identity (sabbe dhammā anattā), and they are always temporary products of causality (sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā).
Very interesting. This is precisely what Hume says, except for him even causality is an illusion brought about by our habitual, inductive modes of interpretation. It's true that qualia *seem* to exist, but that does not mean they have a discrete identity outside of interpretation.

>>19227722
I've watched and skimmed though the entire thing. Yeah, I was right in saying Chalmers has this Hindu Brahman/Platonic essences/mental substance thing going on. Also Dennett's view is eeerily similar to a modern take on Buddhist views. Particularly his break down of the qualia is something that Buddhist LOVE to do. Dennett's nominalist conclusion on qualia is also eerily similar to early Buddhist conclusions too. However the mideval Buddhist take is more sophisticated. They adopt a more post-structuralist view of the consciousness and its mental constituents (qualia). They're still nominalist in a sense and while the qualia (I'm using qualia because thats what modern word is roughly equivalent to) lacks intrinsic existence on its own, the foundations of the qualia aren't the intrinsic existence but rather the walls themselves and those walls's foundations isnt an intrinsic wall but rather more parts, an infinite regress of mereological structure which goes in the direction of ontological and in causal.

I've been reading about these Buddhist debates about the nature of consciousness and their epistemology for a few weeks, thats my take on it.

>>19227842
>I've been reading about these Buddhist debates about the nature of consciousness and their epistemology for a few weeks, thats my take on it.
Interesting. What have you been reading? Are these modern debates or were these subjects debated long ago in Buddhist texts? I would love to dig more into the various Buddhists "theories" of consciousness.

>>19227801
>Buddhist claim that consciousness is inherently suffering, unsatisfactory, painful
There is no suck claim. Being is bliss. Ignorance is hell

>>19227801
>this actually repudiates the Buddhist claim that consciousness is inherently suffering, unsatisfactory, painful etc
The first noble truth is “life is dukkha”, not “consciousness is suffering”
https://www.learnreligions.com/life-is-suffering-what-does-that-mean-450094

>>19227801
No Buddhist claims consciousness is inherently suffering. I think you're confusing Buddhist with Hindu understanding. To Buddhist, of all traditions, the suffering is its own thing that which is bad. No person is suffering and no consciousness is suffering.

>https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/miln/miln.intro.kell.html

>>19227856
I've been particularly reading about guys like Dignaga, Dharmakirti, Chandrakirit, etc, I haven't read any particularly lengthy articles yet, but from bits and pieces I've gathered so far, I've got a fairly decent understanding of their ideas of what is knowledge, what is perception, what is consciousness, how is consciousness formed, what constitutes consciousness, etc.

>>19227856
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-indian-buddhism/

Read this for starters. You prob wont get all of it, but some key elements should catch your eye.

>>19227762
It's unfortunate that your brain has turned into word salad. What are you trying to say?

>>19227813

Lol dude watch one of their interviews. They're both visibly insane. I have read Chalmers but not Dennett. His writing is stupid schlock. I would recommend the born canon of philosophers instead

>>19227928

>born

Normal*

>>19227910
Err. Where did you get filtered? The whole issue is dense and requires lot more understanding of the problem.

>>19227872
>There is no suck claim
Yes, the claim that everything whatsoever and all beings have or are characterized by the three marks of existence (tilakkhaṇa), including dukha. If the dropping of mental rumination reveals consciousness as spontaneous bliss, then it doesn’t logically follow that conscious is characterized by or expresses dukha; the claim that consciousness is characterized by dukha is contradicted, but if this is true then the 3 marks dont apply to everything and the original claim is falsified.

>>19227882
>The first noble truth is “life is dukkha”, not “consciousness is suffering”
There is a Buddhist teaching found in the Pali canon that everything is characterized by the 3 marks anicca, anatta and dukha.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_marks_of_existence

>>19227780
I don't understand. But you can watch thoughts rise without identifying with them, it's a pattern machine trying to fit patterns onto symbols. Why is language more of a trap than another identification?

>>19227947
Read up on what anatta is. There is no sense of self that suffers, that is the state of enlightenment. However what we experience normally isn't an enlightened state, so with that nominal suffering and nominal understanding of self-hood is there. There is no contradiction, its just that you have to view the entirety of the person suffering as a sort of an illusion, in fact that illusion is the entirety of samsara itself. There is no hidden person behind the skandhas and no hidden reality behind the samsara. The samsara is the "whole" of reality in a sense that reality is a categorical illusion.

