/lit/ - Literature

>>15982680
>Why not just let go of moral responsibility but still act exactly the same as we do now (e.g. put people in jail for crimes) but give reasons other than moral responsibility? We could, for instance, say that criminals should be jailed because they make others' lives worse, without saying anything about morality.
What if we have good reason to think that the criminal will never commit a crime again? Seems to me they should still be imprisoned, so that particular rationale won't work.

More generally, there's a worry that without the notion of moral responsibility you'll never be able to recover our sense that criminals *deserve* to be punished for what they've done, which is at the core of our conception of justice. Instrumentalist morality won't be able to capture this.

It's idiotic. You can quite happily talk about higher level phenomena like freedom, laws, thoughts, intent, and so on while accepting some kind of materialism. I don't understand this reductive autism. You can say the higher level social phenomena supervene ultimately on atomic level interactions, but that does not mean that there is no social ontology, and that all phenomena are simply reducible to atoms. Crimes are only possible in relation to others. A man in the mountains can't commit a crime against himself, so criminality and morality are social phenomena that are only intelligible with respect to the social.

The big problem with determinism is that it implies the annihilation of the subject altogether, in which case there is no "human action" being determined. If you accept subjecthood as an irreducible, but higher phenomena, that is defined in the realm of the social then any argument about deterministic atoms is entirely irrelevant to questions of crime, freedom, intent, and so on.

On the one hand you can accept the existence of the subject as an irreducible phenomenon, in which case atomic determinism does not challenge the social. On the other hand, you can deny the subject, insodoing deny any ontology of the social, in which case you don't have humans, or even objects, just matter comprised of fundamental particles (which are totally not objects guys!). But doing the latter simply dissolves every philosophical or scientific question in its own absurdity, and does not pose a challenge to human social constructs of justice, will, law, and so on, since in that case there is no thing being determined.

>>15982680
>Over 60% of philosophers believe we have free will.
That's a whole lot of cope.

>>15983904
Being an materialist eliminativist and still holding on to moralistic supserstitions is retardedand dishonest, It's like hyporcite scientisst who keep quiet when xtians talk about souls and resurrection nonsense. Either all is matter or nothing, there can be no dualism.

>>15983915
They're probably right. People build free will up into this scary metaphysical thing when really it's a pretty prosaic ability, not that different from being able to walk, drive, juggle, solve an equation, whatever.

>>15984013
If you eliminate all objects, then what are fundamental particles? If they are infinitely small then mass and matter itself is impossible. What is the factitude of matter, what is the materiality of matter? prime-matter can't be explained itself in relation to matter.

If you eliminate higher level phenomena and objects you also eliminate the foundation of matter and so of elimination itself. Eliminativism just ignores this point, and spends its days smugly and glibly dismissing philosophical problems without realising the fundamental contradiction in doing so.

If you're predetermined to commit crime then I'm predetermined to stop you anyway, what's the point?

>>15984279
Huh ? Eliminmativism is not about emlimination of objects or particles.
It's about the abandoning of folk pschology, that is, assigning any reality to mental constructs like motives, intentionality etc.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminative_materialism#:~:text=Eliminative%20materialism%20(also%20called%20eliminativism,in%20the%20philosophy%20of%20mind.

I think it’s compatibalism.

>>15982680
>It seems they are having their cake and eating it too. It's like they are saying 'yes determinism is true but I'm still going to hold you morally accountable for your actions'.
Conversely, herd determinists say "no, we don't have any control over your actions, therefore you shouldn't do the thing you've already been predetermined to do or believe the things you've been predetermined to believe; instead, you should do and believe all the right things"

>>15984555
>herd determinists
I meant "hard determinists" of course, but "herd" works just as well

>>15983757
You can just make the purpose of prison and punishment to be prevention. By punishing criminals you prevent others from committing crimes. You can operate under the presumption of free will without actually committing to it metaphysically.

