/lit/ - Literature

>>18816423
That would be the opossite of Platonism.

>>18816423
It's not platonic but yes. I have been annoyed recently by people referring to things like language and art as representational and symbolic. Because these are false abstractions. A door is a door and that's all there is to it. Pic related for example is objectively a pipe.

>>18817561
>Pic related for example is objectively a pipe

>>18816423
>has anybody written about linguistic or semiotic platonism
Julia Kristeva has written about "primordial"/"essentialist female" semiotics, but it's not a path you want to go down.

>>18817561
>objectively
>The pipe is imbued with purpose.

>>18817613
It clearly does not depict anything that we would say is not a pipe. By saying "this is not a pipe" the artist is saying it is in fact a pipe, because he did not say "this is not a ball" or "this is a leaf" which would make no sense in context. This is the problem when one considers art to be subjective and representational, when it is always grounded in something real and so must be objective, even if it is subjectively stylized.

>>18816423
You might find Wittgenstein's Tractatus interesting. Its central idea is the idea that a word is a template for combinatorial purposes with other words that corresponds to its referent thing in the same combinatorial pattern with which that thing relates to other things in the world.

>>18817667
>It clearly does not depict anything that we would say is not a pipe
Didn'y you notice the cursive lettering? It could resemble smoke (it's placed under the pipe though) but why would you think it also depicts a pipe?

>>18817561
I mean obviously it is yes, what else would you think?

>>18816423

>>18817561
Can you smoke with it? Could you, at any point of its history, accomplish the essential function of a pipe?
It is a representation of a pipe. That's its eidos. It is not a pipe.

>>18818206
A picture of a pipe.

>>18816423
Words and language are equally shadows of the forms as art is. Read Phaedrus if you're really interested.

>>18816423
Umm, universals are not prior to or causal of particulars. That is crazy talk.
https://www.bitchute.com/video/mhWx7Ceg4q1z/

>>18818239
You cannot smoke with the mere appearance of a pipe alone.

>>18816423
Yes! This is exactly what Frege and Husserl talked about. You need to read Frege's short paper "Sense and Reference". Husserl also talks about it in his First Logical Investigation. For Frege, when you say "a doorway", and the french says "a porte", you and he are both referring to the same object; the difference is in the in the *sense* you refer to the doorway. According to Frege, senses are ideal objects, - the meaning of words and propositions - which determine the reference of the word or proposition. Frege distinguishes between the objective sense, which exists independently of people, and the subjective idea. You and I necessarily have different ideas when we talk about the doorway (because your idea exists in your head and mine in my head), but the objective meaning is our common property which enables us to communicate. Husserl also argues for the same thing but with a slightly different terminology.

>>18818834
>For Frege, when you say "a doorway", and the french says "a porte", you and he are both referring to the same objec
That's not what OP is speaking about. He's speaking about the linguistic "door", ie a connection purely between words and symbols and not what is behind them (in this sense there would be an ideal word which represents what a door actually is in reality, not just the real commonality of a door which you're speaking about). The idea that there is something real behind words is standard Platonism. see >>18818501
See, this is what he was asking:
>" is there some kind of platonic form, not just of the concept of a doorway, but of the word used to refer to it?"
Is there a Platonically ideal "word", which there isn't. There is no ideal word used to refer to a door.

>>18818867
Actually, let me correct myself slightly. Maybe there is an ideal "symbol", but this symbol would likely be exactly the same thing as the physical door itself; so that the physical door and the linguistic symbol would be identical. In other words, Egyptian hieroglyphics or maybe Chinese characters are the most advanced and supreme language (Platonically).

>>18818867
That would make no sense. How could the syntactic word, being only a string of symbols, have a form? Only in the semantics, the interpretation of the word, we can posit the form. I wasn't aware of Plato's philosophy of language, but I'm glad that he talks about the same thing (I very much like the idea). I will take a look at Phaedrus.

>>18818244
The picture consists of multiple things, including itself and a pipe. I could ask what's in the picture of a pipe, and the answer would be a pipe.

>>18818899
>Only in the semantics, the interpretation of the word, we can posit the form.
I agree. I think you have to read between the lines a little bit with Plato, his philosophy of language isn't hugely explicit like some modern authors (I think it is scattered a little bit too throughout his dialogues, Cratylus might even be more explicit than Phaedrus). I mean to read Husserl, I'm just not sure if I'll be able to keep up with his terminology and phraseology.

