/lit/ - Literature

>>16340526
>For the concept of metaphysics to exist we have to assume that something exists outside of the physical reality.
Stopped reading right there. You have no idea what metaphysics is. There is no "metaphysical realm". Almost all metaphysicians are physicalists. Here's the first paragraphs for wikipedia to get you started:

>Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that examines the fundamental nature of reality, including the relationship between mind and matter, between substance and attribute, and between potentiality and actuality. The word "metaphysics" comes from two Greek words that, together, literally mean "after or behind or among [the study of] the natural". It has been suggested that the term might have been coined by a first century AD editor who assembled various small selections of Aristotle’s works into the treatise we now know by the name Metaphysics (ta meta ta phusika, 'after the Physics?', another of Aristotle's works).

>Metaphysics studies questions related to what it is for something to exist and what types of existence there are. Metaphysics seeks to answer, in an abstract and fully general manner, the questions: What is here? What it is like? Topics of metaphysical investigation include existence, objects and their properties, space and time, cause and effect, and possibility. Metaphysics is considered one of the four main branches of philosophy, along with epistemology, logic, and ethics.

>>16340526
Your notion of metaphysics is a bit too restrictive. Not every metaphysics implies the existence of metaphysical substances: for example, a metaphysical explanandum of physical facts (i.e. a treatise on the notion of physical causality) is enough to talk about real metaphysics.

Regarding souls, are you specifically thinking about Plato? If so, check Phaedo for a description of the soul, and Timaeus to see how it interacts with the sensible world. To cut it short, the soul is properly an efficient cause, a principle of sensible self-motion, and it is trascendent insofar as this principle of self-motion determines itself through an intellegible, representational paradigm. Both these abilities are derived from its constitution: it can do these things because it is constituted by elements derived from both the realms it has access to (sensible and intellegible).
Why this must be the case, according to Plato, is to be derived from a trascendental argument (in the kantian sense), which you can find in Meno. By proving that the presence of certain representations cannot be derived from sensible perception, everything else follow. For me to have a representation of these sorts (i.e. of the concept of sameness) certain conditions of possibility (entailing the existence of non-sensible substances, and our ability to have access to them) have to be realized.

>>16340526
Nobody believes in dualism anymore, noob. Metaphysics is only defined relative to an empirical theory. For example, "QFT Metaphysics" asks: what must the world be like in order for Quantum Field Theory to be true? What primitive objects and relations are needed? Do objects occupy spacetime or are objects made up of spacetime, etc.

FYI, these are the core topics of metaphysics:

+ The Problem of Universals: Realism, Nominalism and Trope Theory
+ Concrete Particulars: Substrata, Bundles, Substances
+ Predication
+ Propositions
+ Facts, States of Affairs, and Events
+ The Necessary and the Possible: Modality and Possible Worlds
+ Causation
+ The Nature of Space, Time, and Spacetime
+ Persistence through Time: Endurantism and Perdurantism
+ Mereology: Parts and Wholes
+ Numbers and Abstract Objects

>>16340648
While substance dualism is very rare among current philosophers, property dualism is supported by lots of them (pretty much everyone who thinks that the hard problem of consciousness is really a hard problem).

>>16340526
Metaphysics tends not necessarily to refer to things existing outside of physical reality per se, but often is understood to mean things that structure or are necessary for our capacity to conceive of reality in any sense. Consider the fact that things exist; how could these exist without relying on the concept of Being/existence? For things to be, BEING itself must BE (See: Plato, Heidegger). This is a metaphysical concept. Or we can apply this more towards entities in particular. Consider the computer in front of you. For you to comprehend it, you must have an idea of what a computer is. You may say your idea of the computer derives from the computer (empiricist) (you might not, ofc (idealist)), but ultimately that idea exists metaphysically, and your perceptions derive from some entity out there which you may or may not adequately or truthfully understand. (See: Kant's Critique of Pure Reason).
Your concern about Soul, which tends to be addressed in more modern times as an issue of Consciousness has various answers. One of which is the well-known Hard Problem of Consciousness. People can tell at the very least that they are conscious, yet they cannot demonstrate or pinpoint in physical reality where our perceptions or consciousness is, not in the same way you might point out your computer. Even if we say it occurs due to certain neuroscientific concepts, still the very perception of the world that we have is something that cannot be effectively delineated via physical reality. The electrical impulses in them do not show or reveal in them the visions, sounds, textures, etc, that we perceive and experience. You're concern of the interaction between soul and body is one that plagued Descartes (see: Heterogeneity problem). Many people have argued that we shouldn't conceive of Soul and Body as necessarily separate, with the former existing irrespective of the physical realm, but as I said earlier, understood as the basis for the physical realm to make sense within.