Barba non facit philosophum

>>19227963
>you can watch thoughts rise without identifying with them
This is the first step. And if you're doing it right, there's no language. And then you know the answer. It's experiential, that's the whole point or Buddhism or Daoism, you know it because once you experience it, it's obvious. But you can't teach it, because in words, it will just be words, and the word center will start defending itself with rhetoric
Keep doing what your doing catching thoughts and let them go

>>19227974
I'm not talking about anatta but rather dukha, does consciousness express the mark of dukha or does it not?
1) It it does, this is refuted by the claim that it turns out to be spontaneous bliss
2) If consciousness doesn't express dukha, then the "3 marks of everything" turn out to be "3 marks of everything except consciousness"

>>19227773
>https://longtermrisk.org/the-eliminativist-approach-to-consciousness/#Denying_consciousness_altogether
The way that the author tries to hold onto utilitarianism while denying that consciousness exists is hilarious. I actually feel sorry for these clowns.

>>19227396
Yes, it would be more accurate to say this guy doesn't believe that consciousness literally exists

>>19228010
>does consciousness express the mark of dukha or does it not?

No. The nominal sense of self has claims to the experience of suffering. At no part in Buddhism does consciousness beget suffering. In fact there's no sense of agency to consciousness at all. Consciousness is just a process of attaining new senses, modeling it in the minds and colored by our emotions/habits/memories. That process happens at every moment of perception.

>>19227831
>It's true that qualia *seem* to exist, but that does not mean they have a discrete identity outside of interpretation.
Unless you're the type of being that has direct epistemic access to them, yes.

>>19228040
The type of being which against *seems* to claim to existence. Now you're at two orders of magnitude of a tall order.

I kind of want to read more about consciousness but also would rather discover those things at my own pace through my meditation.
Good to know that you guys are fighting the good fight and trying to figure it all out!
Currently I think of myself as an interpretation system built on a data stream, the data stream being all of perception. There's a bunch of filters on the stream and some of them feed back into the stream itself and gives more data, and all those filters are fluid and change from moment to moment.
"Me" seems to be a council of (forces? Urges?) Which I can guess at their existence by the pattern of data. So I can see that I am constantly pushed towards having sex, and that my thoughts are whiddled and changed in some manner as to make me have sex, and if I characterize that pattern I can see that I have a libido. All ideas I have of what "really" is there is pattern recognition, which with increased perception slowly become, maybe not more right, but less wrong.
One of the problems I'm dealing with is that the voices in the head constantly, constantly, push and pull. If my being is a council, it's a pretty rowdy one - and they all got very good weapons - if I want to reach equanimity, a quarrel seeking voice will say that seeking equanimity is "just" another urge, and so forth. The new voice is not wrong - stillness and peace is different, and equanimity is not necessarily right, but it makes for a hard life. So now I'm just trying to accept that this is reality, and try to "want" less. But wanting less also means I shouldn't stop the urges from getting what they want, eh? I think I'm missing something basic which I can train to "turn off" which will help me, but then again, should I? Like messing around with a computer, most of that stuff is there for a reason.
Work hard, and you will find hardship! Just droppimg a bit of a blogpost, sorry. How's your path going?

>>19227988
>Let them go
But why are the thoughts there?
This is the thoughts latest weapon, and I will not train myself to stop thinking till I find an answer. Why do the urges use thoughts? What is the point of building images?
I train myself to let go of language a bit, but also not to fight it when it wants. The path is hard.

>>19228037
Also to add, it happens with all other senses simultaneously as well. So not only is it a stream of consciousness as a singular sense organ (eye) processing information over/over again, but all other sensory organs are also doing the same thing at the same time.

There is no hidden controller/alien/ghost/self behind the consciousness in the Buddhist model.

>>19227974
>you have to view the entirety of the person suffering as a sort of an illusion
You stop suffering when you get enlightened because you stop being reborn, not because you have some kind of postmodernist depersonalization moment. The Buddha still had aches and pains while he lived ("Ananda, go teach the monks today. My back hurts too much for me to do so myself."), he just didn't give a shit about it and dealt with it stoically.

>>19228046
Yeah, but what if you are though?

>>19228075
The Buddhist scripture particularly refer to Buddha as a tathagata, in a sense that "he" is called "thus gone" and its not talking about death, paranirvana, but during nirvana/after enlightenment.