Agree with this guy here >>15983904

>>15984555
>>15984577
Wrong way to think about it. Hard determinists can still go about their day as though they have a choice. It means embracing the illusion. Instead the compatibilists contradict themselves by denying the illusion even though it makes no ontological difference.

>>15982680
You're basically making the case that anyone who wants to can commit murder, cross it off their bucket list and make the case that it won't happen again and go free. The threat of consequences is what's important.

>>15984714
>Hard determinists can still go about their day as though they have a choice.
That doesn't make it not-hypocritical to say with one breath that people don't have any say in what they do and therefore moral agency is bunk, and then in the next breath use the language of moral agency to tell people that our lack of moral agency means we should act a certain way.
If there is no choice, then there is no "should", there is only "will". In telling people that they "should" do something, you implicitly accept that they have a choice—that they have free will.
>It means embracing the illusion. Instead the compatibilists contradict themselves by denying the illusion even though it makes no ontological difference.
This is all very vague. What "illusion" is it exactly that is being denied? And what is it that makes no ontological difference? Is it the illusion itself, or the question of whether or not the illusion is denied?

>>15982680
>'yes determinism is true but I'm still going to hold you morally accountable for your actions'
What makes you think determinism precludes the possibility of moral responsibility?

>>15984378
Who the fuck published my rap sheet?

>>15984685
This doesn't recover our judgement that murderers and rapists should be punished even in special cases where their being punished won't deter others. Moreover, it risks committing us to punishing the innocent when doing so will prevent further crime (as in the case of the angry mob who is convinced that an innocent man committed some heinous crime and will go on a murderous spree if the man is not lynched to sate their bloodlust). Again, this is morally unacceptable, so these justifications of punishment seem impotent when they can't appeal to moral responsibility and cognate notions like desert and justice.

>>15984761
>>15984899
>>15985059
Maybe I'm not making my point clear. Take the statement 'Fred committed a murder so we should execute him'. This is an ordinary language statement which implies both moral responsibility and normative beliefs about how we judge moral actions. Since I believe in determinism and not free will, I can translate this statement to: 'Fred committed a murder, and even though I do not hold him accountable for his actions, I will fight to have him executed anyway because I don't like his actions'. If Bill suffers from a brain tumour that makes him commit a murder, I can excuse his actions even though he is just as blameworthy as Fred above. In other words, I operate under my normal intuitions while denying free will in fundamental agency. In the same way as a biologist my say that the human is nothing but a way for the DNA to replicate itself, but still treat people compassionately.

Show me where my contradiction is.

>>15985591
>Take the statement 'Fred committed a murder so we should execute him'...I can translate this statement to: 'Fred committed a murder, and even though I do not hold him accountable for his actions, I will fight to have him executed anyway because I don't like his actions'.
This is not a good translation. People like/dislike plenty of actions that they consider immoral/moral.

>>15982680
>Over 60% of philosophers
There are no more philsophers alive retard stop shilling academia here

>>15985666
Oh look, another underachieving kantbot groupie

>>15985717
Fuck off bugman

>>15985772
More of a BAP guy, aye. We cool then

>>15982680
I don't understand how free will is still a thing

>>15983757
First sentence doesn't make sense
Second: Maybe because criminals don't deserve to be punish. Also we can redefine justice to be something that seeks hapiness to all.

>>15983904
I didn't understand half the shit you said but even accepting that we're all one we can keep playing the game of the individuals with help outside of it to the ones that break the rules.

>>15984042
You are using a different definition.

>>15984378
>>15984555
You don't know what you are predetermined to do in the future, only in the past. You can change, we can evolve.

>>15984761
Yeah, that's a problem. It shouldn't be a big change but incremental changes with psychological treatment, reduction of sentences and an increase of them if the criminal doesn't change.