Some things that you might want to read on these matters include Plato's Parmenides and Timaeus, Aristotle's On the Soul (De Anima), Descartes' selected Correspondence and Meditations, Locke's Essay Concerning Human Nature, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Heidegger's Being and Time. Consider also looking up in the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy topics like the Hard Problem of Consciousness, or Dualism.
God Bless.

>>16340659
>property dualism
I'm not convinced that is an intelligible position.

>>16340669
What does not convince you?

>>16340685
Ultimately there is only spacetime and its physical properties. The way we speak about things in ordinary discourse reflects our simplified conceptual schema endowed by natural selection. Folk categories like beliefs and desires are convenient for us to make behavior predictions with but don't reflect fundamental causal reality.

>>16340714
Intentionality is one of the easy problems of consciousness, though. Lots of property dualists are willing to reduce it to physicalist accounts.

>>16340727
Consciousness is just one of the activities of the brain. Why is dualism of any kind needed?

>>16340736
Because phenomenal experience cannot be explained through physical processes, insofar as the question ot physics cannot identify a mark of consciousness which could be used to answer to the question "is this body conscious?".
It cannot find said mark because every other function of ours (everything that can be observed of our bodies and behaviours) can be fully explained under a purely physicalist framework, without having to ever refer to consciousness. But we know we are conscious: hence the problem.

>>16340754
The physical processes are constitutive of what we call consciousness. Just as certain physical states of the brain constitute what we consider to be representational states like beliefs.

>>16340790
I think my comment concerning the mark of consciousness can count as an answer to your objection. What do you think about it?

>>16340799
That's sounds like an empirical question. Not seeing the relevance.

>>16340790
dogmatic assertion. consciousness is reflexive and self-convertive, bodies cannot self-convert.

>>16340868
Say what now?

>>16340892
how is an incomposite immaterial ens constituted by bodies?

>>16340907
No need for 'immaterial' things. All events are physical events.

>>16340844
The argument, if correct, entails that even a complete physicalist account of reality could not tell you wether this or that body is conscious. Basically, I'm arguing that the claim for which this is an empirical question is a category error.

>>16340989
>even a complete physicalist account of reality could not tell you wether this or that body is conscious
Why not?

>>16340998
>Because phenomenal experience cannot be explained through physical processes, insofar as the question ot physics cannot identify a mark of consciousness which could be used to answer to the question "is this body conscious?".
Important part:
>It cannot find said mark because every other function of ours (everything that can be observed of our bodies and behaviours) can be fully explained under a purely physicalist framework, without having to ever refer to consciousness. But we know we are conscious: hence the problem.

>>16340985
all physical particles are composite, either each particle will be composed by other particles which will be composed by other particles and so on ad infinitum and no thing will be a thing, no thing will be one thing, things will be infinitely (indefinitely) composed and no thing will exist (nothing will be definite, totality, a-thing).

all of your peremptory postulates don't survive through the most basic logic and goes against the evidence of consciousness's elusiveness. will you insist on your phantasies?

>>16341012
I'm still not following you. Consciousness is constituted by physical processes in the brain. We know the human brain generates consciousness, and we can test correlations between brain structures and aspects of consciousness to narrow it down further.

>>16341032
Particles don't really exist. All that exists is spacetime and the fields defined over it.

>>16341076
all of these imply a common quality: extension.

>>16341072
We cannot make any test, since we cannot be sure wether to a physical process correlates a cognitive content, nor we can find a way to establish that. Basically, again, we have no way to know wether a body is conscious or not, even if we knew everything there is to know about the physical world.