>>19228090
How would you know?

>>19228090
Then you have to ask yourself where you get that sense of "you" from.

Refer to Buddhist idea of Skandha or if you're skittish, refer to Humean Bundle theory. If that doesn't satisfy you and you want to hide behind a cosmic space ghost aka soul, then you're a lost soul.

>>19228106
Also hiding behind the vague sense of our "mind"/consciousness doesn't help either as the Buddhist model of mind/consciousness is just too plain/simple that it leaves no room for a ghost to hide behind.

See
>>19228065
>>19228037

>>19228098
>How would you know?
What part of "direct epistemic access" are you having trouble parsing?
>>19228106
Never said I had some soul outside of my experiences. My use of pronouns is entirely nominalist.

>>19227988
>one experience is better than others

>>19228113
I don't know, what if it was a lie?
We have direct epistemic access to all of perception and we're still stuck at the fact we can only guess at the source
What does direct access mean? If you are a being alike to ours, then its something that's in your perception, and you're stuck at the same problem. If you're unlike us, then you're basically god and well, now we're in the "inconceivable" territory

>>19228131
>We have direct epistemic access to all of perception
huh, wasn't this exactly what you were doubting.
i.e. what if it merely *seems* that we have direct epistemic access to all of perception?
>What does direct access mean? If you are a being alike to ours, then its something that's in your perception
Are you trying to say, "your inference that you have perceptions is itself a perception" and that therefore it is fallible too, like all other perceptions?

>>19228037
>No. The nominal sense of self has claims to the experience of suffering.
Okay, so the “3 marks of existence” turn out to be “3 marks of all existence aside from consciousness”, I wonder how many other Buddhist teachings turn out to have contradictions that are only saved by hidden clauses made up on the fly

>>19228236
No, 3 marks of existence applies to beings whom claim a nominal self.

The consciousness is part of the nominal self, but it not the self. Just like the body is or the eye is or the memories or the feelings. The suffering agent is not ascribed to the category of consciousness because consciousness is never ascribed as having agency. I don't understand what you're talking about.

>>19228037
>At no part in Buddhism does consciousness beget suffering. In fact there's no sense of agency to consciousness at all.
https://personal.carthage.edu/jlochtefeld/buddhism/wheeloflife/nidanas.html
1. Ignorance (avidya)
2. Karmic formations (samskaras)
>3. Consciousness (vijnana)
4. Name and Form (nama-rupa)
5. The Six Senses (shadayatana)
6. Contact (sparsha)
7. Feeling (vedana)
8. Craving (trshna)
9. Grasping (upadana)
10. Becoming (bhava)
11. Birth (jati)
>12. Old Age and Death (jara-marana)

>>19228236
please don't judge all of buddhism from what some rando Mahayanist on /lit/ spouts out

>>19227396
He mischaracterizes himself through his own uveruse/misuse of the word "illusion".

>>19228229
You're no longer talking to the person to whom you originally replied, which is me. I am also confused by the phrase "direct epistemic access" in regard to qualia. What do you mean by this?

>>19228267
You're just too confused. The suffering is attributed only to the nominal self. Consciousness is one part of the skandhas that is used to show that nominal self is just that, a nominal and has no inherent existence beyond that. Thus suffering does not have a connection with consciousness.

>>19228286
It means that you know the truth of a fact without any further qualifications.

Am I the only one who thinks that the practical/ethical side of Buddhism is completely inconsistent with the metaphysics? If there is no essence I don’t see how it matters if a non-self renounces attachment or not. I feel like I must be missing something.

>>19228291
>Thus suffering does not have a connection with consciousness.
You are the one who is impossibly deluded. Please do not claim to be a Buddhist in public.

>>19228302
Buddhist practical ethics are designed around reducing "suffering." In which the attainment of realization through both meditation and through moral acts of selfishness/care for others are cultivated. In a sense metaphysics dont matter to ordinary people ongoing the suffering because the problem is the suffering at hand, not the metaphysics but the metaphysics is where the buddhist ethics leads to naturally. Thats how its seen.

>>19228302
>I feel like I must be missing something.
Yeah it's really weird, but in early Buddhism suffering and causality are real "essences" in the way that matter is a real essence in materialism. The self isn't real, but "you" still have a vested interest in escaping Samsara because the illusion of a self hurting *is* real.