>>18818930
>I think you have to read between the lines a little bit with Plato
Of course, that's what Plato wants us to do anyway, or else he would have written treatises like the other philosophers. Husserl's terminology can be confusing, as he tries to be very precise and make as many distinctions as he can, but he doesn't abuse it like Heidegger and others do. I think he is readable, but it would help if you also familiarize yourself with Brentano first.

>>18817667
Can you put tobacco into it and puff it by the fireplace?

>>18818219
I like to imagine that that is how Terry died.

>>18818926
>I could ask what's in the picture of a pipe, and the answer would be a pipe
Ask all you want, all that is present is a representation. The pipe is never there.

>>18819008
The whole world is my representation.

>>18816423
words are to physical objects what physical objects are to the forms

>>18818834
God I hope this isn't what analydwits actually think

>>18819008
but actually it is tho???

>>18818926
>>18819008
The problem you are arguing about is solved by Husserl. An expression has an ideal sense or meaning, and it also has a reference to some object; but this 'meaning' can have a range of possible fulfillment in that whether, or how accurately, it refers to an object. In the case of that pipe picture, the picture has an ideal sense or meaning (the meaning of the pipe), but it's not clear to what actual object, what pipe exactly, it precisely refers. It is only vaguely fulfilled.

>>18819047
You are thinking in the same vernacular in which you are writing. You need to drop down a level and start getting at the roots of what an image is. You can add a representation of tobacco to the representation of the pipe and you can represent it being lit and being smoking - but it is all still representative. You cannot smoke the pipe because it is never there. You can only theorize about smoking the pipe that exists in your imagination, manifested in the representation.

>>18819076
Within this paradigm, can there be a direct representation of the concept of the pipe? An artifact that embodies the entire nature of the pipe so much that one can actually smoke it?

>>18819039
I don't care about the imaginary line between analytic and continental, and I don't consider as analytic nor continental. Go read Husserl's LI §12-15 if you want to learn something, or go back to masturbating to whatever obscurantist pretender that continentals consider en vogue nowadays.

>>18818239
>Can you smoke with it?
Yes I can, if I draw myself smoking the pipe

>>18819093
But you never draw yourself - just a representation of yourself.

>>18819082
You have to be very careful in using the word 'representation' in the context of phenomenology, as Husserl rejects the Kantian distinction altogether. In phenomenology, we talk about the intentional experience (i.e. the relation of the ego with the experienced object). But if the expression refers to a precise object, then it is fulfilled, or hits the mark as Husserl says.

>>18819114
Point taken. I am out of my element at the pedantic level, though I grasp the concepts. I am only a tourist.

>>18819120
It does seem that philosophers are being pedantic when they care about being precise, but I assure you at least sometimes it's needed. The word representation for example has had so many different usages that in any conversation, people would likely have different meanings of it in mind.

>>18816423
Before asking yourself if something can be applied to something else, ask yourself what is the point and justification of doing so
In this case, there are none

>>18819135
>pedantic
I was strictly using the term denotatively - not in it's pejorative sense in the common vernacular.

>>18819146
>In this case, there are none
The rote practice of application prepares one for the eventual application towards a practical example.

>>18819152
If there is no point in the theoretical application, there is even less of a point in the practical application

>>18819158
I disagree.

>>18819163
No you don't.

>>18819082
>can there be a direct representation of the concept of the pipe?
Representation is the intentional act fulfilled by the "mental object", constitutive of its full presence to us in consciousness, specifically as something that naturally aim beyond itself at something else.
An object can be better suited than another to be a representation, you can have a better, clearer painting of the pipe. Sometimes you look at something for a while before you understand what you are supposed to be looking at. The primary qualities of the object seen do not lend themselves well to evoking the secondary qualities it is meant to evoke as a representative work.

>>18818834
Meaning and noema are not fully interchangeable. Otherwise the phenomenological content of an act would correspond fully to its propositional one, which Husserl is clear it does not (following in the footsteps of Brentano's theory that judgement is not propositional).

>is there some kind of platonic form, not just of the concept of a doorway, but of the word used to refer to it?

yes, it’s called indo-european. that’s why words like honey (outside of anglo-hick languages) carry so much power. Meli, Miel, Mel!

>>18816423
Isn't this just the difference between a "type" and "token?" One is a class of object, the other is a specific within that class. We have "book" (type) and the specific book I'm reading (token). The type exists and still there can be many tokens for the same book as different editions exist and different translations exist. Maybe I'm retarded.

Signs only point to signs and are only pointed to by signs

>>18819102
Not if you are good at drawing though