>>16341138
We know that human beings are generally conscious, do we not? Or are you adopting a hyperskeptical position?

>>16341161
>Or are you adopting a hyperskeptical position?
Pretty much. Under monist physicalism that claim is purely speculative, and it can't ever be anything more than a speculation. I think we collectively agree on that claim for practical reasons, rather than theoretical ones.

>>16341269
If you adopt a solipsistic stance, that makes dualism even less attractive. Everyone is an physical automaton, so talk of sentient properties can be dropped altogether.

>>16341076
>>16341101
>Time, which comprises past and future is, in its entirety absolutely continuous. Through this continuity, which makes duration, it stands in contrast with eternity, which is on the contrary the intemporal ''instant'' without duration, the true present of which no temporal experience is possible. Eternity is reflected in the 'now' which at any given time both separates and unites the past and the future. Even this 'now' inasmuch as it is really without duration and consequently invariable and immutable, in spite of an illusion of 'movement' due to a consciousness submitted to the conditions of time and space, is not really distinct from eternity itself, to which the whole of time is always present in the totality of its extension. One can compare the relationship between eternity and time to that between the center and circumference: all points of the circumference and all the radii are simultaneously visible from the center, without this view interfering in any way with the movements taking place on the circumference or along the radii.
>Time itself would be inconceivable without this intemporal instant that is eternity, just as space would be inconceivable without the ''non-dimensional'' point. It is clear that the one of the two terms that gives the other all its meaning is also the most real in the true sense of the word.

>The essential nature of spatial shape is definable as an assemblage of directional tendencies: at every point in a line its directional tendency is specified by a tangent, and the assemblage of all the tangents defines the shape of the line. In 3-dimensional geometry the same is true of surfaces, straight line tangents being replaced by plane tangents; it is moreover evident that the shape of all bodies, as well as that of simple geometrical figures, can be similarly defined, for the shape of a body is the shape of the surface by which its volume is delimited. The conclusion toward which all this leads could be foreseen when the situation of bodies was being discussed, namely, that it is the notion of direction that without doubt represents the real qualitative element inherent in the very nature of space, just as the notion of size represents its quantitative element; and so space that is not homogeneous, but is determined and differentiated by its directions, may be called 'qualified' space. Indeed homogeneous space has properly speaking no existence at all, being nothing more than a mere virtuality. In order that it may be measured and this means -to be effectively realized-space must necessarily be related to an assemblage of defined directions. These directions moreover present themselves to us as radii emanating from a center, which thus becomes the center of a three-dimensional cross.

>The geometrical point is quantitatively nil and does not occupy any space, though it is the principle by which space in its entirety is produced since space is but the development of its intrinsic virtualities.

>>16341347
Epiphenomenalism is a dualist position, I'm not sure its attractiveness is relevant to its truth. Also under physicalist monism people are automata too, so it shouldn't bother you that much (and if you're a compatibilist, then extending said compatibilism to an epiphenomenalist framework would be trivially easy).
I would have supported monist physicalism, if only it it were not refuted by the fact that I have a first-personal experience (as I have argued earlier).

>>16340526
Sorta like you get influenced from secondary or tertiary exposure is how we interact with it. Not directly

>>16340546
Most metaphysicians in history or even currently aren't metaphysicians. I know conties aren't physicalists

>>16340648
What? Metaphysics is defined according to its own epistemology?

>>16340662
are you all trolls? Read >>16341387

>>16341269
Physicalism doesn't deny consciousness even as an immaterial object

>>16340659
Lmao this is the funniest shit I have ever heard. Property dualism is literally "its magic i aint got to explain shit."
There are plenty of explainations for consciousness that rely only on physicalities.

>>16341410
physicalism is a terrible justification as a metaphysics

>>16341410
physicalism has too many contradictions

>>16341371
I don't subscribe to Epiphenomenalism as that would imply the existence of mental events over and above physical events. There are only physical events, and humans are indeed complex automata. The experiences that I (or anyone) experiences are ultimately physical events. I'm not seeing the problem.

>>16341421
Epiphenomenalism is straightforward physicalism.

>>16341419
Can you elaborate?