Don't ask me about later forms of Buddhism though (i.e. what some people ITT are discussing). I think it's total bullshit and the Buddha himself would have already called them out on their heresy if he was here to do so.

>>19228333
>>19228307
I see what you're getting at now. You're the fake buddhist troll lmao

>>19228322
selflessness*

>>19228338
Mahayana scum. You probably believe in buddha-nature too. Go pray to Amitābha.

>>19228322
Thanks for the answer. I can understand and respect an anti-metaphysical stance where true knowledge isn’t attainable but suffering can be reduced, so the focus is on the pragmatic. But if we’re making a metaphysical system out of the ethics, then aren’t the ethics in some way transcendent? Or is the metaphysical system being created for pragmatic reasons to reinforce the ethics?

>>19228333
That makes some sense. Seems sort of Platonic in nature, where concepts are more real than you are. I don’t think most of the Buddhism posters here would accept that.

>>19228361
Metaphysical claims about the reality is the real nature of the world. Its just that the practice of selflessness leads to that world as well. That's the buddha's path.

In Mahayana, for example, the pure act of selfless and caring is cultivated and embraced strongly because these behaviors themselves transform the mind into seeing the ultimate reality of selflessness and the ultimate sense of interconnectedness of reality. Buddhist morals thus can be seen as not only a pragmatic solution to mundane suffering but also a utility to see the metaphysical truth of nature.

>>19228369
Most Buddhists historically wouldn't either. I disagree with Anon's claim that the Buddha himself would have rejected modern Mahayana or Theravada positions, because it's pretty clear that he was absolutely not a Sarvasitvadin.

To clarify, after the Buddha's death, the Abhidharma gets codified. This is a large system that tl;dr wants to create a theory of everything to understand the mind. This is different from Western ideas of such projects where they're trying to understand reality. Buddhism is rigidly teleological: attaining nirvana is THE goal. So, after the Abhidharma gets codified (although it's supposedly the Buddha saying it, both Western scholars and certain historical thinkers internally argue that the Abhidharma is actually post-Buddha monks putting their systems in his mouth) you end up getting this school called the Sarvastivadins.

The Sarvastivadins (literally the "theory of all existing" school) hold to a form of atomis wherein all things are atomic dharmas. This is separate from THE Dharma. These dharmas are not just material, but ideal; when you see something red, there is a sight dharma, and a red dharma, and a mind dharma, and so on. These dharmas are Ultimately real, so a Western parallel is that this is a form of Demicritean atomism but with far more complicated atoms (that is, everything is just a big jumble of tiny balls bumping around). These atoms exist momentarily, coming about and then dissipating moment to moment.

This IMMEDIATELY brings up problems, with essentially all Buddhists turning on the Sarvastivadins at once for the two problems that are in that prior paragraph: The dharmas being real, and momentariness.

>>19228361
In the Mahayana, even Dharma and Nirvana are Empty. In the Theravada, Nirvana is actually Ultimately real (but that doesn't mean that it's transcendent). In a sense, you could actually say that Buddhism doesn't have an ethical system, it's just epistemology+metaphysics and soteriology. The actual ethical system for the laity (as opposed to what Monks do, which is soteriological practice) just comes down to "lmfao whatever gets more people being reborn as monks". It's very flexible.

>>19228421
But what exactly achieves nirvana if there is no self? Or is there a self and I'm just retarded?

>>19228443
Nirvana isn't achieved; rather, it's a state that things are currently in. In the Mahayana, it's a sort of process that you're performing. You're ALSO performing Samsara. You are simultaneously Nirvana-ing and Samsara-ing. The goal is stop stop Samsara-ing so that all that remains is Mahayana-ing. This also solves the problem of "why don't Enlightened people just poof away?" in that there's still Karmic "momentum", such that even though the Samsara-ing is no longer occurring, there's still fallout from it. Internally this is sometimes referred to by referencing the Buddha's back problems that he acquired in old age (a result of karma in prior lives).

>>19228443
Its a categorical error with the claim "George achieved Nirvana" because the idea of "George" rests upon the "pre-Nirvana" supposition of the world and once the "Nirvana" is achieved, the "George" becomes almost a meaningless concept. Ofcourse "George" can be in the process of achieving Nirvana and that would be a coherent statement, but not so afterward.

>>19228443
>>19228461
>>19228456
The Buddhist uses the term "Tathagata" (thus gone) as a fix for this non-"self-reference" linguistic issue.

