/lit/ - Literature

None.
Likewise for determinism.

>>17640318
Nietzsche, Freud, Marx, Deleuze, Foucault (except for later work), Althusser

>>17640424
Based

>>17640318
Faggoted thread dude

>>17640616
>Faggoted thread dude

No one has believed in Free will for 500 years.

>>17640616
The ashkenazi goy rat surely Faggoted the fucking foreskin right off this cocksucking garbage.

Take your forskins meds

You's loco

>>17640318
Schopenhaur does not refute free will because we are fragmented into individuals from the Nous

>>17640694
fag

>>17640424
Also Spinoza

>>17640700
Do what he wants isnt free, if you cant decide from the start what you want to do.

Spinoza (pbuh)

>>17640718
Yes this is the paradox.

It is self evident that effects are due to causes, and naturally this also applies to the decisions we make to at least some extent. This understanding actually predates conscious thought and is embedded in our instincts; even animals know to raise their young because their offspring would be helpless otherwise. We've always understood the fact that the choices we make in life are the result of previous input, and that only an adult who has had sufficient input can function properly.

Hard determinism however, is an idiotic extrapolation of what is otherwise just common sense. It takes this self evident mechanism of cause and effect, and then runs with it all the way to the absurd notion that our will doesn't actually exist, when it is in fact one of the few things that can be said to be truly our own. Think about it: all we ever can really know is subjective experience, and from that inescapable frame of reference we appear to make decisions all the time. To then conceptualize those decisions as "not ours" because the notional model we've constructed to glimpse into the noumenal realm tells us so, is fucking stupid.

There's a big difference between concluding that we are shaped by outside influences, and convincing ourselves that everything we think we decide is a lie and there is no such thing as agency. They're essentially two different ways of conceptualizing the same phenomenon, the latter of which adds nothing of substance and proposes an ontology that is literally impossible to live by.

>>17640424
Based

Behavioral Economics

>>17640788
Where does willpower come from?

>>17640788
>It is self evident that effects are due to causes
What is self evident is not necessarily what is true.

>>17640958
That's like asking why there is something instead of nothing. It's metaphysical speculation, we don't have the answer. In the mean time, we definitely up in this bitch and we can argue about whether or not our decisions are really ours and where willpower comes from until the moon grows titties, but that doesn't change the fact that we certainly do have the experience of having willpower and free will. While we can say with a great degree of certainty that our decisions are affected by all sorts of input, I really don't see the point in conceptualizing in the way hard determinists do. Like I said, the difference between soft and hard determinism largely boils down to different ways of conceptualizing the same phenomenon, one of which is retarded.

>>17640424
He said refute not give opinions

>>17641006
Don't see how you can just dismiss Nietzsche as giving opinions.

>>17640967
>What is self evident is not necessarily what is true.
Duh, that's self evident

>>17641016
Is that a joke lol?

>>17641039
>Nietzsche just said things to his fancy and gave no arguments
One of the dumbest memes of /phil/

>>17641041
Yes. Schopenhauer I could agree with, because he at least made the effort to give them (which is who Nietzsche, among others, ripped off for the more solid parts of his own). Nietzsche's philosophy is pure conjecture, pure and simple. There's virtually no reason to agree with his philosophy if you don't feel like it.

>>17641070
His books are full of arguments, not conjecture. You just have to read between the lines / aphorisms to get at most of them because he doesn't provide everything up front.

“Free” will never stood a chance

>>17641100
>dubs
It's a sign, Spinoza (PBUH) was right

Free will is just shorthand for the ability to choose, which is entirely consistent with deterministic causality. One can be determined to be presented with two or more cognitive options, one of which can then be selected. The complexity of the brain ensures that these options can be reflected on rather than immediately forced by necessity .

>>17640788
> Think about it: all we ever can really know is subjective experience, and from that inescapable frame of reference we appear to make decisions all the time
Think about it: our will is subject to our subjective experience, and is therefore never free from that frame of reference, our decisions made according to that frame of reference.

>>17641070
read BGE and come back

>>17641150
>Think about it: our will is subject to our subjective experience, and is therefore never free from that frame of reference, our decisions made according to that frame of reference.
What's your point? What meaning would free will even have outside of the context of the experience of having it? It can't be seen as independent of our subjective selves, but just because we can't measure a precise amount of free will floating somewhere in a vacuum with no one to absorb it into their subjective experience, doesn't invalidate its existence. This is precisely the problem with hard determinism, and reductionist materialism in general: to give so-called objective reality so much prevalence that it begins to see our entire lived experience as "not real" in spite of the obvious fact that it's all we have in the first place. It's like they built a model of the noumenal world and then decided the model is not just an abstraction of objective reality, but reality itself.