>>16341407
Pysicalism absolutely denies the existence of anything immaterial (I wouldn't use the word "object" though, since it would imply that consciousness is a substsnce, and I don't think we are warranted in claiming that).
>>16341410
It's a good thing that i have provided an actual argument for my claim. Feel free to refute it.
>>16341432
Not really, since epiphenomenalism entails ad the very least a dualist ontology. I agree with you that when it comes to practical philosophy (morality, free will, etc), their conclusions end up being extremely similar (i.e. physicalist compatibilist arguments can be easily transposed to a epiohenomenalist framework).
>>16341421
Mental events cannot be reduced to physical events, which is proven by the previous argument I've sketched earlier. I agree with you only insofar as I don't claim that mental events can have any effect on the physical world.

>>16341494
Yeah I can copy paste my argument that I saved. I have two. I want to argue this one.

If it takes a physical object to allow an immaterial object like math then how do you account for how math becomes emergent off these physical instantations? In consciousness, at some point something was not conscious and yet it has emerged in different systems of life, or at the very least will have in terms of aliens. Of course taking a physicalist approach would deny that consciousness ever existed until a conscious being happened. This predicates consciousness off that certain being which wouldn't allow consciousness to arise in different lifeforms.

>>16341529
Physicalism doesn't deny immaterial objects, materialism does. Physicalism asserts immaterial objects exist at the behest of material objects and only by them

>>16341540
I've literally never ever read any monist physicalist accepting the existence of immaterial objects. What's a physical, immaterial object?

>>16341551
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism

You know philosophical zombies? They try to use it to suggest a human isn't a human by its material makeup alone so humans must be derived from something immaterial primarily. I deny philosophical zombies, I think there are better ways to argue against it

>>16341529
>Mental events cannot be reduced to physical events
I still don't see why not. Just because a full reduction doesn't currently exist doesn't mean mental events don't supervene on physical events. By that logic, chemicals would be non-physical as there is currently no rigorous reduction of chemistry to physics.

>>16341535
None of that is true.

>>16341540
What on earth are you talking about?

>>16341575
read the wiki. The ss has it at the last two sentences

>>16341580
Multiple realizability doesn't imply immaterialism.

>>16341580
last 3*

>>16341586
just read it

>>16341565
Philosophical zombies are usually used to refute physicalism, not to support it.
>>16341568
I have argued that not only it doesn't currently exist, but that it also cannot ever exist, not even given a complete account of the physical world. Here's the argument again: >>16340754

Basically, it's a category error. It's like someone who, while knowing that they won't live forever, hopes to reach an infinity quantity by keep counting for their entire life, hoping that at some point they will finally reach infinity. You try to explain to them that they won't ever reach their goal, and they respond by saying "hey, you don't know yet. Currently I'm at 4678883, if I keep going on I might get to infinity before I die".

>>16341603
I mean that's kinda exactly what I said. Philosophical zombies refute physicalism by taking soul out and pretending a human isn't made up solely of material or nothing supervenes because of it.

I disagree because I think it's a bad argument and I've got better

>>16341603
Your 'argument' there is just an assertion that consciousness has no physical correlate, which is absurd. The correlate ("mark") is the human brain. To suggest otherwise is just hyper skepticism.

>>16341618
Any argument that relies on "philosophical zombies" can be safely discarded.

I've had physicalists try tell me the color is in the wavelength. They're invalids.

>>16341653
I agree. Now refute this: >>16341535

>>16341686
Word salad.

>>16341693
Are you not a physicalist? It's straightforward

>>16341702
You are either ESL or mentally disabled.

>>16341704
I don't see how you can't understand or try to refute it as a physicalist

>>16341647
Physicalism cannot provide any argument nor proof for which other brains are correlated to other minds.
I'll try to explain again what I mean by "mark". To prove such a correlation you need to observe consciousness (related to a body). First-personal experience (what I call consciousness) is not observable directly, so we need to observe it indirectly.
To observe it indirectly we need to find a physical phenomenon which requires consciousness for it to take place (this would the mark), as in, a phenomenon which cannot happen unless a given body is conscious. But everything that can be observed (i.e. the motion of each part of a body, and every behaviour a body might manifest as a whole) can be fully explained without reference to consciousness, by using purely physical laws. So, there is no possible physical datum we can use to justify the inference for which a body is conscious (no matter how much data we possess: in fact this would stand even if we knew everything there is to know about the physical world).