>>19228131
>and we're still stuck at the fact we can only guess at the source
Only if you are of the view that it's not immediately obvious that the source of direct access to perception is apprehending witness-consciousness, if this is obvious than you don't have to guess.

>What does direct access mean? If you are a being alike to ours, then its something that's in your perception,
The direct access to perception is experienced as an immediate fact without that itself being an object of perception, the fact of the percipient existing with direct access discloses it, but this fact is not a perceived object, it's what perception presupposes.

>>19228302
>Am I the only one who thinks that the practical/ethical side of Buddhism is completely inconsistent with the metaphysics?
No, some scholars have made this point as well. David Burton writes about that point in "Emptiness Appraised", which is an interesting book that takes a critical view of Nagarjuna.

>>19228461
im other anon. but i always find interesting how the decision of "achieving" nirvana is of george. and is a consequence of george. my point is that buddhists are just addicted to a human possibility of thought. the found and take seriously a mental trick to avoid suffering. all comes down to george in the end, but you have to avoid acknowledge it because then the trick dont work. wich is the only reason you become addicted to a mental trick in first place.

>>19228501
>>19228493
You're in luck, then, because there's a 2.5k year system of exercises designed to demonstrate how this works. This isn't my thing, the Buddha flat out tells people to do the exercises before believing him. You can be like David Burton and reject it off hand as being mystical woo, but then if that's the case why bother with this sort of stuff at all, just go plug your atman into the coom machine and eat lotos forever.

>>19228456
Okay, this makes sense, but it still seems to give the self an essence - i.e. the karma transference from past lives. Or is the karma transferred but not the self? In this case are they really past lives?
>>19228461
So George doesn't attain Nirvana, so what does? Or is Nirvana independently existing?
>>19228493
Good to know I'm not alone.

>>19228520
>So George doesn't attain Nirvana, so what does? Or is Nirvana independently existing?
The body/mind in which the person that initially claimed to have a personhood of "George" attains Nirvana and the chains of causation from which gave rise to the idea of "George" personhood has ceased and a /realized/ nominal sense of George takes place.

>>19228421
>essentially all Buddhists turning on the Sarvastivadins at once for the two problems that are in that prior paragraph: The dharmas being real, and momentariness.
Could you elaborate on this? Why is dhammas being real a problem? Surely the Sarvastivadins aren't claiming that they're unconditioned.

>>19228520
>In this case are they really past lives?
You could make the argument that they aren't. What makes something a "past life"? Shared atoms? Shared memories? You lack an atman, so what makes you (you)? A stream of continuity. The karma itself is a continuity. Once you stop generating new karma (this isn't 100% correct but it's a close enough approximation) then the leftover karma has to run its course. The karma isn't attached to anything, karma isn't an object, it's not like in Jainism where the soul is made of cotton, and different "colors" of karma are burrs generated by action. The goal of Jainism is to pick the "burrs" off via spiritual exercise and then literally do nothing until you die of dehydration, lying naked on the floor, and then die (and ascend).

In Buddhism meanwhile, because Karma is action (and volition) rather than a "thing", you can keep living after you stop making new karma. The karma doesn't "transfer" because it's not an "object". Rather, the karma is part of the stream of continuity (in some theories, alternatively, it is "planted" at the time of an action and "sprouts" later).

>>19228520
>Or is Nirvana independently existing?
Yes. It is in fact the only thing which is so.

>>19228518
>You're in luck, then, because there's a 2.5k year system of exercises designed to demonstrate how this works.
That's not an argument which helps you in this discussion here, it doesn't function as a rebuttal. There is older stuff before Buddha anyway that disagrees with him like the Upanishads, proto-Samkhya and Jainism, which all posit an eternal consciousness, so being old doesn't really add any weight to your position.
>You can be like David Burton and reject it off hand as being mystical woo,
I rejected it here for reasons which have to do with the fact of how our experience takes place, and David Burton after a patient examination rejects Nagarjuna's philosophy because he finds it to be logically untenable; that's not "rejecting it off hand as being mystical woo", that's a dishonest claim for you to make.

>>19228421
>the Abhidharma
A big nuance here. There is no "the Abhidharma" that gets codified. Thats lost to time. However what follows is various Abhidhamma after the initial Abhidhamma. One of which is the Abhidhamma Theravada schools use, its not an exact replica but the version Theravada uses is an offshoot of a one of the many Abhidhammas that were prevalant.

