/lit/ - Literature

>*we got a code four, repeat, code four*
STOP RESISTING

The question of real is not the concern simply what is apparent, as long as husserl can demonstrate the reduction derives purely from its perception he doesn’t actually need to say anything concerning the ontological nature of what is phenomena beyond its experience as phenomena, if need be you may take the Hegelian route and just equate being and phenomena fully, cutting out a noumena, but the Husserlian method doesn’t require this in order to do what it seeks, attain knowledge of phenomena and consciousness, and yes this does and in certain readings of Husserl’s has lead to a kind of neo-Neoplatonism based on a transcendental ego-monad from which all phenomena unfolds, but this depends on whose reading and which book of Husserl’s you read.

>>18905342
I DIN DO NOTHIN

>>18905409
He can demonstrate what is real, at least for him, based on inner intuition of it. Or at least its presence for him is a demonstration for him, and he can report on that (and then compare it with our own etc.). But he can't demonstrate the ideality (unity, universality, necessity) of the phenomena. He can't know or convey anything about their "inner nature" and thus their necessary behaviour for him (across other presentations) or for other people.

The only way he could do that is by positing something metaphysical/ontological about them, i.e. by assuming them to be real, even if only to treat OF them as presentations.

That's what is confusing me. How does Husserl, on his own terms and not on a neo-platonic extension of his ideas or later effort to supply such foundations for them, justify presupposing the ideality of the phenomena?

Another way to put this is by replying to this:
>the Husserlian method doesn’t require this in order to do what it seeks, attain knowledge of phenomena and consciousness
It seems to me that even without any metaphysical framework, i.e. even while remaining solely a descriptive method, there is a residuum of reality/actuality being presupposed for the ideal, as it presents itself phenomenally. The key phrase here is "attain knowledge," as opposed to mere experiences. To use the familiar Aristotelian definition, knowledge implies foundations (and thus the possibility of demonstration - by conveying those foundations, leading to intuitive recognition of the knowledge they culminate in). Foundations have to be apodeictic. In this case, Husserl requires an apodeictic, axiomatic assumption that Ideas (ideal essences and structures) are necessarily and universally what they appear to be in particular presentations.

So what are those foundations, if everything is bracketed out? Again, I know many people plug Husserl into a platonic framework. But he is bracketing out that, as much as he is bracketing out reductive materialist or psychologist frameworks.

>People will cordially debate this part of Husserls observations but shoot it down when it's an Evola thread that makes the same observation in equal or fewer steps.

>>18905607
Come on, I like Evola but you know why that is. How many people interested in Evola or bandying his name around are interested in his phenomenology?

>>18905641
Just because the external stuff filters atheist shitlords doesn't mean it doesn't ultimately all connect at this crux which is the value of consciousness to experience being.

>>18905581
>He can demonstrate what is real, at least for him, based on inner intuition of it. Or at least its presence for him is a demonstration for him, and he can report on that (and then compare it with our own etc.). But he can't demonstrate the ideality (unity, universality, necessity) of the phenomena. He can't know or convey anything about their "inner nature" and thus their necessary behaviour for him (across other presentations) or for other people.
>The only way he could do that is by positing something metaphysical/ontological about them, i.e. by assuming them to be real, even if only to treat OF them as presentations.
>That's what is confusing me. How does Husserl, on his own terms and not on a neo-platonic extension of his ideas or later effort to supply such foundations for them, justify presupposing the ideality of the phenomena?


He does more or less resolve this in logical investigations, his argument being that the ideal is that it is given, that we perceive the eidetic intuition thus it is the case for us, the actual problem for Husserl is the intersubjective problem and where do we sit on the question of noumena, but broadly he justifies the ideas not by their pre-existence in the world but through the transcendental ego by an act of aggregation and correspondences and rational divisions producing a subject and object vision which then is filled with ideas on what a thing is, thus the transcendental ego through intentionality produces the meaning and context of all things, the transcendental ego and consciousness according to Husserl giving birth to the meaning and idea.

To quote Husserl at length.