If you want to refute this "hyper skepticism", as you call it, you'll need to abandon monist physicalism.

Read Kant and then Schopenhauer.

>>16341748
How do you account for math being universally true using a physical object?

>>16341827
Computer can compute mathematical statements too, so whatever the answer to your question is, it is not exclusive to human beings.

>>16341748
I know I'm conscious, and I know other people have basically the same hardware I do, so I assume they are conscious. That's basically the move. You can call it an illegitimate inference, but it's what we all do.

>To observe it indirectly we need to find a physical phenomenon which requires consciousness for it to take place (this would the mark), as in, a phenomenon which cannot happen unless a given body is conscious. But everything that can be observed (i.e. the motion of each part of a body, and every behaviour a body might manifest as a whole) can be fully explained without reference to consciousness

I'm not understanding how this isn't merely a linguistic issue. It's like saying parades don't exist since every physical event taking place on the street can be explained without reference to 'parades'. The parade just is the collection of micro-physical activities. At the same time, there is no particular 'mark' of a parade in general.

>>16341827
Math isn't universally true. It is only true relative to a set of axioms.

>>16341843
Sure and atoms use math as well in terms of combination of their protons neutrons electrons charge etc. Im asking what physical thing we all share that allows particularly math to work universally. Also in the vacuum of space would math work there?

>>16341870
what axioms do 2 hydrogen atoms becoming 1 helium atom accept to operate correctly?

>>16341878
>atoms use math
They don't, though. You're confusing the map with the territory.

>>16341892
what do you call that ontological mapping into the territory? I call sociological math same as the ontological math.

>>16341892
The math only works because it's isomorphic to the real structure.

>>16341910
then math comes from atoms? Is it all math or just certain maths inherent in atoms?

>>16341915
You can pick arbitrary axioms for pure math but only a subset apply to our physical universe. The ontological status of physical "laws" is an open question, but they're mathematical to be sure.

>>16341535
>If it takes a physical object to allow an immaterial object like math
Why is math immaterial?
Is a video on a flash drive immaterial?
As far as I understand if math is something that happens on your brain it must be material. Even your words are material, whether as pixels on my screen or as sound waves vibrating the air.

>>16341910
Not necessarily. Physics can be done without quantifying over numbers, or otherwise requiring standard infinitary arithmetic. Geometric and other nominalistic structures are enough.

>>16341923
I saw that book, he only did it for Newtonian gravitation which may be a special case.

>>16341918
So pure math can be true without a physical process? So physicalism doesn't account for truth?

How do you determine if any math equation is false if it's anything from the subject determines truth?

>>16341921
Sure but in all conscious beings, and unconscious, like atoms or black holes forming, they must contend with the universal math rules, or you can never get two hydrogen atoms to become gold for instance

>>16341927
Others have extended it to modern physics.

>>16341948
>>16341927
If y'all are open to a good discussion, I like this argument against physicalism. It has a lot of implications and it's fun to argue but it's a bit.

To argue for a continuum we assume Being exists, or that existence exists. Starting from a smaller point, we can assume it is congruent with a larger or smaller object and by getting to a perfectly congruent aspect of the larger and smaller object then comparing that to the full aspect of the larger object then differing it by quantifying this difference, or incongruency. This creates a quantifiable continuum.
Assuming physical events are on a continuum. For instance a bit of stone is less physically consequent of reality than a mountain, planet or star, then we can measure some events as more physically prevalent. This develops a hierarchy of causation caused by physical events per physicalism.
If being physically assaulted or tortured then I would experience stronger emotions, being causated at a higher level necessarily from something physical and at a higher level. Yet it can be the privation of physical objects which cause more distress than being punched for instance.