>>19228542
this is just faith. imagine you buy an elevator in your house, and you go saying you are now a new person because the elevator change your life. this is the same, you are just infatuated. there is a george who choose to go to nirvana and is using nirvana for his personal reasons. there is no a completely metamorphosis. the inner world is eluvise in itself. you can say the same of whatever life experience, is not because nirvana its a really life altering shit
but because you, george, are putting the weight in it.

>>19228583
>George gets Covid
>George falls in coma
>1 years later
>George wakes up
>George now speaks Sanskrit and claims his name is Ashoka
>Ashoka claims that he is an Indian king that converted to Buddhism 2300 years ago
>Hospital's legal paper says the person George is in hospital
>Person waking from the coma claims he's not George but Ashoka
This is rare event but these events have happened in medical history.

>>19228562
You haven't read the Upanishads.

>>19228549
>Surely the Sarvastivadins aren't claiming that they're unconditioned.
Some did. Firstly, the Buddha is pretty clear that there are no things that are Ultimately real in as far as our bodily existence is concerned (ignore Theravada ideas about Nirvana here). If we say that wood is composed of Ultimately real wood dharmas, then how do those wood Dharmas ever go away? Remember, under Greek elementalism (and Hindu elementalism) you can argue a Democritean atomic soup (wood is fire+water+earth so when you chop it up the atoms get knocked around and go somewhere else). That's hard to square with Momentariness, and the whole "all dharmas arise and fall" thing that the Buddha goes on about. So, you have a doctrinal problem and a simple metaphysical one.

At this time, all of the Sangha is just monks holding onto different ideas coexisting in the same monasteries, so it's not really fair to say that "Sarvastivadinism" is a thing, especially at this point. I'm gonna need another post for the "proto-Mahayana", but essentially the proto-Theravada forks here: the "Pseudo-Hinayana", and "orthodox Theravada". The Pseudo-Hinayana ends up becoming the Hinayana (monks who just wander off into the woods and then get mauled by tigers or nirvana out) and the Pudgalavadins. The Pudgalavadins developed from a monastery that received lavish royal attention (the Pudgalavadin theories developed after the patronage), the tl;dr is that there is no atman, true, but there IS a "ball" (the "pudgala") in which is made up of unconditioned dharmas that CAN be said to "achieve nirvana". This was, obviously, a problem.

The Theravada proper end up crafting a very complicated metaphysical-epistemological model to explain how things work. This differs from the Pudgala in that the Theravada do NOT believe that the "you-ball" is made up of unconditioned dharmas.

>>19228603
>there is no atman, true, but there IS a "ball" (the "pudgala") in which is made up of unconditioned dharmas that CAN be said to "achieve nirvana". This was, obviously, a problem.
That is a big problem.
As someone who lurks a lot on dhammawheel (as opposed to dharmawheel) my impression is that most users there interpret "arising and passing away" as just meaning causally conditioned, rather than meaning illusory. The no-self arguments perfectly parallel modern physicalist no-self reasoning, but pain and pleasure are taken to be real things just as the Buddha described them.

>>19228603
The "proto-Mahayana", meanwhile, splits into four-ish camps (only two exist today).

The Vaibhasikas, sort of "orthodox-Sarvastivadins" (that is, Sarvastivadins who go back to "orthodoxy" come up with "self-replicating dharmas", thereby solving the problem of unconditioned dharmas AND momentariness. This raises the problem of the infinite regress and the "why" of when a self-replicating dharma actually comes to fruition. It should be noted that they also believed there to be no separation between an "internal" and "external" world. These guys end up dying out.

The Sautrantikas meanwhile posit the "seed and fruit" theory, which gets taken up by all Buddhists, even the Theravada, but this tradition dies out. This theory allows for things like "enlightened beings still having bodies", as mentioned up thread. These dudes held that there IS an external world separate from the mind, but we can only engage with it via the mind.

Then there's the Madhyamaka, which has the apex of Nagarjuna demonstrating that all dharmas MUST be Empty. Essentially all Mahayana today are Madhyamaka (and even those schools, incredibly minor though they are, that say otherwise are basically Madhyamaka).

Finally, you get the Yogacara, who end up coming up with a mental "bed" that seeds get planted in. This ends up being similar to the Theravadan systems. This "Bed" allows for varying degrees of "the mind observing itself", which is really just mental phenomena taking other mental phenomena as object. It also allows for a "vehicle", allowing for fine gradiations of mental observation. The Yogacara are split between "soft idealism", wherein the mind can only ever experience the world via mental perception, and a sort of "hard idealism", where the world literally is entirely mind and there's no meaningful "physical" that we can speak of.