“and one must also make it understood wherein, now, inside the sphere of vision belonging to the synthetic experience itself, the transcendent object consists — as the identical pole immanent in the single mental processes and yet transcending them by virtue of having an

Cont

>>18906638
identity that surpasses them. It is a giving of something-itself and yet a giving of some- thing-itself that is "transcendent": an at first "indeterminately" itself-given identical pole, which subsequently displays itself, in "its" (likewise ideally identical) "determinations", throughout the giving of it-itself, a giving that can be continued in the synthetic form: "explication". But, in the manner of something instituted originally, this transcendence lies in the proper essence of the experience itself”

“ Let us start from the fact that objects exist for us, and are what they are for us, exclusively as the objects of which we are
at any time conscious: as objects / experienced (that is, perceived <99> and recollected) or as objects emptily objectivated but never- theless meant believingly (as certain objects, uncertainly pre- sumed objects, or the like), and thus somehow as objects meant
in some modes or other of consciousness, including those belong-
ing to the emotions and the will — regardless, moreover, of how such objects have acquired from our previous conscious living
the sense that they now have for us. Here belong also the modes of consciousness proper to thinking, in the specific sense: the modes
of comprehendingly judicative thinking, and naturally also those
of "cognitive"-predicative thinking. Therefore, if we are busied with objects — and, in particular, if we are judging about them —,
we stand inside our own consciousness; which is naturally not to
say that our consciousness is what we are busied with, and most assuredly is not to say that those objects are nothing but states
or processes of consciousness.
We need not give any transcendental philosophy here. We have only to explicate correctly what concerns us: at present, namely, that fact that, when we are judging, the relation to the object is effected in our judging itself. It must be noted in this connexion that the object can indeed be given already by experience, prior to the predicative judgment, but that the experiential judgment or the subsequent non-experiencing judgment that is never- theless "based on experience" includes in itself either the ex-perience (as the experiential judgment does) or (as the non- experiencing judgment "based on experience" does) a mode of consciousness derived somehow from the earlier experience and modifying it: and it is only by virtue of this inclusion that the judging, in its concreteness, is a judging about such and such. Now, in the current judging we have made a judgment; and we are well aware that the judgment made (or else being built member by member in the making

Cont

>>18906645
activity) should not be confounded with the judging, the making activity itself.
We now note that this "having the made judgment in the making of it" is not at all the same as having that judgment objectively: as a "theme" and, in particular, as a judgment-substrate. In judging we are directed, not to the judgmeut, but to the "objects- about-which" (the substrate-objects) currently intended to, to the
predicates (that is, the objectively determining moments) cur- rently intended to, to the relational complexes; or, in causal judg- ments, we are directed to the predicational affair-complexes cur- rently intended to as grounds and the correlative predicational af- faircomplexes as consequences; and so forth. At any time, how- ever, a change of focus is obviously possible, such that we make our judgments, their components, their connexions and relations, the theme. This happens in a new judging at the second level, a judging about judgments, a judging in which judgments /
<ioo> become objects undergoing determination. Naturally, without this change of focus we could not obtain any concept of the judgment or of the judgment-syntaxes belonging to it.“

So once more, Husserl’s system is inherently apophatic concerning beyond the consciousness but the consciousness itself is the basis for the contents of the consciousness, all unfolding from the transcendental ego. To speak more would go against his aims.

(Note all of the citations can be read in formal and transcendental Logic by Husserl. )

>>18905294
>>18905409
>>18905581
>>18906638
>>18906645
>>18906655
Back to work, wagie!

Husserl makes absolutely no sense to me and is the only one next to Spinoza (and Wittgenstein for being so trite) who falls into that category which makes me assume that it is their jewishness which makes them so alien in their thinking.
I love Kant, Hegel, Aristotle, Descartes, Heidegger, Deleuze etc. but those kikes are completely schizo to me, because it seems to me like their words have absolutely no meaning, but are instead just vain AI attempts at philosophy.

Yes, I have tried to read him before.

>>18906638
>his argument being that the ideal is that it is given, that we perceive the eidetic intuition thus it is the case for us
But the whole problem is that he doesn't allow any talk of "for us." That is psychologism. Even Kantians are just transcendental psychologists according to Husserl.