>>15984899
When you "decide" to do something you shouldn't do it expecting to change the future but expecting that the future is already good

>>15985949
kys

>>15985949
>You are using a different definition.
He's using THE definition. Once you get past all the faulty metaphysical assumptions and contradictory arguments behind incompatibilism, and once you take the time to familiarize yourself with the nature of the will through meditation, you come to realize that "free will" cannot mean "freedom from determinism," because free will is SELF-determinism. It is simply the act of making decisions for yourself—something all normal human beings are capable of and which everyone practices to varying degrees.
>You don't know what you are predetermined to do in the future, only in the past. You can change, we can evolve.
>When you "decide" to do something you shouldn't do it expecting to change the future but expecting that the future is already good
What you're saying is "we should act as if we have free will even though we don't." That's intellectual dishonesty no matter how you slice it. Also self-contradictory because, again, if there is no choice then there is no "should".
If you can't help but behave as if X were true, then the only intellectually honest choice is to believe that X is true.

>>15986111
I don't understand how do you think something can escape causality o randomness. And I think we should act utilitarian.
Understand "decide" like proccesing and coming to a conclusion. Idk where do you understand that I'm saying that we should act as it were real. I think we should act utalitarian and if you enjoy the illusion fine, but if someone is suffering because of it we should be able to help them.

>>15985949
>First sentence doesn't make sense
Makes sense to me..

>>15986111
>self-determination
Have you heard Galen Strawson's argument? Essentially, the 'basic argument' is that to be responsible for your actions, you need to be responsible for your desires, disposition etc. and in turn, to be responsible for that would entail creating yourself. If you accept you as you are, then the definition of free will is weakened, since a crazed person is still free.

Both determinism and indeterminism have no effect on the incoherence of free will, but indeterminism is especially bad because it implies that our actions might as well be random because their effects are.

>>15985949
>Maybe because criminals don't deserve to be punish.

Lol yeah cool man child rapists definitely don't deserve to be punished totally bro. This is not a serious position.

>Also we can redefine justice to be something that seeks hapiness to all.

Ok yeah maybe you can redefine the word, but I was using the word with its ACTUAL meaning. Ya know, like a normal person? And given what justice ACTUALLY is, your utilitarian enjoinders are unjust.

>>15986111
A sane person on /lit/. Refreshing.

>>15986567
Okay, keep it if you want, it's a useless word then

>>15986355
>I don't understand how do you think something can escape causality o randomness.
I don't, but causality doesn't conflict with ffree will. In fact, it is only by causality that I am able to make meaningful choices.
>And I think we should act utilitarian.
You still haven't addressed my point that, if there is no choice, then there is no "should", there is only "will" or "will not".
>>15986561
>Essentially, the 'basic argument' is that to be responsible for your actions, you need to be responsible for your desires, disposition etc. and in turn, to be responsible for that would entail creating yourself.Yes I've heard of it, and I don't believe that degree of responsibility is necessary for free will. For an action to be freely willed, all that is needed is that you be the originator of the intent to perform that action.
Yes, free will in the superlative sense of being absolutely free from any form of causality is incoherent, but that's precisely the reason why that can't be the correct definition of free will; because it doesn't describe any sort of freedom at all. Only compatibilist definitions of free will describe meaningful forms of freedom.

>>15987287
Allow me to elaborate on my thoughts in regards to defining of "free will".
"Free will" is at its core a phrase used to refer to a certain feeling, that being the feeling that we are the origin of the decision to do X rather than Y. Over time, and due to a bunch of metaphysical assumptions held by our society, a lot of unnecessary baggage has been attached to that simple concept so that it's blown up and transformed into the notion that "free will" means being ocmpletely and aboslutely responsible for everything you ever have done or will do. "Free will" in this superlative sense absolutely does not exist, you're correct, but this doesn't change the fact that the underlying feeling behind the essential concept of "free will", buried as it is under layers upon layers of nonsense, still points to one very important sense in which we are responsible for our decisions: that we are (often) the ones who originate the intent to do X rather than Y. You might argue that that decision was predetermined at the time of the big bang, but it is still we who are responsible for bringing that decision from potentiality into actuality, and therefore we are responsible for it.