Also, to clarify about the wood dharmas, this means that the smallest unit of a log cannot be subdivided further; the end is just "wood dharmas(/atoms)", not "fire, water, and dirt atoms".

>>19228634
The Theravada seem to as a whole be more okay with having abstract things be "okay it's sort of Ultimately real", yeah. They're definitely less okay with the Mahayana habit of playing with language while also being really autistic with language. The sort of Zen stuff doesn't fly.

>>19228603
>You haven't read the Upanishads.
Yes I have lol. The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad says "the vision of the witness can never be lost, because it is immortal" in verse 4.3.23, and this predates Buddha by centuries

>>19228602
what i mean is that there is a difference between accidentally or involuntary having amnesia.
and willfully practice a method to have amnesia.

>>19228671
The memories aren't destroyed in the state of enlightenment. Nor are consciousness nor sensations or the feelings nor the cognition. Just the idea of personhood having a sense of self is destroyed.

The sense of selflessness itself can be easily cultivate in in any beginner meditator, heck even non-meditators can experience the sense of selflessness occasionally, but those aren't complete awakening, those are selflessness without awareness, without attention and without wisdom.

There's no meditation or otherwise in Buddhism that trains or cultivates amnesia. You maybe confusing Buddhism with something else entirely.

>>19228704
amnesia was a metaphore. obviously.
there is a difference between accidently destroying your self
and willfully practice a method to destroy your self.
anyway if consciousness still exist the self still exist. you have to make a daily practice to de-attach, de-self yourself, which is in the end artificial and it exist only because it have some kind of abstract realm of (real) reality you think you have when you de-self yourself, or you are doing it because you cant cope with your pain. in any case it is still the self the one who is guiding the show.

>>19228670
The Upanishads also say that the Vedas is a cow and that the mind is the result of parts, what's your point?

>>19227635
I think he actually calls himself a behaviorist somewhere.

>>19228736
Don't confuse the destruction of the sense of self with the self. Your hangup is that you believe self exist and that consciousness is self. That's not Buddhism. These are however probably a good starter for a Hindu friend or a guy like Chalmers to talk with.

>>19228670
good argument for dvaita vedata tbqh. nicely demonstrates why madhvacharya btfo'd shankara.

>>19228757
no, im saying quitting self from consciousness is just a method, its artificial, and it exists always with an underlying motive that it comes from the self and never goes out from the self. its like the self is the base of the pyramid even if you don´t see it when you are in the peak.
the self is the base of the pyramid of why you are de-selfing yourself. you are not in other place you are just making the accurate method to delude yourself that you are.

>>19228780
You would need to make a case for the Buddhist to accept a self exists in the first place. The Buddhist certain didn't think a self exists at all. They only say a sense of self exist that people nominally refer as the self. Not only do they the self doesn't exist, it cannot exist in any form or shape. The self idea itself is nothing more than a flawed understanding of what makes a person and then applying mythology to it.

>>19228790
>The Buddhist certain didn't think a self exists at all
Well theravada implictly sorta do in some sense as did the strong Yogacara or the Pudgalas of the past. But if any survived, then these views are mostly in weak forms today afaik.

>>19228790
>The self idea itself is nothing more than a flawed understanding of what makes a person and then applying mythology to it.
my point, more or less, is that no-self is still an understanding that comes from the same place that the self comes. you are not in other place.

>>19228819
No the self idea comes from inserting a supernatural element towards a natural sense of self. Everyone has a sense of self. However many believe that there's a supernatural component to this sense of self to create "the self" or "the soul" or "the essense" from thin air. The extra supernatural element is not a natural thing, its a mythological addition. So the no-self does not come from the self idea, but rather the sense of self. The self idea is an alien idea.

>>19228835
its ironic that you are criticizing the self as essence (completely incorrect, that would fit a word as spirit, not self, which ussually is used to describe the personal individual self... i dont know if all is a misunderstanding of what one of us is refering with self and not the other...) anyway is ironic because buddhists big point is that no-self is the real essence (or essence no-essence) all the way.

>>19228863
Absence of essence is not essence of absence.