>>17641217
This is what I mean: that freedom is generally understood as 'the absence of restraint and an imposed authority'. Free will, then, must also be the will uncoerced by another entity. Such a will, however, does not exist, for willing itself sprouts from the presence of an end, having been precipitated by that end. Therefore, it is misnomer to ever attribute freedom to the will.

>>17640700
>>17640718
What a man wants is based on who he is, and if a man can change who he is, then he can, by proxy, change what he wants

>>17640318
I think Luther wrote a book in which he calls free will a whore.

>>17641302
>Free will, then, must also be the will uncoerced by another entity. Such a will, however, does not exist, for willing itself sprouts from the presence of an end, having been precipitated by that end.
I don't know if I understood correctly, but doesn't the will of one entity such as I, to achieve an end, chosen by me, count as free? If I'm not coerced by anyone that is

>>17641445
The will is still coerced in that case.

>>17640628
Why do we still punish criminals then?

>>17641526
Scandinavians don't

>>17641526
To avoid further crimes

>>17641526
Because we have no other choice

>>17641396
Can he change what he wants to whatever he wants though?

>>17640318
Define free will.

>>17641526
punishment doesnt stem from moral reasons

>>17641600
Define define.

>>17640628
free to will as far as your physical being lets you
but not free to will yourself into exclusive places that are guarded
unless you're stronger than them

>>17641454
This is just semantics, will always exists in the context of a subject, if will imposed by no other than the subject itself isn't classified as free, then indeed there is no "free" will, but to me that's redundant

>>17641550
Good question. All of this reminded me of
Computerphile's video on the problem with possible super AI. A super AI wouldn't want anyone to change its code for the same reason a person with kids wouldn't take a pill that makes them so that they become eternally happy if they kill their kids. Taking such a pill would be a rational decision, but a human won't take it due to their irrational feeling of love and their core values that deem life itself precious. Could a man then change himself to want to take such a pill? Seems unlikely right?

I think that it might be the case that there are some irrational urges and feelings that a human can never change, e.g. loving their kids. If that means our will isn't truly free, then I guess it is so. But I would still reject the steep argument of "everything we do is predetermined since we can't decide what we want". Because human beings can absolutely change themselves

(1) Interested in free action, we are particularly interested in actions that are performed for a reason (as opposed to 'reflex' actions or mindlessly habitual actions).

(2) When one acts for a reason, what one does is a function of how one is, mentally speaking. (It is also a function of one's height, one's strength, one's place and time, and so on. But the mental factors are crucial when moral responsibility is in question.)

(3) So if one is to be truly responsible for how one acts, one must be truly responsible for how one is, mentally speaking—at least in certain respects.

(4) But to be truly responsible for how one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, one must have brought it about that one is the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects. And it is not merely that one must have caused oneself to be the way one is, mentally speaking. One must have consciously and explicitly chosen to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, and one must have succeeded in bringing it about that one is that way.

(5) But one cannot really be said to choose, in a conscious, reasoned, fashion, to be the way one is mentally speaking, in any respect at all, unless one already exists, mentally speaking, already equipped with some principles of choice, 'P1'—preferences, values, pro-attitudes, ideals—in the light of which one chooses how to be.

(6) But then to be truly responsible, on account of having chosen to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, one must be truly responsible for one's having the principles of choice P1 in the light of which one chose how to be.

(7) But for this to be so one must have chosen P1, in a reasoned, conscious, intentional fashion.

(8) But for this, i.e. (7), to be so one must already have had some principles of choice P2, in the light of which one chose Pl.

(9) And so on. Here we are setting out on a regress that we cannot stop. True self-determination is impossible because it requires the actual completion of an infinite series of choices of principles of choice.'

(10) So true moral responsibility is impossible, because it requires true self-determination, as noted in (3).

>>17640958
God, I expect.

>>17641761
>(5) But one cannot really be said to choose, in a conscious, reasoned, fashion, to be the way one is mentally speaking, in any respect at all, unless one already exists, mentally speaking, already equipped with some principles of choice, 'P1'—preferences, values, pro-attitudes, ideals—in the light of which one chooses how to be.
This is implying a person couldn't purify themselves of society-imposed values and recreate their value system rationally. And (3) admits that one needs to be responsible for how one is, mentally speaking, at least in some respects. As in, not in absolutely all respects. It might be that even if one recreated their value system, society could have some impact on it. Does that, then, mean that you aren't responsible for how you are?