I am reading Logical Investigations and the first volume, refuting psychologism, the one published first, is ambiguous on the issue. He continuously asserts that logic cannot be grounded in particular observations of supposed psychological laws, or in descriptions of the particular constitutions of types of thinking beings (e.g. humans), because logical laws are apodeictically and ideally necessary and simple, relying on nothing for their justification. That's fine. But it only leads to a Kantian, immanent position, of agnosticism regarding the sources of these ideas and their apodeicticity. But Husserl then has lengthy quotes from Erdmann, who argues from just this Kantian position, i.e. that we only have access to our OWN presentations of ideal logical simplicity (even intersubjectively), and we can say nothing about their ground or what is beyond them etc. This would seem to be an appropriately agnostic Kantian position, which Husserl should agree with given his premises: we have our presentations, intersubjectively comparable and describable, but that's all.

Yet Husserl criticises this (with mind-numbing repetition) on the basis that the very forms of logical ideas and the premises of logical judgments, the very senses of logic's core concepts, always already presuppose universality for all logic, i.e. for all minds - it's a logical contradiction to say "other beings may have other logics." It is not possible to make the logically valid statement "A != not-A for me, but perhaps not for an angel or alien." Logic's concepts always already contain the sense "A != A tout court, in and of itself, for anyone."

But again, Erdmann can answer that complaint simply. His position isn't a DOGMATIC, metaphysical one about the plurality of forms of judgment. It is agnostic. It amounts to: "We have our presentations, and any regularities we note in them. What else can we have?" That's good Kantianism.

Husserl responds to this by saying: "Mathematical angels [i.e. radically different kinds of minds] may no doubt use other methods of [ratiocination] than ours -- does this mean that they may have different axioms and theorems?" I have a hard time seeing how to interpret this except from a rationalistic, logicist standpoint.

Continuing from >>18907003
The problem simply put is that Husserl's point, about logic always presenting itself "as if" universal, is well taken, but ALREADY ENCOMPASSED by the Erdmannian, Kantian agnostic position, which acknowledges it, and simply says nothing else that we don't know why this is. If Husserl is being eidetic, shouldn't he be similarly agnostic? Surely Erdmann would. be wrong if he tried to POSITIVELY, dogmatically claim that other kinds of minds exist. But he is not doing that. He's agnostic by necessity, as a function of his immanent and descriptive position. Husserl is the one violating "eidetic" agnosticism by going beyond description and immanence, by actively presuming that the forms of our logic tell us something about the (im)possible otherness of the minds of angels and aliens. He really does seem to be presuming that logic is logic, reason is reason, dogmatically. He is being far more dogmatic than Erdmann while mistakenly critiquing Erdmann for dogmatism. On what basis?

The only possible reading of this is rationalism, and that's precisely how he was interpreted by almost all the early reviewers and readers. His whole Munich school of early followers interpreted him as an Aristotelian empirical-realist, another Brentano, and then was horrified when he declared himself Kantian. It's not hard to see why from the Investigations. Everything he says suggests that he is deriving knowledge of logic's actuality FROM OUR presentations of logical ideality, and presuming that it exists as a stable real to be empirically observed in intuition.

I couldn't quite follow some of the other things you're saying. It seems like you're talking about his later transcendental and genetic phenomenology, which are fine and more understandable, but really I want to understand whether he was a rationalist (or simply confused) in Logical Investigations, not the later genetic work like Experience and Judgment. That stuff is fine but it's precisely because it is essentially Kantian, Erdmannian even. It's transcendental psychology. Again, most readers and reviewers of the Investigations initially thought the Investigations themselves (the second volume) were a lapse back into Brentanian/Erdmannian-Kantian descriptive "transcendental psychology" after the first volume's dogmatic rationalist rebuke of it. That's how unstable the Logical Investigations is. That's what I'm trying to figure out.

>>18906655
>Husserl’s system is inherently apophatic concerning beyond the consciousness but the consciousness itself is the basis for the contents of the consciousness, all unfolding from the transcendental ego. To speak more would go against his aims.
I forgot to reply to this. This is my entire issue in >>18907003 >>18907013. He IS going beyond this, in two senses: 1 in the general sense that he constantly lapses into what can only be interpreted (and was in fact mostly interpreted) as a realist-rationalist position, and thus dogmatic and non-agnostic in the Kantian sense, and 2 in the sense that even the later eidetic phenomenology, if we are to believe it was already being practiced in LI (and I can't see how that's the case), would still need to presuppose more or less exactly what Kant and Erdmann are provisionally presupposing in their immanent, descriptive "transcendental psychologies," namely that we are dealing a species-being (human) that has law-like features. But that would be psychologism, "physics of thought," which is what he just spent 150 pages fuming about.