>>15987287
>You still haven't addressed my point that, if there is no choice, then there is no "should", there is only "will" or "will not".
Ok, then "i recommend and hope that we act utilitarian"

>>15984279
Everything is just a field over spacetime. There are no discrete 'objects'.

>>15984555
To hard determinists, the question of what one "should" do is academic. You will always do exactly what the laws of physics force you to do.

>>15984685
You're talking as if we have a choice. We don't.

>>15983915
they believe in 'compatibilist' free will, which is a gigantic fucking meme of word games

>>15985591
Deliberating about what to do is pointless given that the outcome has already been determined.

>Over 60% of philosophers believe we have free will.
Less than 40% of philosophers are right about free will. Sad.

It's interesting to me that some proponents of determinism seem to think the justice system is exempt from their determinism; and then, ironically enough, they want the application of will to change that system.

>>15988883
it's descriptive. you can point out what sorts of things humans think are moral issues and how they think about them

>>15982680
Indeterminism doesn’t save free will. It leads to randomness, not responsibility.

Anyway, here is Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument against free will:

>(1) Interested in free action, we are particularly interested in actions that are performed for a reason (as opposed to 'reflex' actions or mindlessly habitual actions).

>(2) When one acts for a reason, what one does is a function of how one is, mentally speaking. (It is also a function of one's height, one's strength, one's place and time, and so on. But the mental factors are crucial when moral responsibility is in question.)

>(3) So if one is to be truly responsible for how one acts, one must be truly responsible for how one is, mentally speaking—at least in certain respects.

>(4) But to be truly responsible for how one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, one must have brought it about that one is the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects. And it is not merely that one must have caused oneself to be the way one is, mentally speaking. One must have consciously and explicitly chosen to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, and one must have succeeded in bringing it about that one is that way.

>(5) But one cannot really be said to choose, in a conscious, reasoned, fashion, to be the way one is mentally speaking, in any respect at all, unless one already exists, mentally speaking, already equipped with some principles of choice, 'P1'—preferences, values, pro-attitudes, ideals—in the light of which one chooses how to be.

>(6) But then to be truly responsible, on account of having chosen to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, one must be truly responsible for one's having the principles of choice P1 in the light of which one chose how to be.

>(7) But for this to be so one must have chosen P1, in a reasoned, conscious, intentional fashion.

>(8) But for this, i.e. (7), to be so one must already have had some principles of choice P2, in the light of which one chose Pl.

>(9) And so on. Here we are setting out on a regress that we cannot stop. True self-determination is impossible because it requires the actual completion of an infinite series of choices of principles of choice.'

>(10) So true moral responsibility is impossible, because it requires true self-determination, as noted in (3).

>>15988968
>This may seem contrived, but essentially the same argument can be given in a more natural form. (1) It is undeniable that one is the way one is, initially, as a result of heredity and early experience, and it is undeniable that these are things for which one cannot be held to be in any way responsible (morally or otherwise). (2) One cannot at any later stage of life hope to accede to true moral responsibility for the way one is by trying to change the way one already is as a result of heredity and previous experience. For (3) both the particular way in which one is moved to try to change oneself, and the degree of one's success in one's attempt at change, will be determined by how one already is as a result of heredity and previous experience. And (4) any further changes that one can bring about only after one has brought about certain initial changes will in turn be determined, via the initial changes, by heredity and previous experience. (5) This may not be the whole story, for it may be that some changes in the way one is are traceable not to heredity and experience but to the influence of indeterministic or random factors. But it is absurd to suppose that indeterministic or random factors, for which one is ex hypothesi in no way responsible, can in themselves contribute in any way to one's being truly morally responsible for how one is.

>>15986111
>you come to realize that "free will" cannot mean "freedom from determinism," because free will is SELF-determinism
You are confused. Free will conflicts with *physical* determinism, not determinism in some generalized sense. What free will conflicts with specifically is causal closure of the physical -- the idea that every cause is a physical cause.