>>17641888
You are always going to be recreating your value system in light of previous inheritances. What drives you to "rationally recreate" your value system? Whence the idea of rationality? etc. But all this is really second factor contingent stuff. The point is not so much the individual against society or anything. If we were talking purely about genetics, or even an immaterial consciousness arising from a quantum flux, the argument would still be the same.

The point essentially is that any action taken is the product of a preconfigured system.

>Does that, then, mean that you aren't responsible for how you are?
Indeed.

>>17641621
If you can ask that question, you don't need someone to define define for you.

>>17641929
>You are always going to be recreating your value system in light of previous inheritances
How so? Ever heard of moral intuitionism?

>What drives you to "rationally recreate" your value system?
I don't see how this is relevant, as long as there is the option to do so

>Whence the idea of rationality?
You're right, fuck rationality. Better to use it as a tool to analyze morality, rather than to build it

>If we were talking purely about genetics, or even an immaterial consciousness arising from a quantum flux, the argument would still be the same.
This is just determinism. I'm not saying it's necessarily wrong, but that's what it is. The question is how determinism deals with the conscious subject(s) of reality

>>17642144
>moral intuitionism
That's even more subject to what I'm talking about. You don't, in any conceivable way, choose your intuitions.

>I don't see how this is relevant, as long as there is the option to do so
But you will always be acting in light of previous characteristics you already have.

>This is just determinism.
Strawson's argument isn't dependent on materialistic determinism. Even if there were indeterministic factors, like random quantum fluctuations, or just chaotic non-causal events, affecting the human will, they would still be external. We, ourselves, wouldn't have any greater amount of freedom.

>>17641976
Explain define.

>>17642221
Something that cowards, trolls, and cowardly trolls (read: dialecticians) avoid doing

>>17642229
In the other thread a frogposting baiter nicely defined seethe. So clearly your statement is wrong.

>>17642264
Asking to define a word isn't the same as asking to define define itself, we're talking about two different trolls here

>>17641006
every refutation is an opinion elevated above that which it is arguing against

>The causa sui is the best internal contradiction ever devised, a king of logical freak or outrage: but because of man's excessive pride we have come to be deeply and terribly entangled with this particular nonsense. The yearning for 'freedom of the will' in the superlative metaphysical sense that unfortunately still prevails in the minds of the half-educated, the yearning to bear complete and final responsibility for one's own actions and to relieve God, the world, one's ancestors, coincidence, society from it—this is really nothing less than being that same causa sui and, with a daring greater than Munchhausen's, dragging yourself by your hair out of the swamp of nothingness and into existence. Now, if someone can see through the cloddish simplicity of this famous concept 'free will' and eliminate it from his mind, I would then ask him to take his 'enlightenment' a step further and likewise eliminate from his head the opposite of the non-concept 'free will': I mean the 'unfree will' which amounts to a misuse of cause and effect. One should not make the mistake of concretizing 'cause' and 'effect' as do the natural scientists (and whoever else today naturalizes in their thinking...), in conformity with the prevalent mechanistic foolishness that pushes and tugs at the cause until it 'has an effect'; 'cause' and 'effect' should be used only as pure concepts, as conventional fictions for the purpose of description or communication, and not for explanation. In the 'in itself' there is nothing of 'causal associations', of 'necessity', of 'psychological constraint'; the effect does not follow 'upon the cause', no 'law' governs it. We alone are the ones who have invented causes, succession, reciprocity, relativity, coercion, number, law, freedom, reason, purpose; and if we project, if we mix this world of signs into things as if it were an 'in itself', we act once more as we have always done, that is, mythologically. The 'unfree will' is mythology: in real life it is only a matter of strong and weak wills. Whenever a thinker sniffs out coercion, necessity, obligation, pressure, constraint in any 'causal connection' or 'psychological necessity', it is almost always a symptom of where his own inadequacy lies: to feel this particular way is revealing—the person is revealing himself.