The first volume's critique of psychologism just doesn't make sense when coupled with the second volume phenomenological investigations, except maybe as a reminder to be slightly less sloppy in one's terminology. But in substance, Erdmann (and many others like Herbart) were doing what Husserl is doing in that second volume, and he is basically a transcendental psychologist (a term of derision for him) himself.

>>18905677
I agree, and part of the difficulty in asking these questions is that I already do agree with the neo-platonic extension of Husserl, and many things Evola says by further extension. But that still doesn't make the Investigations any less of a clusterfuck from where I'm sitting, despite my best efforts.

>>18906980
I keep having to resist the temptation to emperor's new clothes him as I read him. I can't bring myself to do it. I just don't understand why he was so dogged in claiming that the Investigations was a transcendental text already.

Did you try reading later easier ones like Ideas? At least read Crisis and Cartesian Meditations, those are okay. Even the actual phenomenological investigations themselves, in Investigations, are fine. But the psychologism part makes no fucking sense and I'm not changing my mind on that until I have the "luminous insight" of understanding how it does.

>>18905294
>then it seems like the only other option he has for justifying his method of intuition (into the ideal essences grounding logic) is to presume something almost platonic?
*Almost* is correct. You could as well link it to the aristotelian Form, it is of the same spirit, but historically, the link to Plato has been more emphasized.
However, Husserl is not a realist, he never changed his position on that either, contrary to what is often believed, he simply always restricted himself according to the phenomenological level he was investigating, which led to him apparently adopting either limited aspects of realism or idealism at a certain moments. For him essences are "concrete yet unreal".
>but to begin in the first place he has to at least presume that the ideal is real in some way, that it's meaningfully "there" to be intuited.
This presumes more than can be described once you reduce the relationship between the essences of truth and reality. Simply because we have the ability to reach at entities which cannot be properly described as empirical individuals doesn't really tell us anything about the relationship between ideas in general and reality.

>>18907131
I see the Aristotelian connection too, but the problem there is he begins to shade into the Ingarden/Munich crowd who wanted him to be another Brentano, or Herbart, or Lotze, that whole school of quasi-realist, quasi-empiricists who were sick of transcendental/epistemological enclosures having to precede all good thinking. The thing is, if he is transcendental he's a Kantian and really shouldn't be bashing Erdmann so much, and if he's realist then he's what the Munichers thought he was, mistakenly according to him.

>doesn't really tell us anything about the relationship between ideas in general and reality.
I'm not talking about the "natural" reality, in the sense bracketed by the eidetic reduction and all that jazz. I'm more talking about the Hume problem of induction and necessity. How does Husserl deal with the fact that he's describing "law-like" (in the strict logical sense of posited generalities, derived from observations) ideal structures, WITHOUT taking a stand on the nature of their lawfulness/generality?

And how does that relate to the Investigations, where he DOES seem to make very broad claims for logical universality bordering on Leibnizian rationalism?

>>18906980
>that it is their jewishness which makes them so alien in their thinking.
Husserl is the least Jewish-like Jew philosopher.
Ironically, Heidegger is the most Jewish-like non-Jew philosopher.

>>18907003
>>18907013
>>18907058
Great posts. Husserl/Kant threads are GUARANTEED quality. How's that for a law-like feature lmao

>>18907155
>How does Husserl deal with the fact that he's describing "law-like" (in the strict logical sense of posited generalities, derived from observations) ideal structures, WITHOUT taking a stand on the nature of their lawfulness/generality?
That would be the difference between direct and peculiar ideation. Check (LU II/2,184/LI 2, 307). Direct ideation lead you to imperfect essences, those directly related to material reality, while peculiar ideation (Idealisierung) is obtained through taking idealized "fictions" to their only possible outcome (LU II/1,245/ LI 2,15).

>>18907080
>I just don't understand why he was so dogged in claiming that the Investigations was a transcendental text already.
Do you read French? If so, find this book. Best explanation of this very issue I could find in about 18 years of reading on Husserl.

Since there is a mention of an underlying platonist essence in Husserl, it is interesting to note that one of the interpretations of Plato's unwritten doctrines posited that the One limits the Dyad, as if they had a determined correlation, One: a definite direction, Dyad: formless, indefinite multiplicity. It recalls a lot intentionality and the relation between Subject and Object, I and Other. Thoughts?

bump