>>19228745
>The Upanishads also say that the Vedas is a cow and that the mind is the result of parts,
I dont recall either claim, do you have a textual source for them? If true, the former is obviously metaphorical symbolism and latter is not an issue for anyone since the Upanishads say consciousness is partless and not the mind.
>what's your point?
That the age of Buddhism doesn’t add any strength to its claims, which you had previously been implying
>>19228760
>good argument for dvaita vedata tbqh
And why would that be?
>nicely demonstrates why madhvacharya btfo'd shankara.
Lol, no he didn’t. Can you please humor me by trying to explain how?

>>19228877
i know you are gonna say this or something along that. buddist have so many branchs that is really ungrateful cricitize it because there is always an specific branch that would say the contrary. anyway, i think the main point is that the "absence of essence is real reality". the know-it-all end of all possible knowledge. so then, and just then, its when it become an essence. but is something subtle anyway.

>>19228893
>think the main point is that the "absence of essence is real reality"
Not according to Madhyamaka. The absence of essence is not the real reality. The real reality is what is aside from the talks of essences. Thats the point people miss. There is a fully functional reality that is no different whether or not essences exist or not. That is the reality.

>>19228910
you are just misusing words.
when you found a fully functional reality that exist in itself and is the basis of everything, we as humans put the name "essence". that is not something bad or wrong, is just name it, its a symbolic form of knowledge. not a literal one.
if your point is that to know the essence you have to not talk about essences, is just a trick to dont hold in preconceptions you would may had about essences. not about literally dont think about essence, that is hypocritical at best.
>essence:.
>the intrinsic nature or indispensable quality of something, especially something abstract, which determines its character.

>>19228919
>fully functional reality that exist in itself and is the basis of everything
No such thing, reality doesn't exists in itself

>we as humans put the name "essence".
>the intrinsic nature or indispensable quality of something, especially something abstract, which determines its character
Certainly doesn't have any intrinsic or indispensable quality to it.

Unless you use a linguistic trick to claim not having any intrinsic quality is a quality. Thats what you used to trick yourself into believing Buddhist philosophy is about atman and self right? Where atman = anatman

>>19228953
if you dont think the non-essence is an essence you dont go for it but this is something you sure miss because you think the part of you that see the non-essence is non-essence in itself. to me, you are just completely blowing out of proportions depersonalization, which is a pretty common human experience or whatever you want to call it. and you are bolowing out of proportions because it makes you feel nice, not more, not less. ancient buddhists find this human trick and they blowing it out of proportion too because it works to "not suffering" and buddhist addicts start to make a world based in that experience. that, i repeat, every human feel some time or another but dont give to it the important buddhist give. they literally create a reality-view from it. this is my pov of buddhism and all you say sound to me like byzantine shit of thinking too much and put too much tomatoes in the same box. but is just my point of view. its ok. i think we can´t understand each other, that is why i explained myself in this manner.

>>19228749
Yeah, and he also insults Husserl. What an NPC. Wonder how he justifies his empiricism if he thinks that the conscious experiences constituting his observations are just illusions. Seems like such a fucking backwards way of thinking.
>if our current scientific methods can't explain consciousness, then consciousness isn't real, despite what your first-person experiences would tell you
So much for empiricism, then.

>>19227727
>*ngloid philosophy

>>19227396
>would I be mischaracterizing him?
Yes, he does claim that your perception itself is real, but that it is a "user-illusion". Qualia does not exist because it is not a good way to represent the concept. Following this, he emphasizes that your intuition that you are not a zombie is the only thing that leads you to argue against it.
He fails to understand that this conviction is the expression of the transcendental Ego and the apodictic conviction of its contemplation.

>>19227396
Oh hey I saw this dude speak at NYU in like 2007. He talked about consciousness

nah don't drop just yet

>>19229023
This isn't what Dennet claims, read the thread.

>>19228919
>>19229001
>mistaking the finger pointing at the moon for the moon
Start with What the Buddha Taught, then read the Heart Sutra.

>>19227773
Minsky was based. I want to deny the existence of consciousness now.

>As it is shameful for a man to express doubt if he has a tongue or not, so also it is shameful to say, ‘I do not know what consciousness is’

- Vidyaranya

>>19227659
Lankavatara Sutra calls delusions eternal though. I've always found that weird in relationship to the rest of Buddhist thought.

>>19233493
>Lankavatara Sutra
what sutras say and what suttas say often have very little in common. there is no such thing as "Buddhist thought", just particular schools.