The causa sui is the best internal contradiction ever devised, a kind of logical freak or outrage: but because of man's excessive pride we have come to be deeply and terribly entangled with this particular nonsense. The yearning for 'freedom of the will' in the superlative metaphysical sense that unfortunately still prevails in the minds of the half-educated, the yearning to bear complete and final responsibility for one's own actions and to relieve God, the world, one's ancestors, coincidence, society from it—this is really nothing less than being that same causa sui and, with a daring greater than Munchhausen's, dragging yourself by your hair out of the swamp of nothingness and into existence. Now, if someone can see through the cloddish simplicity of this famous concept 'free will' and eliminate it from his mind, I would then ask him to take his 'enlightenment' a step further and likewise eliminate from his head the opposite of the non-concept 'free will': I mean the 'unfree will' which amounts to a misuse of cause and effect. One should not make the mistake of concretizing 'cause' and 'effect' as do the natural scientists (and whoever else today naturalizes in their thinking...), in conformity with the prevalent mechanistic foolishness that pushes and tugs at the cause until it 'has an effect'; 'cause' and 'effect' should be used only as pure concepts, as conventional fictions for the purpose of description or communication, and not for explanation. In the 'in itself' there is nothing of 'causal associations', of 'necessity', of 'psychological constraint'; the effect does not follow 'upon the cause', no 'law' governs it. We alone are the ones who have invented causes, succession, reciprocity, relativity, coercion, number, law, freedom, reason, purpose; and if we project, if we mix this world of signs into things as if it were an 'in itself', we act once more as we have always done, that is, mythologically. The 'unfree will' is mythology: in real life it is only a matter of strong and weak wills. Whenever a thinker sniffs out coercion, necessity, obligation, pressure, constraint in any 'causal connection' or 'psychological necessity', it is almost always a symptom of where his own inadequacy lies: to feel this particular way is revealing—the person is revealing himself.

>>17642199
>That's even more subject to what I'm talking about. You don't, in any conceivable way, choose your intuitions.
The point was that a moral system created with intuition isn't contignent on previous inheritances of morality

>But you will always be acting in light of previous characteristics you already have.
You can change the characteristics you have

>Strawson's argument isn't dependent on materialistic determinism. Even if there were indeterministic factors, like random quantum fluctuations, or just chaotic non-causal events, affecting the human will, they would still be external. We, ourselves, wouldn't have any greater amount of freedom.
The twist is that the subject can affect the reality it resides in, and therefore there is nothing "external" about the world affecting the subject in turn

>>17641526
we should be killing them since they can't change their criminal tendencies

>>17641526
Intimidation

>>17640731
>>17640706

based and monad pilled

>>17640700
Fear and love, you can want both. The world is more than a duality. These either/or situations fall apart with quantum. We can do it.

>>17642492
>The point was that a moral system created with intuition isn't contignent on previous inheritances of morality
Well it usually is, since you’re conditioned by the moral atmosphere you grew up in. Your own moral gut feelings are generally your cultures. A modern is deeply uncomfortable with slavery and pederasty, an Ancient Greek not at all. Even when we feel ourselves deeply at odds with our own cultures, we are still deeply integrated into their moral outlook - we tend to use its own moral compass against it, judge it by its own standards. That’s what Socrates was killed for. Even Sade and Stirner are just taking the dominant philosophies of the day to what they see as their logical conclusions.

>You can change the characteristics you have
Yes, but the way you change those characteristics - your reasons for doing so, the extent of your ability to do so - is determined by the characteristics you already have.

>The twist is that the subject can affect the reality it resides in
Yes, but the self-generated motion of the subject is always contingent on non-self generated characteristics and conditions

free will is not real

your psychology, your neurology, your genetics, and your environment determine what decisions you make

even the bible implies a determinist worldview
god hardened the heart of pharaoh so he would persecute the jews even more

geography basically determines what religion and values you will have

>>17644269
>free will is not real
of course a jezebelposter would come to that conclusion, being enslaved by his lust

>>17644288

implying the bible advocates for freewill

free will is a heresy made up by augustine

The answer is simple,
those who think they have free will do
those who don't, don't
please don't willingly be an npc anons

>>17644300

there are examples of god hardening people's hearts all throughout the bible(which implies there is no free even from a biblical perspective).

https://www.biblegateway.com/quicksearch/?quicksearch=hardened&version=NIV

>>17644326
NIV....

>>17640318

Free will was proven right by Luis de Molina in the 1500s

https://iep.utm.edu/middlekn/

>>17641550
only at the request of some deeper desire

>>17641526
We don't. Baby torture is legal. The only reason to have laws is for some to own slaves. Laws are completely useless beyond that.

>>17644244
>self-generated motion of the subject is always contingent on non-self generated characteristics and conditions
Not really, there is no object without the subject, they're inseparable. You can't say the subject is contingent on reality's properties, since subject itself is a necessary property of reality. Although it's not exactly like the object is contingent on the subject either.

Existance is essentially choosing to exist, since reality has to choose itself to be what it can be, out of that which it cannot be. Therefore what it can be is not truly up to a choice - despite the term "choose" - but the will of the subject to make the choice - to exist or not - is.

>>17640318
Me