>>15988920
But if you think that the future is going to be good because of the conversation that you're going to have about how to make it good, then you proceed to have it

>>15988981
>both the particular way in which one is moved to try to change oneself, and the degree of one's success in one's attempt at change, will be determined by how one already is as a result of heredity and previous experience.

says who?

>>15988920
The deliberation is itself part of the outcome unfolding

>>15989049
What else will they be determined by? Grace, perhaps? Well, that doesn’t help either.

>>15988968
Why do people keep talking about "moral responsibility" in discussions of free will? Moral responsibility is obviously a spook. That's the easy part. The more interesting question concerns the coherence of practical reasoning in a world in which all causes are physical.

>>15989082
the will. (3) is just an assertion of external determination as if we were observing at a remove some physical process we've already subsumed under a general law. it's wrong if anyone ever was not an overgrown lab rat.

>>15989071
When we deliberate, we act as if the future is not already fixed.

>>15989359
yes and that is still part of the outcome unfolding, that deliberation 'as if the future were not fixed'.

>>15982680
I you're "locked" into a deterministic mechanism then everything inside of that world seems non-deterministic as seen from the inside. So "free will" is a question of perspective, there's free will on the inside but these individuals still act deterministic in relation to the mechanism.

>>15989385
It's noteworthy that we engage in a process with irrational and false presuppositions, and call it rationality.

>>15986111
>It is simply the act of making decisions for yourself
Doesn't happen.

>>15987287
>free will in the superlative sense of being absolutely free from any form of causality is incoherent
Then you concede, because that's what's being discussed.

The whole free will/determinism debate is completely pointless.

On an introspective level, every single person can point to the fact that they are making decisions. I decided to type this post. Any anon who replies decided to reply; any anon who reads it and doesn't decided not to.

>But it's an illusion! You haven't decided anything!

No, you faggot, I obviously did. "Deciding" is just the name we give to the mental operation that makes the human act in a way or another. The mental operation obviously fucking happened, regardless of whether it was moved by my genes, the chemicals in my brain or my supernatural soul.

Could I have decided otherwise?

Metaphysically, no. Having decided between going to the toilet instead of shitting in my pants, there is no reality in which I type this with my underwear covered in shit. Having decided X, there is no world in which I decided Y. In fact, there could never have been a world in which I had decided Y.

This is an ontological issue. I'm an entity with a certain identity and ontology, which means that I also act as an entity with a certain identity and ontology. and I can't act in a different way. And this entity I am is the totality of me - my biological being, my inclinations, my personality, my experiences etc.

So the decision happened, but it was always going to happen anyway. Does it mean I'm not "free"? But what would "free" mean, in this case? Mastery over the rules of ontology?

So this is my issue with the free will debate. It defines freedom as essentially godhood. It's untenable. There is the fact that we make decisions. It's enough to, among other things, attribute moral responsibility.

>>15991067
I don't think what we're actually doing is that irrational since our deliberating about it does impact the outcome, being part of the causal web. That's why we evolved to deliberate about stuff.

>>15991221
To continue, because I forgot to add this: I'm not saying we're automatons. An automaton acts in a certain way because of a mechanism that is not itself. We, on the other hand, act as we do because of what WE are. There are no gears or strings moving us. We are the gears and the strings as well as the machine and the puppet.

>>15991221
The question boils down to whether non-physical causes exist. Specifically, non-physical mental causes. If everything is physical, then mental states are just classes of physical states, and there can be no free will. Free will requires that the mind creates its own ultimate causes that break the chain of physical cause-and-effect at the point of 'decision' or 'intention'.

>>15991251
Or maybe it just means that the Humean understanding of causality is not sufficient to account for the act of decision.

There is nothing inherently materialism x anti-materialism in the free will debate.

Consider this: if souls exist, then souls also have a particular identity and thus are bound to a specific ontology (that is, they act in a certain way and not in another). Which is to say there is nothing to keep us from arguing that, even if there is a mystical ghost in the machine, since this ghost also necessarily is bound to certain ontological rules, that the ghost's decisions aren't mechanistic either. So we are back at where we started.