>>16341878
You would have to ask a computer engineer for that, I'm not well versed in computational science. If instead your question is: how is it possible that computation can give as a result universal and true propositions, that's more of a question for philosophy of math (comcerning the debate of platonism vs formalism).
>>16341843
>That's basically the move. You can call it an illegitimate inference, but it's what we all do.
Theoretically speaking, yes, I think this is an illegitimate inference. That said, in another post I've also claimed that that inference can make sense from a practical standpoint (as in, even if it is not true, we might have some reasons to act as if it is).
I'm not sure how the parade example is analogous, considering that it is an arbitrary concept based on stipulation. I can easily accept an ontology in which parades are just conventional names, I cannot do the same for my own consciousness. Basically, this is a whole other debate (concerning the existence of universals).

>>16341918
As far as I can tell, the only math that strictly "applies to our universe" is geometry. Reality is not discrete, so arithmetic and numbers are not needed.

>>16341960
Sorry, meant to respond to this for the second paragraph:>>16341856

>>16341960
idk wth you read as I only asked how is it universally operable and you claimed atoms so I asked what in atoms allowed it.

>>16341936
I don't really agree with physicalism, was just responding to that one point.
>>16341965
Quanta are discrete.

>>16341965
that's fine but how do you deal with geometry being universal despite being a physicalist

>>16341975
I'm not the guy who talked about atoms, in fact I thought I was responding to him

>>16341982
then just the last question

>>16341986
Sure that's fine different person said math comes from atoms by implication but I'm asking how they are universally computible as a physicalist

>>16341990
Rephrase it.

>>16342010
If math is foundation of the physical laws (or the universe) how can you check whether a math equation is true or not?

>>16341982
The world under Quantum Mechanics is continuous. Quanta only arise at the level of observation.

>>16341984
Geometry is nominalistic. It simply describes concrete physical structures and does not require the existence of abstracta like numbers.

>>16342051
How do you account for two hydrogen atoms becoming one helium atom everywhere in the universe?

>>16342004
I have no idea frankly, since this is an empirical question rather than a philosophical one, which is why i have suggested that someone well versed in computational science could explain to us how complex systems can compute mathematical statements. Since computers can already compute mathematical theorems, the scientific theory behind it should already be available, I just don't know much about it.
Btw I'm not the physicalist guy either, I'm the epiphenomenalist one

>>16342097
there were 4 monologues stating physicalism is primordial and now I can't find one.

I'm not asking for you to compute it. I'm asking what axiom allows math to be universally =?
If epiphenominalism doesn't imply physicalism then ig ignore it but i thought it did imply it just it said the mind can't influence the physical but it is inherent from it

>>16342017
If it conforms to the rules of the formal system and can be deduced from its axioms, I guess the operations and relations that allow the construction of formal systems are even more basic structures that could follow from the physical.

>>16342136
There's a lot of guessing for your metaphysics.
So you think math isn't fundamental but you don't know what is? You also assume math is formal but is there any math system you can make up and have it still running?

>>16342114
I'm not sure that the universality of math implies the presence of a mind in what computes a mathematical statement, unless by mind you mean the embodied mind (what computes), in that case I agree with you. If it did, this would lead to quite weird conclusions, such as the one for which rudimentary computers are conscious, or even panpsychism, if we attribute the ability of computing mathematical contents to the most basic elements of the physical world.
I do agree that it might be a problem for monist physicalism though, since the answer to this question might imply the existence of mathematical object. I'm open to that option (epiphenomenalism does not tie me to dualism, pluralism can still be an option), but I'm not willing to defend it, since to do so I would have to go way out of my depth.

>>16342235
I just want a half decent debate and I'm going crazy seeing terrible sayings and debates on Facebook, discord and to a lesser degree 4chan

>>16342235
Physics doesn't require the existence of mathematical objects like numbers. Geometry suffices, and geometry is reducible to nominalistic relations of part to whole.

http://www.nyu.edu/projects/dorr/papers/CalculusAsGeometry.pdf

>>16343082
That's not the point, the point is that we can still think about math

>>16341354

>>16341535
First sentence invalidates it all. Math is not an object it is a process

>>16341748
This argument says we need to prove dualism to prpve materialism. Of something required consciousness as a component "piece" that does something that would make it dualistic you absolute mong.