>>15991227
I understand that. But that process requires assuming what we know to be false -- that the future is not fixed -- pretending as if we were free. I just find it interesting that this fictitious role-playing that we engage in is constitutive of the very concept of practical rationality.

>>15991275
Now let's frame it in terms of Aristotelian causality. The free will debate reveals itself to be fundamentally about what is the efficient cause of a human's actions/decisions.

The freedom-ist is going to say: the efficient cause is the self.

The determinist is going to say: the efficient cause is something alien to the self.

But what is the self that is causing this decision? Or what are the limits of the self so the determinist can say that something external to it is the efficient cause of the action?

>>15991275
>There is nothing inherently materialism x anti-materialism in the free will debate.
No, I think the free will debate can only be understood in terms of physical vs nonphysical causes.

>Which is to say there is nothing to keep us from arguing that, even if there is a mystical ghost in the machine, since this ghost also necessarily is bound to certain ontological rules
What rules would those be? The point is that the free will proponent needs room for physically uncaused mental events to act as causes of physical events, and such a possibility does not exist in a purely material world, where every cause is physical.

>>15991296
No, that doesn't get to the difference since the determinist is happy to accept that the efficient cause is "the self". He just regards the self as a complex physical system.

>>15991221
If you ever think you've solved a problem of philosophy, it means you probably haven't read any counter arguments to your idea.

>>15986814
Useless for utilitarian retards != useless for thinking people

>>15984279
That's not how eliminative materialism works you fucking retard. Jesus, some of you are so confident about stuff you know nothing about.

>>15988968
>(3) So if one is to be truly responsible for how one acts, one must be truly responsible for how one is, mentally speaking—at least in certain respects.

This seems false. When I choose to catch a ball that someone has thrown, my choice is a function of that person throwing the ball in the first place, yet I am responsible for catching the ball despite not being responsible for their throw.

>>15992153
>This seems false.

That's because it is false. As is incompatibilism

>>15982680
Hey can someone ITT edit this picture in from of the wall in the meme image??

>>15991301
>No, I think the free will debate can only be understood in terms of physical vs nonphysical causes.

I disagree and think the problems of free will would continue even if the supernatural soul were an universally accepted concept. Indeed, it's been discussed even by Christian philosophers who most definitely believed in supernatural souls.

>What rules would those be?

Any particular set of rules doesn't matter. It only matters that there ARE rules, because everything is subject to the rules of its ontology. That is, the soul is going to act in a specific way (because it is a specific thing). So when this hypothetical soul propels the body to act in a way, was it really "free" when the soul was just acting according to the rules that govern its being?

>>15991322
If a person says that an action's efficient cause is the self, then I can't classify him as anything other than a proponent of free will. A determinist could argue that the material cause of a man's actions is the self, but never the efficient cause.

It is different from, say, a robot. The efficient cause of a robot's actions are not itself, but the programming put into it by something outside of itself.

The objection that this is not free will because the self is a complex physical system is akin to saying: "the self is not free because, due to having an ontology X, it is bound to the rules of ontology X."

But then this falls into the problem delineated here: >>15991221. That is, that the criteria for characterizing freedom becomes unreasonable and is essentially demanding godhood, the liberation from all ontological rules.

Don't know if it is related, but would a utalitarian materialistic empiricist adopt idealism or dualism as a world view if statistics showed him that people with such views are happier?

>>15992404
No.

if reductionist determinism is true how is consciousness unified as one?

>>15989037
>Free will conflicts with *physical* determinism
Not necessarily, it depends on one's body-mind ontology.
>>15991085
Who or what makes your decisions for you, then?
>>15991110
That's a very superficial take on what's being discussed. Without engaging with the question of the proper definition of "free will", how can you be sure the thing you're arguing about is what actually constitutes free will?
>>15991335
Then how about you offer one? I've been making roughly the same arguments as him for a couple years in various places and have yet to be offered a real counterargument.

Schopenhauer solved this 200 years ago. Look up "intelligible character" and "empirical character".